James Buchanan's contributions to social and economic thought: Citation counts,self-assessment,and peer review

This paper demonstrates James Buchanan's impact on socio-economic thought through citation analysis of his published works, a discussion of Buchanan's own views of what his work means and is, and summary discussions of the assessments of other scholars. Thus the central themes of his work are illuminated as well. These themes include a deep distrust of government interference in the economy and in the personal lives of members of the polity, and his absolute conviction that collective decisionmaking should take place only within the framework of a contractual agreement, the fundamental principles of which have been derived through near unanimity.     

Thinking Things Through: The Value and Limitations of James Buchanan's Public Choice Theory

Abstract

James Buchanan, one of the founders of Public Choice theory, applies the conceptual apparatus of economics to the public domain. This article investigates which assumptions are crucial to Buchanan's project, concentrating on methodological individualism and the Homo Economicus model. It shows that Buchanan from time to time moves away from these economic concepts, though only in minor ways. The article also focuses on Buchanan's normative emphasis on the role of institutions in coordinating self-interested individual actions in mutually beneficial ways. Criticizing Buchanan's analysis, the article argues that a broader view of the individual and of the role of institutions is necessary in a theory of constitutional choice.     

Cultivating constructive discourse over economics and public policy

This paper addresses the demand for a pluralistic methodological approach to the science of economics. In responding to Robert Garnett’s artful criticism of an earlier statement of mine, I agree with him that understanding one’s intellectual opponent’s framework leads to greater scientific advancement than simply dismissing it entirely. Being able to see and appreciate the perspectives of others is an important scholarly virtue to cultivate. Competition amongst and challenges of competing ideas is what spurs innovation in economic science. So, strongly held positions are to be expected and, in fact, encouraged, but as Garnett persuasively argues, the process of scientific progress is more likely to lead to advancement if the process is Smithian rather than the Mandevillean approach my earlier statement seemed to imply.     

Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility

This paper explores the feasibility and desirability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). We identify CSR with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads. Using a model with profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that there is a direct parallel between CSR and traditional models of private provision of public goods. Indeed, firms that use CSR will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary contribution equilibrium for public goods. We compare CSR with government provision and charitable provision, discussing when CSR by private for-profit firms could have a comparative advantage in dealing with public goods provision.     

Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan

James Buchanan advocated the market mechanism for allocating resources because it is based on voluntary exchange. People engage in market transactions only when they believe they benefit from doing so. Buchanan depicted the political process the same way. People engage in collective activities to accomplish together ends that they would be unable to accomplish individually, or through bilateral exchange. Buchanan’s vision of politics as exchange is a normative framework for evaluating the rules within which political activity takes place. Rules that meet the criterion of agreement are desirable constitutional rules, and Buchanan recognized that not all government activity satisfies that criterion. Buchanan is the father of the subdiscipline of constitutional political economy, and his “politics as exchange” approach provides the foundation for much work in that area. Buchanan has created a foundation that is rich in ideas, but leaves behind a number of unanswered questions that point the way toward a further development of the research program in constitutional political economy.     

Regulation and administered contracts revisited: Lessons from transaction-cost economics for public utility regulation

This article reexamines the administered contracts approach to regulation in light of recent empirical research that establishes the importance of transaction-costs in the organizational choice and design decisions. After reviewing the fundamentals of transaction cost reasoning and the franchise bidding-versus-regulation debate, the study surveys the empirical literature on franchise bidding, contracting, and vertical integration. The implications of transaction-cost theories for current policies toward pubic utility regulation and deregulation are also addressed.We would like to thank Michael Crew, Victor Goldberg, Mark Lowry, Claude Menard, and Roger Sherman for helpful comments.     

The three Is of public schools: irrelevant inputs,insufficient resources and inefficiency

We examine the educational production function and efficiency of public school districts in Illinois. Using non-parametric kernel methods, we find that most traditional schooling inputs are irrelevant in determining test scores (even in a very general setting). Property tax caps are the only relevant factor that is related to districts’ financial constraints and have predominantly negative associations with test scores. Therefore, insufficient resources may be partially responsible for the lack of growth in test scores. For most other relevant inputs, we find substantial heterogeneity in the returns, which helps reconcile some of the puzzling results in the literature. We further find that there exist inefficiencies in school districts. Moreover, the level of test scores, commonly used as a measure of school effectiveness, (while related) differs substantially from our efficiency scores, and standard parametric approaches drastically underestimate school efficiency. We discuss the policy implications of our results.     

Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives

Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional economic incentives and social preferences may be either complements or substitutes, explicit incentives crowding in or crowding out social preferences. We investigate the design of optimal incentives to contribute to a public good under these effects would make either more or less use of explicit incentives, by comparison to a naive planner who assumes they are absent.     

Drugs: Drugs, economics and policy

There is no necessary link between drug consumption, addiction and social disintegration. Empirical evidence suggests that a considerable share of the population has consumed illegal drugs during some period of their lives. A substantial proportion of drug users have a job and home. Many 'mature out' of drug consumption in their thirties. Most drug users are normal consumers responding systematically to relative prices.
After the failure of a repressive drugs policy, Switzerland allows cities to pursue a 'third way' between repression and liberalization. The state allows carefully screened heavy addicts to inject heroin at a nominal price, while at the same time raising the cost to potential entrants. The 'experiment' has produced encouraging results. The health of heroin users has improved and crime has been reduced. A homogenized drugs policy in the European Union would probably disallow such promising programmes.     

Structural break,nonlinearity and asymmetry: a re-examination of PPP proposition

In this study, we examine the validity of the PPP proposition for 28 European countries. For this purpose, we propose a new unit root test procedure that allows for both gradual structural breaks and asymmetric nonlinear adjustment towards the equilibrium level. Small-sample properties of the new tests are examined through Monte-Carlo simulations. The simulation results suggest that the new tests have satisfactory size and power properties. We then apply these new tests along with other unit root tests to examine stationarity properties of real exchange rate series of the sample countries. Our tests reject the null of unit root in more cases when compared to alternative tests. Overall, we find that the PPP proposition holds in majority of the European countries examined in this article.     

The economics of university computer provision: a case study in public production and cost

Is the provision of computer services in British universities provided efficiently? The pattern of expenditure in the last twenty years is explored and a study is made of current spending across universities. Variations in unit computing costs and the output of computing expreience is studied for British universities using conventional cost and production function estimation. In addition the three-demensional production surface for the output of computer provision is estimated using distance weighted techniques. This case study has more general applicability to other areas of public production and cost.     

Reforming the local public sector: economics and politics in privatization of water and solid waste

Several empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local privatization. We examine the influence of transaction costs and political factors on local governments’ choices through new variables. We consider two relevant services accounting for different amounts of transaction costs: water and solid waste delivery. Our results show that privatization is less common for water, which has higher transaction costs. Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling party privatize more often regardless of the ideological orientation of the constituency. Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation may be a suitable organizational form for some municipalities.