Do private equity owners increase risk of financial distress and bankruptcy?

In this study, we investigate financial distress risks of European companies around the buyout event in the period between 2000 and 2008. In addition, we analyze whether buyout companies go bankrupt more often than comparable non-buyout companies. Our results suggest that private equity investors select companies which are less financially distressed than comparable non-buyout companies and that the distress risk increases after the buyout. Despite this increase, private equity-backed companies do not suffer from higher bankruptcy rates than comparable non-buyout companies. In fact, when companies are backed by experienced private equity funds, their bankruptcy rates are even lower. These findings indicate that experienced investors are better able to manage distress risks than their inexperienced counterparts.     

USING NEURAL NETS TO COMBINE INFORMATION SETS IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY PREDICTION

We demonstrate that the use of a neural network (NN) model to combine information from corporate financial statements and equity markets provides improved predictive estimates of the probability of corporate bankruptcy. Using performance measures, based on the receiver operating characteristic curve, the forecast combinations from the NN models are demonstrated to outperform the forecasts derived from a forecast combination generated using a logistic regression approach. This result provides support for the use of forecast combinations generated from NN models in the estimation of corporate bankruptcy probabilities as it outperforms the standard approach of forming a hybrid forecasting model which includes all the explanatory variables. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO incentives and earnings prediction

This study investigates whether information about Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives is useful for predicting future earnings. We find that in companies with higher CEO equity incentives, current year earnings are more informative of future earnings than in other companies. Additionally, in an earnings prediction setting, CEO incentives are shown to provide information about future earnings that is incremental to current earnings or earnings components. The predictive power of CEO incentives for future earnings is robust to the inclusion of other predictors of future earnings. Furthermore, we find that CEO incentives are predictive of “real” future earnings, as represented by operating cash flow and non-discretionary accruals, but not predictive of future discretionary accruals. Finally, we find that financial analysts do not incorporate information about CEO incentives when they forecast future earnings. This result suggests that incorporating CEO incentives can potentially improve analyst forecasts of future earnings.     

Bankruptcy as an Auction Process: Lessons from Sweden

The traditional U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy process in which financial claims are renegotiated under court protection and the firm continues to operate under existing management has long been criticized by economists as an inefficient way of dealing with financially distressed companies. In this paper, the authors make the case for a mandatory auction bankruptcy system of the kind now used in Sweden—one that requires all companies filing for Chapter 11 to be sold in open auctions soon after the filing. After discussing the notable features of and differences between the U.S. and Swedish bankruptcy systems, the authors summarize recent research (much of it their own) on the benefits and possible drawbacks of the Swedish system. Among the most notable findings of this research, there is no evidence that mandatory bankruptcy auctions in Sweden lead to “fire‐sale” discounts in auction premiums. Moreover, the fact that three‐quarters of the Swedish companies that filed for bankruptcy survived as going concerns should allay concerns that an auction system will produce excessive liquidations. At the same time, the post‐bankruptcy operating profitability of the companies that emerge from Swedish auctions as going concerns tends to be on a par with that of their (non‐bankrupt) industry peers. Such post‐operating performance, when combined with a 75% rate of reorganization (versus liquidation), suggests that allowing auction investors—instead of the bankruptcy court—decide which companies survive and how they get capitalized and restructured has been quite effective in accomplishing the two aims of a bankruptcy system: (1) preserving intact all economically viable enterprises while (2) eliminating the excess capacity that results from prolonging the existence of companies that are never expected to earn high enough returns on capital to attract private investment. Consistent with these findings, the U.S. in recent years has seen a sharp increase in the use of auctions in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, though on a voluntary rather than a mandatory basis. Such a change reflects the growing recognition of the role of auction processes in reducing bankruptcy costs and preserving going‐concern values as U.S. capital market participants push harder for private workouts, “prepackaged” Chapter 11 filings, and auction sales in Chapter 11.     

Dynamic capital structure and the contingent capital option

The financial crisis has emphasized the difficulties for financial companies to raise funds through conventional liabilities. In this environment, hybrid securities are becoming popular. In this paper we study the optimal capital structure of a company issuing a particular type of hybrid security: perpetual contingent capital, i.e., debt that converts into equity under some conditions. A two-period model with endogenous bankruptcy for a company with equity, straight debt and contingent capital is analyzed. We investigate the instrument under different conversion rules: automatic or optimally chosen by equity holders. We show that contingent capital reduces the coupon of straight debt and expected bankruptcy costs but can require a high spread. A trigger imposed by the regulatory authority in terms of par value of debt may induce a little use of contingent capital with an increase of bankruptcy costs.     

