Optimal pricing and investment for resources with alternative uses and capacity limits

Airport runways, radio spectrum, and hospital beds are resources with capacity limits used to provide multiple services with specific capacity requirements in separate markets, which contribute to recover capacity investment costs. A welfare-maximizing and (possibly) budget-constrained firm, whose operating costs significantly increase as total capacity use presses against capacity, chooses prices and capacity. When the equilibrium capacity is reached, second-best Ramsey prices must be adjusted, and mark-ups on marginal costs may be higher for services with higher demand elasticities, if they intensively use capacity. Moreover, for a given output vector, the firm invests more than in first best. Instead, the equilibrium capacity may be first best when there is excess capacity to reduce operating costs and thus improve welfare. Our model can be used as a benchmark to evaluate the efficiency of market mechanisms for resource allocation and pricing, or when market mechanisms are not adopted.

     

General equilibrium effects of environmental policy: A CGE-modeling approach

Estimation of emission control cost functions is often carried out in a partial equilibrium framework, i.e., under the assumption that emission control measures have negligible effects on input and output prices. In this paper a computable general equilibrium model is used for simulation of the impact on factor prices and resource allocation of reductions of SO _infx ^sup- , NO _infx ^su- and CO₂-emissions. Thus the model includes markets for tradable emission permits, and the equilibrium prices of permits reflect the marginal costs of emission control. The results suggest that major emission reductions are likely to have general equilibrium effects, and thus that emission control cost functions that fail to take these effects into account may give a distorted picture of the economic impact of emission control.     

Incomplete cost pass-through under deep habits

A number of empirical studies document that marginal cost shocks are not fully passed through to prices at the firm level and that prices are substantially less volatile than costs. We show that in the relative-deep-habits model of Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe [Ravn, M., Schmitt-Grohé, S., Uribe, M., 2006. Deep habits. Review of Economic Studies 73, 195–218], firm-specific marginal cost shocks are not fully passed through to product prices. That is, in response to a firm-specific increase in marginal costs, prices rise, but by less than marginal costs leading to a decline in the firm-specific markup of prices over marginal costs. Pass-through is predicted to be even lower when shocks to marginal costs are anticipated by firms. In our model unanticipated firm-specific cost shocks lead to incomplete pass-through (or a decline in markups) of about 20 percent and anticipated cost shocks are associated with incomplete pass-through of about 50 percent. The model predicts that cost pass-through is increasing in the persistence of marginal cost shocks and U-shaped in the strength of habits. The relative-deep-habits model implies that conditional on marginal cost disturbances, prices are less volatile than marginal costs.     

On derivatives and information costs

Information plays a central role in capital markets and in the process of asset pricing. The specific features of over-the-counter (OTC) markets require often an investment in information acquisition. Information costs can be defined in the context of Merton's [Merton, R. (1987). A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance, 42, 483–510] model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information (CAPMI). In this context, hedging portfolios can be constructed and analytic formulas can be derived using the Black and Scholes technology or the martingale method. This paper presents a simple framework for the valuation of exotic derivatives and OTC traded securities in this context. We incorporate information costs into a model, and then use this new model to price a variety of exotic options using the general context in Bellalah [Bellalah, M. (2001). Market imperfections, information costs and the valuation of derivatives: Some general results. International Journal of Finance, 13, 1895–1928]. In each case, simple analytic formulae are derived.From a pedagogical viewpoint, we illustrate the methodology and propose simple analytic formulas for pay-on-exercise options, power derivatives, outperformance options, guaranteed exchange-rate contracts in foreign stock investments, equity-linked foreign exchange options and quantos in the same context. These formulae are simple and have the potential to explain some deviations with respect to the standard Black–Scholes model. We can use also stochastic volatilities and information costs to explain the smiles and skews found in options price data as in Bellalah, Prigent, and Villa [Bellalah, M., Prigent, J. L., & Villa, C. (2001). Skew without skewness: Asymmetric smiles, information costs and stochastic volatilitiy, International Journal of Finance, 2001, 1826, 1837] or Bellalah and Mahfoudh (2004) [Bellalah M. and Mahfoudh S. (2004). Option pricing under stochastic volatility with incomplete Information, Wilmott Magazine]. Our methodology can be applied for the valuation of several OTC and real options in the presence of incomplete information.     

The Effects of Rivalry with Price Regulation of Electric Power Generation

This article examines how rivalry between an electric utility and nonutility generators (NUGs) affects electricity prices, market structure and welfare. If a utility cannot break even financially when outputs are priced at marginal cost, then the Ramsey optimal price paid by a utility purchasing electricity from a NUG should be below avoided cost, in contrast to the requirements of PURPA. The analysis also compares FDC, Residual and Ramsey prices for a utilitys electricity sales. It illustrates how FDC prices may force a utility to exit relatively competitive business markets, eliminating any benefits of economies of scope from serving both business and residential customers.     

