Gross national happiness as an answer to the Easterlin Paradox?

The Easterlin Paradox refers to the fact that happiness data are typically stationary in spite of considerable increases in income. This amounts to a rejection of the hypothesis that current income is the only argument in the utility function. We find that the happiness responses of around 350,000 people living in the OECD between 1975 and 1997 are positively correlated with the level of income, the welfare state and (weakly) with life expectancy; they are negatively correlated with the average number of hours worked, environmental degradation (measured by SOx emissions), crime, openness to trade, inflation and unemployment; all controlling for country and year dummies. These effects separate across groups in a pattern that appears broadly plausible (e.g., the rich suffer environmental degradation more than the poor). Based on actual changes from 1975 to 1997, small contributions to happiness can be attributed to the increase in income in our sample. Interestingly, the actual changes in several of the ‘omitted variables’ such as life expectancy, hours worked, inflation and unemployment also contribute to happiness over this time period since life expectancy has risen and the others have, on average, fallen. Consequently the unexplained trend in happiness is even bigger than would be predicted if income was the only argument in the utility function. In other words, introducing omitted variables worsens the income-without-happiness paradox.     

What are we learning from the life satisfaction literature?

The recent availability of cross-sectional and longitudinal survey data on life satisfaction in a large number of countries gives us the opportunity to verify empirically (and not just to assume) what matters for individuals and what economists and policymakers should take into account when trying to promote personal and societal well-being. We now have ample evidence, generally robust to different cultural backgrounds, on the effects of some important happiness drivers (income, health, unemployment, marital status, etc.) which can be considered “quasi-stylized facts” of happiness. If economic policies, for many obvious reasons, cannot maximize self-declared life satisfaction as such, we are nonetheless learning a lot from these findings. In particular, results on the relevance of relational goods, on the inflation/unemployment trade-off in terms of welfare and, more in general, on the measurement of the shadow value of non-market goods obtained with life satisfaction estimates are conveying relevant information about individual preferences and what is behind utility functions. Such findings suggest that the anthropological reductionism characterizing most economic models can be misleading and that target indicators of economic policies have to be refocused if we want to minimize the distance between economic development and human progress.     

THE PARTISAN MODEL OF MACROECONOMIC CYCLES: MORE THEORY AND EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES*

The “Partisan Theory” of macroeconomic policy is based on the idea that political parties typically weight nominal and real economic performance differently, with left-party governments being more inclined than right-party ones to pursue expansive policies designed to yield lower unemployment and higher growth, but running the risk of extra inflation. Given suitable assumptions about the structure of the macroeconomy, partisan models imply a political signal in demand management, output and inflation movements originating with shifts in party control of the government. In this paper I develop and test with postwar US data a revised Partisan model that allows for (i) uncertainty among policy authorities about the sustainable output growth rate and therefore about how aggregate demand expansions will be partitioned between extra output and extra inflation, and (ii) ex-post and projective learning and preference adjustment under such uncertainty. Dynamic numerical analysis of a small, stylized political-economic model based on these extensions of Partisan Theory generates within-sample forecasts that correspond remarkably well to the observed pattern of price, output and nominal spending fluctuations under the parties.     

Variable rational partisan cycles and electoral uncertainty

Variable rational partisan theory of political business cycles suggests differences in inflation under left-wing and right-wing governments. Fluctuations of economic activity result from uncertainty about the electoral outcome and the exact timing of elections. However, the core hypothesis that post-electoral booms and recessions depend upon the degree of electoral uncertainty has rarely been tested. Using polling data, we provide empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis of the existence of variable rational partisan cycles.     

How Much Does the State of the Economy Influence the Popularity of Austrian Parties? An Empirical Investigation

We estimate popularity functions for the Austrian parties Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), Social Democrats (SPÖ) and Austrian Freedom party (FPÖ) between 1987 and 2010 (using annual data) as well as vote functions for the same Austrian parties in the 86 election districts in the national elections in 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2008. In most cases we find a statistically significant and theoretically predicted influence of three economic variables, namely the unemployment rate, inflation rate and growth rate of income, on both popularity and voting behavior. However, this influence is not robust and shows a tendency to decline over time.     

