Proof of nonparticipation in a price fixing conspiracy

When a group of firms colludes on price, the industry price will rise even when there are some firms that do not participate in the conspiracy. If the government or private parties file antitrust suits, the noncolluders face the problem of establishing their innocence since their prices rise along with those of the colluders. We propose a simple output test. Under various models of oligopoly pricing—Bertrand, Cournot, and Stackelberg—we show that the colluders restrict their output while the noncolluders take advantage of the higher price by expanding their outputs. Thus, distinguishing between colluders and noncolluders involves simply observing the output behavior of the industry members.The authors appreciate the support of the Public Policy Research Center at the University of Florida. We regret that B&R Associates is purely imaginary as is the industry.     

On vertical control in monopolistic competition

This paper demonstrates that vertical restraints are profitably imposed by a manufacturer or wholesaler who has some market power and whose product is sold in a monopolistically competitive downstream market. Simple conditions are developed under which a price floor (resale price maintenance) or a price ceiling is profitable, and under which private incentive for a restraint is sufficient for its social desirability. Where demand elasticities are constant, observed vertical price floors are always welfare-improving but profitable price ceilings may decrease welfare. In the special case of the CES-aggregate-surplus specification with competitive conjectures, price ceilings are profitable and welfare-decreasing.     

Endogenous capacities and price competition: The role of demand uncertainty

We analyze the role of demand uncertainty in markets of fixed size, in which firms take long-run capacity decisions prior to competing in prices. We characterize the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria under various assumptions regarding the nature and timing of demand uncertainty. In order to prove equilibrium existence, we identify a sufficient condition for the capacity choice game to be submodular. This condition resembles the standard downward-sloping marginal revenue condition used in Cournot games. A robust conclusion of the analysis is that equilibrium capacity choices are asymmetric, even when firms are ex-ante identical. Concerning the equivalence between the capacity-price game and the Cournot game, we find that with inelastic demands, the equilibria of the former belong to the equilibrium set of the latter. However, as compared to the Cournot game, the capacity-price game leads to lower prices and generates price dispersion.     

Neglected elements in vertical integration analysis: The case of retail price preticketing

The “conventional wisdom” with respect to the advantages to be gained through vertical integration are highly overrated. That associated with increased efficiency tops the list. Also, those advocating vertical integration have tended to ignore the preticketing phenomenon. In these cases the best that can be said is that there may exist a neutral effect. On the other hand, empirical analysis shows that, at the worost, negative effects may prevail.     

The emerging oligopoly of pay-TV in the USA

The pay-television industry in the USA has been developing very rapidly in the past five years and is providing network quality alternatives to the mass taste programming of commercial television. However, the industry has been developing along lines very similar to the early history of radio in the USA with the emergence of strong distributor networks, restrictive affiliation contracts, and wide-spread vertical integration across all stages of production. History and economic efficiencies suggest that the result will be a strong oligopoly market structure. The proper public policy, then, is to insure that the unavoidable degree of concentration is not greater than that needed for efficiency reasons.     

Simultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets: experimental evidence

We investigate simultaneous and sequential price competition in duoply markets with differentiated products and random matching of symmetric firms. We find that second movers gain from the sequential structure in comparison to simultaneous-move markets whereas first movers do not. As predicted by the theory, there is a significant first-mover disadvantage in the sequential game. Finally, we report the results of control treatments varying the matching scheme and the mode of eliciting choices (strategy method vs. standard sequential play).     

Poverty effects of food price escalation: The importance of substitution effects in Mexican households

Recent food price increases reportedly caused significant numbers of households to fall into poverty, particularly in the developing world. Most research into the welfare effects of these food price changes assumes constant demand or approximates second order substitution effects. Poverty forecasts with these assumptions may overestimate or underestimate the effect of food price increases in a nation where most households consume diverse food baskets. We account for full substitution by calculating a theoretically consistent food demand system, accounting for household responses to food price changes by decreasing some food purchases and increasing other food purchases. We use Mexican data to confirm the mitigation of adverse welfare effects from food price increases after accounting for country-specific dietary preferences in modeling demand. In comparison to previous literature, our welfare measures predict theoretically consistent numbers of Mexican households entering poverty due to recent food price changes.     

