Behavioral political economy: A survey

In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a “benevolent” way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of “behavioral political economy” and considers the scope for further research.     

Was Bentham a primitive rational choice theory predecessor?

This paper challenges the view of Jeremy Bentham as a primitive predecessor of rational choice theory and welfare economics. The psychological hedonism in Bentham is of a rather weak form – net pleasure motivates behaviour, but we are not always capable of its maximisation. Thus, the outcome of our choices is not necessarily in our best interest and the aggregation of our revealed preferences is not necessarily a good indicator of general happiness. The bottom line is that the underpinnings of Bentham's utilitarianism are better aligned with contemporary psychological theory than previously thought, which puts his ethical thinking on firmer ground.     

Between mathematical formalism,normative choice rules,and the behavioural sciences: The emergence of rational choice theories in the late 1940s and early 1950s

Abstract

This paper discusses why mathematical economists of the early Cold War period favored formal-axiomatic over behavioral choice theories. One reason was that formal-axiomatic theories allowed mathematical economists to improve the conceptual and theoretical foundations of economics and thereby to increase its scientific status. Furthermore, the separation between mathematical economics and other behavioral sciences was not as clear-cut as often argued. While economists did not modify their behavioral assumptions, some acknowledged the empirical shortcomings of their models. The paper reveals the multifaceted nature of rational choice theories reflected in the changing interpretations and roles of the theories in those early years.     

A Comment on “Economic Inefficiency: A Failure of Economists”

This comment argues that the Staten-Umbeck critique of welfare economics, published earlier in this journal, is useful in that it challenges economists to carefully specify the assumptions of welfare analysis, but its primary point is only that welfare analysis is not methodologically positive.     

Ethics,human behavior and the methodology of social economics

Social economists differ among themselves but are united in rejecting the rational actor model. They insist that individuals are more than economic actors; they arepersons with ethical values who live in community. That agreement over fundamentals leads social economists to embrace a methodological approach that differs substantially from the mainstream of economics. They (sometimes explicitly but usually implicitly), engage in a special form of storytelling known in the philosophy of social science as pattern modeling. Instead of using a pre-existing theoretical framework, such as rational choice theory, to logically construct a story, this type of story is constructed empirically from the bottom up through the use of case studies. The article concludes with a specific consideration of Albert Hirschman's methodology to illustrate the storytelling approach of a first rate and well-recognized social economist.     

Ethics,human behavior and the methodology of social economics

Social economists differ among themselves but are united in rejecting the rational actor model. They insist that individuals are more than economic actors; they arepersons with ethical values who live in community. That agreement over fundamentals leads social economists to embrace a methodological approach that differs substantially from the mainstream of economics. They (sometimes explicitly but usually implicitly), engage in a special form of storytelling known in the philosophy of social science as pattern modeling. Instead of using a pre-existing theoretical framework, such as rational choice theory, to logically construct a story, this type of story is constructed empirically from the bottom up through the use of case studies. The article concludes with a specific consideration of Albert Hirschman's methodology to illustrate the storytelling approach of a first rate and well-recognized social economist.     

What are the ethics of welfare economics? And,are welfare economists utilitarians?

Four questions: (1) What is welfare economics? (2) Is it an ethical system?  (3) How do welfare economists differ from one another? And (4), how do they differ from other economic ethicists? Then utilitarianism is discussed. I was taught, and have inferred to others, that welfare economists are utilitarians. They are not. Welfare economics is an atypical form of welfare consequentialism: consequentialist in that whether an act or policy is right or wrong is a function of only its consequences—the adjective “welfare” because the only consequences that matter are the welfare (well-faring) consequences. Most welfare consequentialists are neither welfare economists nor utilitarians. And, most moral philosophers are not welfare consequentialists—neither are most normal folk.     

The Ethics of Intergenerational Distribution: Reply and Response to John E. Roemer

Recent concerns among economists over global climate change have given rise to an uneven literature on intergenerational welfare economics. Environmental & Resource Economics in its March 2011 issue published a paper by the political philosopher John E. Roemer that contains not only errors of interpretation of what others have written, but also misunderstandings of settled matters. I respond and reply to Roemer by re-exploring the foundations of intergenerational welfare economics. I show that ethical pluralism gives rise to a very different framework for thinking about the subject than the one Roemer presents in his paper. Moreover, his dismissal of much of what welfare economists write on such concepts as social discount rates has as its source an utterly narrow view of the contexts in which economic evaluation is undertaken in the contemporary world.     

