Is the multinational firm in danger?: The threat of nationalism

A ground swell of nationalism in foreign countries may mean the end of the multinational firm; steps to accommodate to public sentiment in the host country offer only temporary relief, and the proposed. “supranational” corporation would still be considered an outsider. A new form of international business activity must evolve. One possibility is a management contract, whereby the Western firm supplies management skills and technical knowledge without the equity participation and direct control that have been the essence of traditional foreign investment. This device would remove the principal objection of host countries to direct investment from abroad—foreign ownership of local industry—and the foreign firm would benefit from some revenue—better than eviction.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,CREDIBLE POLICY: The Role of Risk Sharing

This article constructs a model of international joint ventures with risk sharing as the main motivation. A foreign firm decides whether to undertake full ownership foreign direct investment, or to form a public-private joint venture with the host country government in an economy in transition. In our framework uncertain taxation is the source of risk. It is demonstrated that start-up investment cost sharing by the host country government encourages foreign investment. Joint financing of investment can act as insurance for the multinational firm because cost sharing serves as a means to sustain the credibility of government policy.     

Reevaluating the role of trade agreements: Does investment globalization make the WTO obsolete?

International ownership alters the role of multilateral trade institutions by redefining pecuniary externalities among countries. Regardless of the underlying cause - whether foreign direct investment, international portfolio diversification, cross-country mergers, or multinational firms — international ownership can mitigate incentives that lead large countries to set inefficiently high tariffs. At the same time, however, foreign ownership introduces the potential for expropriation by investment-host countries, which can extract rent from foreign owners by manipulating local prices. The basic principle of reciprocity continues to serve as an important guide to efficiency, though its application must account for the pattern of international ownership in addition to traditional measures of market access.     

Who is afraid of political risk? Multinational firms and their choice of capital structure

This paper investigates how multinational firms choose the capital structure of their foreign affiliates in response to political risk. We focus on two choice variables, the leverage and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate, and we distinguish different types of political risk, such as expropriation, unreliable intellectual property rights and confiscatory taxation. In our theoretical analysis we find that, as political risk increases, the ownership share tends to decrease, whereas leverage can both increase or decrease, depending on the type of political risk. Using the Microdatabase Direct Investment of the Deutsche Bundesbank, we find supportive evidence for these different effects.     

Who is afraid of political risk? Multinational firms and their choice of capital structure

This paper investigates how multinational firms choose the capital structure of their foreign affiliates in response to political risk. We focus on two choice variables, the leverage and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate, and we distinguish different types of political risk, such as expropriation, unreliable intellectual property rights and confiscatory taxation. In our theoretical analysis we find that, as political risk increases, the ownership share tends to decrease, whereas leverage can both increase or decrease, depending on the type of political risk. Using the Microdatabase Direct Investment of the Deutsche Bundesbank, we find supportive evidence for these different effects.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Training in the Host Country: The Tariff-Jumping Argument Revisited

We analyze the direct investment versus export decision of a multinational firm in competition with a potential entrant in a host country. We consider a workers' skills asymmetry between the host and the multinational home countries. We also give the multinational the possibility to train all (or a part of) the hired workers when investing. We show that an improvement in the workers' skills in the host country does not systematically increase the multinational incentive to invest. We also demonstrate that the tariff-jumping investment can improve the welfare of the host country even if it excludes the local firm from the market.     

Governance mechanisms, investment opportunity set and SMEs cash holdings

This study analyses the effect of firm characteristics and governance mechanisms on cash holdings for a sample of UK SMEs. The results show that UK SMEs with greater cash flow volatility and institutional investors hold more cash; whereas levered and dividend paying SMEs with non-executive ownership hold less cash. We also find that ownership structure is significant only in explaining the cash holdings for firms with high growth investment opportunities, and leverage is only significant in explaining the cash held by firms with low growth investment opportunities. Our findings suggest that internal governance mechanisms are more effective for SMEs with high growth investment opportunities, while external governance mechanisms, such as capital market monitoring, are more effective for firms with low growth investment opportunities.     

Outward foreign direct investment and green innovation in Chinese multinational companies

This paper investigates the reverse green innovation spillovers of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in Chinese multinational companies and how environmental regulation stringency in host countries moderates the relationship between OFDI and green innovation. The empirical analysis is based on an integrated dataset of publicly listed firms from 2008 to 2018. The findings demonstrate a significantly positive relationship between OFDI and the green innovation performance of multinational companies. It is also shown that environmental regulation stringency in host countries positively moderates the relationship between OFDI and green innovation. Further analysis reveals the variation of the findings across multinational companies in host countries at different development stages, with different ownership and in industries with different pollution intensities. The observations in this paper imply that the institutional environment of investment destinations matters for reverse technology spillovers, particularly reverse green technology spillovers from OFDI.     

