Does apprenticeship improve job opportunities? A regression discontinuity approach

In Italy the main difference between apprentices and other types of temporary workers is that apprentices must receive firm-provided training. The firm incentive in hiring apprentices consists in paying lower wages and labour taxes. Using an Italian administrative dataset containing information on the jobs started between January 2009 and June 2012, we estimate the effect of apprenticeship on the hazard function to a permanent job. Identification is based on a regression discontinuity design. We find that, for 29-year-old workers, apprenticeships are “long entrance halls” towards permanent contracts, especially within the firm where the apprenticeship is performed.

     

What enhances mathematical ability? A cross-country analysis based on test scores of 15-year-olds

This article examines the mathematical abilities of 15-year-olds in a range of countries which participated in the 2003 cycle of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED)'s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). Utilizing information on the scores obtained by individual students in the mathematical part of the PISA assessment, we use a range of indicators from the literature on inequality and poverty to evaluate the ‘mathematical performance’ of participating countries. Since data from PISA contained a wealth of information on the circumstances of the students in terms of their home and school environment, we identify and examine the relative influence of factors which serve to enhance the mathematical performance of students in the PISA assessment.     

Take Your Time to Grow: A Field Experiment on the Hiring of Youths

We investigate the effect of spells of no formal employment of young Germans on their chances of entering the labor market through an apprenticeship. We also study whether the potential negative effects of such spells can be mitigated by publicly provided training measures. In a field experiment, the fictitious applications of three young women were sent to firms advertising apprenticeships for the position of office manager. One application was from a fresh school‐leaver and two from applicants who had been out of school for two years, where one of them had participated in a training measure. We find that applicants who have been out of school for two years and have participated in the training are more successful than older applicants without additional training. We do not find a significant difference between older applicants with or without training and fresh school leavers. Our findings show that training measures increase the attractiveness of applicants and that the potential stigma of spells of no formal employment after school are compensated by informal work experience or age or a combination of both.     

Budgeting for efficiency? A case study of the public K-12 education systems of Canada

In spite of the declining and uneven performance of Canadian students on the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests, little attention has been paid to whether provinces are allocating their education budgets to improve academic performance. This study uses a two-stage data envelope analysis (DEA) technique to estimate the degree to which education expenditures are efficiently allocated relative to achievement scores. We find that in these terms the overall cost-efficiency of the public K-12 education systems in the 10 provinces has deteriorated and that, in general, the provinces have become less able to allocate resources efficiently and use them in the most technically productive way. However, some provinces are more efficient than others. To gauge the extent to which performance measures, such as PISA scores, factor into budgeting decisions we interviewed 28 budget managers in 10 Canadian provinces and two territories, probing the criteria used to allocate education resources. The preponderant pattern of budgeting is described as an ‘increments-based-on-formula’ approach, one that is not particularly responsive to efficiency concerns but that often takes account of equity imperatives.     

BETTER LATER THAN NEVER? AN EXPERIMENT ON BARGAINING UNDER ADVERSE SELECTION

A central result in the literature on bargaining with asymmetric information is that the uninformed party (buyer) can screen the informed party (seller) over time. Screening eliminates trade failures that are otherwise common in the presence of adverse selection, but the downside of the bargaining institution is the cost associated with repeated offers and time frictions. This article reports an experimental test of these predictions. We find that rates of trade are substantially higher in the bargaining institution than in control treatments in which we remove the possibility to make repeated offers (take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offer) or the time frictions. However, we also observe a persistent overdelay before agreements are reached, that is, bargaining takes longer than theoretically predicted. This lowers efficiency below its predicted level and below the level observed in the take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offer institution. We identify possible channels for overdelay in the form of fairness preferences and loss aversion, concluding that there are important behavioral deviations from the standard model that are detrimental to the efficiency of bargaining under incomplete information.     

