The Impact of Japanese Economic Cooperation on Asian Economic Development

The main objective of this paper is to overview the developments of Japan's ODA and assess, in a quantitative manner, their economic impacts on Asian countries. The benefits of two alternative measures—one from capital formation by Japan's ODA loans and the other from import liberalization in the Japanese market—are compared. Those economy-wide impacts of aid and trade on six Asian countries—China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam—are estimated by a CGE model of global trade, incorporating a certain mechanism of dynamic capital formation. Japan's ODA loans are effective for economic growth in the countries. Real GDP gains range from 0.1 to 1.6% annually. Trade liberalization is efficient to improve economic welfare. Utility gains range from 0.2 to 1.9%, which exceed those on account of Japan's ODA. Variations in those economic impacts are much more significantly observed when examined by sector.     

The global impact of a sharper US‐China slowdown

• ? We forecast a moderate global slowdown through 2020, but risks are looming of a sharper downturn in China and the US. If these were to materialise, our simulations suggest global GDP growth would hit a post‐crisis low, with the level of GDP dropping by 0.6% and growth slowing by 0.4 ppt in 2019/20.
• ? Economies with strong trade linkages to China and the US – Korea, Taiwan and Mexico – would suffer most. Conversely, a weaker dollar, lower oil prices and relatively smaller trade flows with the US and China would offset the blow in Europe and for some EMs, including Turkey, Argentina and India.
• ? Since 2010, Chinese activity has been a powerful leading indicator of every major economy's exports, proving stronger than similar indicators for US or eurozone activity. This is even the case for non‐Asian economies such as Canada, Mexico, Italy, Germany, France and the UK. This may reflect deepening trading relationships and the relatively high volatility of Chinese cyclical indicators over the period.
• ? Over the past decade, global macro stability has been supported by the US and Chinese cycles moving counter to each other. But this could reverse if the ongoing Chinese policy stimulus fails to gain traction and the weakness gains momentum.

     

Human capital mobility patterns in the European Union and the financial crisis

This paper provides new evidence on the quantification of economic losses and/or gains from skilled human capital mobility in terms of GDP and productivity in several EU countries during and after the Great Recession. We construct two novel indicators to quantify and compare the economic effects of human capital mobility across EU countries in 2008, 2012, and 2016. Through hierarchical clustering, we created groups of countries to perform a non-parametric MANOVA. The results suggest the existence of three groups of countries aggregated by similar economic and mobility patterns. The differences between these groups are significant and allow us to delineate the countries’ gains and losses.

     

Privatization, Labor and Social Safety Nets

Privatization promotes economic efficiency and growth, thereby reinforcing macroeconomic adjustment. In the short run, however, it can lead to job losses and wage cuts for workers. This paper discusses these adverse impacts of privatization in terms of various methods of privatization and surveys the existing empirical evidence. It finds that public sales and auctions can have stronger negative effects on workers but maximize the government's revenue. Policymakers' options for mitigating the social impact of privatization are surveyed.     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Growth resilient to protectionist concerns

• ? Despite the mounting threat of more protectionist trade measures, we expect the impact on global growth and trade to be mild. Given this, and the still fairly solid underlying economic picture, we have left our global GDP growth forecasts for 2018 and 2019 unchanged at 3.2% and 3.0% respectively.
• ? Although economic data in Q1 painted a pretty solid picture, there are signs that the global expansion may lose momentum in Q2. Most notably, the global PMI fell sharply in March, more than offsetting the gains of the previous three quarters or so. Some of the decline may reflect an over‐reaction to recent trade threats and could be reversed in April and despite the drop, the surveys still point to strong growth. But the fall highlights the risk that lingering trade tensions could damage confidence and prompt firms and consumers to delay investment and major spending plans.
• ? On a more positive note, China's economic growth picked up markedly in early 2018, which could provide a fillip to global trade growth in the near term. Given the betterthan‐expected start to the year, we have made no change to our 2018 China GDP growth forecast (of 6.4%) despite the probable negative effects of trade measures.
• ? Meanwhile, most advanced economies remain in the late expansionary stage of the cycle. And those that show signs of slowing, such as the Eurozone, are doing so from multi‐year highs. While we have nudged down our 2018 Eurozone GDP growth forecast slightly to 2.2%, the pace is expected to remain well above trend. We judge the impact of US tariffs and counter‐measures on the US economy to be subdued and have lowered our GDP growth forecasts for 2018 and 2019 by just 0.1pp.
• ? For now, we see further solid growth for the world economy this year even in the environment of rising protectionism. While there is a risk that a further escalation of trade tensions could trigger a sharper slowdown in global GDP growth, we still see the risks of a full‐blown and damaging trade war as limited and the chances of protectionism leading to recessions as smaller still.

