Is universal banking justified? Evidence from bank underwriting of corporate bonds in Japan

We examine the extent to which universal banking in Japan creates conflicts of interest. We find that as banks enter the securities business, they discount the price of the corporate bonds they underwrite significantly in an effort to attract investors, thereby generating conflicts of interest that are harmful to issuers. Further, we find that close prior lending relationships between banks and their client issuers is the driving force behind such conflicts and that competition from investment houses limits but does not eliminate these conflicts. Our results contrast sharply with the evidence for the US, which largely shows a certification role for banks.     

Do investors value frequent issuers in securitization?

We assess the value of frequent issuers to investors in securitization markets by examining the initial yield spread of 6132 European mortgage-backed securities (MBS), covering a 20-year period between 1999 and 2018. We find that frequent issuers have certification value, and it increases as the credit cycle approaches its peak, as lending standards loosen, and information asymmetries in securitization markets increase. Investors value frequent issuers more favourably on riskier, difficult to evaluate MBS. We find that after the great financial crisis (GFC), investors began to attribute more value to frequent issuers, regardless of MBS credit quality. We also find that in the pre-crisis period, investors required higher yields to compensate for perceived rating shopping, which is not observed after the GFC. Finally, we show that investors expect higher yields on deals closed by subsidiaries of foreign banks.

     

Banking relationships and access to equity capital markets: Evidence from Japan’s main bank system

We study the role of banking relationships in IPO underwriting. When a firm in Japan goes public, it can engage an investment bank that is related through a common main bank, or can select an alternative investment bank. The main bank relationship can be an efficient way for the investment bank to acquire information generated by the main bank, but may give rise to conflicts of interest. We find that main bank relationships give small issuers increased access to equity capital markets, but that issuers of large IPOs often switch to non-related investment banks that are capable of managing large offerings. While investment banks seek to exploit bargaining power with related issuers, issuers respond to expected high issue cost by switching to non-related investment banks. The net result is that total issue costs through related and non-related investment banks are similar. With respect to aftermarket performance and use of proceeds, we find no evidence of conflict of interest or self-dealing for either the main bank or the investment bank.     

Underwriter Reputation and Initial Public Offers: The Detrimental Effects of Flippers

In this research, we examine the relationship between the reputation of investment banks and the investor clientele to whom they market initial public offers. We hypothesize that the most reputable investment banks have considerable distribution power but confine initial public offer sales to investors with long-term horizons in an effort to maintain prestige. Using the level of relative after-market trading volume to proxy for investor type, we find that as underwriter reputation increases investors with short-term trading horizons (“flippers”) tend to dominate the offerings over the lower prestige levels. For underwriters in the upper reputation tier, however, this dominance begins to decline with increasing reputation. In addition, we find a negative relation between the after-market price performance of the initial public offer firm and the first week's trading volume. The results suggest that flippers can be detrimental to the performance of initial public offer firms. While distributing power may be essential for the maintenance of the reputation of investment banks, the type of investor clientele also appears to be of major importance.     

Investor recognition and seasoned equity offers

We find that seasoned equity issuers who pay more in underwriting costs are associated with larger improvements in investor recognition, greater contemporaneous increases in firm value, and larger declines in illiquidity risk. We identify increased analyst following as an important channel through which these effects occur. The results are consistent with the prediction of Merton (1987) and imply that an equity issuing firm can actively manage its degree of investor recognition and thereby influence its valuation. Furthermore, equity issuers associated with greater improvements in investor recognition exhibit significantly more negative multi-factor alphas during the three years after issuance, suggesting that improved investor recognition can partially explain the appearance of post-issue stock underperformance.     

Reforming the US IPO market: lessons from history and theory

The current US IPO market is inefficient and unfair. To protect their own balance sheets, US investment banks systematically underprice offerings. To ration the cheap securities, the investment banks utilize various nefarious nonprice rationing techniques, including kickbacks. Regulators should reform the market by loosening restrictions against issuers. The early history of the market (1781-1861) shows that unregulated IPO markets can function efficiently. Early US corporations successfully sold equities directly to investors without the aid of intermediaries because they could overcome information asymmetry cheaply. Today, the Information Revolution is again decreasing the cost of reducing information asymmetry between investors and issuers. Regulators could improve upon the past, however, by allowing the market to price ration new shares via an auction method.     

IPO Placement Risk and the Number of Co‐Managers

Previous studies show that co‐managers mainly affect initial public offering (IPO) aftermarket activities. We investigate the role of co‐managers in IPO pre‐market activities. We argue that co‐managers help reduce IPO placement risk and hypothesize that IPO issuers hire more co‐managers when placement risk is higher. We find the number of co‐managers is positively associated with three proxies for placement risk. IPOs with more price uncertainty and high‐tech IPOs hire more co‐managers, while IPOs in regulated industries hire fewer co‐managers. We also find larger IPOs, recent IPOs, and IPOs with more reputable lead underwriters hire more co‐managers.     

