Teacher unions, teacher pay and student performance in India: A pupil fixed effects approach

This paper examines the relationship between teacher unionization, student achievement and teachers' pay using a cross-section of data from private schools in India. We use differences in student mark across subjects to identify within-pupil variation in achievement and find that union membership of the teacher is associated with reduced pupil achievement. We find no evidence this could be due to the unobservables not controlled for by this procedure. A school fixed effects equation of teacher pay shows that union membership raises pay and in this case too we find that remaining unobservables are unlikely to explain this outcome. We discuss the policy implications of the findings and show that the effectiveness of teacher credentials in improving teacher performance is linked to unionization.     

DOES TEACHER‐FAMILY EXPERIENCE AFFECT TEST SCORES?

Since families play a pivotal role in elementary schools, student learning may be influenced by how well the teacher knows a family and how well the parents know the teacher. We test this hypothesis by evaluating whether assignment to a teacher who has previously taught an older sibling affects test scores. We refer to teachers who have previously taught the older sibling as having “teacher‐family experience” when teaching the younger sibling. Using a novel data set that includes administrative data on students and teachers matched to family identifiers, we find that when the older sibling's teacher is teaching in the younger sibling's grade, 40% of younger siblings are assigned their older sibling teachers. We find that teacher‐family experience does not have any significant effects on test scores and we can statistically rule out small effects. (JEL I20)     

Test scores,educational opportunities,and individual choice

A model combining student preferences for college with university admissions decisions is estimated to provide information on the role of test scores in the determination of post-secondary educational opportunities in the U.S. In contrast to implications of much of the recent criticism of tests and their use, we find that scholastic aptitude test scores are more strongly related to student application and choice of college ‘quality’ than to college admissions decisions. In addition, although there is a substantial correlation between test scores and high school performance, we find that both post-secondary school preferences and ultimate opportunities are related as much to performance in high school as to test scores themselves. Although SAT scores certainly exclude some persons from schools, our findings indicate that they do not represent an overriding constraint on the college opportunities of high school graduates.     

Racial diversity and academic test scores in public elementary schools

This article examines the effect of racial diversity on academic achievement using panel data on San Francisco’s public elementary schools from 2003 to 2007. Theories argue that the relationship between racial diversity and academic achievement may be positive or negative. Few studies have examined the effect of racial diversity in US elementary schools. Fixed effects models are used to examine the relationship between racial diversity and academic performance in elementary schools. Controls for student differences and teaching staff differences are added as part of the education production function literature. Results show that racial diversity has little effect on academic achievement scores.     

The effects of spending on test pass rates: evidence from Michigan

This study uses data on standardized test scores from 1992 through 1998 at Michigan schools to determine the effects of spending on student performance. The years in the data set straddle 1994, when Michigan dramatically changed the way that K-12 schools are funded, and moved toward equalization of spending across schools. Focusing on pass rates for a fourth-grade math tests (the most complete and consistent data available for Michigan), I find that increases in spending have nontrivial, statistically significant effects on math test pass rates, and the effects are largest for schools with initially poor performance.     

LOST IN TRANSLATION? TEACHER TRAINING AND OUTCOMES IN HIGH SCHOOL ECONOMICS CLASSES

Using data from a 2006 survey of California high school economics classes, we assess the effects of teacher characteristics on student achievement. We estimate value‐added models of outcomes on multiple choice and essay exams, with matched classroom pairs for each teacher enabling random‐effects and fixed‐effects estimation. The results show a substantial impact of specialized teacher experience and college‐level coursework in economics. However, the latter is associated with higher scores on the multiple‐choice test and lower scores on the essay test, suggesting that a portion of teachers' content knowledge may be “lost in translation” when conveyed to their students. (JEL A21, I21)     