‘On the Econ within’: a reply to Daniel Hausman

This note replies to a comment by Daniel Hausman on our paper ‘Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics’. We clarify our characterisation of behavioural welfare economics and acknowledge that Hausman does fully endorse this approach. However, we argue that Hausman’s response to our critique, like behavioural welfare economics itself, implicitly uses a model of an inner rational agent.     

The market for surrogate motherhood contracts

Surrogate motherhood is a controversial subject, and has not previously been formally modelled by economists. In this paper, a neoclassical model of the market for surrogate motherhood contracts is developed, based on the utility maximizing decisions of potential surrogate mothers and commissioning parties. The presence of both altruistic and self-interested behaviour generates unusual market outcomes.     

Social-Self-Interest

This paper is about rational sociality. Retaining rational choice as its basic framework, it aims to enrich it by taking seriously a well-established cultural, social and psychological phenomenon: that some inter-personal relationships have intrinsic value. These are termed primary. Utility maximisation includes the binary choice to enter or not to enter a primary relationship: this on the one hand has a direct impact on utility, and on the other imposes restrictions on consumption choices. The model encompasses standard economic choice theory as a special case, while explicitly recognising that self-interested agents make choices that are sometimes group dependent. The broad scope of this approach is illustrated by a number of extensions and applications, some of which lead to distinctly unorthodox conclusions.     

THE CITATION IMPACT OF FEMINIST ECONOMICS

Abstract

Feminist economics is a transformative project. However, transformation generates resistance. Feminist economics can be deliberately excluded, co-opted through an uncritical application of rational choice theory, or ignored. And feminist economics can be listened to: when the United Nations consults feminist economists; when feminist economists publish in widely read journals; when a student finds inspiration in a Feminist Economics article. All of these are ways feminist economics can, and has, influenced the profession. After ten years of discourse, it is possible to take stock and assess the impact of feminist economics. This article provides a partial assessment through a consideration of citations of the journal Feminist Economics, describing its impact on mainstream economics, heterodox economics, and other disciplines. While the overall project of feminist economics encompasses much more than just one journal, studying the citations for Feminist Economics is a first step toward assessing the influence of the entire corpus.     

Psychological versus economic models of bounded rationality

That the rationality of individual people is ‘bounded’ – that is, finite in scope and representational reach, and constrained by the opportunity cost of time – cannot reasonably be controversial as an empirical matter. In this context, the paper addresses the question as to why, if economics is an empirical science, economists introduce bounds on the rationality of agents in their models only grudgingly and partially. The answer defended in the paper is that most economists are interested primarily in markets and only secondarily in the dynamics of individual decisions – specifically, they are interested in these dynamics mainly insofar as they might systematically influence the most useful approaches to modeling interesting markets. In market contexts, bounds on rationality are typically generated by institutional and informational properties specific to the market in question, which arise and are sustained by structural dynamics that do not originate in or reduce to individuals' decisions or psychological dispositions. To be sure, these influences interact with psychological dispositions, so economists have reason to attend to the psychology of valuation. But no general model of bounded rationality should ever be expected to feature in the economist's toolkit, regardless of the extent to which psychologists successfully identify specific human cognitive limitations. Use of moderate rational expectations assumptions should be understood in this light. Such assumptions are readily relaxed in specific applications, and in ways customized to modeling circumstances, that modelers, experimentalists, and econometricians are making steadily more sophisticated.     

Back to the BOG, Austrian-style

Robust political economy begins with assumptions of self-interested planners who lack perfect information. In such a world, the social planner does not necessarily outperform the decentralized outcome. Crampton and Farrant (2005) argue that the inability to engage in economic calculation reduces the ability of social planner to extract consumer surplus. Thus, the lack of calculation improves the welfare of the median citizen which contrasts with conventional wisdom. We argue that they overstate their results. First, the calculation argument fails because of its underdevelopment, not because of the empirical record. Second, the welfare implications cannot be adequately addressed by assuming diminishing marginal utility of income or using the median welfare standard. Third, robust political economy has not developed a model that yields meaningful welfare comparisons. Thus, robust political economy remains in its early stages. JEL Code P0, P16, P50 With apologies to Gordon Tullock     

Thinking Things Through: The Value and Limitations of James Buchanan's Public Choice Theory

Abstract

James Buchanan, one of the founders of Public Choice theory, applies the conceptual apparatus of economics to the public domain. This article investigates which assumptions are crucial to Buchanan's project, concentrating on methodological individualism and the Homo Economicus model. It shows that Buchanan from time to time moves away from these economic concepts, though only in minor ways. The article also focuses on Buchanan's normative emphasis on the role of institutions in coordinating self-interested individual actions in mutually beneficial ways. Criticizing Buchanan's analysis, the article argues that a broader view of the individual and of the role of institutions is necessary in a theory of constitutional choice.     

