ECB repo rate setting during the financial crisis

I estimate a reaction function for the ECB using an ordered logit model for the period 1999-2009. Allowing for a smooth transition from one set of parameters to another, I detect a rapid change in the middle of 2008.     

Links between trust in the ECB and its interest rate policy

We analyse determinants of trust in the European Central Bank (ECB). Our main finding is that when households have pessimistic expectations, aggressive cuts in interest rates have an adverse effect on their trust in central bank. This result is in accordance with the ‘lack-of-confidence shock’ hypothesis developed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) and in contrast with the ‘fundamental shock’ hypothesis which implies positive effects of aggressive cuts for trust in the ECB. The result is robust to various changes in the modelling approach.     

Monetary policy in a financial crisis

What are the economic effects of an interest rate cut when an economy is in the midst of a financial crisis? Under what conditions will a cut stimulate output and employment, and raise welfare? Under what conditions will a cut have the opposite effects? We answer these questions in a general class of open economy models, where a financial crisis is modelled as a time when collateral constraints are suddenly binding. We find that when there are frictions in adjusting the level of output in the traded good sector and in adjusting the rate at which that output can be used in other parts of the economy, then a cut in the interest rate is most likely to result in a welfare-reducing fall in output and employment. When these frictions are absent, a cut in the interest rate improves asset positions and promotes a welfare-increasing economic expansion.     

Monetary policy uncertainty and interest rate targeting

This paper studies the issue of monetary delegation in the case where central banker’s preferences are uncertain. A distinctive feature of the analysis is that it introduces nominal interest rate targets to the monetary delegation scheme in addition to linear contracts, quadratic punishments, and inflation targets. This paper shows that the implementation of interest rate targeting will improve social welfare since it leads the central bank to make smaller interventions, which limits the scope for the central bank’s uncertain preferences to impact the economy.     

Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting

This paper shows that it is preferable for monetary policy to be conducted by a committee instead of a single policy maker if there is uncertainty about potential output. We examine three decision procedures - an optimal procedure, averaging and voting - and find that the latter is the appropriate way to reach decisions if policy makers are not equally skilled. Finally, we demonstrate that efficient decision procedures reduce the persistence of shocks.     

Competition policy: ten lessons learnt from the financial crisis

The financial crisis brought great challenges also for competition policy. The aim of this paper is to summarize the most important insights for competition policy that could be derived from the turbulent period 2008–2010. The financial crisis is seen as project that demanded sound management from competition policy and enforcement. The insights will be presented in the instructive form of ‘lessons learnt’ which represents a common approved project management technique. We come to the result that the financial crisis is not the result of ‘too much competition’, but of regulatory failure and that the main answers to the financial crisis have to come from ‘smart regulation’. The relaxation of competition policy would be the wrong policy response in troubled times since competition policy can play an important role in bringing the crisis economy back on track. In contrast to banking we see no economic rationale for rescue packages for other economic sectors by referring to systemic risk. The renaissance of industrial policy is viewed with great skepticism since empirical evidence shows that the effort of picking ‘winners’ all too often results in saving ‘losers’.     

The eurozone financial crisis: debt,credit ratings and monetary and fiscal policy

This paper discusses the eurozone financial crisis. It argues that it was largely the result of a common monetary policy not being suitable for individual countries which led to excessive private and public borrowing and a debt crisis. Neither borrowing rates nor credit ratings anticipated the crisis. Fundamental changes to eurozone governance are being proposed. The paper examines whether instead there might be a market solution if financial markets priced risk better. Accordingly, a more timely way of obtaining credit ratings is shown.     

Bank behavior, incomplete interest rate pass-through, and the cost channel of monetary policy transmission

This paper employs a New Keynesian DSGE model to explore the role of banks within the cost channel of monetary policy transmission for shaping the interest rate pass-through from money market rates to loan rates. Banks extend loans to firms in an environment of monopolistic competition by setting their loan rates in a staggered way, which means that the adjustment of the aggregate loan rate to a monetary policy shock is sticky. We estimate the model for the euro area by adopting a minimum distance approach. Our findings exhibit that (i) financial costs are an important factor for price changes, (ii) frictions in the loan market have an effect on the propagation of monetary policy shocks as the pass-through from a change in money market rates to loan rates is incomplete, and (iii) the strength of the cost channel is mitigated as banks shelter firms from monetary policy shocks by smoothing loan rates.     

Investment and interest rate policy: a discrete time analysis

This paper analyzes the restrictions necessary to ensure that the interest rate policy rule used by the central bank does not introduce local real indeterminacy into the economy. It conducts the analysis in a Calvo-style sticky price model. A key innovation is to add investment spending to the analysis. In this environment, local real indeterminacy is much more likely. In particular, all forward-looking interest rate rules are subject to real indeterminacy.     

辽宁省应对金融危机财政政策效果的实证分析

本文重点定量探讨了辽宁省财政政策实施效果.利用协整关系检验表明,辽宁省的财政支出、货币供给、税收以及实际GDP之间存在显著的协整关系,财政支出对辽宁省经济增长具有促进作用.通过定量分析结果看出,辽宁省为应对全球金融危机而实行的扩张性财政政策,对拉动投资、促进经济增长、调整产业结构和解决内需不足等问题能够得到相关数据和统计检验的支持.     