Why do institutional investors buy green bonds: Evidence from a survey of European asset managers

Using survey evidence from European asset managers, we provide insights into their green bond investment activities and the factors that affect their investment decisions. We find that the majority of investors are actively invested in the green bond market via a variety of investment channels. Investors prefer green bonds issued from corporate issuers and sovereigns and we find that there is strong unmet investor demand for green bonds from these issuer types, in particular from non-financial corporates in the industrials, automotive and utilities sectors. Competitive pricing and strong green credentials, both pre- and post-issuance, are the most frequently named factors impacting respondents' decision to invest in a green bond, and unclear and poor reporting on how bond proceeds are allocated to green projects induces a majority of investors to not invest in a green bond or to sell a bond if already included in the portfolio. Among policy measures to grow the green bond market, preferential capital treatment for low-carbon assets and minimum standards for green definitions receive the highest investor support, but respondents are divided whether a strict definition of ‘green’ or a less strict definition would be more beneficial for scaling up the green bond market.     

Financial Contracts in PIPE Offerings: The Role of Expert Placement Agents

We examine how Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE) contracts allocate contingent cash flow rights between investors and issuers and the role of placement agents in PIPE contract design. Issuers advised by expert agents agree to more investor‐friendly terms than issuers advised by nonexpert agents. Expert agents appear to help issuers understand the payoff consequences of negotiable terms. Moreover, expert agents allow issuers to negotiate more attractive pricing when they agree to investor‐friendly terms. Issuers earn higher postoffering stock returns when they use expert agents or agree to more investor‐friendly terms. These results suggest that the involvement of expert agents is beneficial to PIPE issuers.     

SEASONED EQUITY ISSUERS’ R&D INVESTMENTS: SIGNALING OR OVEROPTIMISM

It is well known that investors often react negatively to the announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We posit that issuers can use positive discretionary (higher than expected) R&D investments before the SEO to signal their investment prospects to mitigate the negative announcement effect. Alternatively, positive discretionary R&D may be attributed to managerial overoptimism about future returns of R&D investments. We find strong support for the signaling hypothesis among high‐tech issuers: investors respond more favorably to the SEO announcements of high‐tech issuers with positive discretionary R&D; these issuers are more likely to use new capital in future R&D and they produce better post‐SEO operating performance. In contrast, we find some evidence of managerial overoptimism among low‐tech issuers: investors tend to penalize low‐tech firms with positive discretionary R&D at SEO announcements; they are more likely to hold new capital as cash and they fail to produce better post‐SEO operating performance.     

投资银行-机构投资者关系、“捧场”与IPO中的利益问题

投资银行是直接融资过程中最重要的中介机构,作为融资产品的“卖方”代表,其核心竞争力源于它所构建的投资者关系网络,但现有文献对于投行-投资者关系在证券发行中的作用还缺乏系统的实证研究。本文利用机构投资者在中国IPO新股发行中的完整询价记录,基于报价参与和报价水平两个维度提出了一种新的动态关系强度测算方法,并由此细致刻画了投行-机构关系对股票发行、定价的作用机制。结果发现:(1)投行可以驱动关系机构主动认购其承销的IPO新股,并引导关系机构给出与投行估值水平保持一致的高位报价,进而有效缓解了IPO拍卖制下的“投资者参与不确定性问题”。(2)关系机构的捧场报价显著提高了股票发行价格、增加了投行的承销收入;但是当新股交易价格在长期内逐渐向其内在价值水平收敛时,受到关系机构捧场支持越多的IPO新股,其长期回报率相对越低。(3)投行与机构的关系在本质上是互惠的,一旦投行被赋予新股分配权力,它明显倾向于将新股抑价发行带来的巨大利益分配给在前期捧场的关系机构,二者的关系越强,机构报价被认定为“有效报价”的概率越高,而一旦被认定为有效报价,关系机构的新股需求更是将被优先满足。     

Neglected Risk in Financial Innovation: Evidence from Structured Product Counterparty Exposure

We investigate the compensation of counterparty exposure in the prices of structured products. Our analysis reveals that product issuers did not compensate retail investors for counterparty exposure before the Lehman default. Post-Lehman, retail prices have no longer neglected this risk. We also measure retail investor attention towards issuer credit risk. For a given level of issuer credit risk, counterparty exposure is compensated more when attention is higher. Furthermore, issuers tend to construct products with larger counterparty exposure. Overall, our results shed light on the conditions under which financial engineering generates neglected risk.     

Competitive IPOs

Competition between investment banks for lead underwriter mandates in IPOs is fierce, but having committed to a particular bank, the power of the issuer is greatly reduced. Although information revelation theories justify giving the underwriters influence over pricing and allocation, this creates the potential for conflicts of interest. In this clinical paper we analyse an interesting innovation that has been used in recent European IPOs whereby issuers separate the preparation and distribution roles of investment banks, and keep competitive pressure on the banks throughout the issue process. These 'competitive IPOs' allow the issuer greater control and facilitate more contingent fee structures that help to mitigate against 'bait and switch.' But unlike more radical departures from traditional bookbuilding – such as auctions – the competitive IPO is an incremental market-based response to potential conflicts of interest that retains many of the advantages of investment banks' active involvement in issues.     

