锵锵三人行--与国际买家谈跨国采购

这是一个让中国制造商又爱又恨的对象. 所有的厂家都用充满着渴望的神情去拥抱它,而所有的厂家又在沃尔玛们的价格屠刀下鲜血淋漓. 就在去年的这个时候,"后配额时代"一词刺激了老板们的神经,一座座新厂房拔地而起--就在本已供应过度的制造基地上.他们都带着同样渴望的表情期冀啃一大口买家们送上门来的蛋糕,却不料不到半载光阴,好日子、想象中的好日子就似乎到头了.     

Buyers differ in evaluating suppliers

This article discusses the industrial buyer's vendor evaluation in light of past vendor performance. A conjoint analysis approach was used to determine the relative importance of factors and the levels of performance. This evaluation indicated that industrial buyers can be classified into classical decision model categories.     

Reverse Price Discrimination with Bayesian Buyers

This paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers' prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter. The buyers interpret new information via Bayes' rule. We show that, in this environment, prices are not monotone in buyers' prior valuations. Interestingly, this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer (Reverse Price Discrimination). We derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets.     

Collective Bargaining and Faculty Job Satisfaction

Estimates of the impact of union membership on job satisfaction suffer from nonrandom self‐selection of employees into unions. In this paper, we circumvent this problem by examining the impact on satisfaction of collective bargaining representation, rather than of union membership. We use a two‐stage technique that controls for nonrandom selection of faculty into institutions, and apply that to a panel of faculty at repeatedly observed four‐year universities. We find that bargaining agreements increase satisfaction with compensation but reduce satisfaction with faculty workload. Bargaining has no statistically measurable impact on overall job satisfaction or on faculty's satisfaction with their authority to make decisions regarding their instructional duties.     

Ethnicity in housing markets: Buyers,sellers and agents

This paper examines how ethnicity related to cultural differences arising from ethnic background affects housing market transactions in the Atlanta metro area. Using both the US Census and Wikipedia approaches to infer ethnicity from individuals' names, we find that the interplay of buyer, seller, and agent ethnicity composition affects interaction in the housing market. Sellers working with listing agents in the same ethnic group set higher listing prices and enjoy higher selling prices and quicker sales. Agents working with same ethnicity buyers yield higher prices and liquidity. Even though sellers only communicate with buyers through their agents, houses sold by sellers to buyers of same ethnicity have higher prices and sell faster. And while the ethnic mix of agents and their clients matter, the ethnic mix of agents in the transaction does not.     

Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities

This paper provides an analysis of a non‐cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network. We establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents. That is, we provide a non‐cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non‐cooperative surplus. The resulting division is related to the Myerson‐Shapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications. We demonstrate this by examining buyer‐seller networks and vertical foreclosure.     

Competition Among Middlemen When Buyers and Sellers Can Trade Directly

This paper examines competition among middlemen when sellers and buyers can trade directly. Direct trade alters the supply and demand facing the middlemen, making them interdependent, and reduces the market power of intermediaries. However, it does not alter the Stahl [1988] result that middlemen may have an incentive to “corner” the market if demand is inelastic. The model is applied to market making in financial markets, vertical integration in goods markets and to the question of bypass in utilities. This discussion suggests that cornering is most likely in markets for essential inputs and that it may enable seller collusion.