Inducing Cooperation with a Carrot Instead of a Stick

The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Leegin turned on the insight that manufacturers may use resale price maintenance (RPM) for procompetitive purposes. This paper presents a model of manufacturer-retailer interactions that clarifies why, as a rule, retailers and manufacturers are joint beneficiaries of service-inducing RPM. The model identifies factors that determine how RPM-generated benefits are allocated between a manufacturer and its retailers. The paper then shows that manufacturers may use market share discounts (MSD) in lieu of RPM or other vertical restraints to induce retailer performance. The outcomes and efficiency effects that are achieved with RPM can be replicated and usually surpassed if manufacturers substitute MSD for RPM, thereby enabling a manufacturer to retain all incremental profit rather than conceding some of it to retailers.     

Resale price maintenance and restrictions on dominant firm and industry-wide adoption

We consider a model in which firms use resale price maintenance (RPM) to dampen competition. We find that even though the motive for using RPM is thus anti-competitive, market forces may limit the overall adverse impact on consumers. Indeed, we find that when there are a large number of firms in the market, consumer welfare under a laissez-faire policy might be as high or almost as high as it would be under an alternative policy in which RPM is banned. Government interventions that put an upper limit on the extent of industry-wide adoption of RPM can have adverse welfare effects in the model. We further show that proposed guidelines in the United States and Europe may come close to minimizing welfare.     

Online RPM and MFN Under Antitrust Law and Economics

The legal framing of a firm’s pricing strategy can determine whether it constitutes online resale price maintenance (RPM) or online most favored nation (MFN). Together, cases that involve online RPM and MFN can be viewed as a natural experiment of how antitrust economics and law may adapt to an online world. Thus far, legal theories that have been inconsistent with economic theories have dictated enforcement across jurisdictions, which has led to confusion that thwarts potentially efficient business practices. This paper distinguishes issues of online RPM from traditional RPM and online RPM from online MFN. We apply the economics learning to RPM and analyze the antitrust cases of online RPM and MFN to date in the United States, Europe, and Australia. Finally, we offer policy recommendations that reduce the confusion in current legal doctrine.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Leegin</Emphasis> and the Economics of Resale Price Maintenance

When the U.S. Supreme Court overturned its century-old precedent that treated resale price maintenance (RPM) as a per se violation of the antitrust laws, it signaled approval for the vertical restraint’s widespread use. But the increased use of RPM occurred under a pre-existing rule that permitted RPM as long as no formal agreement over price was reached. This paper documents not only the increased use of RPM post Leegin but also the importance of avoiding the appearance of agreements to control resale prices. The paper then discusses how plaintiffs, previously enamored of claims of RPM, are now recasting vertical RPM arrangements as ancillary to horizontal agreements among distributors that are made effective though enforcement by producers.     

The choice between resale price maintenance and exclusive territories: Evidence from litigation

A manufacturer's choice between resale price maintenance (RPM) and exclusive territories to protect dealer provided services is examined empirically. The relative efficacy of RPM in solving the free rider problem depends on the life cycle of the product being distributed. A manufacturer of a product with a long life cycle is more likely to protect its dealers' investment in service with exclusive territories, whereas RPM becomes the more probable restraint for products of short life spans. Data gleaned from vertical restraint litigation strongly support this hypothesis.The author wishes to thank Howard P. Marvel, Laura A. Boyd, and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper. The financial support of The Procter and Gamble Fund is also gratefully acknowledged. Any errors are mine alone.     

Challenges for Empirical Research on RPM

This article discusses the empirical challenges that researchers face when demonstrating the existence and effects of resale price maintenance (RPM). We outline three approaches for finding price effects of RPM and the corresponding hurdles in data and methodology. We show that the quantity test that was suggested by Posner (Univ Chic Law Rev 45(1):1–20, 1977; Univ Chic Law Rev 48:6–26, 1981) does not identify the change to welfare when demand-enhancing effects are considered generally. Finally, we present some solutions to the challenge of identifying welfare effects, and we suggest guidelines for future research.     

