A Two-Sector Model of Endogenous Growth with Leisure

This paper analyses the equilibrium dynamics of an endogenous growth model with physical and human capital in which leisure enters the utility function. The inclusion of leisure introduces a potential source of non-convexities in our optimization problem and leads to the possible existence of multiple balanced growth paths. This multiplicity of optimal stationary solutions is linked to the assumption that education has no effect on the quality of leisure, and hence a relatively more educated economy may choose to grow faster, and devote more time to income-directed activities. To characterize the set of optimal solutions in our non-concave optimization framework we develop a new method of analysis that should be of interest in related applications.     

Convergence in a Two-Sector Nonscale Growth Model

Much of the convergence debate has focused solely on output. Recent empirical evidence suggests that crucial inputs, such as technology and capital, may exhibit markedly distinct convergence patterns. We examine the convergence characteristics of a two-sector nonscale model of growth that features population growth and endogenous technology. The model replicates key economic ratios and speeds of convergence with relative ease. Most important, however, is that capital and technology differ strikingly in their convergence paths and speeds. The nonconstancy of the convergence rates and the nonproportionality of the endogenous variables during transition suggests further refinements for the empirical tests of convergence.     

Equilibrium Dynamics in a Two-Sector Model with Taxes

In this paper we are concerned with the equilibrium dynamics of a two-sector model of endogenous growth with distortionary taxes. We show that for certain parameters values and tax schemes every equilibrium orbit—except the steady state solution—is non-interior; i.e., there are times in which one of the sectors is inactive. This analysis confirms that in multisector models the set of easily checkable, universal conditions that can guarantee the interiority of equilibrium solutions is rather limited. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D90, E22.     

Ramsey Equilibrium in a Two-Sector Model with Heterogeneous Households

We prove an existence theorem for a stationary perfect foresight equilibrium under borrowing constraints in a two-sector model with infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. The most patient agent holds all the capital in this solution. We also show that if the capital goods sector is capital intensive and capital income is increasing in the aggregate capital stock, then the aggregate capital stock eventually is monotonic and converges to the steady state stock. If the consumption goods sector is more capital intensive and capital income is increasing in aggregate capital we prove convergence to the steady state under more restrictive conditions. Periodic equilibria are shown to exist under weaker hypotheses. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D90, E13.     

Imperfect Capital Mobility: A General Approach to the Two-Sector Harris Todaro Model

This paper investigates the analytical implications of partially mobile capital among sectors arising in the context of the two-sector general-equilibrium Harris–Todaro (HT) model. It is shown that under partially mobile capital, unlike the case of totally mobile or immobile capital, labor growth (capital accumulation) may destabilize sectoral capital movement and lower the welfare of a small country if the agricultural rental rate is lower (higher) than the manufacturing rental rate. While the price–output response is always normal in a stable system, the Rybczynski type of factor endowment–output response requires more stringent conditions ( vis-à-vis perfectly mobile or immobile capital case).     

A Model of Outsourcing and Foreign Direct Investment

This paper presents a model in which two firms may use foreign direct investment or outsourcing in order to reduce the production cost of an intermediate input. Outsourcing requires training which is costly and creates a positive spillover. The paper shows that the equilibrium depends on the level of training costs. If they are high, only bilateral outsourcing is possible in equilibrium. If bilateral outsourcing is incomplete, it will not change prices compared to no outsourcing. If they are low, only complete outsourcing is possible. If complete outsourcing is unilateral (bilateral), the price increases (decreases) with the degree of spillovers.     

Long-Run Effects of Monetary Expansion in a Two-Sector Model of Endogenous Growth

This paper explores the long-run effects of monetary expansion by introducing a cash-in-advance constraint into one of the basic models of endogenous growth. In our model, the real side of the economy consists of two production sectors, one of which produces a final good that can be used either for consumption or for investment and the other produces new human capital. Both sectors use physical and human capital under constant returns to scale technologies. We first characterize the balanced-growth equilibrium and then examine how a rise in money growth affects the relevant variables, such as the long-term growth rate and the relative prices.     

Energy Transition Under Irreversibility: A Two-Sector Approach

This paper analyses the optimal energy transition of a two-sector economy (energy and final goods) under irreversible environmental catastrophe. First, it proposes a general appraisal of optimal switching problems related to energy transition showing: (1) the possibility of a catastrophe due to accumulation of pollution; and (2) technological regimes with the adoption of renewable energy. Second, it numerically shows that for given baseline parameter values, the most profitable energy transition path may correspond to the one in which the economy starts using both resources, crosses the pollution threshold by losing a part of its capital, and never adopts only clean energy. Third, it extends the model to allow for additional investment in energy saving technologies. We then find that this additional investment favours full transition to the sole use of renewable energy. It is then profitable to take advantage of these synergies by jointly promoting deployment of clean energy and providing incentives for investment in energy saving technologies.     