OPERATING LEVERAGE AND UNDERINVESTMENT

Using a contingent claims model, we examine the impacts of both operating leverage and financial leverage on a firm's investment decisions in the context of capacity expansion. Our model shows that quasi‐fixed operating costs could significantly mitigate the underinvestment problem for debt‐financed firms. The existing debt induces equity holders to delay equity‐financed expansion because the expanded earnings base will also benefit the debt holders by lowering the bankruptcy risk. The operating costs decrease this type of wealth transfer from equity holders to debt holders by magnifying the bankruptcy risk of the existing debt upon investment. By applying the Cox proportional hazard model on a large sample of publicly traded U.S. firms over 1966–2016, we offer empirical support for the theoretical predictions. The results are robust to various measures of operating leverage.     

The effect of personal bankruptcy exemptions on investment in home equity

Homestead exemptions to personal bankruptcy allow households to retain their home equity up to a limit determined at the state level. Households that may experience bankruptcy thus have an incentive to bias their portfolios toward home equity. Using US household data for the period 1996–2006, we find that household demand for real estate is relatively high if the marginal investment in home equity is covered by the exemption. The home equity bias is more pronounced for younger and less healthy households that face more financial uncertainty and therefore have a higher ex ante probability of bankruptcy. These results suggest that homestead exemptions have an important bearing on the portfolio allocations of US households and the extent to which they insure against bad shocks.     

The Predicament of Bank Creditors in Chinese Bankruptcy and the Way Out

Although Chinese banks are the major creditors for companies in China, their role in bankruptcy is often neglected. Even if this may be justified in the past, as banks did not assume an important role, it is not the case now as banks have become more proactive in the bankruptcy procedure and begin to conduct debt‐for‐equity swaps under the initiative of the government. This article considers the role of Chinese banks in bankruptcy both in and out of formal bankruptcy procedure. It argues that based on the reality of the country, especially its corporate governance structure, bank intervention is feasible for corporate rescues in China. The debt‐for‐equity swap scheme could be the start. Copyright © 2018 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluating the information in the federal reserve stress tests

We present evidence that the Federal Reserve stress tests produce information about both the stress-tested bank holding companies and the overall state of the banking industry. Our evidence goes beyond a standard event study, which cannot differentiate between small abnormal returns and large, but opposite-signed, abnormal stock returns. We find that stress test disclosures are associated with significantly higher absolute abnormal returns, as well as higher abnormal trading volume. More levered and riskier holding companies seem to be more affected by the stress test information. We find no evidence that stress test disclosures have reduced the production of private information. After disclosure begins, stress tested firms attract equity analysts without changing analysts’ forecast dispersions or their mean forecast error.     

Have ‘European’ and US GAAP measures of income and equity converged under IFRS? Evidence from European companies listed in the US

The EU's adoption of IFRS, combined with the SEC's removal of the US GAAP reconciliation requirement for non‐US registrants reporting under IFRS, signifies a major shift towards the acceptance of global standards. Based on 20‐F reconciliations provided by the population of US listed European companies filing IFRS‐based statements with the SEC in 2005, we examine whether ‘European’ and US GAAP measures of income and equity converged under IFRS. We find that during the period immediately preceding IFRS, for our sample companies, European and US GAAP measures are generally comparable in respect of income and equity. However, as an exception to the latter, we find that UK GAAP yielded significantly lower measures of equity than US GAAP For companies adopting IFRS for the first time in 2005, we find a significant gap between IFRS and US GAAP measures of income, thereby, signifying de facto divergence from US GAAP in regard to income determination. Furthermore, we find that, following IFRS adoption, significant differences with US GAAP equity persisted for companies that previously reported using UK GAAP. Our findings, thus, support critics’ claims that standard‐setters, most notably the IASB and FASB, have more work to do to achieve a sufficient degree of convergence between IFRS and US GAAP that will convince the SEC to require US companies to use IFRS.     

