Fiscal multipliers in good times and bad times

This paper estimates the magnitudes of government spending and tax multipliers within a regime-switching framework for the U.S. economy during the period 1949:1–2006:4. Our results show that the magnitudes of spending multipliers are larger during periods of low economic activity, while the magnitudes of tax multipliers are larger during periods of high economic activity. We also show that the magnitudes of fiscal multipliers got smaller for episodes of low growth, while they got larger for episodes of high growth in the post 1980 period. Analyzing the effects of government spending and taxes on consumption and investment spending indicates that the magnitude of the effects of fiscal shocks on consumption and investment is very small.     

Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals

Summary. In this paper we study the real and financial effects of insider trading in a Static, Kyle-type model. In our model the insider is also the manager of the firm. Hence the insider chooses both the amount of the real output to be produced and the amount of the stock of the firm to trade. The aim of the paper is to study the relationship between financial decisions and real decisions. In particular, we examine how insider trading on the stock market affects the real output and price and how the real decision making affects the financial variables, such as the extent of insider trading, stock prices, and the stock pricing rule of the market maker. In the model, the market maker observes two correlated signals: the total order flow and the market price of the real good. We study the informativeness of the stock price and the effects on insider's profits. We also construct a compensation scheme that aligns the interests of the insider and the firm. Finally, we generalize the pricing rule set up by a competitive market maker and analyze the comparative statics of the model. Received: October 3, 1999: revised version: December 1, 1999     

Knowledge flows and insider trading

Much insider trading literature focuses on the redistribution of monetary rents. This focus has led to ambiguous and conflicting results, unable to identify who the clear winners and losers of insider trading legislation are. Lacking any clearly defined beneficiary, an analysis of the origins and continued support of such legislation is lacking. This paper rectifies this omission by reassessing the involved agents not in light of their relationship to a company, but from all roles of the knowledge transmission process: creator, distributor and user. Information distributors—large news companies and investment houses—are argued to be sufficiently well organized to lobby for maintained and strengthened legislation to protect rents that would otherwise be greatly diminished.     

Stackelberg financial-leader in insider trading model

In this paper, we extend the Jain-Mirman [Jain, N., & Mirman, L. (2000). Real and financial effects of insider trading with correlated signals. Economic Theory, 16, 333–353, Jain, N., & Mirman, L. (2002). Effects of insider trading under different market structures. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 42, 19–39] and the Daher-Mirman [Daher, W., & Mirman, L. (2006). Cournot duopoly and insider trading with two insiders. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 46, 530–551, Daher, W., & Mirman, L. (2007). Market structure and insider trading. International Review of Economics and Finance, 16, 306–331] papers on competition, and postulate that the competition among the insiders in the financial market be Stackelberg. However, an owner high in the organizational hierarchy, who designs manager compensation mechanisms and chooses a manager to serve his purpose, should have information on the manager's reaction and act as a Stackelberg leader in the financial sector. We show that owner's profit can definitely enlarged while the manager's profits may decrease or increase depending on the variances in the two sectors, which are the exogenous parameters.     

On insider trading and belief evolution

In a market with stochastic demand with seller competition at most one seller can acquire costly information about demand. Other sellers entertain idiosyncratic beliefs about the market demand and the probability that an informed seller is trading in the market. These idiosyncratic beliefs co-evolve with the potential insider’s inclination to acquire information.True demand expectations (in the Bayesian sense) are not evolutionarily stable when beliefs, via revelation, can be used to commit to more aggressive behavior. The commitment effect fades away in large markets and has the same direction for both strategic substitutes and complements. Whether one observes an insider, in the long run, depends on information costs. For strategic substitutes insider activity benefits the whole population whereas the uninformed sellers could gain even more than the insider.     