     

Impact of China's currency valuation and labour cost on the US in a trade and exchange rate model

Ricardian dynamic general equilibrium analyses show that under free trade arrangements a low income country with lower wage cost and large endowment of labour has comparative advantage in trade. Efficiency gains from this enhance economic growth and welfare of households simultaneously in both low income and advanced economies. Theoretical predictions are empirically validated here with structural VAR analysis based on quarterly data over the time period 1995:1 to 2009:1 on China's relative wage cost, interest rate differential, real effective exchange rate (REER), relative GDP and the US current account balance. It is shown how the relative prices of labour, capital and the currency affect the economic activity in China and current account balance in the US. With free capital inflows and outflows and restrictions on labour mobility, comparative advantage of China and the trade deficit of the US will both be minimised if China allows real appreciation of the Yuan and complete adjustment in prices. Higher production cost and prices in China could reduce welfare of Chinese households and the trade imbalance of the US, while higher relative GDP of China lowers the current account balance for the US.     

Taxing air pollutants and carbon individually or jointly: results from a CGE model enriched by an emission abatement sector

We analyse the separate and collective impacts of emissions taxation to understand the internalisation effects of externalities. The analysis is carried out using a static computable general equilibrium model, with unemployment, bottom-up abatement technologies represented by a step function, and detailed emission coefficients. Environmental and health external costs are quantified using the ExternE’s Impact Pathway Approach. Emissions, as a result of environmental taxation, fall through reduced output, production factor substitution, and increased end of pipe abatement activity. The analysis shows that a full internalisation of environmental externalities can result in modest overall economic and environmental welfare gains. There are, however, differences in terms of employment and output, depending on what combination of taxes are applied, which sectors are covered, and how fiscal revenues are redistributed. Air quality benefits range from €35–75 per ton of CO₂ abated. Total environmental benefits always exceed GDP loss and the associated welfare loss.     

Fixed versus floating: vulnerability to rising interest rates

• ? Looking at different economies' exposure to fixed‐ and floating‐rate private‐sector debt reveals how vulnerable they could be to rising interest rates. Our analysis finds that Hong Kong, Sweden, China and Australia are potentially most exposed via floating rates to rising debt service costs. A 150bp rise in rates would also push several other countries' debt service ratios above the peaks of 2008. Less vulnerable economies include the US and Germany.
• ? High levels of floating‐rate debt imply a large and rapid pass‐through of rising interest rates to firms and households, with negative consequences. Exposure to floating‐rate debt as a share of GDP varies greatly: the highest levels are in Hong Kong, China, Sweden, Australia and Spain, with the lowest levels in the US, France and Germany.
• ? Growing shares of fixed‐rate housing debt in the US, Eurozone and UK mean the impact of higher interest rates may be less severe than a decade ago. Private deleveraging in countries such as the US, UK and Spain could also soften the impact.
• ? A rise of 100bp in short‐term interest rates would raise the debt service ratio after one year by around 2.5% of GDP in Hong Kong, with increases of 1.5–1.7% of GDP in Sweden, China and Australia. The smallest effects would be in the US and Germany.
• ? A 100–150bp rate rise would push debt service ratios in China, Hong Kong, Canada, France and the Netherlands well above their peaks of a decade ago. A similar rate rise would take debt service ratios in Sweden, South Korea and Australia close to, or above, previous peaks.
• ? The distribution of debt within economies, which our analysis does not cover, is also important. For example, there is some evidence that the US corporate sector has a high concentration of debt among borrowers with weak finances. Countries that are highly vulnerable to interest rate rises may see their central banks normalise policy rates more slowly than they otherwise would.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: entering 2018 with plenty of momentum