Early Evolution of the Assumption of Non-satiation

The paper explores the mostly tacit transmission of the assumption of non-satiation from the outset of classical political economy to the advent of marginal analysis in Great Britain. The evolution of the assumption is traced back to contributions to the philosophy of mind in the early British enlightenment, which provided scientific ground not only to the economic agent's insatiable nature but also to a delusional dynamic of association that challenges the causality between acquisitiveness and pleasure. The paper claims that, because there is evidence that such delusional aspect was known to the early political economists, the assumption of non-satiation might have become a mainstay in economics not only for its scientific status but also as a result of a strategic choice that can only be explained within the political, cultural, and social context in which it was made. Had this been the case, the exportability of the assumption through time and space must be further questioned. The consistent inclusion of non-satiation in economic theories, policies, and institutions may have had extraordinary consequences, and may have nurtured rational behaviors that in fact fulfill the assumption itself.     

ENERGY UTILITIES, CONSERVATION, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

Academic and policy debate has centered around an apparent "underinvestment in conservation." This paper outlines traditional explanations for underinvestment and presents a prospect theory analysis of individual conservation behavior. On the basis of investment criteria, individuals seem to discriminate against conservation investments. While these decisions might appear rational as life style decisions, individual choice across different household appliances shows little consistency. For policymaking purposes, understanding and modeling actual behavior is crucial to maximizing social welfare. The insight of certain positive models of human behavior supports economic efficiency arguments for marketplace intervention. This paper argues that because individuals making conservation investment decisions apparently do not act according to the dictates of utilitarian economics, utility sponsored conservation programs are justified on economic efficiency grounds. Finally, in light of prospect theory considerations, the paper suggests marketing guidelines for conservation investments sponsored by electric utilities.     

Is novelty always a good thing? Towards an evolutionary welfare economics

Evolutionary economists are increasingly interested in developing policy implications. As a rule, contributions in this field implicitly assume that policy should focus on the encouragement of learning and innovation. We argue that, from an individualistic perspective, this position is not easy to justify. Novelty and evolutionary change have in fact a rather complex normative dimension. In order to cope with this, the evolutionary approach to policy-making needs to be complemented with an account of welfare the background assumptions of which are compatible with an evolutionary world-view. Standard welfare economics is unsuited to the job, since the orthodox way to conceptualize welfare as the satisfaction of given and rational preferences cannot be applied in a world in which preferences tend to be variable and incoherent. We argue that, in order to deal with the specific normative issues brought up in an evolving economy, welfare should be conceptualized in a procedural way: At the individual level, it should be understood as the capacity and motivation to engage in the ongoing learning of instrumentally effective preferences. Evolutionary-naturalistic insights into the way human agents bring about, value, and respond to novelty-induced change turn out to be a valuable input into this extended concept of welfare. Finally, some implications of this concept are explored.     

The Recent Critique of Theoretical Economics: A Methodologically Informed Investigation

My purpose is to appraise the recent critique of theoretical economics by applying the methodological perspective. Therefore, I start by identifying the main lines of criticism raised against theoretical economics in the aftermath of the post-2008 global economic crisis: namely, the voices criticizing economics for its unrealistic models, excessive mathematization, and overconfidence in its theoretical claims. First, I show that these issues are interconnected and should be jointly analyzed. Next, I investigate these lines of critique from the perspective provided by the latest achievements in the philosophy of economics (e.g., studies on the epistemic role of economic models). Taking this perspective reinforces some allegations against economics (e.g., these voices accusing economists of treating economic laws as universal laws of nature) and makes some criticisms more nuanced (e.g., the issue of unrealistic assumptions). I conclude by stating that such a methodological perspective is necessary in critically apprising the recent critique of economics.     

Examination of Multiple Criteria in Health Technology Assessment for Application to Instrumental Analysis

Abstract:

The instrumental-ceremonial dichotomy is the analytical concern emphasized in instrumental analysis by original institutional economists for making welfare decisions. Paul Dale Bush and Wolfram Elsner explained that warranted criteria are required in order to conduct instrumental analysis. The concern for criteria led to an examination of multiple criteria decision analysis in health technology assessment in order to improve instrumental analysis. Health technology assessment (HTA) is one of the most active and extensive areas of analysis for policy making because medical technology changes very rapidly, expenditures on it are high and growing, it can harm as well as help, and there is intense personal concern by citizens who want wellness. Although HTA, especially with regard to the analysis of multiple criteria, has made considerable progress, its appraisal has been a disappointment. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to critique aspects of multiple criteria HTA in order to further develop instrumental analysis.