文化产业发展专项基金的寻租博弈分析

文化产业发展专项基金是我国文化产业发展的客观要求,但政府监管、惩罚机制的缺失,导致了寻租现象的发生.本文通过构建寻租行为的博弈模型,分析寻租行为的成因和过程,得出了寻租行为不可避免、制度建设尤为重要的结论.在此基础上提出了相关对策:建立监督约束机制;建立租金的消散机制;加强思想道德教育和专业知识培训.     

基于中小企业的物流金融三方主体博弈分析

当前,物流金融可以有效支持中小企业融资活动。在委托代理关系中,金融企业委托第三方物流企业对中小企业进行监管和控制。文章定量研究物流金融主体间三方博弈模型,得出在三方主体不同行为条件下,第三方物流企业与中小企业合谋的最佳概率、金融机构进行监管的最佳概率。文章研究结论指出金融机构工作能力、不同选择行为的损失和收益之间的差异化程度可以有效减少寻租行为发生概率。这些定量分析的结果对物流金融服务市场抑制合谋有较强的借鉴价值。     

集成创新过程中的三方博弈分析

在理性经济人和风险中性的前提下,本文通过分析国家政府、政府官员、研发单位间的双方动态博弈,建立集成创新中三方博弈模型;并通过分析博弈三方的行动集策略,解出博弈均衡解和行动概率,在此基础上提出治理知识集成中寻租及造假的对策,为创新提供良好的研发环境.     

基于演化博弈的PPP项目研究

PPP项目中,政府部门代理人与私营企业会经济租金产生寻租行为,为了保障民生,监管部门需要对PPP项目进行监管.文章经过演化博弈模型分析,得出可能影响监管部门和寻租部门最终策略选择的变量为:成功稽查寻租行为的概率θ,稽查成本k,以及对寻租双方的惩罚力度α、β,减少寻租行为可以从上述参数入手.     

文化产业发展专项基金的寻租博弈分析

文化产业发展专项基金是我国文化产业发展的客观要求,但政府监管、惩罚机制的缺失,导致了寻租现象的发生。本文通过构建寻租行为的博弈模型,分析寻租行为的成因和过程,得出了寻租行为不可避免、制度建设尤为重要的结论。在此基础上提出了相关对策:建立监督约束机制;建立租金的消散机制;加强思想道德教育和专业知识培训。     

非政府投资建设项目参与人行为的博弈分析

在非政府投资建设项目中,涉及四方参与人——业主、承包商、监理方和政府,他们的行为必然对工程质量产生影响。本文以寻租理论和委托代理理论为基础,建立了四方博弈模型,并求解了博弈过程的混合策略纳什均衡。通过对博弈结果的分析,提出在项目质量管理过程中应当建立的制度安排。     

高校预算管理中的寻租行为分析——基于博弈论的视角

随着我国高等教育事业的发展,预算管理在高校事业发展中的作用越来越大,但其问题也不断暴露,严重影响教育经费的有效使用,探寻高校预算管理问题根源所在已成为广大教育理论和实践者追求的目标之一。文章借助博弈论,就导致高校预算问题的重要原因——寻租行为进行分析,构建了基于高校预算的制定方、执行方以及监管方的三方博弈模型,并通过对模型的求解和分析,提出了有针对性的政策建议。     

重复博弈在施工过程质量控制中的应用研究

本文综合分析了工程项目质量问题的产生原因，以寻租理论和委托代理理论为基础，应用博弈理论建立了三方无限次重复博弈模型，并分析得到了均衡解。通过对模型及博弈结果的分析，提出建立建筑市场各主体及相关个人的信用体系。通过制度安排，创造无限次重复博弈的环境，改变博弈方的策略空间和收益结构，进而改进均衡结果，从而达到通过有效的制度安排来提高建筑工程质量的目的。     

政府采购中寻租行为的经济分析

文章分析了我国政府采购中的寻租现象及其危害,通过建立博弈寻租模型的方法,提出了减少或制止寻租的发生的一系列办法。     

财税利益格局中的地方保护倾向分析

中央和地方以税种为基础的分税制、政企不分、寻租活动以及监督机制不够健全是地方政府产生地方保护倾向的重要原因。使用霍泰林空间竞争模型作为分析框架 ,尝试用一个包含三阶段的完全信息动态博弈模型进行分析 ,两个地方政府进行非合作博弈 ,如果竞争充分激烈 ,地方保护会逐渐丧失意义。完善地方政府官员政绩考核和政府行为监督机制、防止寻租行为、加大对落后地区转移支付的力度等是有效消除地方保护倾向的手段。     

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in the general model of contests due to Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a contest among singletons. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests. Received: March 2004, Accepted: October 2004, JEL Classification: D72, D74 We thank Joan Maria Esteban, Kai Konrad, Debraj Ray, Stergios Skaperdas and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on the paper. We also benefitted from comments by seminar participants in Barcelona, Istanbul, Paris and WZB Berlin.     