Money Doctors

We present a new model of investors delegating portfolio management to professionals based on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge fees. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting fees, but because of trust, fees do not fall to costs. In equilibrium, fees are higher for assets with higher expected return, managers on average underperform the market net of fees, but investors nevertheless prefer to hire managers to investing on their own. When investors hold biased expectations, trust causes managers to pander to investor beliefs.     

Overconfidence and Investor Size

Recent research documents that institutional or large investors act as antagonists to other investors by showing opposite trading behaviour following the disclosure of new information. Using an extremely comprehensive official transactions data set from Finland, we set out to explore the interrelation between investor size and behaviour. More specifically, we test whether investor size is positively (negatively) correlated with investor reaction following positive (negative) news. We document robust evidence of that investor size affects investor behaviour under new information, as larger investors on average react more positively (negatively) to good (bad) news than smaller investors. We furthermore find that the performance of smaller, or more overconfident, investors is in general hurt by their behaviour.     

On the Benefits of Concurrent Lending and Underwriting

This paper examines whether there are efficiencies that benefit issuers and underwriters when a financial intermediary concurrently lends to an issuer while also underwriting its public securities offering. We find issuers, particularly noninvestment‐grade issuers for whom informational economies of scope are likely to be large, benefit through lower underwriter fees and discounted loan yield spreads. Underwriters, both commercial banks as well as investment banks, engage in concurrent lending and provide price discounts, albeit in different ways. We find concurrent lending helps underwriters build relationships, increasing the probability of receiving current and future business.     

The Effect of Credit Ratings on Disclosure: Evidence from the Recalibration of Moody's Municipal Ratings

This paper examines how credit rating levels affect municipal debt issuers’ disclosure decisions. Using exogenous upgrades in credit rating levels caused by the recalibration of Moody's municipal ratings scale in 2010, we find that upgraded municipalities significantly reduce their disclosure of required continuing financial information, relative to unaffected municipalities. Consistent with a reduction in debtholders’ demand for information driving these results, the reduction in disclosure is greater when municipal bonds are held by investors who relied more on disclosure ex ante. However, we also find that the reduction in disclosure does not manifest when issuers are monitored by underwriters with greater issuer-specific expertise and when issuers are subject to direct regulatory enforcement through the receipt of federal funding. Overall, our results suggest that higher credit rating levels lower investor demand for disclosure in the municipal market, and highlight the role of underwriters and direct regulatory enforcement in maintaining disclosure levels when investor demand is low.     

Welfare effects of information and rationality in portfolio decisions under parameter uncertainty

We analyse and quantify, in a financial market with parameter uncertainty and for a Constant Relative Risk Aversion investor, the utility effects of two different boundedly rational (i.e. sub-optimal) investment strategies (namely, myopic and unconditional strategies) and compare them with each other and with the utility effect of full information. We show that effects are mainly caused by full information and predictability, being the effect of learning marginal. We also investigate the saver's decision regarding whether to manage her/his portfolio personally (DIY investor) or hire, against the payment of a management fee, a professional investor and find that delegation is mainly motivated by the belief that professional advisors are, depending on investment horizon and risk aversion, either better informed (‘insiders’) or more capable of gathering and processing information, rather than possessing the ability to learn from financial data. In particular, for very short investment horizons, delegation is primarily, if not exclusively, motivated by the beliefs that professional investors are better informed.     

Determinants of individual investment decisions in investment‐based crowdfunding

We investigate determinants of investment decisions in investment‐based (equity and bond) crowdfunding campaigns, using a novel investment‐, investor‐ and campaign‐level database, where equity refers to investments in entrepreneurial start‐ups and bonds to large real estate projects. We find that investors who have higher social interactions invest more. Social interactions are important in an equity crowdfunding context but do not affect participation in bond investments. This is consistent with the view that investors' social networks help reduce information asymmetry. Women invest less in the riskiest (equity) investments but more in safer ones (bonds). These findings are better explained by differences in risk aversion than differences in overconfidence between men and women. Overall, the findings contribute to the understanding of how investment‐based crowdfunding can be a viable source of entrepreneurial finance and how entrepreneurs' campaign decisions affect investor participation in this new form of entrepreneurial finance.     

League table: a study of the competition to underwrite floating rate debt

We find evidence of price and non-price competitions in the competition for market shares among underwriters. The market pricing for underwriter’s service is rationally determined. Gross spread is a function of cost of production and distribution, underwriter’s organizational assets, and the extent of competition. Strategic discount pricing affects market share in the short run. There exists evidence of client loyalty to an underwriter, albeit much weaker than expected. The number of effective competitors for any particular issuer is quite small, ranging from three to five. Commercial banks are more aggressive in pricing to first-time issuers and have gained limited success in attracting clients of investment banks. They expand the market by bringing in new issuers, while causing gross spread to fall.