Ownership structures of norwegian foreign subsidiaries in manufacturing

This article explores how Norwegian multinational companies select ownership structures for their foreign manufacturing subsidiaries. Hypotheses are drawn from various theoretical perspectives on the choice of wholly owned versus partly owned affiliates. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 174 foreign direct investments made by Norwegian companies. One main finding is that political risk of the host country strongly increases the probability that ownership of a foreign subsidiary is shared. The results also suggest that cultural distance between the home and the host countries leads to a higher propensity to joint venture. Other results were less conclusive and little support was found for a transaction coast approach to choice of ownership structures.     

Hedging with mismatched currencies

This article presents a model of a risk-averse multinational firm facing risk exposure to a foreign currency cash flow. Forward markets do not exist between the firm's own currency and the foreign currency, but do exist for a third currency. Because a triangular parity condition holds among these three currencies, the available forward markets, albeit incomplete, provide a useful avenue for the firm to indirectly hedge against its foreign exchange rate risk exposure. This article offers analytical insights into the optimal cross-hedging strategies of the firm. In particular, the results show that separate unbiasedness of the forward markets does not necessarily imply a perfect full hedge that eliminates the entire foreign exchange rate risk exposure of the firm. The optimal cross-hedging strategies depend largely on the firm's marginal utility function and on the correlation of the random spot exchange rates. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 19:859–875, 1999     

Equity-based entry modes of emerging country multinationals: Lessons from Turkey

Based on a sample of 522 foreign affiliates of Turkish multinational enterprises (MNEs) with varying levels of Turkish equity ownership, this study provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of equity-based entry mode strategies in host country markets. A number of hypotheses are developed to examine the impact of institutional, transaction specific and firm level variables on Turkish MNEs’ choice of equity ownership mode in their foreign affiliates. The results reveal that institutional variables are important in explaining the equity composition of foreign affiliates of Turkish MNEs. Particularly important in determining equity ownership mode were found to be political constraints, linguistic distance, knowledge infrastructure and the extent of parent diversity. Results concerning the influences of the size of the affiliate are contrary to expectations and contradict the findings of previous research. No support was found for the impact of cultural distance on the equity ownership mode of Turkish MNEs in their foreign affiliates. Apart from political constraints, equity ownership choice and its underlying determinants do not vary between emerging and developed host country markets.     

The moderating effect of bilateral investment treaty stringency on the relationship between political instability and subsidiary ownership choice

We investigate whether the degree to which a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) protects against expropriation (i.e., its “stringency”) influences the international strategy of multinational enterprises (MNEs) as they invest in countries with varying levels of political instability. We draw on institutional logic and insights from political economics to hypothesize that BIT stringency will moderate the established positive relationship between host country political instability and minority ownership. Analysis of a sample of 289 foreign investments made by AEX-listed Dutch MNEs in 34 countries between 2004 and 2013 provides support: a more stringent BIT will encourage the MNE to choose a majority stake as political instability rises. Robustness tests provide further support for our argument. The results have both managerial and policy implications relating to the role that BIT stringency plays in determining MNE strategy.     

The impact of inward FDI on local companies’ labour productivity: evidence from the Italian case

The article aims to investigate the impact of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) occurring through acquisition upon the local target company’ performance, as measured by labour productivity. It relies upon the idea that multinational enterprises (MNEs) act as a device to transfer firm‐specific proprietary assets, thus causing their subsidiaries to exhibit better performance than their host country rivals. Specifically, our results show that foreign acquisitions generally increase the local target companies’ labour productivity in the medium term after the acquisition. The empirical evidence refers to foreign acquisitions that occurred in Italy in the period 1994–1997.     