Educational performance gaps in Eastern Europe

To assess the educational performance gaps in Eastern Europe, this article takes a look at the differences in PISA test scores between Finland and seven Eastern European countries, as well as between Eastern European countries. The methodology applied is a semiparametric version of the threefold Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition. We find that main part of the average test score gap cannot be explained by the individual characteristics. Furthermore, our analysis at different quantiles provides evidence that the average test score gaps are due to the fact that poorly performing students in Finland score much higher than poorly performing students in Eastern Europe.     

Why Some Firms Train Apprentices and Many Others Do Not

Abstract. The latest study investigating the cost–benefit ratio of apprenticeship training for Swiss companies has shown that most apprentices offset the cost of their training during their apprenticeship on the basis of the productive contribution of the work they perform. Given this outcome, it is worth investigating why so many firms choose not to train apprentices. Maximum-likelihood selection models were used to estimate the net cost of training for firms without an apprenticeship programme. The models show, firstly, that non-training firms would incur significantly higher net cost during the apprenticeship period if they would switch to a training policy and, secondly, that this less favourable cost–benefit ratio is determined less by cost than by absence of benefit. For the apprenticeship system as such the results indicate that, as long as training regulations and the market situation permit a cost-effective training of apprentices, companies do not need specific labour market regulations or institutions to offer training posts. In this respect, the Swiss findings might be of interest for the ongoing German discussion about the expected repercussions of a more general labour market deregulation on the apprenticeship training system.     

Strong,bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas

We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker’s risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest—and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.     

An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem

We investigate, in an experimental setting, the effect of private information on the Coase theorem's predictions of efficiency and allocative neutrality. For a two-person bargaining game, we find significantly more inefficiency and allocative bias in the case of private information compared with the case of complete information. We also find substantial bargaining breakdown, which is not predicted by the Coase theorem. For the case of private information, we reject the Coase theorem in favor of the alternative of a generalized version of the Myerson—Satterthwaite theorem, which predicts inefficiency, allocative bias in the direction of the disagreement point, and some bargaining breakdown.     

Parental occupation and children’s school outcomes in math.

We investigate the relationship between math attitude and students’ math scores using data obtained from PISA 2012 and a 2SLS model. Math attitude is approximated by an indicator that takes into account intangible (parental attitude, student instrumental motivation and student math anxiety) and tangible (parental help in math homework) factors. The presence of one family member in a math-related career is our instrumental variable. We find that an increase of one standard deviation in math attitude increases the student score by approximately 30 points, a relevant effect since 40 points is the equivalent of one year of schooling.     

PISA: What makes the difference?

The large difference in the level and variance of student performance in the 2000 PISA study between Finland and Germany motivates this paper. It analyses why Finnish students showed a significantly higher performance by estimating educational production functions for both countries, using a unique micro-level dataset with imputed data and added school type information. The difference in reading proficiency scores is assigned to different effects, using Oaxaca–Blinder and Juhn–Murphy–Pierce decomposition methods. The analysis shows that German students and schools have on average more favorable characteristics except for the lowest deciles, but experience much lower returns to these characteristics in terms of test scores than Finnish students. The role of school types remains ambiguous. Overall, the observable characteristics explain more of the variation in test scores in Germany than in Finland.      

Demand in New Zealand hospitals: expect the unexpected?

The health care sector in New Zealand has undergone substantial structural reform since 1983 and stands out relative to other OECD countries, with relatively low per capita health expenditure and a high share of public funding. Efficient allocation of resources in this public dominant health system is therefore paramount. This article uses a national database of hospital admissions to predict hospital demand. We find lagged information on patient demand imperative in formulating an easy to implement approach for predictive purposes. Contrasting predicted with actual demand, we construct an indicator of volatility in unexpected patient demand (at both the hospital and the disease chapter level) and assess its role with regard to patient outcomes. There is consistent evidence that when actual patient numbers exceed predicted, patients stay in hospital significantly longer and are more likely to have an acute readmission.     

