Static and dynamic efficiency of pollution control strategies

A great deal of the economic literature on pollution control strategies concentrates on the efficiency of environmental policy instruments. Most analytical studies in this field show that market instruments are more efficient with respect to the cost of pollution abatement of a given number of polluters than non-market instruments. According to several analytical studies, market instruments should also be more efficient with respect to innovation in pollution abatement equipment than non-market instruments. In the empirical literature a great number of case studies exist with estimations of the savings of abatement costs of market instruments in a situation without technological progress. Empirical studies about the impact of environmental policy market instruments on the abatement costs in situations with technological progress are lacking.The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. The paper deals with an empirical estimation of abatement costs for the emission of SO₂ of coal-fired electricity units in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2000. First, the working of market instruments and non-market instruments (the existing environmental policy of the Dutch government) is simulated in a static situation. Second, we analyse the learning effects of flue gas desulphurization. The efficiency advantage of market instruments turns out to be larger in a situation of technological progress than in a static situation.     

经济结构、技术进步与环境污染——基于中国工业行业数据的分析

文章将环境污染的影响分解为规模效应、结构效应、纯生产技术效应、纯污染治理技术效应、混合技术效应、结构生产技术效应、结构治理技术效应和综合效应,并运用37个工业行业2001-2009年三种主要废气排放数据实证分析了工业经济结构和技术进步对工业废气减排的贡献,得到如下结论:纯生产技术效应、纯污染治理技术效应在减排过程中占据了主导地位;工业经济结构的变化对工业废气减排的作用效果不明显,相对2001年甚至还加剧了环境污染;结构生产技术效应和结构治理技术效应都对废气减排起到了促进作用,环境技术进步在一定程度上弥补了工业结构的不合理。     

Does Technological Innovation Really Reduce Marginal Abatement Costs? Some Theory,Algebraic Evidence,and Policy Implications

The existing literature models innovation in pollution control as a reduction in marginal abatement costs. We show that this assumption is inappropriate for production process innovations such as fuel switching. Algebraically, we examine the effects of different innovation types on marginal abatement cost curves, showing that some desirable innovations increase marginal abatement costs. Empirically, we estimate marginal abatement costs for sulfur dioxide by measuring the output distance function for electric power in Korea. Regression results confirm that production process innovations did raise marginal abatement costs in this case. One policy implication: economic instruments do not always provide stronger innovation incentives than command-and-control policies.      

Environmental regulations and innovation activity in UK manufacturing industries

We examine the relationship between environmental regulations and innovation, using data from UK manufacturing industry during 2000-2006. We estimate a dynamic model of innovation behaviour, and explicitly account for the likely endogeneity of our measure of the stringency of environmental regulations (pollution abatement costs). Our results indicate that while on the one hand environmental R&D and investment in environmental capital are stimulated by greater pollution abatement pressures, on the other hand there is not a positive impact of environmental regulation on total R&D or total capital accumulation. We find some evidence that this is because more stringent environmental regulations directly lower the optimal expenditure on non-environmental innovations. In addition, we find that environmental R&D may crowd out non-environmental R&D, although there is no evidence that environmental capital crowds out non-environmental capital.     

Environmental innovation and the cost of pollution abatement revisited

It is widely assumed in the literature that environmental innovation reduces the marginal cost of pollution abatement. In this paper we show that this is not necessarily the case and we provide some unexpected outcomes.     

The effects of environmental policies on the abatement investment decisions of a green firm

This paper focuses on environmental policies aimed at rising investment in pollution abatement capital. We assume that ecological uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty over the dynamics of pollution, affects firm investment decisions. Capital irreversibility is not postulated but endogenized using a quadratic adjustment cost function. Using this framework, we study the effects of environmental policies considering taxes on polluting inputs and subsidies to reduce the cost of abatement capital. Environmental policies promoted to enforce abatement capital may generate the unexpected result of reducing the abatement investment rate.     

The Timing and Strategic Role of Self-Protection

Self-protection has private goods characteristics as it reduces own exposure to pollution given a certain level of pollution. We study the effect of timing self-protection before, after or simultaneously with abatement. We find that self-protection when timed before abatements has strategic effects. In this case self-protection, shifts the second stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of abatements such that own contributions of abatement are decreased and those of the other country are increased. Thereby shifting future abatement costs to the other country. When countries cooperate only on abatement, the incentives to shift future abatement costs are greater. Contrary to, intention, cooperation on abatement may in fact worsen environmental quality if it does not include self-protection.     

