Crime,apprehension and clearance rates: Panel data evidence from Canadian provinces

The Becker model of crime establishes the importance of the probability of apprehension as a key factor in a rational individual's decision to commit a crime. In this respect, most empirical studies based on US data have relied on variation in the number of police officers to estimate the impact of the probability of apprehension or capture. We measure the probability of apprehension by clearance rates and study their effects on crime rates, employing a panel of Canadian provinces from 1986 to 2005. OLS, GMM, GLS and IV estimates yield statistically significant elasticities of clearance rates, ranging from ?0.2 to ?0.4 for violent crimes and from ?0.5 to ?0.6 for property crimes. These findings reflect the importance of police force crime‐solving productivity.     

Police Violence and the Underreporting of Crime

This paper examines the relationship between police violence and the reporting of crime. Utilizing original data from a large‐scale household survey conducted in Costa Rica from October 2013 to April 2014 (n = 4,200), we find that the observation of police violence significantly reduces citizens’ willingness to report crime. The implications of this finding are explored using a game‐theoretic model of crime, crime reporting, and police misconduct. The model reveals that although the prospect of police violence against criminals may generate a degree of deterrence for criminal behavior, permissiveness toward police violence also raises expectations about the likelihood of police abuse against law‐abiding citizens. Consistent with our empirics, this reduces citizens’ propensity to report crime, thereby fostering a climate of impunity for criminal activity.     

Improving police integrity in Uganda: Impact assessment of the police accountability and reform project

Uganda and in particular the Ugandan police are perceived as highly corrupt. To address the integrity of police officers, an intervention called the Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP) was implemented in selected police districts between 2010 and early 2013. This paper studies the impact of PARP for a sample of 600 police officers who were interviewed about police integrity by means of 12 hypothetical vignette cases depicting context‐specific, undesirable behavior of varying degrees of severity. The assessments of the cases by the police officers are analyzed using propensity score matching, inverse probability weighting, and seemingly unrelated regression techniques. We show that the self‐selection of police officers into the program is unlikely to drive the results. The results suggest that officers participating in PARP activities (1) judge the presented cases of misconduct more severely, (2) are more inclined to report misconduct, and (3) also expect their colleagues to judge misbehavior at the police level more critically although the latter two coefficient estimates are smaller in size. This suggests that PARP activities have affected the perception of police officers but only encouraged them moderately to actually take action against bad practices.     

Racial Profiling, Statistical Discrimination, and the Effect of a Colorblind Policy on the Crime Rate

This paper develops a model of racial profiling by law enforcement officers when officers observe both an individual's race as well as a noisy signal of his or her guilt that depends on whether or not a crime has been committed. The model shows that given officers observe such a guilt signal, data regarding the guilt rate among those investigated from each race will not be sufficient for determining whether racially unequal investigation rates are due to statistical discrimination or racial bias on the part of officers. The model also reveals that when racially unequal investigation rates are due to statistical discrimination, imposing a colorblind policy on officers can increase, decrease, or have little effect on the crime rate, depending on specific characteristics of the jurisdiction and the crime in question.     

The Effects of the Fourth Amendment: An Economic Analysis

We develop an economic model of crime and search that allowsus to analyze the effects of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionaryrule on crime and privacy. We find that the rule always increasescrime but has two opposing effects on searches. It directlyreduces searches by reducing the chances that they lead to successfulconviction, but it also indirectly increases them by increasingcrime. If its indirect effect dominates, the rule actually increasessearches and has an ambiguous effect on wrongful searches. Ifits direct effect dominates, it reduces wrongful searches, therebyprotecting privacy. Its direct effect is more likely to dominatethe greater is the number of police officers per capita, thelower is the police's incentive to simply close cases and themore accountable the police are for their mistakes. Police accountabilityalso increases crime but unambiguously reduces wrongful searches.We also explore the effects of long-term progress in searchtechnology on crime and privacy.     

Modeling crime in Japan

This study aims at identifying the factors of aggregate and disaggregate crime categories in Japan over the period 1964–2009. All crime categories are related to police outlays, police numbers, unemployment, divorce and urbanization rates. Bounds testing approach to cointegration is implemented to test the existence of a long-run relationship amongst the variables. Cointegration analysis yields that the main deterrent effect on crime is the police presence and this factor is further confirmed by the real police outlays. As for the essential cause of crime, urbanization stands as the leading factor which is followed by divorce and unemployment rates. Policy implications are discussed.     

ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF LABOR MARKET AND DETERRENCE VARIABLES ON CRIME RATES IN MEXICO

Many studies examine the relationship between crime rates and various economic and/or sociodemographic variables in high income countries, but similar efforts for middle and low income countries are less common. Utilizing an 8‐year panel data sample for all 32 states in Mexico, this study assesses the impact of Mexican labor market and deterrence variables on various Mexican crime rates. The principal results indicate that: (1) State gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has ambiguous effect on crime rates under different conditions. Both wages and unemployment rates are negatively linked with crime rates. (2) Although the Mexican judicial and public security systems are widely believed to be ineffective, increased federal police forces and incarceration rates are associated with lower crime rates, but higher public security expenditure per capita is associated with higher crime rates. (3) The impacts from labor market and deterrence variables presented in (1) and (2) continue to hold under the Fox administration as well as for non‐border states. Their respective impacts diminish, however, under the Calderon administration as well as for border states because of the small number of observations. Overall, the results indicate that increasing average wages, federal police forces, and incarceration rates would have significant impacts on reducing crime rates in Mexican states. (JEL O54, K42)     

Can racially unbiased police perpetuate long-run discrimination?

We develop a stylized dynamic model of highway policing in which a non-racist police officer exhibits a cognitive bias: relative overconfidence. The officer is given incentives to arrest criminals but faces a per stop cost that increases when the racial mix of her stops differs from that of the population. By observing the racial composition of jail inmates, she estimates crime rates of each race. Her overconfidence regarding eventual incarceration of criminals is shown to lead her to overestimate the crime rate of one race causing the long-run racial composition of the jail population to deviate from the “fair” one.     

Are youth offenders responsive to changing sanctions? Evidence from the Canadian Youth Criminal Justice Act of 2003

This paper examines youth offenders’ responses to changing sanctions, using evidence from the Canadian Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), which replaced the Young Offenders Act on April 1, 2003. Using police reported and court based official statistics and the difference‐in‐difference strategy, it is found that Canadian youth offenders were less likely to be charged by police and less likely to receive a custodial sentence following the YCJA. These changes were relatively large for less serious crime and small or insignificant for more serious crime. In response to these changes in the certainty of sanctions, less serious youth crime increased while the direction of change for more serious youth crime was less clear. Empirical analysis on youth self‐reported crime corroborates the findings on youth crime reported to police, particularly for boys.     

THE IMPACT OF LOW‐PRIORITY LAWS ON CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA

We examine the impact of low‐priority initiatives on criminal activity. Low‐priority initiatives mandate that minor marijuana possession offenses be the lowest enforcement priority for police. Localities pass these laws because they believe if officers devote fewer resources toward minor marijuana crimes, more resources will be available to deter more serious crimes. Using data from California, we find that jurisdictions that adopted low‐priority laws experienced a reduction in arrests for misdemeanor marijuana offenses. However, we do not find evidence of a consistent effect of enacting a low‐priority initiative on the crime or clearance rate of other felonies. (JEL H1, H4, K4)     

高低级别公职人员经济犯罪行为决策差异分析

公职人员经济犯罪决策受到需求动机、"进入"成本、道德自律三个条件约束。在引入公职人员效用函数的基础上,得出影响公职人员经济犯罪决策的因素是效用偏好结构、既有效用量、相对效用量、犯罪金额。研究结果表明:个人效用偏好结构不同导致高低级别公职人员经济犯罪决策的差异;就财富指标而言,高级别比低级别公职人员经济犯罪倾向性小,但一旦高级别公职人员发生经济犯罪,其犯罪金额较大;就相对效用指标而言,高级别比低级别公职人员经济犯罪倾向性大。     

Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective

Even among themselves, criminals are not seen as trustworthy. Consequently, a criminal organization needs to incentivize its members, either by threats of violence or by rewarding good behavior. The cost of using violence depends on the resources police allocate to investigating intraorganizational violence. This means that the police may affect the choice of an incentive scheme by the criminal organization. The design of the optimal strategy for crime control has to take this into account. We develop a model of an infinitely repeated criminal labor market where (i) a criminal organization hires and incentivizes members, and (ii) peripheral crime (crime outside the criminal organization) is a stepping stone to a career in organized crime. We establish that there are two possible optimal strategies for the police. (i) There are situations in which the optimal strategy for the police is to use all of their resources to decrease the efficiency of criminals. (ii) In other situations, the optimal strategy for the police is to spend the minimum amount of resources to ensure that the criminal organization cannot punish disloyal criminals, and spend the rest of their resources to decrease the efficiency of criminals.     

