Stability of a crime level equilibrium

We consider crime level in an economic market with a supply of potential criminals. These criminals differ in their opportunity cost for committing crime, reflecting differences in the value of foregone opportunities such as performing productive labor. The realized demand is influenced by the expected value for crime, which depends on several socio-economic variables including wealth, police enforcement, and police arrest ability. After determining the equilibria level suggested by our approach, we propose a dynamic setup and study the stability of this system. Two critical enforcement levels are determined. Exceeding the lower enforcement threshold will push crime to stabilize (converge) to an equilibrium level. Correspondingly, exceeding the higher enforcement threshold will collapse the crime market to zero.     

The Effect of Performance Standards on Health Care Provider Behavior: Evidence from Kidney Transplantation

Performance standards are designed to ensure a basic level of quality, and through public reporting of firm performance, encourage firms to compete on quality thus allowing the market to determine the optimal level of quality. In markets with substantial excess demand, however, demand effects may be insufficient to induce any change in firm behavior and enforcement may be required to ensure high quality. Even with enforcement, quality still may not improve at underperforming firms if gaming the system is less costly than improving quality. We test whether information alone or with regulatory enforcement improves outcomes or elicits gaming behavior in our study of 266 kidney transplant centers between 2001 and 2012. In a context of excess demand induced by price controls, we show that information alone has no impact and enforcement may actually increase market inefficiencies; firms respond to costly quality requirements, not by improving quality, but by reducing supply, which exacerbates the disequilibrium between supply and demand, and by cream‐skimming, which reduces access to transplantation among sicker patients.     

Licensing and innovation with imperfect contract enforcement

Licensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing contracts is often imperfect. We model contract enforcement as a game with perfect information but probabilistic enforcement and explore the implications of weak enforcement on the design of licensing contracts, the conduct of firms, and market performance. An upstream firm develops a technology that it can license to downstream firms using a fixed fee and a per‐unit royalty. Strictly positive per‐unit royalties maximize the licensor's profit if competition among licensees limits joint profits. With imperfect enforcement, the licensor lowers variable royalties to avoid cheating. Although imperfect contract enforcement reduces the profits of the licensor, weak enforcement lowers prices, increases downstream innovation, and in some circumstances can increase total economic welfare.     

Ethnic Fractionalization,Governance and Loan Defaults in Africa

We present a theoretical model of an imperfectly competitive loans market that is suitable for emerging economies in Africa. The model allows for variation in both the level of contract enforcement (the quality of governance) and the degree of market segmentation (the level of ethnic fractionalization). The model predicts a specific form of nonlinearity in the effects of these variables on loan default. Empirical analysis using African panel data for 110 individual banks in 28 countries over 2000–08 provides strong evidence for these predictions. Our results have important implications for the conditions under which policy reform will enhance financial development.     

A sequential model for cracking down on street markets for illicit drugs

This paper develops a sequential decision-making model for assisting law enforcement officials in allocating resources during a crackdown operation on illicit drug markets. The sequential crackdown model (SCM) considers a probabilistic framework, where the probability of incarceration of a dealer and the probability of dealing are modeled as a function of the size of a drug market, crackdown enforcement level, drug dealer's financial hardship, and other market characteristics.The model was developed and tested in consultation with enforcement officials from Philadelphia, PA and Camden, NJ. We present a detailed, step-by-step implementation scheme for updating parameters on each day of the crackdown. Parameter estimation along with examples of model usage is provided. Through these examples, we illustrate how the SCM could be helpful in understanding the response of illicit drug markets to various enforcement strategies. We further show conditions under which an alternating crackdown policy (referred to as a crackdown-backoff) or a consistent use of maximum possible enforcement would be optimal strategies for managing a drug crackdown operation. Within the context of the model and parameter estimates, we show that a much quicker and less costly collapse could be implemented if the available enforcement resources are increased. Finally, the model provides possible conditions under which a crackdown operation would be unsuccessful in eliminating a drug market.     

Enforcement of Accounting Standards in Europe: Capital-Market-Based Evidence for the Two-Tier Mechanism in Germany

On the background of regulatory initiatives that mandate the establishment of comparable enforcement systems in EU jurisdictions to ascertain consistent and faithful application of IFRS, this paper provides capital-market-based evidence on investor reactions for one specific institutional set-up: the two-tier enforcement system in Germany. In operation since 2005, the German enforcement mechanism consists of a private body, the DPR, which investigates compliance of published financial reports of firms listed on a regulated market segment and, upon error findings, involves the German securities regulator BaFin, which on a second level enforces disclosure of these findings to establish adverse disclosure (‘name and shame’). For a sample of error findings published in the period 2005–2009, we investigate short- and long-term market reactions to error announcements. Results for abnormal returns, abnormal trading volumes and abnormal bid‐ask spreads indicate that these announcements represent new, negative information and suggest that, despite an enforcement environment that is categorised as weak in the extant literature, the activities of the DPR/BaFin seem to penalise infringing firms and thus provide potential deterrence. Multivariate analyses yield weak evidence that the magnitude of the market value discount is positively associated with the severity of the errors, with the threat of subsequent litigation and with cases in which firms disagreed with the error findings of the DPR.     

