MICROFINANCE REGULATION AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF NIGERIA AND ZAMBIA

This study examines the effect of regulations on microfinance institutions in Nigeria and Zambia by focusing on the post‐regulation experiences and reflections of the microfinance institutions (MFIs) and their regulators. Based on in‐depth interviews with the Central Banks as regulators, MFI managers, practitioners and apex microfinance associations, the study finds that regulations in both countries have managed to professionalize the sector, but their effectiveness in augmenting the centrality of social goals to microfinance and MFIs remains doubtful. The poorly designed regulations are not only undermining social goals but also sending wrong signals to would be social investors, with implications for the social image of the industry. The study further finds that regulations have neither speeded the emergence of sustainable MFIs (especially in Zambia) nor accelerated the sectors’ outreach to the poor and the financially excluded. Additionally, considerable levels of political interference and poor regulation have led to unintended consequences to the sector, further frustrating the ultimate goal of extending financial services to the poor. These findings have policy and practical implications for how microfinance engages with the regulatory logic and continues to serve those at the bottom of the pyramid.     

Competition and microfinance

Competition between microfinance institutions (MFIs) in developing countries has increased dramatically in the last decade. We model the behavior of non-profit lenders, and show that their non-standard, client-maximizing objectives cause them to cross-subsidize within their pool of borrowers. Thus when competition eliminates rents on profitable borrowers, it is likely to yield a new equilibrium in which poor borrowers are worse off. As competition exacerbates asymmetric information problems over borrower indebtedness, the most impatient borrowers begin to obtain multiple loans, creating a negative externality that leads to less favorable equilibrium loan contracts for all borrowers.     

Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions

Credit agents in microfinance institutions (MFIs) must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the MFI's objectives. We show that while giving incentives has no cost in for-profit MFIs, it is costly in pro-poor MFIs: When repayment and wealth are positively correlated, a pro-poor MFI cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment. It then becomes necessary to audit the share of very poor borrowers selected by an agent in order to provide the latter with adequate incentives. When audit costs are large, pro-poor MFIs may have to forego selection on wealth — and use other targeting devices such as working in impoverished geographical locations. Driven by donor concerns with ‘mission drift’ away from the poor, audits on the wealth status of clients have been introduced at the level of MFIs. We show that introducing pro-poor incentives requires extending such audits to the level of credit agents.     

Here today,gone tomorrow: Can dynamic incentives make microfinance more flexible?

This paper presents a model of microfinance lending to individuals that uses dynamic incentives, in the form of access to additional loans, to discourage borrowers from strategic default, or the unwillingness to repay a loan once a positive outcome is realized. We propose an improvement on contracts currently used by microfinance institutions (MFIs) by endogenizing the default penalty, while constraining the MFI to maintain sustainable lending operations. Furthermore, accounting for the risks that the poor face by including a negative economic shock, we show that under certain circumstances, the punishment for default need not be a lifetime without loans.     

If the Banks are Doing So Well,Why Can't I Get a Loan? Regulatory Constraints to Financial Inclusion in Indonesia

Indonesia's financial sector has two paradoxes: (i) Indonesia has been a global leader in microfinance for the past 25 years, but access to microfinance services is declining; and (ii) Indonesia's commercial banks are liquid, solvent, and profitable, and the Indonesian economy has been doing well over the past decade, but small and medium enterprises are facing a credit crunch. Although Indonesia is underbanked, most commercial banks have been unresponsive to unmet effective demand. The behavior of banks has been in their own short‐term best interests, primarily because of the unintended consequences of Indonesia's financial sector reregulation after the East Asian crisis and contradictory monetary policies, which have produced a prudentially sound but inefficient, narrow, and homogenized banking oligopoly. Indonesia should not respond to financial exclusion by artificially pumping out and administratively allocating more credit. Instead, it should promulgate smart regulation so that banks maintain their sound risk management without pursuing noncompetitive and noninclusive business practices.     

Progressive Lending in Microfinance—What about the Farmers?

Dynamic incentives have become a common measure in microfinance institutions (MFI) to counteract the risk of default and to strengthen the borrower's identification with his micro‐lender. This article focuses on progressive lending over the course of the bank–borrower relationship. As the agricultural sector is increasingly important for Azerbaijan's economy, this study differentiates between the lending policies faced by farmers and non‐farmers, and matches the findings with the repayment performances of both client groups. By means of a rich data set spanning from 2007 through 2012 provided by an MFI in Azerbaijan, it can be demonstrated that farmers face a higher degree of loan volume rationing that cannot be justified by our findings on repayment performances. Moreover, we find that repeated borrowing increases the default probabilities of both client groups. In conclusion, we deduce that the MFI and borrowers could benefit from reconsidering the current lending policies.     