• ? Further evidence that the global economy ended last year on a high note is consistent with our view that world GDP growth in 2018 will be around 3.2%, a little better than the likely rise of 3% in 2017 and the best annual outturn since 2011.
• ? The global economy has entered 2018 with plenty of momentum. In December, the global composite PMI continued to trend upwards, rising to its highest level of 2017. This was primarily down to developments in the manufacturing sector, with several emerging markets recording especially strong gains.
• ? While the strength of the manufacturing PMI bodes well for global trade, other timely trade indicators, particularly from Asia, have been less positive. On balance, though, we have nudged up our forecast for world trade growth iwn 2018 to 4.8%. But this would still be a slowdown after last year's estimated rise of 6%.
• ? This partly reflects the change in the drivers of GDP growth from 2017. We still expect a modest slowdown in China, triggering a sharper drop‐off in import growth there. Eurozone GDP growth is also likely to slow slightly, to 2.2%, which is still well above our estimate of potential growth. By contrast, we have nudged up our US GDP growth forecast for this year to 2.8% – 0.5pp higher than the probable 2017 outturn – as looser fiscal policy will not be fully offset by tighter monetary policy. The recent rise in commodity prices, further dollar weakness and still‐strong global trade growth all bode well for prospects in many emerging markets.
• ? Some commentators have questioned the durability of the global economic expansion, reflecting the long period of uninterrupted GDP growth and concerns that a financial market slowdown could eventually impinge on growth. But economic expansions do not die of old age. And while equity markets look expensive on many metrics, we expect strong earnings growth to push equity prices higher over the coming months. Meanwhile, although various geopolitical risks remain, more generally economic uncertainty has diminished.

     

全球向量自回归模型的理论、方法及其应用

全球向量自回归模型(GVAR)是将经典VAR模型加以扩展,使其能够用于分析世界各国或各地区之间经济联系的一种新的模型方法。本文阐述GVAR模型的理论、方法及其在中国经济分析中的应用。基于包含33个国家的GVAR模型,本文实证分析了中国与世界经济的相互影响。通过一般冲击反应函数方法分析中国需求冲击、美国需求冲击、美国债券市场价格和国际油价变动等冲击对中国和其他国家经济增长以及通货膨胀的传导机制、影响强度、持续时间等。结果显示,中国需求冲击对美国、欧元区、日本等主要工业化国家有显著影响,同时中国经济也受到美国债券价格变动较强烈的冲击。     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: US acceleration brings a positive start to 2014

• A series of positive data releases in the US has led us to revise upwards our growth forecasts for 2014. We now expect US GDP to rise by over 3% this year, compared to 2.7% forecast a month ago.
• A key factor changing the US outlook is a more confident consumer. In the three months to November, real consumption rose at an annualised pace of 5%, the strongest in four years. This has been partly financed by a reduced saving rate – but the saving rate has been much lower in the recent past and steady employment gains should support both income and consumer sentiment in the year ahead.
• Also supporting growth this year in the US and the broader global economy will be wealth gains. In recent years, global stock prices at the end of a given year have been a reasonable predictor of economic growth in the following year, and global equities were up over 20% on the year at the end of 2013.
• Nevertheless, the global growth outlook remains patchy. An optimistic picture in the US, UK and Japan contrasts with a rather mixed picture the Eurozone – where some economies are still contracting and where there is a risk of deflation.
• The picture is also subdued in the key emergers. In contrast to the developed economies, emerging market stocks are down 10% on the year as higher US yields draw capital away. Weak currencies, inflation and high interest rates are weighing on growth in markets such as India, Brazil and Turkey.
• These factors are likely to wane only slowly as the year proceeds and could even worsen if tapering in the US is faster than expected. A stronger US economy may not fully offset this – the US's strong competitive position could direct more of rising US demand to US products than in previous upturns.
• As a result, we expect emerging growth to firm only modestly this year, to 4.5% from 4.1% in 2013 – well below pre‐crisis levels of around 7%. Global growth too will remain below par at 2.9%, from 2.2% in 2013, but improving to over 3% next year.

     

Neutral carbon tax and environmental targets in Brazil

We evaluate the effects of a carbon tax in the Brazilian economy using an input–output framework. First, we consider the impacts of a carbon tax of US$ 10 and US$ 50/metric ton of CO₂ equivalent. As usual, the adoption of the carbon tax generates adverse effects on GDP, wages and jobs in the short term, but reduces emissions and generates new government revenues, especially in the case of the greater tax. Second, we consider a broader tax system reform. In this reform, we replace distortionary taxes by a tax on value added. To compensate for the loss of government revenue, we assume a carbon tax with equivalent revenue. We find that the net effect is a GDP increase of 0.47%, the creation of 533 thousand jobs and reduction of 1.6 million tons of CO₂ emissions. Both scenarios exempt exports and levy imports to correct adverse effects on the country’s competitiveness.     