Informal pay gaps in good and bad times: Evidence from Russia

Informal work is traditionally large in Russia and has further increased in the recent years. We explore the implications of this shift in terms of wage dynamics. Our characterization is based on the estimation of informal pay gaps at the mean and along the wage distribution, relying on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey for 2003–2017. Our approach comprises three original features: we rely on unconditional quantile effects of informality, we incorporate quantile-specific fixed effects using a tractable approach, and we suggest a treatment of the incidental parameter bias. Over the whole period, informal wage penalties are relatively small and do not suggest heavily segmented labor markets, even at low wage levels. Yet, in the past decade, a substantial negative selection into informal employment and self-employment has taken place, on average and especially at low earnings. Economic downturns and labor market policies have likely contributed to the shakeout of less productive workers in the formal sector, making the low-tier informal sector more of a last resort.     

Contractual restrictions on insider trading: a welfare analysis

Summary. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of permitting firms to negotiate contractually the right to allow corporate insiders to trade shares in the firm on private information. A computational framework is employed to (i) analyze formally the effects of insider trading on managerial investment choice, the informational efficiency of stock prices, and the welfare of all investor types; and (ii) examine the effectiveness of various compensation schemes (such as stock and insider trading rights) to mitigate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. I show that shareholders will typically choose not to grant insider trading rights to managers. This decision is socially optimal. Received: September 23, 2000; revised version: December 12, 2000     

International stock return predictability: on the role of the United States in bad and good times

In this article, we document the asymmetric role that the US stock market plays in the international predictability of excess stock returns during recession and expansion periods. Most of the positive evidence accrues during the periods of recessions in the United States. During the expansions, there is only a limited evidence supporting the importance of lagged US returns in predictability of stock returns in 10 industrialized countries.     

Even the bad times are good: a behavioural theory of transformation pressure

A theory of transformation pressure was developed in Swedenin the 1990s which suggested that structural changes, rationalisationsand innovations are stimulated by profit crises, arising, forexample, from negative demand shocks and restrictive economicpolicies. Firms will then either become more creative or abandonan overconfident, risk-prone and irrational status quo strategy.A qualified theory states that productivity will increase asexternal pressures become stronger but only up to a certainpoint. A competing qualified theory maintains that productivityis maximised if periods of hard pressure are succeeded by periodsof financial and technical consolidation, scale advantages andweaker demands for defensive actions to raise productivity.     

Price efficiency and trading behavior in limit order markets with competing insiders

We study price efficiency and trading behavior in laboratory limit order markets with asymmetrically informed traders. Markets differ in the number of insiders present and in the subset of traders who receive information about the number of insiders present. We observe that price efficiency (i) is the higher the higher the number of insiders in the market but (ii) is unaffected by changes in the subset of traders who know about the number of insiders present. (iii) Independent of the number of insiders, price efficiency increases gradually over time. (iv) The insiders’ information is reflected in prices via limit (market) orders if the asset’s value is inside (outside) the bid-ask spread. (v) In situations where limit and market orders yield positive profits, insiders clearly prefer market orders, indicating a strong desire for immediate transactions.     

Determinants of government bond spreads in the euro area: in good times as in bad

Government bond spreads increased rapidly during the financial turmoil in the euro area. In general, government bond spreads in the euro area are attributed to solvency and liquidity risks and determinants thereof. This paper proposes the use of latent processes to model the time variation present in the evaluation of these determinants. In contrast to approaches using global measures like the US corporate bond spreads or short-term interest rates to approximate time variation, our model is also flexible enough to deal with the unfolding of the financial crisis. The findings suggest that the expected debt-to-GDP ratio explains a major part of the differences in bond yields in the euro area between 2003 and the unfolding of the financial crises. Coefficients for many determinants increased rapidly during the financial crises. Especially market capitalization gained relative importance in winter 2008/2009.     

On the irrelevance of insider trading for managerial compensation

We examine changes in the compensation of CEOs of German firms after the prohibition of insider trading (IT) in 1994 to test whether IT is a relevant compensation device. While we find that the performance elasticity of explicit CEO pay slightly increases subsequent to the IT law adoption for non-financial firms indicating an incentive-substitution effect, the overall change in levels seems modest. We explore the hypothesis that compensation for forgone IT profits in general is small because typically, firms lack at least one of the two necessary conditions for profitable IT: the existence of a liquid stock market imposing low costs of transactions and the presence of a small number of co-insiders, preventing the information rent to be competed away. Based on a difference-in-difference estimation, we indeed find that explicit pay increases more strongly for intensely traded firms and decreases for non-financial firms and insurance companies with a higher number of co-insiders. The combined effect is relatively small except for firms with the most liquid shares.     

