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1.
Gerhard Sorger 《Economic Theory》1998,11(1):79-100
Summary. A general model of non-cooperating agents exploiting a renewable resource is considered. Assuming that the resource is sufficiently productive we prove that there exists a continuum of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE). Although these equilibria lead to over-exploitation one can approximate the efficient solution by MPNE both in the state space and the payoff space. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for maximal exploitation of the resource to qualify as a MPNE. This condition is satisfied if there are sufficiently many players, or if the players are sufficiently impatient, or if the capacity of each player is sufficiently high.Received: November 1, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
2.
Summary. This paper analyzes two equivalent equilibrium notions under asymmetric information: risk neutral rational expectations equilibria
(rn-REE), and common knowledge equilibria. We show that the set of fully informative rn-REE is a singleton, and we provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative rn-REE. In a companion paper (DeMarzo and Skiadas
(1996)) we show that equilibrium prices for the larger class of quasi-complete economies can be characterized as rn-REE. Examples
of quasi-complete economies include the type of economies for which demand aggregation in the sense of Gorman is possible
(with or without asymmetric information), the setting of the Milgrom and Stokey no-trade theorem, an economy giving rise to
the CAPM with asymmetric information but no normality assumptions, the simple exponential-normal model of Grossman (1976),
and a case of no aggregate endowment risk. In the common-knowledge context, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for a common knowledge posterior estimate, given common priors, to coincide with the full communication posterior estimate.
Received: May 29, 1997; revised version: July 18, 1997 相似文献
3.
Summary. This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning
to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a
sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment.
Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: May 28, 1997 相似文献
4.
Summary. We provide rankings across uncertain outputs generated by agents functioning within the Principal-Agent paradigm. For agents who are identical except for their productivity, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for an agent to be preferred is that her output dominates that of lower agents in the sense of First Degree Stochastic Dominance (FDSD) at every level of effort. Sufficient conditions are based on Blackwells ranking of information systems and involves a characterization of FDSD using stochastic matrices. Our conditions for ranking outputs extends earlier results concerning the value of information within the agency framework. We also show how our techniques can be adapted to rank agents even if the first-order approach for determining optimal contracts fails to hold.Received: April 2, 1996; revised version: October 30, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
5.
Summary. A sunspot equilibrium (SSE) is based on some extrinsic randomizing device (RD). We analyze the robustness of SSE. (1) We say that an SSE allocation is robust to refinements if it is also an SSE allocation based on any refinement of its RD. (2) We introduce two core concepts for analyzing the robustness of SSE in the face of cooperative-coalition formation. In the first, the blocking allocations are based on the RD that defines the SSE. In the second (stronger) core concept,
coalitions select their own RDs. For the convex economy with restricted market participation, SSE allocations are robust under
each of the definitions and the cores converge on replication of the economy to the set of SSE allocations. For the economy
with an indivisible good, SSE allocations are not always robust. We provide examples of each of the following: (i) an SSE allocation that is not robust to refinement, (ii)
an SSE allocation that is in neither core, (iii) an SSE allocation that is in the first core, but not in the second, and (iv)
a core that does not converge upon replication to the set of SSE allocations.
Received: July 31, 1995; revised version August 30, 1996 相似文献
6.
Summary. In a Bayesian model of group decision-making, dependence among the agents' types has been shown to have a beneficial effect
on the design of incentive compatible mechanisms that achieve the efficient choice associated with complete information. This
effect is shown here to depend as much upon the use of large monetary transfers among the agents as it does upon dependence:
if the transfers are bounded in magnitude, then nonexistence in the case of independence of an efficient, incentive compatible,
ex ante budget-balanced and interim individually rational mechanism is robust to the introduction of a small amount of dependence
among types. This robustness result supports the use of the simplifying assumption of independence in mechanism design.
Received: October 28, 1996; revised version: May 28, 1997 相似文献
7.
Paul J. Brewer 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):41-92
Summary. Several `smart market' mechanisms have recently appeared in the literature. These mechanisms combine a computer network that
collects bids from agents with a central computer that selects a schedule of bids to fill based upon maximization of revenue
or trading surplus. Potential problems exist when this optimization involves combinatorial difficulty sufficient to overwhelm
the central computer. This paper explores the use of a computation procuring clock auction to induce human agents to approximate
the solutions to discrete constrained optimization problems. Economic and computational properties of the auction are studied
through a series of laboratory experiments. The experiments are designed around a potential application of the auction as
a secondary institution that approximates the solution to difficult computational problems that occur within the primary `smart
market', and show that the auction is effective and robust in eliciting and processing suggestions for improved schedules.
Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: September 30, 1997 相似文献
8.
Summary. We investigate, in an experimental setting, the behavior of single decision makers who at discrete time intervals over an
“infinite” horizon may choose one action from a set of possible actions where this set is constant over time, i.e. a bandit
problem. Two bandit environments are examined, one in which the predicted behavior should always be myopic (the two-armed
bandit) and the other in which the predicted behavior should never be myopic (the one-armed bandit). We also investigate the
comparative static predictions as the underlying parameters of the bandit environments are changed. The aggregate results
show that the behavior in the two bandit environments are quantitatively different and in the direction of the theoretical
predictions.
Received: October, 27, 1994; revised version February 27, 1996 相似文献
9.