Randomized double auctions: gains from trade,trader roles,and price discovery

Experimental double-auction commodity markets are known to exhibit robust convergence to competitive equilibria under stable or cyclical supply and demand conditions, but little is known about their performance in truly random environments. We provide a comprehensive study of double auctions in a stochastic setting where the equilibrium prices, trading volumes and gains from trade are highly variable across periods, and with commodity traders who may buy or sell their goods depending on market conditions and their individual outcomes. We find that performance in this stochastic environment is sensitive to underlying market conditions. Efficiency is higher and convergence to the competitive equilibrium stronger when the potential gains from trade are high and when the equilibrium spans a wide range of quantities, implying a large number of marginal trades. Speculative re-trading is prevalent, especially among those who have little to gain under equilibrium pricing. Those with the largest expected gains typically earn far less than predicted, while those with little or no predicted earnings gain modestly from speculation, leading to some redistribution of gains from high to low expected earners. Excessive trading volumes are associated with negative efficiencies in markets with low gains from trade, but not in the high-gains markets, where zero-sum trading and re-trading appear to enforce efficiency and near-equilibrium pricing. Buyers earn more relative to their competitive equilibrium benchmark than sellers do. Introducing trader specialization leads to fewer trading errors and higher market efficiency, but it does not eliminate zero-sum trading and re-trading.

     

Hedonic prices and cost/benefit analysis

Hedonic prices have been used to evaluate the willingness to pay for attributes. We reformulate the notion of hedonic price from a composite price on housing to a unit price on traded quantities, in conformity with long run competitive equilibrium theory. This formulation was suggested (but not developed) by Rosen (J. Polit. Econ.82, No. 1 (1974), 34–35). By first characterizing an efficient allocation of consumers to space, we show that hedonic unit prices can be understood as a bid-rent function which supports the efficient allocation. This is despite the fact that the lots over which consumers bid are themselves endogenous. We show that unit hedonic prices reveal preferences in a manner different from composite hedonic expenditures.     

Nonconvexity,efficiency and equilibrium in exhaustible resource depletion

We consider the problem of efficiency and existence of a competitive equilibrium in exhaustible resource markets where extraction costs are nonconvex. Nonconvexity is shown to imply that (1) (efficient) extraction ceases to the left of the minimum efficient scale, i.e., where average costs exceed marginal costs; and (2) a competitive equilibrium does not exist. Introduction of a backstop technology (which induces a flat portion of the industry demand curve) restores both existence and efficiency, provided that the backstop price is sufficiently low. If firms face even a small amount of uncertainty regarding their rivals' stocks, a backstop technology is sufficient to restore existence of competitive equilibrium, even if the backstop price is very high. In this case, however, the competitive equilibrium is not efficient.     

The Identification of Preferences from Equilibrium Prices under Uncertainty

The competitive equilibrium correspondence, which associates equilibrium prices of commodities and assets with allocations of endowments, identifies the preferences and beliefs of individuals under uncertainty; this is the case even if the asset market is incomplete. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D80.     

Entry and Vertical Differentiation

This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and new information is generated through purchases in the market. We derive the (unique) Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon game under the strong long run average payoff criterion. The qualitative features of the optimal entry strategy are shown to depend exclusively on the relative ranking of established and new products based on current beliefs. Superior products are launched relatively slowly and at high initial prices whereas substitutes for existing products are launched aggressively at low initial prices. The robustness of these results with respect to different model specifications is discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D83.     

SERVICE QUALITY IN REGULATED NETWORK INDUSTRIES

ABSTRACT ** : Economic regulators provide incentives for good quality of service as well as constraints on the prices or revenue which can be charged by firms with monopoly power. Economic theory suggests that regulators should choose standards according to consumers' valuation and the marginal cost of quality improvements, and that firms respond by equalizing the marginal costs from not making improvements (i.e. the regulatory penalty plus any loss in revenue) with the marginal costs of improvement. This paper explores the evidence for such economically rational behaviour by both regulators and regulatees. We use a specially constructed data set on service quality targets and achievements across the main UK utility sectors; documentary evidence from regulators; and interviews with managers in companies subject to those regulators. We conclude that regulators are motivated by political as well as economic factors. And that companies may not respond primarily to the regulator's financial rewards or penalties for their quality targets, with a consequent danger that regulated consumers pay for marketing in unregulated markets; the resulting level of service quality may be ‘too high’ in the economic sense.     

Concurrent trading in two experimental markets with demand interdependence

Summary. We report results from fifteen computerized double auctions with concurrent trading of two commodities. In contrast to prior experimental markets, buyers' demands are induced via CES earnings functions defined over the two traded goods, with a fiat money expenditure constraint. Sellers receive independent marginal cost arrays for each commodity. Parameters for buyers' earnings functions and sellers' costs are set to yield a stable, competitive equilibrium. In spite of the complexity introduced by the demand interdependence, the competitive model is a good predictor of market outcomes, although prices tend to be above (below) the competitive prediction in the low-price (high-price) market.     