The effects of price deregulation on maize marketing margins in South Africa

There has been continuous controversy over the impact of food market reforms on food security in Africa. In South Africa, the government and media have often questioned the effects of price deregulation of maize meal, the major staple food, on consumers. This article determines the effect of retail price deregulation on the size of maize milling/retail margins in South Africa. Regression models of monthly milling/retail margins are run from the period May 1976 to December 2004. To assess the robustness of our findings, we estimate several different models of structural change, vary the sample period to examine the sensitivity of findings to unusual weather and market conditions in the region during episodes between 2001 and 2004, and run the models using different estimation techniques, OLS with Newey-West robust estimators and Feasible General Least Squares. In virtually all models, the results indicate that real maize milling/retailing margins in South Africa have increased by at least 20% since the deregulation of retail prices in 1991. Moreover, there is evidence of trend growth in the size of the milling margin over time. Simulations indicate that the deregulation of maize meal prices has entailed a transfer of at least US$179 million/year from consumers to agents in the marketing system. Further study is needed to understand why this outcome in South Africa differs from findings in other countries in the region concerning the effects of reform on food marketing margins.     

Rational conjectures in the theory of oligopoly

The paper employs the notion of rational conjectural equilibrium to remove the arbitrary nature of conjectures about rivals' reactions which characterises the traditional non-cooperative theory of oligopoly. A general definition of these equilibria is given, and the concept is then applied to a simple duopoly model. The standard models of perfect competition, monopoly, limit-price dominant firms are shown to emerge as special cases of rational conjectural equilibria.     

The effects of the business cycle on oligopoly coordination: Evidence from the U.S. rayon industry

Recent game-theoretic studies of the effects of the business cycle on oligopoly coordination predict that coordination is weakest when demand is high and expected future profit is lower. An empirical model that uses a conjectural elasticity term to measure the degree of coordination is developed to test for these two effects. The rayon industry of the 1930s is one that exhibited significantly non-competitive conduct that appears to have varied, in degree, with fluctuations in demand. Application of the empirical model to data from this industry produces results that support the predictions of recent theoretical models.     

Compatibility and competition in airlines demand side network effects

Network effects arising in air transport markets are usually viewed as resulting from the implications of joint production on the cost side. In this paper, we focus on network effects originating on the demand side. We consider a network that links three cities involving two direct and one indirect connection. Two carriers, with asymmetric traffic rights on this network compete sequentially: at the first stage, they choose their departure times; at the second, they set prices. We show that in order to compensate its network disadvantage the ‘weak’ carrier chooses its departure time as close as possible to its competitor's. This is in contrast to the usual maximum differentiation principle. The network effect intensifies price competition. Depending on the size of the market and on consumers valuation of waiting time, various subgame perfect equilibrium configurations are exhibited.     

Food scare crises and developing countries: The impact of avian influenza on vertical price transmission in the Egyptian poultry sector

A bivariate smooth transition vector error correction model is applied to monthly poultry price data to analyze the effects that avian influenza has had on price transmission along the Egyptian poultry marketing chain. In order to reflect consumer awareness of the crisis, an avian influenza food scare information index is developed and used within the model as a transition variable. Our results suggest that price adjustments to deviations from the market equilibrium parity depend on the magnitude of the avian influenza crisis. Further these adjustments are found to have very different implications for market equilibrium: during the crisis retailers use their market power to increase marketing margins. In contrast, wholesaler margins are found to decline. Results also suggest that food safety information indices contribute to understanding the economic effects of food scare crises in developing countries.     

Distributional assumptions in the theory of oligopoly information exchange

We analyze the profitability of information sharing among Cournot oligopolists receiving private information about random demand. In this setting, previous authors showed information exchange to be unprofitable when firms' marginal costs are constant and outputs are perfect substitutes. We introduce a measure of the increase in the accuracy of firms' demand forecasts when information is shared. We provide two examples showing when this measure is large, information exchange is profitable, even though firms' marginal costs are constant and outputs are perfect substitutes. Moreover, we show that in the linear-conditional-expectations framework, which has been standard in the literature, this measure reveals these accuracy gains to be severely limited.     

