The Effect of Political Alignment on Transfers to Portuguese Municipalities

I investigate if political alignment between central and local governments brings financial benefit to local governments, using financial data from Portuguese municipalities (1992–2005). I use regression discontinuity design to determine the effect of political alignment per se on transfers to municipalities. Municipalities aligned with the central government receive 19% more targetable transfers than unaligned municipalities. I test for electoral motivation of this transfer bias: extra transfers increase the vote share of incumbents in local elections for one of the two Portuguese major parties; however, municipal incumbency does not lead to better results in national elections.     

ENDOGENOUS ELECTION TIMING IN MAJORITARIAN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS*

The election date is an endogenous choice in many parliamentary systems. This paper explores when governments call elections and how the timing of an election influences the electoral result. Governments have an incentive to behave opportunistically, calling elections at a time when they are performing well. However, the choice of election date reveals information about the government. Specifically, early elections indicate that a government has little faith in its ability to perform well in the future. The analysis is expanded to consider changes in government composition, political business cycles, informational asymmetries and the role of opposition campaigning.     

Taxation and social protection under governance decentralisation

Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the taxes they pay the government. We examine the political economy of a decentralised revenue-raising authority in light of social protection expenditures by constructing a theoretical model of hierarchical contests and comparing the implications of centralised with decentralised governance. Increasing information available to the government may generate additional expenditures by constituencies trying to affect government taxation decisions.     

The Golden Age of Tax Expenditures: Fiscal Welfare and Inequality in Portugal (1989–2011)

ABSTRACT

This paper studies social tax expenditures as an instrument of social policy, considering its broader social and political ramifications, particularly regressive distributive impacts, the targeting of social protection and making markets for non-state providers. Using OECD data and government budgets, we look at ‘tax breaks for social purposes’ in Portugal since the 1980s, with a focus on healthcare, educational and mortgage loan expenses. Portugal presents a comparatively high level of TBSP before the Great Recession. Why? Using Portugal as a theory-developing case, the paper argues that in the critical juncture following the late, double transition to democracy and structural economic reform, tax and welfare state developments combined to create social tax expenditures as a modality of targeted social expenditure favouring middle and higher strata. Once in place, a combination of powerful vested interests, obscure policy-making, regressive income distribution and high take-up rate across taxpaying groups obtained a path-dependent outcome, keeping inegalitarian and costly fiscal welfare growing during adverse fiscal conditions. Such a resilient outcome was curbed only in 2011 by the harsh conditionality of the economic and financial adjustment programme of the Portuguese bailout, an instance of how deep crises provide opportunities for path-shifting reconfigurations of social policy.     

Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test

We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, D72     

FORGETFULNESS AND THE POLITICAL CYCLE*

This paper examines a mechanism that underlies both the political business cycle and the cycle in non-economic policies executed by politicians. We show that if rational voters suffer from forgetfulness (a noise in the memory). then government expenditure on the production of public good increases as elections approach. Hence, the model describes a cycle that is observed in the government expenditures of democratic societies. Unlike previous models, this model does not require that the government have information superiority over rational voters with respect to its competency. According to this model, incumbents transfer resources from the beginning of their terms of service and use them near the end of their terms. We also find that the less concave the production function, the wider the cycle.     

Zur Wahlzyklik wirtschaftspolitischer Maßnahmen

Summary Election cycles of economic policy measures: An empirical test of the votemaximizing hypothesis.A special characteristic of the economic theory of democracy lies in the assumption of the behaviour of politicians: they are not as much striving for the advancement of public interest but display much rather a behaviour of utility maximization. It is their goal to win the next elections. Public preferences are taken into consideration only because voters seem to favour the political party whose election pledge most closely corresponds to their own ideas. Assuming further that voters are forgetful, we can derive the hypothesis that governments set popular (i.e. vote capturing) economic policy measures ahead of elections and unpopular ones right afterwards. In this paper we test this hypothesis using the increase of political prices and the development of certain categories of public expenditure as explanatory variables.Administered prices and public tariffs proved greatly dependent upon the timing of elections. For all of the tariffs under examination a statistically significant predominance of increases (unpopular) could be observed shortly after elections. The extent of the increase, however, does not appear to have any correlation with the election date.As to popular government expenditures, only subsidies have been paid clearly in line with election cycles in the period under consideration.As to further spending categories, our hypothesis appears to be directionally confirmed, yet the data available is infufficient for a statistically significant proof. Besides, especially in the case of Austria, other factors seem to be important in the determination of economic policy measures as well. Some reasons are given in this paper.     