The Social Return to Apprenticeship Training

This paper draws together findings from a recent program of research to estimate the social rate of return to apprenticeship training and how the costs of training are distributed. It is estimated that 53 per cent of the costs of training an apprentice are borne by the employer, 28 per cent by the public sector and 19 per cent by the apprentice. This is in sharp contrast to the prediction of economic theory that trainees pay for general training. The social rate of return to male apprenticeships is estimated to be 12.8 per cent. This is in line with previous estimates of the social rate of return to university degrees and supports the case for policy measures to increase the level of apprenticeship training. Reforms taking place under the New Apprenticeships Systems are intended to shift the distribution of costs in line with that predicted by theory by placing a greater cost burden on apprentices for general training and increasing the specificity of training. If employers' willingness to offer apprenticeships has been a constraint, then these changes should stimulate apprenticeship training.     

Transaction costs and informational cascades in financial markets

We study the effect of transaction costs (e.g., a trading fee or a transaction tax, like the Tobin tax) on the aggregation of private information in financial markets. We implement a financial market with sequential trading and transaction costs in the laboratory. According to theory, eventually all traders neglect their private information and abstain from trading (i.e., a no-trade informational cascade occurs). We find that, in the experiment, informational no-trade cascades occur when theory predicts they should (i.e., when the trade imbalance is sufficiently high). At the same time, the proportion of subjects irrationally trading against their private information is smaller than in a financial market without transaction costs. As a result, the overall efficiency of the market is not significantly affected by the presence of transaction costs.     

The Managers versus the Consultants*

Since engineering information is rarely available, standard practice is to benchmark managerial performance against best observed practice. We exploit a rare opportunity to benchmark managerial performance against engineering standards. Our managerial performance describes the activities of Spanish electricity distributors, and our engineering standards are obtained from an engineering grid created by an international consultancy. We find the consultancy's network to be much less costly to operate. When we decompose the cost differential, we find that the superior network design, combined with lower input prices, accounts for more than all of the predicted cost savings. However we also find that the managers are more cost efficient than the consultancy, presumably because they exploit their incentive to be cost efficient under a revenue cap regulatory regime.     

Asymmetric information contests

We consider how asymmetries in information affect contest behavior. We find two effects drive behavior-risk and perceptions of an opponent's value. Our results also suggest that the more tractable one-sided asymmetric information contest might be sufficient to capture contest behavior under uncertainty. However, the efficiency of a contest is sensitive to asymmetric information and the distribution a players' values because players with relatively low values can have an increased probability of success. Thus, it is important (a) to account for information asymmetries to avoid biasing predicted efficiency, and (b) to recognize that this bias is unsystematic.     

Cheating to win: Dishonesty and the intensity of competition

We argue that the intensity of competition within a group or organization can have an important influence on whether or not people cheat. To make this point we first work through a simple model of strategic misreporting in the workplace. For low and high levels of competition we show that, in equilibrium, few are predicted to misreport. It is for medium levels of competition that misreporting is predicted to be highest. We test this prediction experimentally and find good support for it. This finding has implications for the design of incentive structures within groups and organizations.     

The effects of government transfers on monthly cycles in drug abuse,hospitalization and mortality

This paper analyzes the monthly patterns of adverse outcomes due to the consumption of illegal drugs by recipients of government transfer payments. We find evidence that certain subpopulations on government cash aid significantly increase their consumption of drugs when their checks arrive at the beginning of the month, and as a result, experience adverse events including hospitalization and death. Using data from California, we find that the overall rate of drug-related hospital admissions increases abruptly at the beginning of the month, with admissions increasing 23% during the first five days of the month. We find that this cycle is driven largely by recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSI recipients also experience an abrupt 22% increase in within hospital mortality after receiving their checks. These findings suggest that “full wallets” adversely affect some aid recipients, and that policymakers should explore alternate disbursement regimes such as a staggered disbursement schedule or in-kind support that have the potential to reduce the rate of adverse events.     

Transmission of information within transnational social networks: a field experiment

Several studies have shown a relationship between the stocks of migrants and country-level investment in the home country; however the mechanism through which this relationship operates is still unexplored. We use a field experiment in which participants who are recent immigrants send information about risky decisions to others in their social network in their home country. The results demonstrate how this information influences decisions in the home country. We find that the advice given by family members and decisions made by friends significantly affects an individual’s risky decision-making.