建设招投标活动中寻租现象浅析

现代建设招标投标制度由外国引入我国已有二十多年,我国正处在建筑业高速发展时期,寻租现象在工程项目交易中随处可见。本文试从几个方面分析招投标过程中寻租行为发生的原因,并提出相关建议。     

Rent Seeking in the Cameroon Economy: Krueger's Analytic Technique Helps to Account for Development Lag in Colonial States

Abstract . Traditional economic theory regards the social costs of monopoly as the reduction in both consumer and producer surplus as a result of monopolization of certain sectors of the economy. Recent research has shown that a proper accounting of the social costs of monopoly must include the costs of obtaining and maintaining monopoly positions. Anne O. Krueger used the term “rent seeking” to refer to the expending of scarce resources by entrepreneurs to fight for rents created through government activity in the economy. Excessive interference in the economy by government can result in an increase in the social costs of monopoly. In a developing country such as Cameroon, where government activity in the economy has been quite pervasive since the latter part of the 1800s, opportunities have been created for rent seeking. This type of activity has helped to impede the economic growth of the country.     

A theory of rent seeking with informational foundations

I develop a model of rent seeking with informational foundations and an arbitrary number of rent seekers, and I compare the results with Tullock’s (1980) classic model where the influence activities are “black-boxed.” Given the microfoundations, the welfare consequences of rent seeking can be studied. In particular, I show that competition among rent seekers can be socially beneficial, since the additional information that the decision maker gets access to makes the increase in rent-seeking expenditures worthwhile. However, the analysis also highlights a logic that, under natural parameter assumptions, makes the rent seekers spend more resources on rent seeking than is in society’s interest, which is consistent with the spirit of the rent-seeking literature.      

Risk,rent seeking and the social cost of monopoly power

Some recent empirical studies that have estimated the social cost of monopoly power have included in these estimates observed monopoly rents as a proxy for the unobserved value of the resources expended by rent seekers. This has involved adding these estimates of resources wasted by rent seekers to estimates of deadweight welfare loss triangles so as to produce an overall estimate of the social cost of monopoly. The present paper points out that each firm seeking a monopoly rent flow not only may be uncertain about obtaining the flow but also about retaining it in future periods. It is shown that this is likely to cause the proportion of the rent flow converted into social cost to be well below 100% regardless of whether the rent sought is small relative to initial wealth and regardless of whether rent seekers are risk-neutral or risk-averse. These findings demonstrate that large errors are likely to be made in monopoly welfare loss studies if observed monopoly rents continue to be employed as a measure of the value of resources used in rent-seeking activities.     

Controlling Corporate Power in China: Case Studies of Seed Companies and Water Distribution

In the course of China's economic transition, the government set up a policy goal to gradually withdraw from the market, while, at the same time, increasing the intensity of anti‐corruption actions. This article reviews the development of Chinese modern corporations and corresponding policy changes. The development and expansion of modern corporations as a result of reforms that occurred after 1978 reveals the government's decision not to fully withdraw from the market. When private companies are allowed to pursue maximum profits, especially in areas of public resources and services, society and the environment suffer severe negative consequences. Case studies of corporate control of seed companies and water utilities demonstrate in detail the damage caused by privatization. In order to protect the interests of society from corruption, government must concentrate on reducing the rent‐seeking behavior of corporations and collusion between businesses and government officials. The Chinese government's fight against corruption in recent years has been based on its market involvement, as well as on its determination to confine the power of corporations, which is a tough game.     

A stochastic differential game of capitalism

We develop a stochastic differential game of capitalism to analyze the role of uncertainty. In the deterministic game, the firm’s rent is completely taxed away and the firm stops investing completely. In the stochastic game, the government does not tax the firm’s rent completely. The firm posts a positive rate of investment if the firm’s rent exceeds the labor’s income. Although the cooperative solution is indeterminate, cooperation is always Pareto optimal compared to the non-cooperative Markovian Nash equilibrium. For individual rationality, we apply a payoff distribution procedure based on Yeung and Petrosyan (2006) to derive a subgame-consistent solution.     

The Economic Impact of Rent Seeking and Military Expenditures: A Comparison of Third World Military and Civilian Regimes

Abstract . The general stereotype of modern Third World military regimes is that of ultra-conservativism combined with military force to dismantle organizations of popular expression. These organizations through their rent-seeking activities are assumed to have reduced overall rates of economic growth. Empirically, the paper does find some support for this line of argument. However, it is apparent that the traditional stereotypes are inappropriate. The two regime types differ largely in terms of contrasting styles of economic management. Military regimes create an environment where military expenditures tend to have a positive overall impact on economic growth Civilian regimes having less control over rent seeking groups do not appear to be able to combine rent seeking activities and military expenditures in a manner conducive to overall economic growth.     

Henry George:

ABSTRACT While generally known today for his famous proposal for a Single Tax, Henry George has not been widely recognized as one of the first economists to write about the possibility of political market failure. Based on his appreciation for the allocational efficiency of markets and his suspicion of government intervention, George was an early advocate of public choice ideas who repeatedly warned of the dangers of rent seeking.     

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Economists have long recognised that government may serve as a vehicle to create and maintain monopoly power and hence generate economic rents for a favoured few. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has a government-provided monopoly of the allocation of top-level domains (TLDs) on the A-root server and so generates economic rents. The A-root server is the only computer network that links registered TLDs to the Internet. This paper uses insights of the economics of regulation and rent seeking to explain how existing technology may bypass ICANN and thus restore a competitive market in domain names.