Cores of combined games

This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing different coalitional games when bargaining over multiple independent issues. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components.     

Alfred Marshall's Mecca: Reconciling the Theories of Value and Development*

The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolutionary nature and content of Marshall's theory of value and the relation it bears to his theory of growth and development. In Marshall's work the two theories are inextricably linked, and the subsequent attempt to separate them has not only marginalised Marshall's rich analysis but also made it impossible to appreciate the role he gave to innovation, and its corollary the growth of knowledge and organisation, in the workings of a market economy. At its core is the relation between the growth of firms and the growth of markets, but this is not steady‐state growth theory; rather, it is the different, mutually determined and ever changing growth rates of different groups of firms that is at the centre of attention. Quite how variation is linked to progress is the central topic of this essay, and the elucidation of its central role necessarily means that we must resurrect the representative firm. We conclude that Marshall was correct in stating that ‘the tendency to variation is a chief source of progress’ (Principles, V, 4, p. 355). We develop a set of evolutionary tools to show how and why this is so. But evolution is more than variation; it requires the organisation of firms and the market process to generate that correlation between differential knowledge and economic advance. Most importantly of all, the concept of a representative firm is re‐established as an indispensable element in a Marshallian evolutionary analysis.     

Agents of change

Evolutionary accounts in economics have offered a new look at economic development. Advancing on the limited cognitive capacities, they have shown that structural change follows technological, institutional and ideological paths. The present examination suggests an add-on to this cognitive portrayal of change. Drawing on Schumpeter’s theory of innovation and Adam Smith’s theory of knowledge, it analyzes human motives as important drivers of development. It brings in the dynamic nature of human motives and particularly discusses the human will as a requirement of change.     

Children as Economic Agents

A generational perspective recognizes that children have preferences which may differ systematically from those of adults, and, furthermore, that a children's standpoint should be recognized by scholars and activists and incorporated into policy targeted at children and their families. Economics has not considered children as agents because of their lack of power relative to adults. The implications of recognizing children's agency are explored for the case of children's paid and unpaid labor force and household work.     

Contracting With Wealth-Constrained Agents

We examine how a project owner optimally selects a project operator and motivates him to deliver an essential noncontractible input (e.g., effort) when potential operators are privately informed about their limited wealth. Truthful revelation of wealth is induced by promising a higher probability of operation and, if necessary, a greater share of realized profit the larger the nonrefundable bond that a potential operator posts. The project owner benefits when total wealth is widely dispersed among potential operators. Under plausible conditions, limited knowledge of wealth is not constraining for the project owner.     

Cores,aggressiveness and the breakdown of cooperation in economic games

The paper develops the use of the core as a solution concept in game theory in two interrelated directions. In the first place, an indicator of aggressiveness of claims is introduced in a modified definition of the core. The modified core may be smaller than the usual core, and may fail to exist if aggressiveness increases beyond some critical level. In the second place the article gives a formulation of a mixed cooperative/non-cooperative game, in which the game will be played cooperatively within coalitions, but non-cooperatively as between coalitions. A mixed cooperative/non-cooperative solution obtains if the grand coalition of all players fail to materialize because the various claims are incompatible. The two directions referred to are interrelated because the level of aggressiveness may be decisive for whether or not the grand coalition, and possibly other coalitions, will break down. The final section of the paper draws some general conclusions and relates the approach to other ideas in the literature.     

The Demand for Australian Rules Football*

Declining attendances at Australian Rules football games organized by the VFL recently have become the focus of much concern. An econometric analysis of the demand for football is presented, using annual average attendance data for the years 1950–86. It is found that increases in admission prices had a significant negative effect on demand, and increases in real income a positive impact. Amongst other variables of importance in explaining demand are lagged attendance and uncertainty of outcome. Elasticities of demand are calculated and it is shown how they might be used to predict attendance under different pricing scenarios.     

Economic Policy Challenges for Sustained Growth*

This paper presents the views of the Prime Minister (as at March 1985) on some of the major economic challenges facing Australia and some of the policy soptions his government proposes to pursue in order to maintain the economic recovery without a resurgence of inflation and to improve Australia's long-term growth performance.     