An empirical examination of government expenditures and the ex-ante crowding-out effect for the British economy

The conventional macroeconomic view that consumers make their consumption decisions without regard for goods provided by the government has been examined in the literature. Moreover, the line of research that questions this conventional view argues that this separation does not have a firm theoretical backing. If consumers take government expenditures into account when maximizing their utility functions then the effects of fiscal policy actions will tend to appear weaker than those suggested by most conventional analyses. The examination of this issue should therefore have far-reaching political as well as economic implications within the context of traditional fiscal policies.

This paper will empirically examine the ex antecrowding-out effect of government expenditures upon private consumption expenditures for the British economy. An aggregate consumption function is derived and estimated in the context of a simultaneous equations model based on intertemporal consumption theory. The empirical results should shed some light on the real effects of fiscal policy on the British economy.     

Are there political cycles hidden inside government expenditures?

This article examines the presence of political cycles inside the Portuguese governments’ aggregate expenditures by using annual data for 10 expenditure components. The results indicate that the choice of the expenditure components to be increased during election periods by Portuguese governments generally relates to more visible items such as general public services, social protection and health care.     

DO GOOD OR DO WELL? PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT IN A TWO-PARTY ECONOMY*

Governments facing elections may strategically manipulate policy instruments in order to increase their re-election chances. The incentives for strategic manipulation are studied in the context of a debt management model, in which two parties with different inflation aversion compete in elections. It is shown that the inflation-averse party may issue nominal debt in order to make its opponent “look bad” to voters, thus getting closer to the median voter. Nominal debt artificially enlarges the ex-post inflation tax base, causing higher inflation. Conversely, an inflation-prone government may issue indexed debt in order to reduce inflation incentives.     

‘Keeping up with the (Portuguese) Joneses’—a study on the spatial dependence of municipal expenditure

Municipalities tend to replicate the size and the composition of their neighbours’ expenditures, independently of being ruled by left-wing or right-wing parties. This is one important conclusion of the study, which includes spatial dependence to explain the value of Portuguese municipalities’ direct awards. We used observations for the 308 Portuguese municipalities from 2009 to 2015. We then tested this spatial dependence for the mean value (per contract of direct award) and we controlled the results considering the demographic characteristics of each municipality, the political wing of the ruling party at the municipality, and the composition of the municipal expenditures.     

Political Business Cycles,Elections and Entrepreneurial Finance: A Framework

Political processes affect the real economy. An important channel through which politics affects economics is uncertainty. It has been observed that political uncertainty is high around national elections and negatively affects corporate investments and foreign capital inflows. If national elections affect corporations and foreign investors, we should expect them to also affect entrepreneurial finance provided by investors like venture capitalists (VCs). To add to that, in a complex federal democracy, state level politics is a significant source of political uncertainty. This is the first paper to examine the impact of national and state elections on entrepreneurial finance and provides a framework of VC investment behavior in the face of political uncertainty. We find that VC investments decrease significantly due to political uncertainty around national and state elections. VCs respond strongly to national elections by decreasing the total investment value and the number of deals in election years. However, they give a softer response to regional political uncertainty around state elections by decreasing only the average deal size. The findings have important implications for governments, regulators and policymakers, and open up an opportunity to examine a variety of new questions which can provide a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the impact of elections on VC investments.

     

Local governance and public goods provision in rural China

In developing countries, identifying the most effective community-level governance mode is a key issue in rural development; therefore, empirical evaluation of these different modes is desperately needed. Since the 1980s, tens of thousands of villages in rural China have held local government elections, providing a good opportunity to investigate the effect of democratization on the level of public goods provision. Using a recent village survey conducted over a significant period of time, this article compares two different governance modes. It finds that elections affect little on the size of revenue but significantly shift the distribution of taxation from individuals to enterprises if possible. However, privatization has made taxation or levies on rural enterprises more difficult. It also shows that elections and power sharing are conducive to improve the allocation of public expenditures.     