Does a factor Phillips curve help? An evaluation of the predictive power for U.S. inflation

This article evaluates various models’ predictive power for U.S. inflation rate using a simulated out-of-sample forecasting framework. The starting point is the traditional unemployment Phillips curve. We show that a factor Phillips curve model is superior to the traditional Phillips curve, and its performance is comparable to other factor models. We find that a factor AR model is superior to the factor Phillips curve model, and is the best bivariate or factor model at longer horizons. Finally, we investigate a New Keynesian Phillips curve model, and find that its forecasting performance dominates all other models at the longer horizons.     

Happy partisans and extreme political views: The impact of national versus local representation on well-being

The political party of elected officials can affect the happiness of the voting public through several different channels. Partisan voters will be happier whenever a member of their party controls political office regardless of the policies implemented. It is hypothesized that congruence between individual party identity and state politician affiliations should have a greater impact on citizen happiness than congruence with politicians at the national level due to results from the literature on Tiebout sorting. It is further hypothesized that individuals with extreme ideological views may report greater happiness as their ideology fulfills basic psychological needs for certainty and structure. Using data from the Generalized Social Survey the effect of party congruence of individuals with national and state politicians on happiness is estimated. The effect of extreme ideological political views on happiness is also estimated. Results find that congruence with presidential party affiliation has a much greater impact on happiness than congruence with national legislative affiliation, gubernatorial, or state legislative affiliation contradicting the hypothesis. Those who possess extreme political views are also found to report higher levels of happiness.     

Some empirical evidence on the determinants of incomes policies in the UK

A model is proposed in which incomes policy is the endogenous variable and is explained by political and economic variables. The empirical results show that the party in power, inflation, wage change and unemployment effect the chances of an incomes policy.     

Party hacks and true believers: The effect of party affiliation on political preferences

This paper examines the effect of party affiliation on an individual's political views. To do this, we exploit the party realignment that occurred in the U.S. due to abortion becoming a more prominent and highly partisan issue over time. We show that abortion was not a highly partisan issue in 1982, but a person's abortion views in 1982 led many to switch parties over time as the two main parties diverged in their stances on this issue. We find that voting for a given political party in 1996, due to the individual's initial views on abortion in 1982, has a substantial effect on a person's political, social, and economic attitudes in 1997. These findings are stronger for highly partisan political issues, and are robust to controlling for a host of personal views and characteristics in 1982 and 1997. As individuals realigned their party affiliation in accordance with their initial abortion views, their other political views followed suit.     

Inequality and the business cycle: A consumption viewpoint

Using Consumer Expenditure Survey data, we obtain summary measures of the distributions of income and consumption for each quarter between 1980 and 1994. We find that the trends in the distribution of income and consumption and the response of these trends to changes in inflation and unemployment were similar during this period. We find that unemployment does not significantly affect the inequality measures and that inflation has a progressive effect, i.e., that a decrease in inflation is associated with an increase in inequality. Finally, we find that the relationship between inequality and macroeconomic variables during the 1990s may be similar to the relationship that existed prior to 1980. First version received: September 1996/final version received: September 1997     

Downward nominal wage rigidity in Canada: Evidence against a “greasing effect”

The existence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) has often been used to justify a positive inflation target. It is traditionally assumed that positive inflation could “grease the wheels” of the labour market by putting downward pressure on real wages, easing labour market adjustments during a recession. A rise in the inflation target would attenuate the long‐run level of unemployment and hasten economic recovery after an adverse shock. Following Daly and Hobijn (2014), we re‐examine these issues in a model that accounts for precautionary motives in wage‐setting behaviour. We confirm that DNWR generates a long‐run negative relationship between inflation and unemployment, in line with previous contributions to the literature. However, we also find that the increase in the number of people bound by DNWR following a negative demand shock rises with the inflation target, offsetting the beneficial effects a higher inflation target has on closing the unemployment gap. As an implication, contrary to previous contributions that neglected precautionary behaviour, the speed at which unemployment returns back to pre‐crisis levels during recessions is relatively unaffected by variations in the inflation target.     