The Tracking of Environmental Costs: Motivations and Impacts

Abstract

Most accounting systems separately capture and accumulate one portion of the overall environmental costs of firms, while the remainder is embedded in other cost pools, such as general overhead costs or administrative costs. Little empirical evidence has been provided to explain the impacts of cost accounting systems that make a larger portion of firms' total environmental costs visible. The aim of this study is to conceptually and empirically examine the relationships among the tracking of environmental costs (TEC) by firms, their environmental motivations, and the impacts in terms of environmental and economic performance. Using survey data from a large sample of manufacturing firms, the results suggest two main conclusions. First, the TEC has an indirect influence on economic performance through environmental performance. Second, this indirect effect is influenced by the environmental motivations of the firm. More specifically, this indirect effect is greater (lesser) for firms whose motivations are predominately business-oriented (sustainability-oriented).     

Forecasting by factors,by variables,by both or neither?

We consider forecasting with factors, variables and both, modeling in-sample using Autometrics so all principal components and variables can be included jointly, while tackling multiple breaks by impulse-indicator saturation. A forecast-error taxonomy for factor models highlights the impacts of location shifts on forecast-error biases. Forecasting US GDP over 1-, 4- and 8-step horizons using the dataset from Stock and Watson (2009) updated to 2011:2 shows factor models are more useful for nowcasting or short-term forecasting, but their relative performance declines as the forecast horizon increases. Forecasts for GDP levels highlight the need for robust strategies, such as intercept corrections or differencing, when location shifts occur as in the recent financial crisis.     

Local and National Impacts from Landing North Sea Gas in Western Norway

A bstract . A simple framework is presented for the analysis of the local employment, income, sales , and local government impacts of landing North Sea gas at either of two Norwegian kommunes (municipalities). These impacts indicate the different forms of economic change arising from a major economic development event. The average annual net change in these economic measures is estimated for the operational phase of a gas terminal. The analysis indicated substantial differences in local and regional net gains. Both sites yielded positive neteconomic gains, which means noneconomic and national considerations become key decision determinates. These national issues provide the setting to judge the local/regional net gains. The unresolved questions include the national benefits and costs of the landing decision given the small scale of the Norwegian economy, potential future gas finds, and a fully employed economy.     

Effects of Schumpeterian and Kirznerian entrepreneurship on economic growth: panel data evidence

Abstract

The relevant literature recognises Schumpeterian and Kirznerian entrepreneurship as mechanisms that can impact economic growth. This article seeks to explore the effects of these two types of entrepreneurship on economic growth across the three GEM (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor) economic ecosystems (factor-driven economy, efficiency-driven economy, innovation-driven economy). Using different databases, we applied unbalanced panel data for 43 countries (2009–2013). By estimating the econometric models, we were able to calculate the effects of these two types of entrepreneurship on economic growth in the three different types of economy. In terms of the overall model for GEM economies, neither Schumpeterian nor Kirznerian entrepreneurship return any statistically significant effects on the Global Competitiveness Index or on GDP growth. However, the Total Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity variable generates a positive effect on the Global Competitiveness Index. The results presented in this paper provide insights into entrepreneurship and the GEM entrepreneurial economic ecosystems.     

A long dollar fall: likelihood and consequences

• ? The dollar has tended to move in long swings over the last forty years, raising the risk that the recent decline could extend considerably further. This is not our base case, but risks do look skewed towards additional dollar weakness. Our modelling work suggests that a large further dollar slide would have significant effects on the pattern of world growth – the US and some emerging markets would gain, with other advanced economies the main losers.
• ? There have been several large multi‐year swings in the dollar over the last four decades. We identify seven such episodes since 1971 including three long declines averaging 31%, the last being in 2002‐08. Since 2017 the dollar has fallen 10%, implying a possible further considerable drop.
• ? Our dollar strength indicator, which covers a range of economic variables associated with dollar moves in the past, does not currently point to a re‐run of the dollar weakness of the 2000s. But we do expect some further near‐term dollar losses and risks to our baseline forecast look skewed to the downside, especially given the emergence of large twin deficits in the US.
• ? Should a further large dollar slump nevertheless occur, our modelling suggests large effects on the pattern of world growth. The main gainers would be commodity‐producing emerging markets (EM) benefitting from improved terms of trade, positive balance sheet and external liquidity effects and scope to ease local interest rates. Rising US yields would erode some of these gains in later years.
• ? The main initial losers would be advanced economies outside the US which would lose competitiveness. In the case of the Eurozone and Japan, undershoots of inflation targets would be likely. There could also be some other negative consequences such as stoking protectionism and creating financial bubbles in some EMs.