Fiscal federalism in rentier regions: Evidence from Russia

When does sub-national fiscal autonomy prompt regional growth and recovery and, under what conditions, does it have adverse effects? We argue that unearned income streams, particularly in the form of revenues from natural resource production or from budgetary transfers from the central government, transform regions dependent on these income sources into rentier regions. Governments in these regions can use local control over revenues and expenditures to shelter certain firms, i.e., natural resource producers or loss-making enterprises, from market forces. Using fiscal data from 80 Russian regions from 1996 to 1999, we test this hypothesis in both cross-sectional and panel specifications. Our results indicate that tax retention, which is a proxy for fiscal autonomy, has had a positive effect on regional reform and investment since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, we also find that this effect decreases as rentable income streams to regions increase. Journal of Comparative Economics 33 (4) (2005) 814–834.     

Toward state funding of elections in india? a comparative perspective on possible options

This paper explores the issue of introduction of state funding of elections in India, focussing on the incentive structures of electoral finance reforms. After summarising the main points in the history of political finance reform in other democracies, and in India, the historical pattern of fund-raising and election expenditures of major parties in India is surveyed. Six electoral finance reform options for India are outlined. It is argued that the time is now ripe for state funding of elections from the point of view of the incentives facing parties and donors.     

Are governmental expenditures also sticky? Evidence from the operating expenditures of public schools

ABSTRACT

Existing research on cost stickiness focuses primarily on for-profit companies. This study investigates cost behaviour in the public sector, a new setting that deserves more research attention. Using unique data from public schools in Taiwan, we find that operating expenditures of public schools are sticky. Moreover, the stickiness is more prominent for schools whose principals facing higher enrolment pressure. These results support the public choice theory, suggesting that bureaucratic power may serve as a key driver leading to a sticky cost behaviour for governmental organizations. The government auditors and congressional representatives monitoring governmental budgets should thus notice that bureaucrats might keep the level of expenditures just for their self-interests when demand declines, a manifestation of distortion in allocation of social resources.     

How to reform China’s fiscal system?

ABSTRACT

As the population aging, China’s government expenditures, including general fiscal expenditure, healthcare and social security expenditure, will grow more rapidly than government revenues, tending to elevate government debt. Local governments undertake overwhelming 85% of total general fiscal revenue and are responsible for healthcare and social security, and their debt has been growing. Fiscal reforms are imperative, including tax reforms, the structure of government spending reforms, social security reforms, healthcare reforms, local public finance reforms, and central and local government’s fiscal relationship reforms. This paper will explore the fiscal challenges China faces and discuss how to reform the fiscal system to cope with these challenges.     

Strategic troping in Sri Lanka: September eleventh and the consolidation of political position

This essay investigates the deployment of the trope of September eleventh in Sri Lanka from 11 September 2001 until Sri Lanka's parliamentary elections and change of government on 5 December 2001. The essay argues that September eleventh in the tropic form of synecdoche performed political work for both parties to Sri Lanka's long-running conflict – the People's Alliance Government and the Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and demonstrates how each belligerent used September eleventh and the lexicon associated with the US attacks and early global response to brand their adversary as terrorist, to recode political and conflict narratives in September eleventh terms, and to indicate the appropriate scale and scope of the war. The article raises important questions about the translation of geopolitical events from one domestic context to another, the representation of political violence as global terror, and the strategic power of narrative.     

Government response to increased demand for public services: The cyclicality of government health expenditures in the OECD

The more that health care expenditures are financed by general taxation, the greater the discretion governments are likely to exercise when timing increases in health care expenditures. Vote-maximising governments time increases in health care expenditures to occur in economic upturns, when voters are not as aware of the required increase in taxation. In recessions, they have an incentive to sustain expenditures on health care by diverting expenditures from other public expenditure programmes that voters perceive as low priority. In this way, government pursuit of a political agenda is likely to exert a systematic influence on the cyclicality of government expenditure. Predictions are tested with reference to the cyclicality of government health expenditures, for a sample of OECD countries from 2000 to 2012.     

Are voters rationally ignorant? An empirical study of Portuguese local elections

The application of the rational choice postulate to a political context invariably leads to the conclusion that most voters are ill informed when making the decision on whom to vote for. In this paper, the authors conduct an empirical evaluation of the rational ignorance theory, based on the model developed by (Rogoff and Sibert Rev Econ Stud LV:1–16, (1988) and by considering that better informed voters reward political candidates who show better performances. The levels of performance are established through the construction of an empirical frontier using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology. According to our results, based on the 1997 Portuguese local elections, even though swing voters do not necessarily behave as rationally ignorant voters, a large majority of voters are rationally ignorant.