Taylor rules and the Great Inflation

Can US monetary policy in the 1970s be described by a stabilizing Taylor rule when policy is evaluated with real-time inflation and output gap data? Using economic research on the full employment level of unemployment and the natural rate of unemployment published between 1970 and 1977 to construct real-time output gap measures for periods of peak unemployment, we find that the Federal Reserve did not follow a Taylor rule if appropriate measures are used. We estimate Taylor rules and find no evidence that monetary policy stabilized inflation, even allowing for changes in the inflation target. While monetary policy was stabilizing with respect to inflation forecasts, the forecasts systematically under-predicted inflation following the 1970s recessions and this does not constitute evidence of stabilizing policy. We also find that the Federal Reserve responded too strongly to negative output gaps.     

Inequality and happiness: are Europeans and Americans different?

We study the effect of the level of inequality in society on individual well-being using a total of 123,668 answers to a survey question about “happiness”. We find that individuals have a lower tendency to report themselves happy when inequality is high, even after controlling for individual income, a large set of personal characteristics, and year and country (or, in the case of the US, state) dummies. The effect, however, is more precisely defined statistically in Europe than in the US. In addition, we find striking differences across groups. In Europe, the poor and those on the left of the political spectrum are unhappy about inequality; whereas in the US the happiness of the poor and of those on the left is uncorrelated with inequality. Interestingly, in the US, the rich are bothered by inequality. Comparing across continents, we find that left-wingers in Europe are more hurt by inequality than left-wingers in the US. And the poor in Europe are more concerned with inequality than the poor in America, an effect that is large in terms of size but is only significant at the 10% level. We argue that these findings are consistent with the perception (not necessarily the reality) that Americans have been living in a mobile society, where individual effort can move people up and down the income ladder, while Europeans believe that they live in less mobile societies.     

Don’t worry,be happy? Happiness and reemployment

This study investigates the effect of unemployed individuals’ happiness on their future labor market outcomes. It therefore acknowledges the possibility that happiness could also be a driver of behavior and influence life's outcomes. I use rich survey data from 2007 to 2009 of entrants into unemployment in Germany (the IZA Evaluation Dataset S) to calculate residual happiness, which displays higher (or lower) satisfaction levels than would be predicted by a number of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. I find a statistically significant inverted U-shaped effect of residual happiness on an unemployed individual's future reemployment probability and reentry wage, even after controlling for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, labor market histories and future job prospects. Further investigation offers three mechanisms that have not been previously shown in this context: (a) happiness is mainly a predictor for exit into self-employment rather than regular employment; (b) only male unemployed experience an effect of happiness on reemployment; and (c) the concept of locus of control and the personality traits of neuroticism and extraversion are main drivers of the baseline effect on regular reemployment and are able to explain the effect on reemployment for males.     

Nonlinearities in the U.S. wage Phillips curve

We examine the relationship between wage inflation and the unemployment rate in the U.S. economy for the 1964–2014 period by means of a three-regime threshold regression model. The estimated threshold parameters suggest that this relationship changes when the unemployment rate transitions between regimes defined by 5.61% and 7.63%. During mild recessions and their subsequent recoveries, the time-varying estimates of the model indicate a negative relationship between both variables, consistent with the implications of a wage Phillips curve (WPC) derived from the standard New Keynesian model with staggered wage setting in Galí (2011). However, we find that this relationship breaks down during deep recessions and their recovery periods, which explains the difference between wage inflation predicted by standard New Keynesian models and the observed low wage growth in the aftermath of the ‘Great Recession’. This finding and the fact that statistical tests strongly favor our three-regime model suggest that linear and two-regime models are insufficient to account for all the variability in the relationship between wage inflation and unemployment.     