定价权约束下的经销商机会主义行为防范——转售价格维持的新解释

在电子商务和服务营销大行其道的今天,转售价格维持的经典理论依然囿于品牌内服务竞争的狭窄视野,对现实问题解释力不足。本文认为,企业采取RPM的动机,不是被动的避免销售服务市场失灵,而是更多地体现在掌握终端市场定价上。制造商掌握定价权有利于防范零售交易中机会主义行为,从而维护品牌商誉,树立消费者信心,同时也便于进取型企业积极展开市场价格竞争。     

Resale price maintenance for supply chains distributing products with demand uncertainty

This paper explores the economic roles of resale price maintenance (RPM) in supply chains for a specific product, when consumers have taste heterogeneity and the manufacturer faces demand uncertainty. Two transaction schemes within supply chains are compared: (1) RPM, and (2) decentralized pricing in a competitive market environment. With decentralized pricing, a manufacturer loses the incentive to produce a product in categories where the probability that the manufacturer fails to design the product as suitable to public tastes of consumers is high. However, RPM resolves the problem and induces the manufacturer to supply the good, bringing positive surplus to consumers.     

Market Power and Technology

It is well known that market power depends on the price elasticity of demand and the intensity of competition. It is also well known that technology can influence market power through its effect on market structure. However, there is limited research on the direct link between market power and technology. In this paper, we investigate this relationship. We find that the monopoly price can be constrained to be identical to marginal cost under certain technological conditions. We also show how market power depends directly upon technology, holding constant demand conditions, market structure, and the degree of competition.     

Why Do Vacant Houses Sell for Less: Holding Costs,Bargaining Power or Stigma?

This article introduces Nash bargaining into a search model to identify various channels through which vacancy affects selling price and liquidity in the resale market for houses. The model shows the various vacancy effects in the form of greater seller holding cost, lower seller bargaining power and unobserved negative attributes or stigma. We use a 20‐year data series on house transactions to test for these effects in a simultaneous model of price and liquidity, using the long data series to allow for variation across market phases. The robust vacancy effects on price and liquidity across all market phases primarily reflect greater seller holding cost and diminished bargaining power. Repeatedly, vacant houses also exhibit significant stigma effects in the rising market but not in stable or declining market phases. At the same time, vacant houses enjoy stronger shopping externality effects from surrounding houses for sale than do their occupied counterparts.     

电力市场效率评估与碳市场价格设计——基于电碳市场关联视角下的传导率估计

厘清并量化电力市场与碳市场间的关联关系,是深化电力市场改革与实现"双碳"目标的重要抓手。本文基于2006—2018年中国100个地级及以上城市的面板数据,使用似不相关回归模型评估了电力市场效率,在此基础上研究了电、碳市场关联条件下碳价对电价的传导率,并对不同场景下全国碳市场的碳价进行了优化设计。研究发现:(1)与非试点地区相比,碳市场试点地区中电力市场的无谓损失率更低,并且市场效率的提高具有更高的碳减排作用。(2)电、碳市场关联条件下,碳价对电力市场中居民电价的传导率高于对工业电价的传导率,但均远低于完全竞争条件下的传导率水平。(3)传导率的提升能够缓解"降电价"与"碳减排"之间的矛盾。当前传导率下电力市场效率目标与碳减排目标的协同实现需要碳价的大幅提升,而在完全传导的理想情况下最优碳价约为40元/吨。(4)长期而言,当前传导率下碳排放总量下降场景、经济增速放缓场景对应的最优碳价分别为255.05元/吨、173.63元/吨,而人口老龄化场景并未对最优碳价的设置形成约束。本文的研究不仅为电力市场与碳市场之间的关联奠定了理论基础,也为全国碳市场价格机制的优化设计提供了政策参考。     

煤电价格传导机制分析及政策建议

对煤价、电价之间的传导关系进行了理论推导,通过实例对煤价、电价之间的价格传导进行了分析。研究表明：由于发电环节对成本的消纳能力有限,煤炭价格的波动对电力价格具有直接的推动作用,必须适时疏导。煤电联动机制作为一种过渡机制,当煤价上涨时,销售侧的电价并不能适时体现发电成本的上涨并随之调整价格,下一步应深化电价改革,形成煤、电价格联动的市场定价机制。     

当前抽水蓄能电站电价疏导问题分析

提出目前抽水蓄能电站电价疏导政策存在的问题,分析选择租赁方式的单一容量电价的合理性,研究电价疏导在省问和省内的特点和方式,提出现阶段合理电价疏导方式,建议新建电站宜继续采用租赁的单一容量电价,应尽早建立网间电力交易机制和深入研究省网内电厂、电网和用户之间的电价疏导比例。     

