A constitutional paradigm is not enough—would sovereign citizens really agree to manipulative nudges?—A reply to Christian Schubert

In this short note I reply to a comment made by Christian Schubert, who argues that my criticism of libertarian paternalism cannot be upheld under a constitutional economics paradigm. I disagree: it is implausible to assume that sovereign individuals behind a veil of ignorance would actually agree on manipulative nudges from the public sector. Resorting to a constitutional economics paradigm does not diminish the force of the manipulation objection—libertarian paternalism remains morally objectionable. Moreover, where sovereign citizens would agree on permissible (morally legitimate) nudges behind a veil of ignorance, these would no longer constitute “paternalism” under its commonly agreed definition. More constructively, the only morally defensible paternalistic nudges would be those that improve welfare while respecting or, better yet, improving individual autonomy. These are not the typical nudges defended by libertarian paternalists.     

The nudge wars: A modern socialist calculation debate

We investigate the claims of behavioral paternalism in the more realistic framework of complex choice. In particular, we analyze the claims made by behavioral paternalists that predictive analytics over large amounts of data will make it possible to target and successfully implement purportedly welfare-enhancing nudges deemed to make nudged agents better off “as judged by themselves” (AJBT). We draw parallels between the socialist calculation debate and nudge theoretical arguments, particularly the libertarian socialism of H. D. Dickinson and the libertarian paternalism of Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler. We find that if actual idealized behavior is a more complicated process of recursive feedback using a knowledge classification method, behavioral paternalists engaging in an automatized process of notice-and-comment rulemaking using Big Data methods still encounter epistemological problems and the problems associated with radical uncertainty unearthed during the socialist calculation debate and afterwards.

     

Does Libertarian Paternalism Reconcile Merit Goods Theory with Mainstream Economics?

In the wake of Musgrave's move to question the absolute hegemony of individual preferences for normative economics in the 1950's by propounding the existence of merit goods, a recent book by Thaler and Sunstein is now making a similar claim under the label of ‘libertarian paternalism’. This paper tackles the question of why the framework of libertarian paternalism has received a so much more friendly reception among economists than the theory of merit goods. The main reason is a better foundation, not only for the conditions under which paternalism may be justified but also for the tools that should be applied, utilizing transaction cost theory.     

Children’s Snacks,their Ads and Consumer Sovereignty

Abstract

The concept of sovereign consumer preferences is challenged from three sides: child consumers, unhealthy food and advertising. The two theoretical concepts of merit goods and libertarian paternalism are implemented in order to classify situations in which full consumer sovereignty does not apply. An empirical analysis of ads for children’s snacks reveals the libertarian paternalist perspective as helpful for understanding the demand for and justification of ‘soft’ governmental intervention in the case of the advertised snacks, whilst the ads for these snacks may well be demerit goods. The banning or heavy taxation of these ads is therefore advocated.     

The Normative Problem of Merit Goods in Perspective

Abstract

In his Theory of Public Finance (1959), Musgrave invented the concept of merit wants to describe public wants that are satisfied by goods provided by the government in violation of the principle of consumer sovereignty. Starting from Musgrave’s mature discussion (1987), I construct two categories to classify the explanations of merit goods. The first strand of thought attempts to justify merit goods within the New welfare economics, by modifying its assumptions to accommodate irrationality, uncertainty, lack of information, and psychic externalities. The second category encompasses more radical departures from consumer sovereignty, drawn from philosophical critiques of economics. In the third part of the paper, I argue that the two strands might be represented by a non-individualistic social welfare function. I also show how this solution echoes Musgrave’s early views on public expenditures before he coined the concept of merit wants. From an historical perspective, the survival of the concept highlights the persistence of a social point of view in welfare economics.     

Should evolutionary economists embrace libertarian paternalism?

Libertarian paternalists hold that biases and distortions in human decision-making justify paternalistic interference affecting individuals’ decisions. The aim of this paper is to analzye to what extent an evolutionary outlook supports libertarian paternalism. I will put forward three arguments in favour of libertarian paternalism and six objections that strongly oppose it. While evolutionary economists should take seriously the contention that our positive knowledge of real-world decision-making will have to influence our normative assessment of these decisions, the objections against libertarian paternalism brought forward in this paper serve as a cautionary note. Contrary to the claims of its proponents, libertarian paternalism is neither inevitable, nor does it provide an adequate measuring rod of normative rationality. It is prone to abuse by anchoring its standard of rationality pragmatically to norms and can thus promote conservative bias and stifle innovative exploration. It also presents the policy-maker with a compounded Hayekian knowledge problem. Finally, from a dynamic point of view, libertarian paternalism’s manipulative shaping of preferences might lock-in individuals into heteronomous preference learning paths without them being even aware of it.     