How accountability pressure on failing schools affects student achievement

Although an emerging body of evidence has shown that the threat of sanctions on low-performing schools can raise student test scores in the short run, the extent to which these test score improvements are due to schools' manipulation of the accountability system has remained uncertain. In this paper, I provide two new strands of evidence to evaluate the relative importance of educational reforms and gaming behavior in generating test score gains by threatened schools. First, using a regression discontinuity design that exploits Florida's system of imposing sanction threats on the basis of a cutoff level of performance, I estimate medium-run effects on student test scores from having attended a threatened elementary school. Threat-induced math improvements from elementary school largely persist at least through the first 1 to 2 years of middle school, while evidence for persistence of reading improvements is less consistent. Second, I analyze the effects of sanction threats on various features of educational production, and I find that sanction threats raise school spending on instructional technology, curricular development, and teacher training. Both strands of evidence are consistent with a predominant role for educational reforms in generating test score gains by threatened schools.     

Testing,crime and punishment

The recent passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 solidified a national trend toward increased student testing for the purpose of evaluating public schools. This new environment for schools provides strong incentives for schools to alter the ways in which they deliver educational services. This paper investigates whether schools may employ discipline for misbehavior as a tool to bolster aggregate test performance. To do so, this paper utilizes an extraordinary data set constructed from the school district administrative records of a subset of the school districts in Florida during the 4 years surrounding the introduction of a high-stakes testing regime.It compares the suspensions of students involved in each of the 41,803 incidents in which two students were suspended and where prior test scores for both students are observed. While schools always tend to assign harsher punishments to low-performing students than to high-performing students throughout the year, this gap grows substantially during the testing window.Moreover, this testing window-related gap is only observed for students in testing grades. In summary, schools apparently act on the incentive to re-shape the testing pool through selective discipline in response to accountability pressures.     

Cronyism and education performance

Recent research suggests that some countries may be unable to use productively their schooling output because of the scope of cronyism or corruption. We investigate further and demonstrate that, in a stylised model, cronyism in the labour market, (e.g. the ability to exert influence to gain high wage positions without merit), may impact heavily on the relationship between schooling inputs and cognitive skills, due to incentive effects. We then use a two-stage DEA approach to identify factors affecting inefficiency in education performance of OECD countries, as measured by PISA scores. Along with other well known factors, a proxy measure for cronyism from the World Value Survey, explains a substantial fraction of the inefficiency. This result suggests that, as in our model, in the presence of cronyism, incentives to cognitive skills acquisition are dampened. The best way to improve education performance may be to increase transparency in labour access.     

The Economics of School Quality

Abstract. Recent national concerns about student performance on PISA tests and similar assessments appear warranted because of the direct relationship between student cognitive skills and both individual earnings and national growth. The evidence on the impacts of school quality indicates very large economic effects. Available research shows, however, that improving school quality is difficult and not closely related to spending levels. One approach supported by research is improving teacher quality, which can yield sizable gains in student performance. Instituting appropriate policies to alter the teacher force will necessarily take significant time.     

Class-size effects in school systems around the world: Evidence from between-grade variation in TIMSS

We estimate the effect of class size on student performance in 11 countries, combining school fixed effects and instrumental variables to identify random class-size variation between two adjacent grades within individual schools. Conventional estimates of class-size effects are shown to be severely biased by the non-random placement of students between and within schools. While we find sizable beneficial effects of smaller classes in Greece and Iceland, we reject the possibility of even small effects in four countries and of large beneficial effects in an additional four countries. Noteworthy class-size effects are observed only in countries with relatively low teacher salaries.     

International Differences in Student Achievement: An Economic Perspective

Abstract. International comparisons reveal large cross‐country differentials in average student performance. Although there is considerable public debate about these differences, their sources are hardly identified. Using school, teacher and student data from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), the present paper attempts to explain what causes between‐country gaps in mathematics test score distributions. Following a three‐pronged strategy of micro‐level and cross‐country regressions as well as bilateral country comparisons, we show how these gaps are explained by differences in school, teacher and student characteristics, or financial resources devoted to the school system. Institutional characteristics, such as competition between schools and the composition of the faculty can also help to understand international differences in student achievement.     