Favor trading in public good provision

Favor trading is common. We do something nice for someone and they do something nice in return. Several motives might underlie such behavior, including altruism, strategic motives, and direct or indirect positive reciprocity. It is not yet well-understood how these fit together to affect behavior, how they interact in various institutional structures, and how they play out over time. We use a laboratory experiment to study the elements and dynamics of favor trading in a particular setting: the private provision of a public good. In our experiment, giving subjects the ability to practice targeted reciprocity by making a simple, low-cost change in information provision increases contributions to the public good by 14 %. Subjects reward group members who have previously been generous to them and withhold rewards from ungenerous group members. Strategic concerns cannot explain all of this behavior, and it must be at least partly due to direct reciprocity. When someone cannot directly benefit from favor trading, he gives much less to the public good. People thus excluded from the “circle of reciprocity” provide a clean and strict test of indirect reciprocity. Contrary to previous studies in the literature, we do not observe indirect reciprocity.     

A game theory model of regulatory response to insider trading

We develop a model which can help in explaining the evolving regulatory regime around insider trading. We form a simple sequential game-theoretical model of insider trading transactions and, utilizing Monte Carlo simulation to determine equilibrium, we show that costly investigations and low penalties incentivize traders to engage in illegal transactions. While the model helps to explain stiffer action by regulatory bodies, the question remains as to whether the elevated penalty levels are sufficient to prevent further insider trading.     

Remarks on good vs. bad characteristics in vertical differentiation

In a recent paper, Garella and Lambertini [Economic Letters 65 (1999) 245] claim that we should distinguish between good and bad characteristics in analysing the incentives for a duopoly to vertically differentiate their products. We prove here that the results obtained by the authors are false and we show that in the context of their model, maximum differentiation should appear whether characteristic is good or bad.     

Corruption: The good,the bad,and the uncertain

This paper argues that the relationship between corruption and economic growth is dependent upon the uncertainty involved. Employing data on a cross‐section of countries, this paper uses an interaction between the frequency of bribery payments and the uncertainty regarding the delivery of the service in exchange for these bribes to show that corruption has a negative association with growth unless the uncertainty is minimal. Furthermore, the negative association becomes larger in magnitude with higher levels of uncertainty. At extremely high levels of uncertainty a relatively small increase in corruption, equivalent to moving from Sweden to the United States for example, is associated with economically large decreases in economic growth.     

Good skills in bad times: Cyclical skill mismatch and the long-term effects of graduating in a recession

We show that cyclical skill mismatch, defined as mismatch between the skills supplied by college graduates and skills demanded by hiring industries, is an important mechanism behind persistent career loss from graduating in recessions. Using Norwegian data, we find a strong countercyclical pattern of skill mismatch among college graduates. Initial labor market conditions have a declining but persistent effect on match quality and skill mismatch early in their careers. Match quality of the first employment may explain up to half of the short-term and most of the long-term earnings loss from graduating in a recession.     

The effects of multilateral trading systems on risk and return in equity markets

The event study methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) is adopted and augmented to evaluate the effect of the launch of multilateral trading systems on risk and return in equity markets. The methodology is supplemented with various techniques, such as the nonparametric ranking test and kernel regression, to find out if announcements about the introduction of Chi-X Australia generated abnormal returns (ARs). Asset pricing models are fitted with interaction variables, while GARCH, threshold ARCH (TARCH), exponential GARCH (EGARCH) and power-ARCH (PARCH) are used to determine changes in systematic risk. We find evidence in favour of Fisher’s separation theorem and detect a new market anomaly, which we call the ‘Fisher market anomaly’. Our results show that Chi-X system testings affect ARs. Consistent with the adaptive expectations theory, we confirm that the first announcement about the launch of Chi-X affected systematic risk the most. In addition, we identify industry and firm effects in risk analysis.