The political economy of legal titling

The libertarian case for legal titling is that formalization of the economic (de facto) rights of those who own land and buildings improves prospects for capitalism and, ultimately, development. Although all rich countries have private property rights, we argue that the success of legal titling depends on a certain kind of state—what we call a property-protecting state—that is often missing in developing countries. We use insights from Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics to clarify the political basis for legal titling to improve land tenure security. Evidence from Afghanistan shows that legal titling has not worked because the country does not have a property-protecting state. We suggest focusing on improving political institutions before investing in legal titling. In the meantime, it makes more sense to register land ownership at the community level, without the state.

     

Atoms,Bits, and Wits: A New Economics for the Twenty-First Century—Part I

Part I: Three elementary components of economics are atoms, bits, and wits. The economics of atoms is familiar to economists, in the production of physical outputs treated as substitutes in consumption. The relation of value to scarcity with atoms is that abundance reduces the worth of material goods. The realm of bits is less understood; the issues appear in network effects, where abundance augments the worth of intangibles. The economics of networks is social: conflicts of interest (substitution) are balanced with concerts of value (complementarity) in combination. But in information networks—the realm of bits—substitution cedes to complementarity and competition defers to cooperation as efficient.     

On the Econ within

This essay examines the critique of behavioral economics that Infante, Lecouteaux and Sugden (ILS) offer in:"Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent.” It identifies and questions three main criticisms that ILS make: (i) a methodological criticism, alleging that there is no psychological basis for the attribution of purified preferences, (ii) an epistemological criticism, alleging that there is little evidence for claims about purified preferences, and (iii) a normative criticism, arguing that policies should aim to facilitate people’s choices rather than to satisfy purified preferences. The essay also distinguishes the view of welfare economics defended in Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare from the claims of behavioral economists ILS criticize.     

Group and individual risk preferences: A lottery-choice experiment with self-employed and salaried workers

This paper focuses on decision making under risk, comparing group and individual risk preferences in a lottery-choice experiment. In the individual treatment, subjects make choices individually; in the group treatment, each subject placed in a group made lottery choice via voting. In the choice treatment, subjects choose whether to be on their own or in a group. The originality of this research lies in the fact that we introduced variability in socio-demographic characteristics by recruiting salaried and self-employed workers. Our main findings indicate that groups are more likely than individuals to choose safe lotteries. Our results also show that individuals risk attitude is correlated with both the type and the sector of employment.     

“Better off,as judged by themselves”: a comment on evaluating nudges

Many nudges are designed to make people better off, as judged by themselves. This criterion, meant to ensure that nudges will increase people’s welfare, contains some ambiguity. It is useful to distinguish among three categories of cases: (1) those in which choosers have clear antecedent preferences, and nudges help them to satisfy those preferences (often by increasing “navigability”); (2) those in which choosers face a self-control problem, and nudges help them to overcome that problem; and (3) those in which choosers would be content with the outcomes produced by two or more nudges, or in which ex post preferences are endogenous to nudges, so that without additional clarification or work, the “as judged by themselves” criterion does not identify a unique solution for choice architects. Category (1) is self-evidently large. Because many people agree that they suffer self-control problems, category (2) is large as well. Cases that fall in category (3) create special challenges, which may lead us to make direct inquiries into welfare or to explore what informed, active choosers typically select.     

THE ECONOMICS OF ILLUSION*

When individuals choose not only goods, but also how to process information, there is a bias: people tend to process information so that they feel good about themselves. This bias is particularly important in voting behavior, where agents have almost no individual effect on public choice outcomes, and therefore almost no incentive for unbiased use of information. Two examples are given. In one example, an adaptation of the classic overdepletion problem, the public chooses not to counteract externalities by appropriate tax policy. In the second example public policy follows the choices of experts, contrary to the interest of the public.     

InterpretingEconomic Justice for all as a pre-economic essay on merit wants

It is fruitful to interpret The Bishops' Letter, in line with Robbins' classic definition of economics, as being a pre-economic document that identifies some “given ends” for economists to accept, if only provisionally, in carrying out their economic analyses. Such an interpretation is entirely consistent with the view of their own work that the bishops expressed in their letter. This interpretation leads to treating The Letter as a document dealling with the moral and ethical issues involved in selection of social goals and with incorporating these goals into welfare economics by identifying them as merit wants (or goals). A society that does have merit goods among its goals cannot achieve its goals without public action. The bishops recognize this, but The Letter is by no means statist.     