Neighbors and friends: How do European political parties respond to globalization?

This paper explores the relationship between globalization and party positions accounting for potential differences between left- and right-wing parties. The analysis is based on a panel model of 36 political parties in 18 Western European countries between 1970 and 2015. We find that right-wing parties move leftward in response to globalization, while left-wing parties do not alter their position. Additionally, we find that ideological party positions are affected by foreign parties’ positions of the same ideological bloc. These findings indicate that there is a convergence towards the left of the political spectrum due to right-wing party moderation.     

Revisiting the welfare effects of eliminating business cycles

We investigate the welfare effects of eliminating business cycles in a model with substantial consumer heterogeneity. The heterogeneity arises from uninsurable and idiosyncratic uncertainty in preferences and employment status. We calibrate the model to match the distribution of wealth in U.S. data and features of transitions between employment and unemployment. In comparison with much of the literature, we find rather large effects. For our benchmark model, we find welfare effects that, on average across all consumers, are of a bit more than one order of magnitude larger than those computed by Lucas [Lucas Jr., R.E., 1987. Models of Business Cycles. Basil Blackwell, New York]. When we distinguish long- from short-term unemployment, long-term unemployment being distinguished by poor (and highly procyclical) employment prospects and low unemployment compensation, the average gain from eliminating cycles is as much as 1% in consumption equivalents. In addition, in both models, there are large differences across groups: very poor consumers gain a lot when cycles are removed (the long-term unemployed as much as around 30%), as do very rich consumers, whereas the majority of consumers—the “middle class”—sees much smaller gains from removing cycles. Inequality also rises substantially upon removing cycles.     

PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND THE PHILLIPS CURVE: A REASSESSMENT OF THE US EXPERIENCE

In this paper, we analyse a new Phillips curve (NPC) model and demonstrate that (i) frictional growth, i.e., the interplay of wage staggering and money growth, generates a non‐vertical NPC in the long run and (ii) the Phillips curve (PC) shifts with productivity growth. On this basis we estimate a dynamic system of macro‐labour equations to evaluate the slope of the PC and explain the evolution of inflation and unemployment in the USA from 1970 to 2006. Because our empirical methodology relies heavily on impulse response functions, it represents a synthesis of the traditional structural modelling and (structural) vector autoregressions. We find that the PC is downward‐sloping with a slope of ?3.58 in the long run. Furthermore, during the stagflating 1970s, the productivity slowdown contributed substantially to the increases in both unemployment and inflation, whereas the monetary expansion was quite ineffective and led mainly to higher inflation. Finally, the monetary expansion and productivity speedup of the roaring 1990s were both responsible for the significant lowering of the unemployment rate.     

HOW HAS THE CRISIS OF 2008–09 AFFECTED SUBJECTIVE WELL‐BEING? EVIDENCE FROM 25 OECD COUNTRIES

This paper uses life satisfaction data of almost 140,000 individuals in 25 OECD countries to study how changes in the rates of GDP growth, unemployment, and inflation during the macroeconomic crisis of 2008–09 have affected subjective well‐being. The relative contributions of the three macroeconomic variables to individuals’ life satisfaction are used to assess how each country performed on balance during the crisis. This approach follows a recent trend of using subjective well‐being data for monitoring economic performance and for policy appraisal. We find that in the countries most strongly affected by the crisis, the effects on an average citizen's well‐being may be of a similar magnitude as the effects of the most serious personal life events. The main driver of these effects is the drop in GDP, whose impact is aggravated by the increase of unemployment. Though the inflation rate went down in several of the countries, the effect was too weak to significantly reduce the negative effect of the changes in GDP and unemployment. The results show that GDP fluctuations are important drivers of subjective well‐being.