Does revamping Japan's dual labor market matter?

This paper argues that Japan's excessive labor market duality can reduce Total Factor Productivity (TFP) due to a negative impact on non-regular workers’ effort and on firms’ incentives to train them. The paper then empirically studies the determinants of labor market duality. The main result of the paper is that the level of employment protection affects duality. In particular, a higher level of employment protection of regular workers increases duality, while a higher level of protection of temporary workers reduces it. On the basis of this result, the paper also discusses some reform options to address Japan's labor market duality.     

Economic Consequences of Accounting Enforcement Reforms: The Case of Germany

This study investigates recent reforms in financial reporting enforcement in Germany. The objective of these reforms was to promote a consistent and faithful application of accounting standards. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find some evidence of a decrease in earnings management, an increase in stock liquidity, and, to a limited extent, an increase in market valuation for companies that fall under the new enforcement regime. Our results also provide some support for the notion that companies characterized by an overall low level of enforcement through other internal and external mechanisms are particularly affected by these reforms. The results are largely robust in several sensitivity analyses, but the results must be interpreted with caution because we cannot completely rule out the possibility of other explanations.     

Buyer cartels and private enforcement of antitrust policy

Collusion among buyers leads to social welfare losses, which provide the economic rationale for public enforcement of the antitrust law. This conduct also imposes losses on the victimized sellers, which provide the foundation for private enforcement through private damage actions. In this paper, we present a rigorous economic analysis of buyer cartels. This effort includes both full participation and partial conspiracies. We review the antitrust treatment of collusive monopsony in the United States, the European Union, and Asia, offer a measure of antitrust damages, and examine the necessary precision of the damage estimate. We also suggest that the proper use of modern econometrics should allay judicial concerns with speculation.     

Decentralized environmental regulations and plant‐level productivity

Using the framework provided by the Porter hypothesis, we study the impact of environmental regulations and enforcement policies on plant‐level green total factor productivity (TFP) growth and its components related to efficiency change and technical change. The detailed microdata we use are from Sweden and for the pulp and paper industry. This industry is the source of significant amounts of water and air pollution and is one of the most heavily environmentally regulated manufacturing industries. Sweden has a unique decentralized regulatory structure where the manufacturing plants have to comply with plant‐specific regulatory standards stipulated at the national level, as well as decentralized local supervision and enforcement. Our empirical results point to beneficial impacts of the environmental policies on plants' green TFP growth and sustainable production practices. We also find that political economy considerations are important, as the presence of the Green Party and aspects like plant size (with corresponding local and regional economic effects) matter in enforcement of the standards.     

How to beat the average

Empirical evidence has shown that people systematically overrate own performance relatively to others. This paper investigates production with identical workers where each one believes to be more productive than other workers. In a simple efficiency wage model, we ask how these seemingly incompatible beliefs can be made compatible with one another. We suggest that to compensate for the subjectively perceived productivity gap, each worker chooses an effort level lower than that attributed to others. The latter is estimated as the lowest effort that allows to pass the firm's monitoring test. Since rational agents will not maintain expectations which turn out to be systematically wrong, we introduce a "consistency requirement for false beliefs". Accordingly, predictions based on the "wrong" model must agree with the observations of the "true" model. We show that even with consistency, less effort is supplied than in the full information setting. Hence, the wage-effort relationship gets less efficient from the firm's viewpoint. At a first sight, at the firm-level workers gain from holding false beliefs, while profits unambigously fall. At the aggregate market outcome, however, the firms' labor demand declines, total output falls, and the rate of unemployment rises, decreasing workers utility again.     

推行TQM与提高建筑施工质量

质量是建筑施工企业在激烈的市场竞争中立于不败之地的基础。推行全面质量管理 (TQM )是提高建筑产品质量的有效保证。TQM要求全体员工都要参加质量管理 ,并且贯穿建筑产品工程施工和保修服务的全过程 ,要求企业从上层到中层和基层管理者全力以赴抓质量 ,努力提高管理水平     

Multidimensional skin in the game

We analyze the alignment of incentives between an originator and investors in a Bayesian equilibrium model that reflects securitization. It involves private types of originators, differing by marginal cost of effort. This model is the first to consider refunding and risk transfer, that is, both major welfare benefits of securitization, and the empirical finding of a non-monotonic relationship between the subordination level of claims and their sensitivity to the originator’s effort. On this basis, our equilibrium model is the first to explain why horizontal retention prevails in some market environments and vertical retention results in other market environments. More specifically, we show that a strong need for refunding, compared to risk transfer, is an argument for horizontal retention. Furthermore, horizontal retention prevails in equilibria with high effort levels, whereas vertical retention arises rather in equilibria with lower effort levels. Our results indicate new ways to regulate cash flow retention in securitization markets efficiently.     