     

中国房地产开发及投资经济效应分析

房地产业在我国国民经济中处于举足轻重的地位,房价的大幅涨跌都会对经济运行造成严重影响。从微观角度,通过对地产开发成本费用的分析,发现以地价和税收为主的整个政府性费用支出占到了房地产开发费用支出的近50%,而房地产开发所得的销售收入中也有近1/3以上的销售收入流向政府。因此,抑制过热的房地产市场,控制不断高涨的房地产价格,政府肩负重要责任。从宏观角度,通过对辽宁省2005年一季度到2010年底二季度的GDP数据以及房地产投资季度数据的定量分析,发现房地产投资与经济增长之间的长期弹性为0.48,存在长期均衡关系。     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Global upswing delayed

• This month sees our global GDP growth forecast for 2015 revised down to 2.7%, implying no improvement from 2014. At the start of the year, we expected world growth for 2015 at 2.9%.
• A key factor behind the slippage in our global forecast has been a softening of activity in the US. The balance of economic surprises (actual data versus expected) has deteriorated sharply in recent months. As a result, we now expect US growth at 2.7% this year, compared to 3.3% at the start of 2015.
• We are wary of reading too much into the most recent data, as the US and other advanced economies also went through ‘soft patches’ at the starts of both 2013 and 2014, but recovered. Also, the balance of economic surprises for the G10 is only moderately negative – and is strongly positive for the Eurozone.
• One area of concern is sluggish US consumption recently – despite lower oil prices. But with labour market conditions favourable and disposable income growing solidly, we expect this to prove a blip. And the evidence from advanced economies as a whole suggests lower oil prices have boosted consumers.
• There are nevertheless genuine drags on global growth. The strong dollar appears to be weighing on US exports and investment, and curbing profits. It is also damaging growth in some emerging markets through its negative impact on commodity prices and capital flows and via balance sheet effects (raising the burden of dollar‐denominated debt).
• Meanwhile, this month also sees a fresh downgrade to our forecast for China – GDP is now expected to rise 6.6% this year versus 6.8% a month ago. This reflects weakness in a number of key indicators and also the likely impact of a squeeze on local government finances from the property sector slump.
• With the US and China representing a third of global GDP, slower growth there will also tend to retard world trade growth. We continue to expect world GDP growth to reach 3% in 2016, but 2015 now looks like being another year of sub‐par global growth.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Outlook bright despite fears of protectionism

• ? President Trump's decision to impose tariffs on some steel and aluminium imports has increased the downside risk of a surge in protectionist measures. But for now, our view is that the direct impact of the US move will be small. Our global GDP growth forecasts for 2018 is unchanged at 3.2% while we have nudged up 2019 from 2.9% to 3.0%.
• ? Available data suggest that the healthy pace of world GDP growth in Q4 has been maintained into Q1. The global composite PMI rose again in February, to its highest level in almost three and a half years. And in the first two months of the year, Chinese import growth remained solid, suggesting that, for now, it is still an important support for world trade. Although our advanced economy leading indicator has fallen back a touch since the turn of the year, it remains consistent with robust growth.
• ? Another plus is that the recent equity market sell‐off has not yet morphed into a fullblown correction. As with other ‘tantrums’ over recent years, we do not expect this to have any notable spill‐overs for growth.
• ? But the bigger concern is now the potential for a sharp increase in economic protectionism. While the imposition of tariffs on some US steel and aluminium imports will have repercussions for foreign producers and worsen US cost competitiveness, the sector is too small to have major knock‐on implications for global growth. The main worry is if this triggers retaliation that spins into a damaging trade war. Although this downside risk has grown, in our view it remains a tail risk. Neither the US nor its trading partners will benefit from a raft of tariffs being imposed. And the political gains for Trump may prove illusory if retaliatory measures disproportionately affect US regions where he and the Republican party are politically vulnerable.
• ? In all, our baseline view remains little changed and we still see another year of healthy GDP growth. Although downside risks to the outlook have risen since the start of the year, they are still lower than two or three years ago.