Coming Through in a Crisis: How Chapter 11 and the Debt Restructuring Industry Are Helping to Revive the U.S. Economy

During the recent financial crisis, U.S. bankruptcy courts and debt restructuring practitioners were faced with the largest wave of corporate defaults and bankruptcies in history. In 2008 and 2009, $1.8 trillion worth of public company assets entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection—almost 20 times the amount during the prior two years. And the portfolio companies of U.S. private equity firms faced a towering wall of debt that, many observers predicted, was about to wipe out most of the industry. But far from the death of private equity or a severe contraction of corporate America, the past three years have seen an astonishingly rapid working off of U.S. corporate debt overhang, allowing corporate profits and values to rebound with remarkable speed and vigor. And as the author of this article argues, corporate America's recovery from the recent financial crisis provides a clear demonstration of the importance of U.S. bankruptcy laws and restructuring practices in maintaining the competitiveness of U.S. companies and the long‐run growth of the U.S. economy.     

A new method for measuring CEO overconfidence: Evidence from acquisitions

This study proposes a new direct method of measuring managerial overconfidence using an acquisition setting. CEOs with significantly higher synergies forecast error (SFE), measured as the deviation between acquisition forecasted operating synergies and actual realized operating synergies, are more likely to exhibit traits of overconfidence. In support of this view, we find that synergies forecast error is positively related to takeover premium and negatively related to acquirer returns. Additionally, validation tests confirm that high SFE firms conduct more diversifying acquisitions. Reflecting, as well, the ex-ante power of the overconfidence measure in other settings, high SFE firms have a positive relation with capital expenditures, leverage, and innovation, and negative relation with equity issues.     

A horse race of models and estimation methods for predicting bankruptcy

We use a comprehensive set of performance metrics to analyze the improvement in the classification power and prediction accuracy of various bankruptcy prediction models after adding governance variables and/or varying the estimation method used. In a sample covering bankruptcies of U.S. public firms in the period 2000 to 2015, we find that the addition of governance variables significantly improves the performance of all bankruptcy prediction models. We also find that the additional explanatory power provided by governance measures improves the further the firm is from bankruptcy, which suggests that governance variables may provide earlier and more accurate warning of the firm's bankruptcy potential. Our findings show that the performance of any bankruptcy prediction model is significantly affected by the estimation method used. We find that regardless of the bankruptcy model, hazard analysis provides the best classification and out-of-sample forecast accuracy among the parametric methods. Furthermore, non-parametric methods such as neural networks, data envelopment analysis or classification and regression trees appear to provide comparable and sometimes superior classification accuracy to hazard analysis. Lastly, we use the dynamic panel generalized methods of moments model to address concerns raised in prior studies about the susceptibility of similar studies to endogeneity issues and find that our findings continue to hold.     

Distressed Debt Restructuring in the Presence of Credit Default Swaps

The availability of credit insurance via credit default swaps has been closely associated with the emergence of empty creditors. We empirically investigate this issue by looking at the debt restructurings (distressed exchanges and bankruptcy filings) of rated, nonfinancial U.S. companies over the period January 2007–June 2011. Using different proxies for the existence of insured creditors, we do not find evidence that the access to credit insurance favors bankruptcy over a debt workout. However, we document higher recovery prices following a distressed exchange in firms where empty creditors are more likely to emerge.     

Post-Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Performance: Avoiding Chapter 22

Despite the long experience in the U.S. with restructuring companies in bankruptcy, there remains a persistent tendency for companies to emerge from Chapter 11 with too much debt and too little profitability. In this article, the author uses a variant of his well-known "Z-Score" bankruptcy prediction model to assess the future viability of companies when emerging from bankruptcy, including the likelihood that they will file again—a surprisingly common phenomenon that is now referred to as "Chapter 22."
The author reports that those companies that filed second bankruptcy petitions were both significantly less profitable and more highly leveraged than those that emerged and continued as going concerns. Indeed, the average financial profile and bond rating equivalent for the "Chapter 22" companies on emerging from their first bankruptcies were not much better than those of companies in default.
The authors findings also suggest that a credible corporate distress prediction model could be used as an independent, unbiased method for assessing the future viability of proposed reorganization plans. Another potential application of the model is by the creditors of the "old" company when assessing the investment value of the new package of securities, including new equity, offered in the plan.     