Environmental Funds,Public Abatement,and Welfare

This paper addresses some features of environmental funds that the government uses to finance public abatement with pollution tax revenue or tariff revenue. I find that when the pollution tax rate and the tariff rate are jointly chosen optimally, then the optimal pollution tax rate is higher than the Pigouvian tax rate under public abatement financed by tariff revenue, and lower when public abatement is financed by pollution tax revenue. Furthermore, I show that the optimal tariff rate is positive regardless of which tax revenue is used to finance public abatement. These results are relevant for countries where the government seeks revenues earmarked for the financing of environmental funds.     

What is the Best Distribution for Pollution Abatement Efforts? Information for Optimizing the WFD Programs of Measures

The Water Framework Directive (WFD) has mobilized economic theory in order to encourage E.U. Member States to reach desirable environmental water pollution levels by conciliating economic and ecological interests. For this purpose, a stringent standard (“good status”) has been set. Nevertheless, it will be possible to relax this standard if it appears that total abatement costs required for reaching this “good status” exceed expected environmental benefits. This ambitious policy updates the issue of the abatement costs and environmental benefits assessment. Concerning the costs, a full discrimination of the abatement effort minimizes the total cost when the impact of polluters changes spatially, while a uniform effort can reach a pollution target in flexible ways. In this case, the increase of the degree of discrimination of the abatement effort is required only if it generates significant positive economies. Our theoretical and empirical results have shown that the discrimination advantage becomes insignificant for either very demanding or very little demanding ecological standards and varies according to the polluters’ profile. In the case of “intermediate” standards, efficiency gains become negligible with a restricted number of effort “levels”.     

Regulating a Polluting Oligopoly: Emission Tax or Voluntary Agreement?

This paper compares, in a polluting oligopoly, an emission tax and a form of environmental policy called voluntary agreement (VA). Here there are two ways of reducing pollution: output contraction and end‐of‐pipe abatement. Given the imperfect competition, firms’ reaction to the tax is sub‐optimal. They reduce output excessively in order to raise the price and do not abate enough. The VA is a take‐it‐or‐leave‐it contract on abatement effort, offered to the firms with the threat of a tax. It has a limited effect on output and always allows higher abatement than the tax. We find that this kind of VA may be more efficient than the tax in a concentrated industry, when pollution is not too harmful and when the abatement technology is rather efficient and cheap.     

THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND EFFICIENCY ON POLLUTION ABATEMENT EXPENDITURE BY CHEMICAL PLANTS: SOME UK EVIDENCE

This paper examines the impact of foreign ownership and efficiency on chemical plants' pollution abatement expenditure. The model estimates presented reveal not only which factors are the key determinants of whether any abatement expenditure occurs but also explain how much was spent on the principal categories of pollution control. These chemical plant results present a conspicuous contrast with earlier results based on other industrial sectors. This would suggest that the efficiency–pollution spending relationship is also characterised by industry specific effects.     

Environmental Abatement Costs and Establishment Size

The impact of environmental abatement costs on the size distribution of manufacturing establishments in pollution-intensive industries is analyzed. Utilizing both state- and industry-specific measures of environmental regulation, a new and important interaction is discovered: Establishment size increases with state environmental abatement costs, but only in industries during periods of relatively high (national) pollution abatement intensity. Increased state environmental stringency during times when similar industries located in other states are not undertaking sufficient abatement expenditures leads to a decrease in establishment size. (JEL L11 , L51 , R38 )     

Environmental Regulation and the Eco-Industry

This paper re-examines environmental regulation, under the assumption that pollution abatement technologies and services are provided by an imperfectly competitive environment industry. It is shown that each regulatory instrument (emission taxes and quotas; design standards; and voluntary agreements) has a specific impact on the price-elasticity of the polluters’ demand for abatement services, hence on the market power of the eco-industry and the resulting cost of abatement. This implies that the optimal pollution tax will be higher than the marginal social cost of pollution, while a voluntary approach to pollution abatement may fail unless the eco-industry itself is willing to participate.We thank Dominique Bureau, Olivier Godard, Émeric Henry, Nicolas Marchetti, Alain-Désiré Nimubona, Anne Perrot, Gilles Rotillon, Katheline Schubert, the editors Michael Crew and Anthony Heyes, and two anonymous referees for helpful discussions and suggestions. We also acknowledge valuable comments from seminar audiences at HEC Montréal, the University of Paris I, the University of Toulouse, and the DG-Entreprise of the European Commission in Brussels.     

Are short‐term effects of pollution important for growth and optimal fiscal policy?

We study optimal fiscal policy in a stock‐flow model of the environment within an endogenous growth framework, where some pollutants have a lasting impact on environmental quality which is restored through abatement expenditure, while others dissipate and hence, have a short‐term effect on the environment. All pollutants, however, affect the productivity of a public good negatively. Given that short‐term pollution, although it dissipates, is irreversible in this sense, a government cannot ignore its negative effects since this type of pollution lowers the productivity of all inputs. We find that a larger negative effect of short‐term pollutants as well as a higher congestion effect of private capital leads to corrective fiscal policies with higher optimal income tax and abatement expenditure rates, which have favorable growth consequences. Interestingly, we find that the rate of short‐term pollution does not affect optimal fiscal policy while that of the long‐term pollution does.     