Do interest rates matter? Credit demand in the Dhaka slums

“Best practice” in microfinance holds that interest rates should be set at profit-making levels, based on the belief that even poor customers favor access to finance over low fees. Despite this core belief, little direct evidence exists on the price elasticity of credit demand in poor communities. We examine increases in the interest rate on microfinance loans in the slums of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Using unanticipated between-branch variation in prices, we estimate interest elasticities from − 0.73 to − 1.04, with our preferred estimate being at the upper end of this range. Interest income earned from most borrowers fell, but interest income earned from the largest increased, generating overall profitability at the branch level.     

Household allocation of microfinance credit in Kyrgyzstan

The limited endowment of resources that usually characterised low-income households imposes a binding trade-off between current and future consumption. In many transition countries, microfinance represents the primary source of credit other than informal moneylenders for low-income households which is the situation in the Kyrgyz Republic. Thus, this study analyses the determinants of household microfinance credit allocation in Kyrgyzstan from 2006 to 2010. We model the household’s behaviour through a multivariate approach to allow for multiple choices at the same time. Results indicate that mobile phone and livestock ownership were identified as two key factors which increase the probability of borrowers using microfinance credit for productive purposes. Furthermore, borrowers in the rural Naryn region, one of the poorest areas in Kyrgyzstan, have a higher probability of allocating their loans toward food purchases and the smallest probability of allocating credit toward starting a business or other productive purposes.     

Microfinance spillovers: A model of competition in informal credit markets with an application to Indian villages

Despite widespread interest in the development of microfinance, spillover effects on the non-using population and redistributive issues remain largely unexplored. I study a competition game between microfinance institutions (MFIs) offering joint-liability loans and moneylenders offering individual loans in presence of adverse selection. I show that one unintended consequence of the entry of a microfinance sector in local credit markets can be to trigger an increase in the equilibrium informal interest rate, because MFIs tend to attract a disproportionately-safe share of the borrower pool away from incumbent moneylenders. The existence of such composition externality depends crucially on the size of the microfinance sector and the risk composition of the borrower pool. The model predicts a non-linearly increasing relationship between informal interest rates and MFIs' capacity in relatively safe credit markets, and no relationship in risky villages. I show evidence supporting these predictions, using a first-hand panel database that records all credit transactions over 8 years for a sample of about 1000 households living in Indian villages with extensive space and time variation in the size of their microfinance sector.     

When is the optimal lending contract in microfinance state non-contingent?

Whether a microfinance institution should use a state-contingent repayment or not is very important since a state-contingent loan can provide insurance for borrowers. However, the classic Grameen bank used state non-contingent repayment, which is puzzling since it forces poor borrowers to make their payments even under hard circumstances. This paper provides an explanation to this puzzle. We consider two modes of lending, group and individual lending, and for each mode we characterize the optimal lending and supervisory contracts when a staff member (a supervisor) can embezzle borrowers’ repayments by misrepresenting realized returns. We identify the main trade-off between the insurance gain and the cost of controlling the supervisor's misbehavior. We also find that group lending dominates individual lending either by providing more insurance or by saving audit costs.     

Total factor productivity change of MENA microfinance institutions: A Malmquist productivity index approach

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate productivity changes of 33 Middle East and North Africa microfinance institutions over the period of 2006–2011 by using the Malmquist productivity index (MPI) method and a balanced panel dataset of 198 observations. The empirical findings indicate that the microfinance industry has reported overall productivity regress in the study period even though all the MENA MFIs have positive TFP growth with the exception of the year 2010–2011. In addition, our study indicates that over the period the Malmquist productivity change experienced by the MENA microfinance industry as a whole has averaged 4.9% annually which was mainly attributed to technical efficiency change. The study reveals also that the industry as a whole has exhibited a decline in technological change (2.9% decrease over the period) and suggested that there has been a deterioration in the performance of the best practicing MFIs. By decomposing the Malmquist index, the result showed that during the study period the MENA MFIs have experienced mainly an increment of pure technical efficiency (improvement in management practices) rather than an improvement in optimum size. Overall, an essential strategic implication for the MENA microfinance industry is that they need to pursue a technological progress in order to meet the dual objectives of reaching many poor people and financial sustainability.     

Investment Professionals' Ability to Detect Deception: Accuracy,Bias and Metacognitive Realism

In the first empirical study on the topic, the authors examined the ability of investment professionals to distinguish between truthful and deceptive statements. A random sample of 154 investment professionals made judgments about a series of truthful and deceptive statements, some of which involved financial fraud. Investment professionals' lie detection accuracy was poor; participants performed no better than would be expected by chance. Accuracy in identifying lies about financial fraud was especially poor. Further, participants displayed poor metacognitive realism when assessing their own performance. The theoretical and practical implications for lie detection in the financial industry are discussed.     

The impact of ethnic diversity on microenterprise start-ups

Until recently, factors determining the decisions made by microfinance institutions (MFIs) to extend loans to business start-ups had not been explored. Recent evidence shows that MFI performance with regard to funds issued for small business start-ups depends on MFI-level characteristics such as profit orientation. We argue that these decisions do not only depend on MFI-specific practices or characteristics, but also on the role ethnic diversity plays. Using data on microfinance lending activities for business start-ups, we examine the impact of ethnic diversity on microenterprise start-ups. Results show that ethnic diversity negatively affects the provision of financial capital for business start-up. Furthermore, results also suggest a negative association between ethnic diversity and the share of female borrowers recorded by MFIs. We examine social networks and outreach as potential channels through which ethnic diversity affects business start-ups.     

