央行:加紧存款保险制度建设

在银行改革方面,会议提出,今年下半年央行将继续推动工商银行、中国银行、建设银行深化内部改革,完善公司治理,健全内部控制,加快转变增长方式,提高资产质量。     

存款保险制度破冰

自1993年提出建立存款保险制度以来，我国对存款保险制度作出了诸多的准备。时隔21年，存款保险制度终于揭开神秘面纱。11月30日，国务院法制办公室就《存款保险条例（征求意见稿）》向社会征求意见，这是加强金融监管、完善金融机构市场化退出机制、防范金融风险的重要举措。存款保险制度，顾名思义，就是为了避免金融机构的系统性风险，保护存款人的合法权益，这等于在金融安全网上再给存款人系上免费“安全带”，不仅让存款人无后顾之忧，也让监管层亦无后顾之忧，以维护金融稳定，促进金融改革进入深水区。     

存款保险制度呼之欲出

“推动存款保险立法,加快建立功能完善、权责统一、运作高效的存款保险制度”,已正式列入中国人民银行今年的工作日程。     

存款保险制度研究

<正>一直以来,我国实行的是隐性存款保险制度,这种政府的隐含担保对保护居民存款利益、维护社会稳定发挥了重要作用,但其弊端也日渐显现。随着我国商业银行改革工作的进展及利率市场化改革的推进,建立显性的存款保险制度迫在眉睫。央行近两年来也多次公开表示,目前我国建立存款保险制度的主客观条件基本具备,离正式推出只有一步之遥。存款保险制度建立后,将对维护我国金融体系的稳定起到积极作用,不仅如此,它对于保护存款人利益、提高银行效率、促进银行业公平竞争以及缓解通货膨胀压力等都能有所帮助。不过,存款保险制度并非万能,不仅在我国现有的金融体系下,银行"大而不倒"的问题将仍然存在,而且一旦处理不当,可能导致存款"搬家"现象,甚至引发道德风险,对金融市场形成冲击。为避免由此带来的不利影响,在建立存     

韩国存款保险制度

成立的背景 全球化过程中金融业变得更加自主和自由,也更容易进入海外市场,银行亏损的可能性更大.对这个问题的担忧使韩国国会在1995年12月29日通过了<存款人保护法案>,并在1996年6月1日成立了韩国存款保险公司来建立存款保险制度.     

浅析存款保险制度

从美国最早建立存款保险制度以来,今天已有超100多个国家建立了该制度。中国作为世界第二大经济体,在加快金融改革、推动利率市场化改革过程中,建立存款保险制度显得尤其重要。本文通过比较美国、日本及德国三国的存款保险制度,分析该制度的优缺点,并对我国建立存款保险制度提出政策建议。     

存款保险制度呼之欲出

争议多年、谨慎推进的存款保险制度或将实行,<存款保险条例>已进入最后的草拟阶段,可望在今年上半年出台.     

存款保险制度待发

2015年人民银行工作会议明确提出“建立存款保险制度”,这标志着在我国始于1993年、酝酿长达21年之久的存款保险制度准备就绪. 存款保险制度是指商业银行等存款类金融机构向存款保险机构缴纳一定保险金,而当自身发生危机时,由存款保险机构保障其清偿能力,以保护存款人利益、维护金融体系稳定的制度安排.     

从"隐性"到"显性"——存款保险制度的变革之路

银行监管、中央银行最后贷款人制度和存款保险制度是维护一国金融稳定的三大法宝。其中,银行监管是防范系统性风险的第一道防线,中央银行最后贷款是第二道防线,存款保险制度则是最后一道防线。我国目前实质上是隐性的存款保险制度,随着金融体制改革的深化,这种隐性存款保险制度已难以满足金融稳定的需要,有必要尽快建立显性存款保险制度,形成符合我国国情的金融稳定机制。     