The effect of ECB monetary policies on interest rates and volumes

This article assesses the transmission of ECB monetary policies, conventional and unconventional, to both interest rates and lending volumes or bond issuance for three types of different economic agents through five different markets: sovereign bonds at 6-month, 5-year and 10-year horizons, loans to nonfinancial corporations and housing loans to households, during the financial crisis, and for the four largest economies of the euro area. We look at three different unconventional tools: excess liquidity, longer-term refinancing operations and securities held for monetary policy purposes following the decomposition of the ECB’s Weekly Financial Statements. We first identify series of ECB policy shocks at the euro area aggregate level by removing the systematic component of each series and controlling for announcement effects. We second include these exogenous shocks in country-specific structural VAR, in which we control for credit demand. The main result is that only the pass-through from the ECB rate to interest rates has been effective. Unconventional policies have had uneven effects and primarily on interest rates.     

The impact of ECB and FED announcements on the Euro interest rates

We investigate the impact of news in the ECB and FED monetary policy announcements on daily changes in Euro interest rates. We document significant impacts of ECB announcements throughout the period but only until mid 2004 of FED announcements.     

Catastrophe theory and the financial crisis

This paper develops and estimates catastrophe‐augmented models of the financial crisis. We employ catastrophe theory to explain discontinuous jumps in state variables of dynamic systems. We estimate an augmented bank failure model showing that the buildup of risk and an increase in the Federal Funds rate combined with low reserves (negative insurance effect) have been the main drivers of the financial crisis. Therefore, macroprudential policy and rating agencies play a key role in preventing the buildup of (systemic) risk and preventing the economy from entering a bifurcation area.     

The recourse rule,regulatory arbitrage,and the financial crisis

In November 2001, regulators finalized the “Recourse Rule.” The rule lowered risk weights, and therefore commercial bank holding company capital requirements, to 0.2 for holdings of AAA- and AA-rated “private label” securitization tranches, created by investment banks and securitizing commercial bank holding company subsidiaries; risk weights for A-rated holdings equaled 0.5. The rule’s aim was to encourage securitization, but not risk-taking. Regulators indicated that the rule would apply to larger holding companies, without identifying them. Using bank holding companies with subsidiaries that commented on the proposed rule-makings as a treatment variable, average treatment effects from a fully flexible difference-in-differences model indicate that treated banks increased their holdings of the highly rated tranches relative to total assets, while other holding companies, on average, did not. Holding companies with greater highly rated tranche holdings also experienced greater increases in risk after Q1 2008, which suggests that poor performance may have been unanticipated.     

The lower bound and the causes of monetary policy inertia: evidence from Sweden

In 2009, in the midst of a global recession, Sweden’s Riksbank approached a lower bound on nominal interest rates. This encounter with the lower bound provides a natural experiment for investigating the causes of monetary policy inertia. To exploit this experiment, we estimate Taylor rules with Tobit specifications that permit both interest rate smoothing and persistent shocks (serial correlation) as explanations for inertia. The interest rate smoothing hypothesis leads to a specification in which lagged actual values of the dependent variable appear on the right-hand side of the Taylor rule, while the persistent shocks hypothesis leads to a specification in which lagged values of an unobserved latent dependent variable appear on the right-hand side of the Taylor rule. The divergence of actual and latent dependent variables that occurs at the lower bound provides leverage in distinguishing the two hypotheses. For a conventional Taylor rule, we find evidence of both sources of inertia. For a modified Taylor rule that includes a measure of financial stress, our evidence suggests that interest rate smoothing is the principal source of monetary policy inertia.     

Debt, interest rates, and integration of financial markets

It is commonly believed that higher budget deficits raise interest rates. However, these crowding out effects of increasing public debt have usually been found to be small or non-existent. One explanation is that on globalised bond markets interest rate differentials are offset due to financial integration. This paper tests crowding out, and measures the degree of integration of government bond markets, using spatial modelling techniques. Our main finding is that the crowding out effect of public debt on domestic long term interest rates is small: a 1% increase in the debt ratio pushes up domestic rates by 2 pp at most. Financial integration implies an important spillover effect via international bond markets, but only between OECD, and in particular EU, countries. The feedback effect from these markets on long term interest rates is as important as the domestic crowding out effect of higher public debt. Emerging markets are not as well integrated into international capital markets, causing a stronger crowding out effect.     

Monetary policy inertia reconsidered: Evidence from endogenous interest rate trajectory

By finding small forecastable variability of future policy rates by highly smoothed central bank's endogenous interest rate trajectory, I suggest that market's failure to predict large portion of variability in future rates does not always imply limited policy inertia.     

Empirical analysis of the monetary policy transmission through interest rate channel in China

With the deregulation of interest rates in China, the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission is becoming more and more important. Firstly, this paper makes empirical studies on the transmission mechanism in China represented by the conventional interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission by using the Granger causality test. The result shows that there is no causality neither between investment expenditure and the market interest rate nor between household consumption and the market interest rate, which suggests that the transmission of monetary policy in China is impeded. Then the reasons from three aspects including interest rate liberalization, asset-backed securitization and household consumption behavior are analyzed.