上市公司财务状况分类研究

如何对众多上市公司的财务状况进行合理分类 ,判别公司的财务处境 ,进而指导公司的财务行为 ,对于公司财务政策的制定具有重要意义。本文突破以往文献将企业财务状况仅仅基于“好”与“坏”标准进行简单分类、即财务困境企业和非财务困境企业的界限 ,在理论上首次将公司的财务状况分为五类 ,即财务闲置、财务充盈、财务均衡、财务困境和财务破产。实证研究表明 ,我国上市公司确存在五种财务状况 ,支持理论假设 ,进一步 ,我们发现 ,中国上市公司普遍存在财务状况不佳的现象 ,隐性财务破产的上市公司多于证券市场上实际披露的数目。     

Reporting Discretion and the Choice of Fresh Start Values in Companies Emerging from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

Using a sample of seventy-two firms that adopted fresh start reporting upon their emergence from Chapter 11 bankruptcy, I test whether management estimates of fresh start equity values are misstated and whether such misstatements are related to characteristics of individual firms' bankruptcy process. I predict that the reported fresh start value reflects a tension between managerial incentives to promote the acceptance of the plan of reorganization, and incentives to enhance future reported performance. I test whether the tendency to overstate the fresh start equity value is increasing in factors affecting the acceptance of the reorganization plan (i.e., bankruptcy claimants' relative bargaining power) and decreasing in factors affecting postbankruptcy reported performance (i.e., the probability of future losses). I find that, relative to the market value of equity immediately after emergence from Chapter 11, the fresh start equity value is, on average, understated by about 4%. The difference between the fresh start equity value and market value also exhibits significant cross-sectional variation (an average absolute error of 11%). Consistent with my first prediction, the misstatement is increasing in the relative bargaining power of junior claimants. In contrast to my second prediction, the misstatement is also increasing in the likelihood of future reported losses. This result suggests that firms that are more likely to experience postbankruptcy financial distress are more concerned with obtaining acceptance for their plan than with the effects of the fresh start equity value on postbankruptcy performance. Finally, I document that the misstatement in the fresh start equity value is negatively related to whether firms have undergone prepackaged bankruptcies, and positively related to replacement of a prebankruptcy CEO.     

The Sale of Assets to Manage Earnings in Japan

In this article we investigate Japanese managers' use of income from the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities to manage earnings. The earnings management target examined is Japanese managers' forecasts of current–year earnings. We find a negative relation between income from asset sales and management forecast error. When current reported operating income is below (above) management's forecast of operating income, firms increase (decrease) earnings through the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities. The results hold after controlling for expected future performance, debt–to–equity ratio, size, growth, and last year's income from asset sales.     

The Debt Trap: Wealth Transfers and Debt‐Equity Choices of Junk‐Grade Firms

If outstanding debt is risky, issuing equity transfers wealth from equity holders to debt holders. If existing leverage is high and bankruptcy costs are small, this wealth transfer effect outweighs the gains to stockholders from optimizing firm value. Empirically, we find that for investment‐grade firms, higher leverage implies a greater likelihood of issuing equity, as expected in a standard tradeoff model. However, consistent with the impact of wealth transfer effects, for junk‐grade firms, higher leverage implies a greater likelihood of issuing debt. The analysis implies an additional route through which historical shocks determine firms’ financing choices.     

Playing to their strengths? Evidence that specialization in the private equity industry confers competitive advantage

The paper examines whether private equity (PE)-backed buyouts have higher post-buyout operating profitability than comparable companies as a result of the alleged superior governance mechanism of private equity (“The Jensen hypothesis”) and whether relative investment specialisation by industry or stage provides the PE firm with a competitive advantage over its peers (“The advantages-to-specialization hypotheses”). A sample of 122 UK buyouts over the period 1995–2002 and a matched sample of non-PE-backed UK companies are constructed to test the three hypotheses. We find that over the first 3 post-buyout years (i) operating profitability of PE-backed companies is greater than those of comparable companies by 4.5%, consistently with the Jensen hypothesis; (ii) industry specialization of PE firms adds 8.5% to this premium, consistently with the industry-specialization hypothesis; (iii) stage (buyout) specialization does not impact profitability but may provide a spur to growth, inconsistently with the stage-specialization hypothesis. Finally, initial profitability of the PE-backed company plays a major role in post-buyout profitability, suggesting that skill in investment selection and financial engineering techniques may be more important than managerial incentives in generating higher PE company performance.