Is it better to be mixed in group lending?

This paper shows that, in a group‐lending scheme with joint liability, a microfinance institution can achieve a Pareto improvement by promoting negative assortative matching among borrowers. The main results are: (i) borrowers may be better off in heterogeneous groups; and (ii) a heterogeneous group equilibrium is possible when individual or homogeneous group equilibria do not exist.     

Toward a Political Economy of Markets

In the post-Washington Consensus era, increasing emphasis on private sector-led strategies for economic growth has contributed to the focus of policymakers on entrepreneurship. However, many programs designed to support entrepreneurship are based on an erroneous and biased image of the entrepreneur, with important consequences for development processes and outcomes. Longstanding ideology underlying the entrepreneur as a rugged individual hero shapes not only the masculinist notion of entrepreneurship in most societies, but also the narrow focus and structure of entrepreneurship programs. Microfinance, however, is generally conceptualized as being "different" from other programs, particularly given its informal sector reach and common group lending model. This paper investigates the extent to which microfinance is able to build community, and to sustain individual entrepreneurs' attention to social solidarity economy. Alternative approaches to microfinance, which fundamentally restructure the way it works — specifically considering the issue of community-building — are discussed as a possible "next evolution" of this form of social enterprise.     

Are microfinance institutions resilient to economic slowdown? Evidence from their capital ratio adjustment over the business cycle

Prior studies using pre-crisis data concluded that microfinance institutions are resilient to economic crises. However, some recent studies indicate that the microfinance sector is becoming part of the global financial system and microfinance lending activities are now vulnerable to economic and financial crises. Capital being a key resource to support lending, this paper analyzes the cyclical behaviour of capital ratio using an international sample of microfinance institutions from 2001 to 2014. We uncover a negative relationship between their capital-to-assets ratios and business cycle indicators. This relationship mainly concerns regulated institutions, comprised mostly of profit-oriented MFIs, and is driven by both asset-side and capital level adjustments. We identify the lending channel (loan-to-assets ratio) as the main mechanism to explain these cyclical variations. Our findings are consistent with the “procyclicality” of capital regulation documented extensively in the banking literature. Hence, macro-prudential regulation for MFIs should target regulated and profit-oriented MFIs.     

The challenge of rural financial inclusion – evidence from microfinance

Financial inclusion is said to foster development and growth. However, progress in financial inclusion has been slow in rural areas where poverty is most pronounced. This is often attributed to higher transaction costs, higher risks and a more unfavourable contracting environment which makes it more difficult for financial institutions to achieve and maintain sustainability in rural compared to urban areas. Based on data covering 772 microfinance institutions (MFIs) over the period 2008–2013, we test whether rural financial inclusion, notably lending to rural borrowers, is hampered by stronger sustainability challenges than inclusion in urban markets. Our results suggest that a higher share of rural borrowers has no direct effect on MFI sustainability. However, we find that MFIs with a higher share of rural borrowers are less able to exploit economies of scale and productivity effects. Thus, our results provide support for the view that sustainability challenges make it more difficult to achieve progress in financial inclusion in rural than in urban areas.     

The effect of corruption on microfinance loan portfolio: A semiparametric analysis

In this paper, we examine the extent to which corruption affects the loan portfolio of microfinance institutions (MFIs). We employ robust econometric estimation on a sample of 507 MFIs across 63 countries from 2005 to 2018. Our results show that corruption is negatively associated with the loan portfolio. However, in semiparametric analysis, we find that lower-level corruption is beneficial to increase the loan portfolio while higher-level corruption is detrimental. The results imply that it is not just corruption that matters as far as its effect on MFIs' loan portfolio is concerned; what matters is the degree of corruption. In further analyses, we find that corruption reduces both the number of active borrowers and average loan per borrower indicating that corruption reduces both coverage and amount of credit extension. The results suggest that the effect of corruption on the loan portfolio is gender-sensitive. Corruption facilitates an increase in loans to female borrowers. Our results are robust to alternative variable measurements and different identification strategies, including two-stage least square.     

Membership has its privileges: the effect of social capital and neighbourhood characteristics on the earnings of microfinance borrowers

In this paper we examine the determinants of self-employment success for microcredit borrowers. Theories of social capital and neighbourhood effects are integrated in an attempt to account for earnings differentials among a unique sample of microfinance borrowers. We posit that social capital – social relations that facilitate individual action – is essential for microentrepreneurial success. Based on a survey and data collected by the authors, it is demonstrated that social capital is a positive determinant of self-employment earnings. The role that neighbourhoods play in fostering social capital and improving microentrepreneurial performance are also highlighted. JEL classification: J23, O17, Z13