A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions

This paper develops a simple model of economic and political institutions that lead to poor aggregate economic performance. In the model economy, groups with political power, the elite, choose policies to increase their income and to directly or indirectly transfer resources from the rest of society to themselves. The resulting equilibrium is generally inefficient because of three distinct mechanisms: (1) revenue extraction, (2) factor price manipulation and (3) political consolidation. In particular, the elite may pursue inefficient policies to extract revenue from other groups. They may do so to reduce the demand for factors coming from other groups in the economy, thus indirectly benefiting from changes in factor prices. Finally, they may try to impoverish other groups competing for political power. The elite's preferences over inefficient policies translate into inefficient economic institutions. The notable exception to this general picture emerges when long‐term investments are important, thus creating a commitment (holdup) problem, whereby equilibrium taxes and regulations are worse than the elite would like them to be from an ex ante point of view. In this case, economic institutions that provide additional security of property rights to other groups can be useful.     

业务外包决策的经济学分析模型

业务外包正在成为企业或国家的一种经营战略与经营管理的新理念。在系统综述业务外包与外包管理理论和应用研究的基础上,运用经济学分析问题的方法和思路,在简单的假定前提下,给出一个业务外包分析的经济学模型,模型分析表明,业务外包不仅会增加本企业或本国的工资水平,而且会提高一国的就业率。     

一体化外包管理模式探讨

随着社会分工的日益精细化,外包作为改善企业绩效的一种管理实践,正在被越来越多的企业所采用。在外包实践中,对外包的有效管理是外包成功与否的关键。提出了一体化外包管理模式,该模式对外包风险问题的分析和控制,有助于降低外包风险,提高外包的效果,对发包商具有重要的现实指导意义。     

乡村外包对江苏服务外包产业影响研究

金融危机与欧债危机的双重背景下,美国服务外包领域的乡村外包作为一种新兴产业新模式,正受到业界高度重视。专家预测,随着乡村外包模式的逐渐成熟,美国极有可能将在亚洲的离岸外包业务转变成乡村外包模式发包。文章在对离岸外包企业进行调查问卷、深度访谈与参看内部资料的基础上,借助扎根理论研究乡村外包模式对江苏省服务外包产业的可能性影响,经过开放性编码、关联性编码与核心性编码分析总结出8个结论,构建了一个包括3个一级指标、6个二级指标、12个三级指标的有效应对乡村外包的竞争力体系。研究结果表明,乡村外包模式降低了美国接发包企业的成本、国际市场风险、汇率风险与国际法律纠纷风险等,也符合美国政府刺激经济复苏、呼吁提高就业率的号召。江苏省承接离岸外包的企业必须采取积极措施加以应对。     

A Simple Model of Contract Enforcement Institutions

We demonstrate that in highly productive economies contract enforcement institutions are endogenously established, and partnership contracts correct inefficient land allocation. In less productive economies, however, such institutions are not established, and partnership contracts are not formed. In economies with intermediate productivity levels, multiple Nash equilibria exist; that is, contract enforcement institutions are established in the high Nash equilibrium whereas they are not formed in the low Nash equilibrium. In this case, institutional quality can be diverse across economies. We also prove that improvement in institutional quality reduces within‐country inequality. All these outcomes are consistent with cross‐country observations.     

A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition

This study investigates competition between health insurance companies under different financing regulations. We consider two alternatives advanced in recent German healthcare reform discussions: competition by contribution rates (health contributions) and by fees (health premia). We find that contribution rate competition yields lower company profits and higher consumer welfare than premia competition when switching between insurance companies is costly.     

培训外包供应商选择的模糊多属性决策模型

培训外包供应商是企业培训项目的主要实施者,直接影响着企业培训的效果,因此培训外包供应商的选择是企业培训外包决策过程的一个重要环节。本文剖析了影响企业培训外包供应商选择的主要因素,并将模糊数学理论引入决策过程,建立了培训外包供应商选择的模糊多属性决策模型,用三角模糊数来描述属性权重和评价值,并利用模糊TOPSIS方法对候选供应商进行排序。最后,通过实例说明了该模型的应用过程和有效性。     

Optimal Patent Protection in a Two-Sector Economy

This article addresses the issue of optimal patent protection in an economy with a downstream and an upstream sector. The key insight is that higher patent protection in the downstream sector raises the incentives of agents to do R&D in that sector but discourages innovation in the upstream sector because of a market size effect. Hence, higher patent protection in the upstream sector accelerates growth whereas higher patent protection in the downstream sector slows it down. If some innovation is socially desirable, optimal patent protection is necessarily higher in the upstream than in the downstream sector.     

A Very Simple Model for Declining Mean Fitness

We describe a large-population one-locus, two-allele model that, for certain values of viability and fertility selection parameters, displays a substantial monotonic decline in population mean fitness, concurrent with complete replacement of the allele associated with higher fitness by the allele associated with lower fitness.