存款保险制度重在细节

在原则性的框架被通过后,细节问题将决定中国存款保险制度能否适时推出、顺利实施。     

Institutions and Deposit Insurance: Empirical Evidence

Do banks’ responses to changes in deposit insurance vary across countries even if the countries have comparable institutions? If so, by how much? Using data on the financial performance of large banks in 15 financially and economically developed countries, we find that where deposit insurance has an effect, it is large and varies depending on the level of economic freedom, rule of law and corruption in the bank’s home country. As in prior papers, we show that during stable economic periods, increases in deposit insurance are associated with higher bank risk, both problem loans and leverage. In most, but not all, cases stronger institutions temper these effects. The institutions’ effects are substantial. For example, average changes in the rule of law double the impact of a change in deposit insurance on bank leverage. We contribute to the substantial literature in this area by showing that the institutional effects are significant even across a set of countries with comparable institutions; by conducting a careful calibration of the economic significance of the effects; by providing evidence that during stable periods changes in deposit insurance only affect bank risk and not other measures of performance; and finally by showing that the effects of both deposit insurance and institutions vary across stable and crisis economic periods. The stable period results are consistent with the moral hazard effects of deposit insurance, while the crisis period results are consistent with endogeneity concerns that poor bank performance could drive changes in regulations.     

The Effects of Setting Deposit Insurance Premiums to Target Insurance Fund Reserves

A common feature of many insurance systems is that they are backed by an insurance fund and insurance premiums are adjusted to target this fund's reserves. This study analyzes the fund targeting policy of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). It examines the distortions to banks' cost of deposit financing that result from setting premiums in this manner. The study's framework is a multiperiod, multibank contingent claims model where the stochastic rates of return on individual banks' assets are assumed to be correlated and match the actual empirical distribution of a sample of U.S. banks. The model identifies factors that are likely to exacerbate distortions due to insurance mispricing. The relative merits of a targeting policy and a flat-rate insurance policy are discussed, and the real effects of insurance mispricing are estimated. A method for valuing a government subsidy under a reserve targeting policy is also presented.     

Deposit Insurance and Depositor Monitoring: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 insured deposits up to $5,000 and limited interest paid by commercial banks. This essay uses a treatment-and-control estimation strategy to determine how those reforms influenced depositors’ reactions to information about banks’ balance sheets by comparing preferred and regular depositors at New York state banks. Before deposit insurance, regular depositors reacted more to information about banks, while preferred depositors reacted less. After, this difference diminished and almost disappeared. This change indicates insurance reduced monitoring, although depositors’ continued response to some information indicates that large, uninsured depositors continued to monitor banks, as the legislation intended.     

存款保险制度面面观

从日本和美国的经验来看,其各自成功的秘诀在于根据本国实际客观情况来制定相应的制度,并及时依据实际情况变化做出调整。而我国即将构建的存款保险制度,也必须从当前实际情况出发。[编者按]     

客观认识存款保险制度

随着我国市场经济体制的建立,对外开放的深入,银行业竞争的格局会愈演愈烈,经营风险日益加剧。因此,建立存款保险制度的问题已被提到议事日程上来,且呼声越来越高。目前,我国是否具备了建立存款保险制度的条件,时机是否成熟,我们应该本着实事求是的态度,客观地认识存款保险制度。     

Pricing Risk-Adjusted Deposit Insurance: An Option-Based Model

This paper presents a methodology for arriving at empirical estimates of deposit insurance premiums from market data by using isomorphic relationships between equity and a call option, and insurance and a put option. The data utilizes the market value of equity to solve for the asset value and its volatility. Market perceptions of FDIC bailout policies are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inverted values of assets and their volatility. Sensitivity analyses are performed to show that rank orderings based on premiums are robust to changes in specification, thus facilitating allocation of aggregate premium across banks.     

Bank Risk and Deposit Insurance

Arguing that a relatively high cost of deposit insurance indicatesthat a bank takes excessive risks, this article estimates thecost of deposit insurance for a large sample of banks in 14economies to assess the relationship between the risk-takingbehavior of banks and their corporate governance structure.The results suggest that banks with concentrated ownership tendto take the greatest risks, and those with dispersed ownershipengage in a relatively low level of risk taking. Moreover, asa proxy for bank risk, the cost of deposit insurance has somepower in predicting bank distress.