Can Tightness in the Housing Market Help Predict Subsequent Home Price Appreciation? Evidence from the United States and the Netherlands

This article assesses the predictive power of variables that measure market tightness, such as seller's bargaining power and sale probabilities, on future home prices. Theoretical insights from a stylized search‐and‐matching model illustrate that such indicators can be associated with subsequent home price appreciation. The empirical analysis employs listings data on residential units offered for sale through a real estate broker in the Netherlands and for certain U.S. regions. Individual records are used to construct quarterly home price indices, an index that measures seller's bargaining power and (quality‐adjusted) home sale probabilities. Using conventional time‐series models we show that current sale probabilities and bargaining power can significantly reduce home price appreciation forecast errors and help to predict turning points in local area housing markets. The measures and approaches in this article help to demonstrate ways in which researchers and practitioners can leverage listings data to gain knowledge about the current and future state of the housing market.     

根治“电荒”需充分发挥电价机制的作用

2011年,我国经历了自2004年以来的最大一次“电荒”,其成因很多,但电价不合理是导致此次电荒的最主要原因之一。分析了电价水平不合理和电价机制不完善对电荒的诱导性作用,并从价格改革方面提出了继续完善煤电价格联动机制、对电煤价格实施科学调控、完善各类电源上网电价政策和跨区跨省电量交易价格机制的应对措施。     

电煤市场中买方市场集中度对均衡价格的影响分析

几乎所有的文献都从"市场煤"与"计划电"的体制矛盾入手分析电煤价格持续上涨及发电企业经营困难的主要原因与相关对策。作者认为,在近年来电煤市场供求总量基本平衡的前提下,电煤市场价格持续大幅度上涨与发电企业买方市场集中度有关。本文运用讨价还价模型,分析了买方市场集中度变化即改单一发电企业购煤为发电集团公司统一购煤甚至多家发电集团公司统一购煤对电煤均衡价格的影响。结果表明:提高买方市场集中度能有效降低电煤市场均衡价格。     

国际输配电价形成机制综述及对我国的启示

从最优输电定价原则出发,通过对一些主要西方国家和地区的输电电价结构和定价机制的介绍比较,提出对我国输配电定价机制和电价结构的设想。     

Resale Price Maintenance: An Economic Analysis of its Anticompetitive Potential

A decade ago, Leegin overruled Dr. Miles and subjected RPM to rule-of-reason treatment, under which the potential for anticompetitive conduct should be analyzed (rather than automatically assumed to be present). In its Leegin decision, the Supreme Court identified four ways in which RPM could be used to retard competition and consequently reduce consumer welfare: The first two involve the well-known concerns that RPM could be used to support either a manufacturer cartel or a dealer cartel; the last two involve unilateral conduct designed to foreclose entry or hinder smaller rivals. In this paper, we analyze these potentially harmful uses of RPM. We conclude that RPM does not pose a substantial anticompetitive threat.     

Mitigating Monopoly or Preventing Discrimination: Comparing Antitrust to Regulatory Goals in the Interstate Commerce Act

The Interstate Commerce Act and Sherman Antitrust Act were passed within 3 years of each other. Although regulation and antitrust both address market power, the ICA and Sherman Act had different objectives. After a minimal reference to just and reasonable prices, the ICA focused on preventing price discrimination in rail. No posited Sherman Act goal—inequality, consumer welfare, efficiency—is in the ICA. Priority of discrimination in the ICA, however, is predictable. Shippers would care less about absolute rates—which can be passed on to final consumers—and more about preventing rivals from gaining advantages through input price discounts.     

进场费的政府规制效果分析——基于权力范式的渠道研究

近年来,进场费问题始终是零售商与供应商矛盾冲突的焦点,也是理论界和政策制定者关注的热点。本文基于经济学研究的权力范式,构造了以政府规制强度为外生变量的供应商与零售商博弈模型,从理论上分析了进场费的作用及限制进场费对零售商、供应商的决策行为和消费者福利的影响。结论是:进场费作为渠道利益分配调节机制,客观上具有传递零售终端竞争压力的作用。限制进场费会减少零售商的利润,但不一定增加供应商的利润,且有可能削弱供应商改进产品的动机和刺激零售商扩张销售网络。