Strategies for Modelling Nonlinear Time-Series Relationships*

Building models of nonlinear relationships are inherently more difficult than linear ones There are more possibilities, many more parameters and thus more mistakes can be made. It is suggested that a strategy be applied when attempting such modelling involving testing for linearity, considering just a few model types of parsimonious form and then performing post-sample evaluation of the resulting models compared to a linear one. The strategy proposed is a ‘simple-to-general’ one and the application of a heteroskedasticity correction is not recommended     

Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents

In standard contract-theoretic models, the underlying assumption is that agent types differ in their preference or cost parameters, and the principal's objective is to design contracts in order to screen this type. We study a contract-theoretic model in which the heterogeneity among agent types is of a "cognitive" nature. In our model, the agent has dynamically inconsistent preferences. Agent types differ only in their degree of "sophistication", that is, their ability to forecast the change in their future tastes. We fully characterize the menu of contracts which the principal offers in order to screen the agent's sophistication. The menu does not exclude any type: it provides a perfect commitment device for relatively sophisticated types, and "exploitative" contracts which involve speculation with relatively naive types. More naive types are more heavily exploited and generate a greater profit for the principal. Our results allow us to interpret real-life contractual arrangements in a variety of industries.     

Finite additive utility representations for preferences over menus

I characterize a finite additive utility representation for preferences over menus. The numbers of both positive and negative components in this representation are expressed explicitly in terms of preference. These expressions can be used to characterize models of temptation, perfectionism, context effects, and other phenomena.     

Inter‐Jurisdictional Competition for Firms*

Regions inhabited with an immobile population of disabled and able individuals compete to attract mobile firms that provide jobs. The redistributive goal of regional governments is to support the disabled, who cannot work. Able individuals may work, be involuntary unemployed because of frictions in the labor market, or choose to be voluntary unemployed. Labor force participation decisions depend on regional redistributive policies. Both the size of workforce and tax on firms affect profits and therefore, firms’ location decisions. Allowing regions to engage in tax competition may be efficient. If regions cannot tax firms, they compete by implementing inefficient redistributive policies.     

Priors from General Equilibrium Models for VARS*

This article uses a simple New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model as a prior for a vector autoregression, and shows that the resulting model is competitive with standard benchmarks in terms of forecasting, and can be used for policy analysis.     

Problems and Prospects for the UK Economy*

Spokesmen for Ms Thatcher's government have repeatedly stated that the British economy was 'the sick man of Europe' in the years before 1979; a policy of demand management in pursuit of full employment had brought only temporary relief, whereas her government's firm policy aimed at a long-term cure. This article considers how far this diagnosis was correct, what the new policies were, how the economy has fared in the light of these policies and the development of North Sea oil and why things turned out that way. It concludes with a brief assessment of future prospects.     

Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments

We explore by purely experimental means a heterogeneous agents scenario in experimental public goods games, assuming the existence of at least three types of player: free riders, cooperators, and reciprocators. We identify the various types by means of four classification methods, and then play the public goods game with homogeneous groups. We observe that (eq1) the average contribution level is enhanced in this setting; (2) the decay phenomenon is replicated in groups of pure free riders, whereas in groups of cooperative and reciprocating players the contribution is high and fairly stable throughout the game.The experiments reported in this paper were financed by the Cognitive Science Laboratory and the Computational and Experimental Economics Laboratory of the University of Trento. We would like to thank Marco Tecilla, Macrina Marchesin and Dino Parisi for their help in running the experiments, and Luigi Mittone, director of CEEL, for letting us use the laboratorys resources. Paul Webley, Robert Moir, seminar participants at the Universities of Pisa and Trento, Charles Holt and two anonymous referees provided very useful comments on a previous draft.     

Non-Dummy Agents in Pure Exchange Economies

We introduce a very fundamental and important axiom of the non-dummy. This states that each agent can change the outcome of the mechanism at some preference profile, thus guaranteeing every agent the minimum right to affect the social decision. We study the possibility of strategy-proof, efficient and non-dummy mechanisms in pure exchange economies. We provide two new interesting classes of such mechanisms. The results shed light on the structure of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms, and should promote a complete characterization of those mechanisms in pure exchange economies with three or more agents.