学校类型与流动儿童的教育-来自上海的经验证据

本文根据在上海地区进行的问卷调查和标准化考试结果,考察学校类型对于流动儿童考试成绩的影响。我们在控制家庭和学生个人因素,并通过工具变量法调整学校选择的内生性问题后,发现在民工子弟学校就读和在公办学校就读的流动儿童之间仍存在较大的成绩差距。进一步的分位数回归结果显示学校类型对于成绩较差的学生影响更大。我们的研究结果与目前民工子弟学校教学质量普遍低于公办学校的观察相吻合。     

How important are school principals in the production of student achievement?

As school leaders, principals can influence student achievement in a number of ways, such as hiring and firing of teachers, monitoring instruction and maintaining student discipline, among many others. We measure the effect of individual principals on gains in math and reading achievement between grades 4 and 7 using a value‐added framework. We estimate that a one standard deviation improvement in principal quality can boost student performance by 0.289 to 0.408 standard deviations in reading and math, while the principal at the 75th percentile improves scores by 0.170 to 0.193 relative to the median principal. Our results imply that isolating the most effective principals and allocating them accordingly between schools can have a significant positive effect on reducing achievement gaps.     

Does data matter? Statewide longitudinal data systems and student performance in the U.S.

Although many industries have benefited from advances in data-driven technology, education is making small steps in capitalizing on the huge potential of data systems. Since 2005, the U.S. Federal Government has been making large grants to help states build statewide longitudinal data systems (SLDS) with the goal of improving programme and teacher evaluation and engage in data-driven decision-making. We analyse whether the introduction of SLDSs improved student performance, measured using test scores for math and reading tests for 4th and 8th graders, as well as high school graduation rates. We find no effects of SLDSs on student performance up to 10 years from implementation. However, we find suggestive evidence that these systems may have long-run effects, emphasizing the long-run nature of educational data collection and policy analysis.     

Why is education performance so different across Latvian schools?

This paper aims to identify the school characteristics consistently associated with better performance of pupils in state exams in Latvia and understand the reasons behind substantial exam score gap between urban and rural schools. We find that exam scores are positively related to school size and teacher salaries, but negatively related to teacher age. Oaxaca–Ransom decomposition shows that the whole urban–rural exam score gap can be attributed to a few observable characteristics of schools, teachers and pupils.     

Teacher sorting, teacher quality, and student composition

Using panel data for Norwegian schools, we establish a two-equation supply and demand model for teachers with approved education. Taking into account nationally determined teacher pay and a strict teacher appointment rule, the data enable us to separately estimate supply and demand functions for certified teachers. The results clearly indicate that the student body composition, and in particular students belonging to ethnic minorities, influences both teacher supply and teacher demand. The implied negative relationship between excess demand for certified teachers and the share of minority students is likely to be important for teacher quality.     

Sequential teamwork in competitive environments: Theory and evidence from swimming data

Many tasks require the input by more than one person very often with members of the team contributing sequentially. However, team production is plagued by disincentive problems. We investigate individual incentives to team production with sequential contributions and competing teams. We show that earlier contributors free-ride on team members contributing later on. We test our predictions on sports data using an athlete's performance in the individual race as a natural control for his relay performance. Our empirical findings strongly support the theoretical claims.     

HOW MUCH DO STUDENTS MATTER? APPLYING THE OAXACA DECOMPOSITION TO EXPLAIN DETERMINANTS OF ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS

The federal government and many state governments have recently passed legislation that punishes school districts for not showing consistent improvement in standardized test scores. This article measures the extent to which school performance reflects student characteristics. After splitting schools in the state of Washington based on adequate yearly progress, the authors find that an overwhelming percentage of the difference between high- and low-performing schools is explained by characteristics beyond the control of school administrators. Thus legislation designed to penalize poorly performing schools may hurt students who are most in need of academic aid. (JEL I2 )     

Grades as incentives

This paper examines how grade incentives affect student learning across a variety of courses at two universities, using for identification the discrete rewards offered by the standard A–F letter-grade system. We develop and test five predictions about the provision of study effort and the distribution of numerical course averages in the presence of the thresholds that separate these discrete rewards. Surprisingly, all are rejected in our data. There is no evidence that exam performance is improved for those students that stand to gain the most from additional study.