OFFICIAL CRIME STATISTICS: THEIR USE AND INTERPRETATION

In this paper we consider the data used by economists to estimate economic models of crime. We discuss the main sources of Official Crime Statistics in the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States, and raise questions about the reliability of these data for estimation and forecasting purposes. In particular, we focus on the disparity between crime rates suggested by victimisation surveys and the rates suggested by Official Statistics, and show that this is primarily a consequence of under-reporting by victims and under-recording by the police. We conclude our analysis by considering the factors that influence the under-reporting of crime.     

Agglomeration,city size and crime

This paper analyzes the relationship between crime and agglomeration where the land, labor, product, and crime markets are endogenously determined. Our main theoretical findings are the following: (i) better accessibility to jobs decreases crime in the short run but may increase crime in the long run; (ii) the per-capita crime rate increases with city size; (iii) when allowing for endogenous policing, lower commuting costs make the impact of police on crime more efficient.     

Crime and local inequality in South Africa

We examine the effects of local inequality on property and violent crime in South Africa. The findings are consistent with economic theories relating local inequality to property crime and also with sociological theories that imply that inequality leads to crime in general. Burglary rates are 25–43% higher in police precincts that are the wealthiest among their neighbors, suggesting that criminals travel to neighborhoods where the expected returns from burglary are highest. Finally, while we find little evidence that inequality between racial groups fosters interpersonal conflict at the local level, racial heterogeneity itself is highly correlated with crime.     

Terror and the costs of crime

This paper argues that terrorism, beyond its immediate impact on innocent victims, also raises the costs of crime, and therefore, imposes a negative externality on potential criminals. Terrorism raises the costs of crime through two channels: (i) by increasing the presence and activity of the police force, and (ii) causing more people to stay at home rather than going out for leisure activities. Our analysis exploits a panel of 120 fatal terror attacks and all reported crimes for 17 districts throughout Israel between 2000 and 2005. After controlling for the fixed-effect of each district and for district-specific time trends, we show that terror attacks reduce property crimes such as burglary, auto-theft, and thefts-from-cars. Terror also reduces assaults and aggravated assaults which occur in private homes, but increases incidents of trespassing and “disrupting the police.” Taken as a whole, the results are consistent with a stronger deterrence effect produced by an increased police presence after a terror attack. A higher level of policing is likely to catch more people trespassing, and at the same time, reduce the number of property crimes. The decline in crimes committed in private houses is likely an indication that the tendency for individuals to stay home after a terror attack further increases the costs of crime.     

Violent crime and punishment: an application of the LISREL model

Public anxiety over violent crime has forged a broad consensus to purchase more crime control. Recently, the President brought into law a federal anti-crime bill that will put an additional 100 000 police on the nation's streets. This paper presents empirical evidence on the deterrence effect of police presence. The principal finding is that police presence deters commission of violent crimes by increasing the risk of being punished for committing those crimes. This risk is modelled as a latent variable, because the probability and severity of punishment for committing a violent crime are generally communicated in an onconsistant fashion. The violent crime commission rate is also treated as a latent variable, because it is almost certainly afflicted with measurement error.     

A model of police financing through income and consumption taxes

This article studies police financing with a focus on the difference in the timing between federal and local government funds. In general, federal government funds came from income taxes collected before possible appropriative activities while local government funds came from consumption taxes collected afterwards. We find that income-tax financing results in more workers, more police, and fewer thieves when appropriation and tax rates are the same between the two cases. Funding the police before possible appropriative activities works as a deterrence. Our findings show the complexity of studying crime and police financing even in a highly stylized model.     

The effect of reporting errors on the cross-country relationship between inequality and crime

This paper analyzes reporting errors in crime data to see how they impact econometric estimates, particularly of the key relationship between inequality and crime. Criminal victimization surveys of 140,000 respondents in 37 industrial, transition and developing countries are used. Comparing the crimes experienced by these respondents with those reported to the police, non-random and mean-reverting errors are apparent. Time-varying factors affect the propensity of victims to report crimes to the police, undermining the use of country-specific fixed effects as a means of dealing with measurement error in official crime data. These errors substantially attenuate both cross-sectional and panel estimates of the partial correlation between inequality and crime.     

The effect of reporting errors on the cross-country relationship between inequality and crime

This paper analyzes reporting errors in crime data to see how they impact econometric estimates, particularly of the key relationship between inequality and crime. Criminal victimization surveys of 140,000 respondents in 37 industrial, transition and developing countries are used. Comparing the crimes experienced by these respondents with those reported to the police, non-random and mean-reverting errors are apparent. Time-varying factors affect the propensity of victims to report crimes to the police, undermining the use of country-specific fixed effects as a means of dealing with measurement error in official crime data. These errors substantially attenuate both cross-sectional and panel estimates of the partial correlation between inequality and crime.