公共品供给的实验研究 及其未来可能的进展

传统经济学基于理性“经济人”基础,认为公地悲剧问题是个体理性选择的必然结果,公共品供给需采取与个体真实公共品偏好相兼容的激励机制,并由政府承担供给角色。实验经济学研究则提供个体异质社会偏好的稳健性证据,并在合适的惩罚、沟通交流和声誉等机制下提供诸多可以实现公共品自愿供给的实验证据,表明群体或自愿组织也可作为公共品供给主体。这些公共品实验研究为现实公共治理创新提供更为科学的偏好基础和公共治理思路。     

Comparative Learning Dynamics*

We study economic environments in which agents make choices on the basis of relative performance criteria and call the associated class of dynamic adjustment rules comparative dynamics. We distinguish two classes of learning behavior: learning from the population experience (imitative dynamics) and learning only from one's own experience (introspective dynamics). Paradoxically, for a broad class of models, comparing stochastically stable states across dynamics, agent payoffs are lower for imitative than introspective dynamics—mimicking best practice in the population is counterproductive.     

Peer influence in network markets: a theoretical and empirical analysis

Network externalities spur the growth of networks and the adoption of network goods in two ways. First, they make it more attractive to join a network the larger its installed base. Second, they create incentives for network members to actively recruit new members. Despite indications that the latter “peer effect” can be more important for network growth than the installed-base effect, it has so far been largely ignored in the literature. We address this gap using game-theoretical models. When all early adopters can band together to exert peer influence—an assumption that fits, e.g., the case of firms supporting a technical standard—we find that the peer effect induces additional growth of the network by a factor. When, in contrast, individuals exert peer influence in small groups of size n, the increase in network size is by an additive constant—which, for small networks, can amount to a large relative increase. The difference between small, local, personal networks and large, global, anonymous networks arises endogenously from our analysis. Fundamentally, the first type of networks is “tie-reinforcing,” the other, “tie-creating”. We use survey data from users of the Internet services, Skype and eBay, to illustrate the main logic of our theoretical results. As predicted by the model, we find that the peer effect matters strongly for the network of Skype users—which effectively consists of numerous small sub-networks—but not for that of eBay users. Since many network goods give rise to small, local networks, our findings bear relevance to the economics of network goods and related social networks in general.     

Fashionable food: a latent class analysis of social status in food purchases

A framed field experiment combined with a latent class econometric approach was used to investigate how prestige-seeking behaviour influences food choices. We propose a theoretical framework to test conspicuous consumption of specialty food products. We test the hypothesis empirically by categorizing individuals into unobserved latent classes according to their general prestige-seeking behaviour. We find evidence of food consumption driven by prestige to the point of becoming a symbol of social status. The prestige-seeking behaviour seems to be motivated by invidious comparison or higher-class individuals seeking to differentiate themselves from lower-class individuals; and pecuniary emulation, or lower-class individuals buying prestigious goods in order to be perceived as members of a higher class. Findings from this study revealed that the effects of differentiating labelling attributes had a higher impact for individuals classified into classes with prestige-seeking behaviour to attain an elevated social status.     

Anonymous Games with Binary Actions

In many economic decision problems the preferences of economic agents depend on the numbers or proportions of individuals choosing the same decision or other decisions. Examples include network or congestion externalities, location choices of firms, the tourist's choice of a vacation destination, the visit of public events like concerts, or the purchase of goods that are subject to fashion. In this article the relating equilibrium characterization and selection questions are formulated and solved in terms of anonymous games with a continuum of players facing a binary decision problem. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D62.     

Richard H. Thaler: A Nobel Prize for Behavioural Economics

ABSTRACT

This paper provides an overview of Richard Thaler’s career and the contributions to behavioural economics that earned him the 2017 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. It focuses on his role in exposing and making sense of empirical anomalies in orthodox economics, his analysis of mental accounting, and his work with Cass Sunstein on the notion of libertarian paternalism and the ‘nudge’-based behavioural approach to economic policy. It then considers his contributions critically and explores how, unlike previous behavioural economics, Thaler succeeded in getting his new approach to behavioural economics accepted by mainstream economists.     

Social responsibility for living standards: Presidential address,association for social economics, 2007

This address presents a vision of economics—drawing upon social, institutional, and feminist economics—that supports the assertion that there should be social responsibility for living standards. Alternative definitions of what an economy is and what economics should study are related to three definitions of living standards presented in Amartya Sen's 1985 Tanner Lectures on the topic. A social provisioning approach to economic life emphasizes that provisioning needs to be organized to promote human flourishing. One contemporary challenge is to do this in a manner that sustains caring and promotes gender equity. 1 1 Following my Presidential Address and prior to publication, I have benefited from comments by Wilfred Dolfsma, Laurie Nisonoff, Nancy Folbre, Ellen Mutari, Martha Starr, and an anonymous reviewer.