Direction of outward FDI of EMNEs: Evidence from the Indian pharmaceutical sector

This article seeks to add to the small but growing literature of emerging‐market multinational enterprises (EMNEs). Using two linked large firm‐level databases, it seeks to explore the determinants of outward investment of Indian pharmaceutical companies, distinguishing between developed‐ versus developing‐country destinations. It specifically examines the impact of two firm‐level characteristics that embody “non‐OLI” [ownership, location, and internalization] firm‐specific capabilities of EMNEs. The finding of this study is that family firms are keen on investing in other developing countries but much less so in developed countries. However, international linkages in the form of foreign investors offset this. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Internationalization and breaking the glass ceiling: An institutional perspective

Gender diversity continues to serve as a thought-provoking and challenging topic for society and business alike. Even as organizations implement policies to minimize discriminatory practices in the workplace, evidence of gender inequality in firms around the world persists. Drawing on institutional theory, this study focuses on the effect that foreign investors and host country corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies have on gender diversity, and how professional groups can moderate this relationship. In analyzing 608 observations from listed firms in Taiwan, the findings demonstrate these relationships. It is shown that both foreign investor ownership and good host country CSR in firms are positively linked to the promotion of women into managerial positions. The assurance of professional groups in home countries further enhances this positive relationship. Our results further indicate how institutions carried across borders by organizations can influence firm decisions such as gender diversity through global norms of corporate CSR and also by the assurance of professional groups in the home multinational firm.     

Expropriation and direct investment

The paper considers a model in which private foreign investors make direct long-lived capital investments in a small developing country that is subject to stochastic shocks to production. Depending upon the preferences of the host country, we find that expropriation can occur because of either 'desperation or ‘opportunism’. We show that under reasonable assumptions increased investment makes expropriation less likely to occur, and that the level of investment chosen by atomistic foreign investors may be non-optimal.     

The impact of firm strategy and foreign ownership on executive bonus compensation in Japanese firms

Building on information-processing perspectives and the Japanese contextual factors, this study investigates the relationships between firm strategy and executive bonus pay as well as the moderating role of foreign ownership on the strategy-compensation relationship in Japanese firms. We focus on R&D investment and product diversification as strategy variables and investigate their direct effects on executive bonus pay. Further, we examine the moderating effects of foreign ownership on the strategy-pay sensitivity. The results, based on a sample of the 148 largest industrial firms in Japan for the 1990-1997 period, show that both R&D investment and product diversification are positively related to executive bonus pay. Our findings also indicate that foreign ownership negatively moderates the relationships between the strategy variables and executive compensation, suggesting that foreign investors play an active monitoring role, reducing cash bonus payments when their invested firms choose to increase R&D or pursue diversification strategy.     

Host country risk and foreign ownership strategy: Meta-analysis and theory on the moderating role of home country institutions

Empirical evidence for the relationship between host country risk and a firm’s ownership level in its foreign entry strategy is inconclusive. We revisit this relationship by integrating the internalisation logic with an institution-based view to examine the moderating effects of formal and informal institutions in the home country. By meta-analysing 64 empirical studies involving 52,229 ownership decisions on foreign market entry, this study gives support to theoretical arguments that the focal relationship is positively moderated by institutional constraints on policymakers and risk-taking tendencies in the home country but is negatively moderated by the joint effect of these two institutional factors. These findings shed new light on the literature of host country risk and foreign ownership strategy. Besides describing the implications of the findings for theory and practice, we discuss the agenda for future theory development in international business.     

Economic slowdowns,hazard rates and foreign ownership

This paper evaluates the link between foreign ownership and firm exit during crises, using a longitudinal micro dataset over an 18-year period. We address two main questions: first, if foreign affiliates have different failure rates than domestic firms during economic downturns, and second if the foreignness effect differs between two different economic downturns. The results partially confirm the liability of foreignness argument, suggesting that when the crisis was more pronounced at home than abroad, the differences in hazard rates between foreign and domestic firms reduce. The footloose argument is also only partially confirmed. For policy makers, our results on survival dynamics during crises are not against policies stimulating inward investment. There is no need to fear that foreign firms destabilize more than usual the host economy during economic slowdowns by immediately closing down operations.     

INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION,INVESTMENT AND BORROWING WITH EXCHANGE RATE RISK AND FUTURES MARKETS

In this paper we consider a multinational firm under exchange rate and interest rate risks in a multiperiod model. We analyze the impact of exchange rate uncertainty and the use of currency futures on the risk-averse firm's decisions about home and foreign production. Without any hedging markets exchange rate risk lowers foreign investment and output. However, when futures markets exist, the separation property holds. Introducing another source of uncertainty, such as the interest rate, which is nondiversifiable, affects the production in both countries, i.e., the separation property does not hold. However, we show that the adverse effect of the missing financial market (to hedge against this additional risk) disappears when international borrowing is available.