CROSS‐COUNTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND POLITICALLY DRIVEN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS

Grossman and Helpman highlighted a political framework to internalize inefficiency incurred due to unilateral trade policy implementation by sovereign countries. This paper extensively adopts their framework to explore the effects of special interest politics on governments under negotiation to forge international environmental standards to control global emission. Particular attention is given to a case in which negotiation is driven by transferring the abatement technology. Within a specific factor model of international trade, improving the abatement efficiency through technology transfer can give the most mutually beneficial outcome, achieving the lowest level of global pollution compared to other political benchmarks.     

SCALE EFFECT VERSUS INDUCED POLICY RESPONSE IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE: THE CASE OF U.S. WATER POLLUTION

The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) could arise from the scale effect in abatement technology as emphasized by Andreoni and Levinson (2001) or from the induced policy response as suggested by Grossman and Krueger (1995). This paper incorporates these two contrary views into a model and quantitatively evaluates their relative importance in shaping the EKC of U.S. water pollution. Our main findings include: (a) some scale effect in abatement technology must exist, otherwise the turning point of the EKC will be unreasonably high; (b) the scale effect alone is not sufficient to explain the practical occurrence of the turning point of the EKC; and (c) the scale effect features critically in the induced policy response as well. (JEL H41, O40, Q20)     

The Impact of Foreign Aid Linked to Infrastructure and Pollution Abatement

This paper studies the macroeconomic effects of foreign aid taking into account environmental quality. We develop a dynamic equilibrium model in which public investments in both infrastructure and pollution abatement can be co‐financed using domestic resources and international aid. We consider untied aid, aid fully tied to either infrastructure or abatement and aid equally tied to both expenditures. We find that when the extent to which agents are affected by environmental problems is taken into account, then, regardless of the chances of substitution between factors, transfers linked to both infrastructure and pollution abatement may be the best welfare‐enhancing alternative.     

Efficient Dynamic Pollution Taxation in an Uncertain Environment

This paper analyzes efficient pollution taxation within a stochastic model of endogenous growth. Pollution is a by-product of production and causes disutility. Furthermore, the productivity which results from environmental quality is uncertain. This reflects e.g. uncertain capital depreciation induced by natural disasters like hurricanes or floods. This uncertainty is shown to raise an ambiguous impact on the optimal pollution level as well as on optimal environmental taxation. Market equilibrium turns out to be suboptimal, since the households mis-perceive their individual impact on pollution. Conditions for welfare maximizing pollution taxation are stated and it is shown that a direct pollution tax is not appropriate to yield Pareto-optimal growth. Instead, a linear capital income tax together with a linear abatement subsidy build an efficient tax scheme, if secondarily the governmental budget is balanced. Moreover, an increase in the riskiness of environmental productivity may even lead to an increase in the optimal pollution level and to a decrease in optimal environmental taxation, depending predominantly on the preference parameters.      

CONCEPTUAL AMD STATISTICAL ISSUES IN DEVELOPING ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES-RECENT U.S. EXPERIENCE

The purpose of this paper is to describe the conceptual and statistical basis of the estimates of United States public and private spending for pollution abatement and control (PAC) prepared by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. The concepts and definitions were designed to ensure comparability with the national economic accounts since much of the analysis of the effects of environmental programs on the economy is conducted with the aid of the accounts. The work to date has been limited to pollution associated with harmful "foreign" substances and forms of energy discharged in the course of production, distribution and consumption. The conceptual base includes evaluation of benefits, but estimates completed thus far are limited to the cost of pollution abatement and control.
Definitions are given for pollution, pollution abatement, direct pollution abatement cost, indirect pollution abatement cost and indirect benefits. A framework for the estimation and presentation of PAC expenditures is developed and the estimate of U.S. PAC expenditures for 1972 and 1973 is presented. A brief chronological summary of the BEA project is also provided.     

Investment and emission control under technology and pollution externalities

This paper studies incentives to develop advanced pollution abatement technology when technology may spillover across agents and pollution abatement is a public good. We are motivated by a variety of pollution control issues where solutions require the development and implementation of new pollution abatement technologies. We show that at the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game with R&D investment and emission abatement, whether the free rider effect prevails and under-investment and excess emissions occur depends on the degree of technology spillovers and the effect of R&D on the marginal abatement costs. There are cases in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium investments in emissions reductions exceed the first-best case.