Wage mobility: do institutions make a difference?

This paper checks empirically the assertion that strict labour market regulation leads to low wage mobility, addressing an apparent puzzle. Indeed, most economic reasoning links a combination of regulations in the labour market to low wage flexibility and mobility, but the scarce empirical evidence available challenges that view. I focus on Portugal, one of the most regulated labour markets in Europe. The evidence gathered indicates that an aggregate view—of minimum wage enforcement, unionisation rates and extension of collective bargaining contracts—provides a misleading idea of the actual constraints imposed by the institutional framework on wage setting. Instead, micro conditions at the firm level play a major role shaping wage mobility in Portugal. Some comparisons with the UK, traditionally pointed out as a flexible labour market, are provided. Remarkable similarities in mobility level and trend are detected between the two countries, further suggesting that a regulated institutional framework does not necessarily reduce individual mobility in the wage distribution.     

浅谈加强烟草行业市场管理的方法

加强专卖管理既是规范卷烟市场秩序、满足市场卷烟供应的有效手段,也是维护行业生产经营秩序、营造良好内外环境、实现行业长远发展的根本保证。烟草行业应全力推进专卖管理工作上水平,在队伍建设、卷烟打假、内部监管等方面下功夫,推进"卷烟上水平"顺利开展。     

关于农民法律意识与推动农村法制化进程研究

在当代的农村，认真分析和审视我国农村目前的法律意识现状，通过加快城市化进程、发展市场经济、加强农村立法改革、确保执法、司法的公正，为农村树立良好的法律形象，形成良好法律意识，推动农村法制化进程。     

Earnings Management in Domestic and Foreign IPOs in the United States: Do Home Country Institutions Matter?

Using a large sample of domestic and foreign IPOs in the US, we investigate how threats of enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and private litigation influence earnings management in IPO prospectuses. We propose that perceptions of foreign institutions may influence SEC enforcement action and private litigation. We provide evidence that enforcement and litigation threats are negatively related to the strength of legal institutions in the foreign IPO’s country of origin. We find earnings management is more pronounced in foreign IPOs from countries with strong legal institutions. We further explore whether earnings management is priced in the IPO market and find no relation between IPO proceeds and earnings management. Our results are consistent with upward earnings management as in Stein (1989), the magnitude of which is reduced when the anticipated cost of enforcement and litigation is higher. Collectively, our results cast doubt on the validity of the bonding hypothesis.     

Effectiveness of quality standards regulation considering the behavior of government and firms

We construct an analysis framework consisting of the central government, a local government, a representative firm, and consumers. This study analyzes how the local government's enforcement, the firm's compliance, and their interaction influence the effectiveness of regulation after the central government has established policies regarding quality standards. We construct three scenarios: perfect enforcement, imperfect enforcement, and collusion. We show that when the local government imperfectly enforces the regulation, the firm's utility and the local government's utility are higher, whereas the degree of the firm's compliance, consumers' utility, and the level of social welfare are lower. When there is collusion between the local government and the firm, the firm's utility and the local government's utility are the highest, but the degree of the firm's compliance, consumers' utility, and the level of social welfare are the lowest among the different scenarios. This study proves that the behavior of governments and firms plays a vital role in the effectiveness of quality standards regulation.     

基于PEST模型的施工企业国际工程承包业务分析

随着全球经济一体化的不断深化,我国施工企业国际工程承包业务,从数量上来看,具备了相当的规模,但相对于市场的发展来说还处于初级阶段,还存在着不少问题;从实践中来看,还有不少存在亏损状况;中国企业要想避免亏损摆脱现状,扩大市场份额,就需要付出加倍的努力。文章通过对中国施工企业的PEST分析,提出中国施工企业国际工程承包业务的发展战略。     

The Value of Employee Retention: Evidence From a Natural Experiment

We estimate the firm‐level returns to retaining employees using difference‐in‐differences analysis and a natural experiment where the enforcement of employee noncompete agreements was inadvertently reversed in Michigan. We find that noncompete enforcement boosted the short‐term value of publicly traded companies by approximately 9%. The effect is increasing in local competition and growth opportunities, and offset by patenting.