Diana Richards 《Economic Theory》1997,10(1):185-193
Summary. This paper contributes to the recent focus on dynamics in noncooperative games when players use inductive learning. The most
well-known inductive learning rule, Brown’s fictitious play, is known to converge for games, yet many examples exist where fictitious play reasoning fails to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Building on ideas
from chaotic dynamics, this paper develops a geometric conceptualization of instability in games, allowing for a reinterpretation
of existing results and suggesting avenues for new results.
Received: October 27, 1995 revised version May 2, 1996 相似文献
10.
Summary. This paper derives the set of equilibria for common agency games in which the principals compete in piece rates and lump
sum payments and one principal has incomplete information about the agent's preferences. We show that the uninformed principal's
expected payoff function is discontinuous with respect to the identity of the marginal agent type. This discontinuity is shown
to support an open set of equilibria. For games in which the first-best equilibrium strategies are measurable with respect
to the uninformed principal's information partition, this result implies the existence of an open set of Pareto inefficient
equilibria.
Received: December 5, 1995; revised version August 18, 1996 相似文献
11.
Kin Chung Lo 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):1-20
Summary. Traditional analysis of auctions assumes that each bidder's beliefs about opponents' valuations are represented by a probability
measure. Motivated by experimental findings such as the Ellsberg Paradox, this paper examines the consequences of relaxing
this assumption in the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values. The multiple priors model
of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18 (1989), 141–153] is adopted specifically to represent the bidders' (and the auctioneer's) preferences. The unique equilibrium
bidding strategy in the first price auction is derived. Moreover, under an interesting parametric specialization of the model,
it is shown that the first price auction Pareto dominates the second price auction.
Received: December 15, 1995; revised version: February 19, 1997 相似文献
12.
Summary. We present a consistent pure-exchange general equilibrium model where agents may not be able to foresee all possible future
contingencies. In this context, even with nominal assets and complete asset markets, an equilibrium may not exist without
appropriate assumptions. Specific examples are provided.
An existence result is proved under the main assumption that there are sufficiently many states that all the agents foresee.
An intrinsic feature of the model is bankruptcy, which agents may involuntarily experience in the unforeseen states.
Received: April 23, 1997; revised version: May 19, 1997 相似文献
13.
Summary. We show that the set of balanced steady state (resp. golden rule) equilibria, parameterized by endowments, of stationary
overlapping-generations economies are smooth manifolds diffeomorphic to Euclidean spaces. These properties extend similar
properties of the Walrasian equilibria and enable one to apply the natural projection approach to the study of these equilibria.
Received: October 30, 1995; revised version: October 10, 1996 相似文献
14.
John Wooders 《Economic Theory》1998,11(1):215-224
Summary. We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: September 24, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
15.
Recursive utility and preferences for information 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Costis Skiadas 《Economic Theory》1998,12(2):293-312
Summary. This paper presents an axiomatic foundation for recursive utility that captures the role of the timing of resolution of uncertainty
without relying on exogenously specified objective beliefs. Two main representation results are proved. In the first one,
future utility enters the recursion through the type of general aggregators considered in Skiadas (1997a), and as a result
the formulation is purely ordinal and free of any probabilities. In the second representation these aggregators are conditional
expectations relative to subjective beliefs. A new recursive representation incorporating disappointment aversion is also
suggested. The main methodological innovation of the paper derives from the fact that the basic objects of choice are taken
to be pairs of state-contingent consumption plans and information filtrations, rather than the temporal (objective) lotteries
of the existing literature. It is shown that this approach has the additional benefit of being directly applicable to the
continuous-time version of recursive utility developed by Duffie and Epstein (1992).
Received: February 18, 1997; revised version: July 18, 1997 相似文献
16.
James A. Dearden 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):189-198
Summary. A group of individuals meet to share the cost and determine output allocations of a partial-excludable public good. We demonstrate
that, for general cost functions and preferences that satisfy the Spence-Mirlees sorting condition, the serial cost-sharing
formula (Moulin, 1994) has remarkable incentive properties. First, a direct economic mechanism that uses the serial formula is coalition strategy-proof, envy-free and satisfies the stand-alone property.
Second, the serial mechanism involves partial exclusion, which is important for the reduction of the free-rider problem.
Received: June 10, 1996; revised version; February 11, 1997 相似文献
17.
Summary. Given a map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of a game, each component of the equilibrium set has an associated index,
defined as the local degree of the map. This note shows that for a two-player game, every map with the same roots induces
the same index. Moreover, this index agrees with the Shapley index constructed from the Lemke-Howson algorithm.
Received: May 30, 1996; revised version June 25, 1996 相似文献
18.
Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Summary. Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit
auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria
in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria
for the uniform price auction.
Received: July 31, 1995; revised version: May 28, 1997 相似文献
19.
Summary. We consider a k-player sequential bargaining model in which both the cake size and the identity of the proposer are determined by a stochastic process. For the case where the cake is a simplex (of random size) and the players share a common discount factor, we establish the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect payoff which is efficient and characterize the conditions under which agreement is delayed. We also investigate how the equilibrium payoffs depend on the order in which the players move and on the correlation between the identity of the proposer and the cake size.Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: December 31, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
20.
We study a duopoly model of investment, in which each player learns about the quality of a common value project by observing some public background information, and possibly the experience of his rival. Investment costs are private information, and the background signal takes the form of a Poisson process conditional on the quality of the project being low. The resulting attrition game has a unique, symmetric equilibrium, which depends on initial public beliefs. We determine the impact of changes in the cost and signal distributions on investment timing, and how equilibrium is affected when a first-mover advantage is introduced. 相似文献