Equilibrium Prices When the Sunspot Variable Is Continuous

We analyze sunspot-equilibrium prices in nonconvex economies with perfect markets and a continuous sunspot variable. Our primary result is that every sunspot equilibrium allocation can be supported by prices that, when adjusted for probabilities, are constant across states. This result extends to the case of a finite number of equally-probable states under a nonsatiation condition, but does not extend to general discrete state spaces. We use our primary result to establish the equivalence of the set of sunspot equilibrium allocations based on a continuous sunspot variable and the set of lottery equilibrium allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D51, D84, E32.     

General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: A new approach

We analyze a class of ‘large group’ Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models by applying different concepts of functional separability to the same set of first-order conditions for utility maximization. We show that multiplicatively quasi-separable (MQS) functions yield ‘constant relative risk aversion’ (CRRA), and, therefore ‘constant elasticity of substitution’ (CES), functions, whereas additively quasi-separable (AQS) functions yield ‘constant absolute risk aversion’ (CARA) functions. We then show that the CARA specification sheds new light on: (i) pro-competitive effects, i.e., profit-maximizing prices are decreasing in the mass of competing firms; and (ii) a competitive limit, i.e., profit-maximizing prices converge to marginal costs when the mass of competing firms becomes arbitrarily large.     

RAMSEY TAXES MEET PRICE RIGIDITY

‘Ramsey taxes’ are commodity taxes that minimize deadweight loss. Evidence has shown dramatic differences in the extent of price rigidity across goods: while the prices of some goods change frequently, the prices of other goods seldom change. This paper examines Ramsey taxes in the presence of heterogeneous price rigidity. We find that, to minimize deadweight loss, lower (higher) tax rates should be imposed on goods with rigid prices if their relative prices are too high (low) relative to the would‐be situation of no price stickiness. Intuitively, Ramsey taxes remedy the relative price distortion caused by the price rigidity of some goods. We calibrate our model to data from Taiwan and the USA, showing a significant cut in welfare cost if Ramsey rather than uniform taxes are applied.     

The Stability of Price Dispersion under Seller and Consumer Learning*

In many markets, it is possible to find rival sellers charging different prices for the same good. Earlier research has attempted to explain this phenomenon by demonstrating the existence of dispersed price equilibria when consumers must make use of costly search to discover prices. We ask whether such equilibria can be learned when sellers adjust prices adaptively in response to current market conditions. With consumer behavior fixed, convergence to a dispersed price equilibrium is possible in some cases. However, once consumer learning is introduced, the monopoly outcome first found by Diamond (Journal of Economic Theory3 (1971), 156–68) is the only stable equilibrium.     

Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment

This paper studies sequential second price auctions with imperfect quantity commitment in environments involving single-unit demands, independent private values, and non-decreasing marginal costs. The paper characterizes the symmetric equilibrium strategy and demonstrates that the equilibrium price sequence is conditionally non-increasing, showing a downwards drift in cases in which the marginal cost exceeds the reserve price with positive probability. The paper also argues that unlike a strong seller who sets reserve prices strictly above marginal costs, a weak seller will typically prefer to commit to such inefficiently low reserve prices.     

Search cost,trading strategies and optimal market structure

The theory of Walrasian equilibrium yields a set of prices at which the aggregate competitive demand for each commodity equals its aggregate competitive supply. However, even at equilibrium prices the theory of competitive equilibrium does not explicitly offer explanation regarding the manner in which trades are actually executed. This paper considers a model where trade takes place in a decentralized fashion and examines in a dynamic game-theoretic framework, the role of social institution of money and markets in facilitating exchange. The steady state Nash equilibrium derived in the paper demonstrates how, depending on the level of transaction costs associated with a market setup (synonymously, trading posts to exchange possible pairs of goods) appropriate monetary trade emerges, which like a hub and spoke network (Starr and Stinchcombe, 1999) makes some markets non-functioning and in equilibrium only the markets having trade through the medium of exchange continue to exist. However, despite the obvious advantages of a market setup in reducing search costs, pure random search for a complementary trading partner (as considered by Ostroy and Starr, 1974; Kiyotaki and Wright , 1989; and others) prevails in many economies, especially, in many developing economies. This paper models this feature of developing economies by introducing differences in transaction costs across agents and shows why sustainable equilibria might exist exhibiting random search for certain commodities even in the presence of established markets.     

Equilibrium Dynamics in a Two-Sector Model with Taxes

In this paper we are concerned with the equilibrium dynamics of a two-sector model of endogenous growth with distortionary taxes. We show that for certain parameters values and tax schemes every equilibrium orbit—except the steady state solution—is non-interior; i.e., there are times in which one of the sectors is inactive. This analysis confirms that in multisector models the set of easily checkable, universal conditions that can guarantee the interiority of equilibrium solutions is rather limited. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D90, E22.     

Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Consumer Inventories

A model with two types of consumers, shoppers and captives, is constructed that leads to an equilibrium price dispersion. Shoppers may hold inventories of the good; the level of consumer inventories leads to state-dependent price dispersions. It is shown that prices and quantities display negative serial correlation. The model is tested using grocery store data, which display the predicted correlations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, L13, D83, L81.