The stalemate of cable digital switchover: A study of competition effects and deregulation

This paper addresses the phenomenon of delayed cable digitization in Taiwan and reports the results of a longitudinal analysis, determining that (1) inter-platform competition, primarily from internet protocol television (IPTV), generates a strong and positive impact on the digitization of cable service after it acquires numerous customers; (2) the installed cable base induces economies of scale that increase its digital penetration; (3) the overbuild of the equivalent-size rivalry can increase digital adoption, whereas unequal-sized competition might reversely decrease it; and (4) the monthly flat fee charged to customers does not influence digital adoption. In addition, this paper presents a discussion on the policy instruments derived from econometric results. Although repealing the horizontal integration cap in the cable TV industry could generate economies of scale, doing so may encourage monopolization over several franchises. The efficacy of intra-platform competition is reserved only for certain cases. Combining the results of these analyses reveals that inter-platform competition most effectively stimulates cable operators’ digital conversion. Hence, regulators should create a level playing field among various TV platforms, such as equal programming access and open standards, to ensure a high degree of cable digitization     

On the competition enhancing effects of exclusive dealing contracts

Antitrust scholars have argued that exclusive contracts have anticompetitive, or at best neutral effects, if no efficiencies are generated. In contrast, this paper shows that exclusive contracts can have procompetitive effects, provided buyers are imperfect downstream competitors and contract breach is feasible. In that case, an efficient entrant is not necessarily foreclosed through exclusive contracts but induces buyers to breach. Because breaching buyers have to pay expectation damages to the incumbent, the downstream profits they obtain when breaching must be large enough. Therefore, the entrant needs to set a lower wholesale price than absent exclusive contracts, leading to lower final consumer prices and higher welfare.     

Inter-temporal inventory competition and the effects of capacity constraints

This paper addresses an intertemporal inventory competition between a supplier (a provider, manufacturer) and a retailer engaged in a supply chain. The paper's focus is on the effect of capacity constraints on both parties when demands are seasonal. The paper provides a comparative study of two solution approaches, one is based on supply chain competition and the other is based on system wide optimization. Our results demonstrate that with dynamic inventory competition, the retailer reduces inventory costs by reducing the response period to higher demands while increasing the supply requests compared to the system-wide optimal approach. As a result, the supplier's inventory costs increase. An example illustrating these particular facets of the problem and its application is presented and discussed in light of the supplier and the retailer coordinating policies.     

Firm innovativeness and business performance: The joint moderating effects of market turbulence and competition

To clarify the nature of the effect of firm innovativeness on business performance, this study draws on contingency theory and an interactional perspective to develop a conceptual framework to investigate how the interaction between market turbulence and competitive intensity moderates the relationship between firm innovativeness and business performance. This study used survey data from a sample of 154 high-tech manufacturing firms in Taiwan and employed hierarchical moderated regression analysis to test the hypotheses developed. The results reveal that the effect of firm innovativeness on business performance varies across the different configurations of market turbulence and competitive intensity. Specifically, the performance effect of firm innovativeness is most positive under high market turbulence and high competitive intensity; the performance effect is least positive under low market turbulence and low competitive intensity. However, the performance benefits of firm innovativeness fail to materialize under low market turbulence and high competitive intensity. Overall, these findings highlight that market turbulence and competition jointly influence the direction and strength of the performance effect of firm innovativeness. This study advances firm innovativeness research by identifying the configurational market conditions that augment or limit the value of firm innovativeness.     

The degree of competition in the advertising industry

After a merger wave began among advertising agencies in the late 1960's, the Federal Trade Commission investigated the anticompetitive effects of the mergers and concluded that the industry would remain competitive. In this paper, we employ a method suggested by Bresnahan to investigate the issue of competition in the advertising industry. The method uses industry-level data over the period 1972–87 to consider the determinants of supply and demand for advertising messages and to calculate the degree of market power on the supply side of the market. Statistical results support the hypothesis that the industry was competitive over this period.We thank Robert Coen of McCann-Erickson, Inc., for providing data on advertising costs and expenditures and W. Bradford Todd of the Richards Group for information about the industry. Lacy Glenn Thomas directed us to McCann-Erickson. We also thank James C. Murdoch, two anonymous referees, and the Editor, William G. Shepherd. Pornpong Sumanun provided research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.     

The possibility of price umbrellas in Canadian manufacturing industries

The paper looks for evidence of ‘price umbrelias’ within Canadian manufacturing industries. Price umbrellas occur when relatively low-cost firms, trading-off market share against profit margins, set a price high enough to allow relatively high-cost firms to remain in business (the latter have an ‘umbrella’ held over them). The disaggregated data appear to show (1) that there are significant differences in average costs between the plants within an industry, (2) that the marginal costs of the low-cost plants are non-increasing with output. Together, these findings imply that output could be transferred from high- to low-cost plants with a reduction in total-industry costs, consistent with the existence of price umbrellas. The numbers are quite large.