THE ACCURACY OF CASH FLOW ESTIMATION PROCEDURES

Prior research uses mechanical procedures to estimate cash flow data. This study examines the accuracy of these procedures by measuring errors between estimated cash flows and reported cash flows. The results indicate that mechanical rules provide poor estimates for reported cash flows. We also show that the errors between cash flow estimates and reported cash flows can be reduced by adjustments made from footnote disclosures. However, large errors remain, even after adjustments are made from footnote disclosures. These remaining errors are correlated with firm specific characteristics such as sales (firm size), extraordinary items, foreign currency gains and losses, and changes in inventory.     

THE IMPACT OF THE QUALITY OF EARNINGS ON THE VALUATION RELEVANCE OF CASH FLOW DISCLOSURES

This study investigates whether the ‘quality of earnings’, defined as the relationship between profitability and cash generating ability, is a conditioning factor with regard to the valuation relevance of cash flow disclosures. The study is performed on a sample of 197 British firms employing data over a 23-year period. The results of the study support the contention that the valuation relevance of cash flow disclosures is conditional upon the ‘quality of earnings’, as previously defined. Specifically, the decomposition of unexpected earnings into its cash flow and accruals components provides incremental information content to earnings when the firm-specific time-series correlation between earnings and cash flows is low. Furthermore, the cash flow ‘surprise’ is valued more than the accruals ‘surprise’ when the firm-specific time-series correlation between earnings and cash flows is low.     

CASH FLOW ACCOUNTING AND THE ALLOCATION PROBLEM

Cash flow accounting (CFA) proposals typically have included firm statements that CFA data are allocation-free. This is not entirely true if the term allocation is interpreted in a wide sense. However, it can be argued that most allocations can be avoided in CFA systems, and this paper is an attempt to present this argument. In particular, it aims to strengthen the case for CFA in practice.     

FREE CASH FLOW AND PUBLIC GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF ALASKA

In a widely cited 1986 article in the American Economic Review, Michael Jensen gave the concept of free cash flow (FCF) a new twist by redefining it as cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects with positive net present values. Put another way, FCF represents funds available in the firm that managers may choose to hold as idle cash, return to shareholders, or invest in projects with returns below the firm's cost of capital. In redefining FCF in this way, Jensen converted FCF from a measure of economic income and value into a measure of corporate assets available for discretionary, and potentially value‐destroying, use by firm managers. And, as he argued in his important article, managers in mature businesses with substantial free cash flow have a tendency to destroy value by plowing too much capital back into those businesses or, often worse, making ill‐advised acquisitions in unrelated businesses. Several methods have been developed in financial markets and internal corporate governance systems to discourage managers from wasting FCF. Better monitoring by boards of directors, large ownership blocks, and properly aligned management compensation contracts are all parts of the solution. And the extraordinary increase in stock repurchases in recent years, invariably applauded by investors, is another illustration of the market's success in encouraging companies to address their free cash flow problems. But if the “FCF problem” of the private sector has attracted considerable attention from finance scholars, the problem is even more acute in the public sector, where FCF can be thought of as tax revenue in excess of what is required to finance well‐defined and generally accepted levels of public services. Unlike the private sector, in the public sector there are neither measures nor mechanisms by which to monitor and constrain wasteful spending by elected officials. In this article, the authors attempt to measure the costs to taxpayers of government FCF using the case of Alaska, which since 1969 has received a huge windfall of tax revenue from North Slope oil leases. After examining the state's public finances from 1968 through 1993, the authors offer $25 billion as a conservative estimate of the social losses from Alaska's waste of free cash flow during that 25‐year period.     

THE MARKET REACTION TO STRAIGHT DEBT ISSUES: THE EFFECTS OF FREE CASH FLOW

In this paper we measure the market reaction to 937 straight debt issues between 1983 and 1993. We find a negative and significant market reaction to a straight debt announcement. In addition, we find that the market reaction to a straight debt issue is directly related to the issuing firm's level of existing cash and inversely related to the issuing firm's investment opportunities.     

THE ADVENT OF CASH PLANNING

This article explains why it was decided to introduce cash planning in 1982. It analyses the Treasury's ostensible and real aims in the abandonment of volume-planning, and its preference for cash planning rather than cost planning in the context of the Conservative Government's politico-economic strategy, and the wide-rangipg debate on budgetary reform precipitated by the publication of the Armstrong Report. It argues that that decision was a politically rational response to the imperatives of that strategy.     

EVALUATING CASH FLOW SYSTEMS UNDER GROWTH

This paper considers a potential extension and refinement of the type of cash flow analysis of cash management systems commonly found in financial management texts. The timing effect of a cash management system has three distinct components—overlap, acceleration, and residual. However, only the overlap component is explicitly quantified by the standard evaluation procedure. Conditions are specified under which quantification of an additional component (acceleration) can significantly improve the accuracy of the estimates.     

LEVERAGING THE UNDERINVESTMENT PROBLEM: HOW HIGH DEBT AND MANAGEMENT SHAREHOLDINGS SOLVE THE AGENCY COSTS OF FREE CASH FLOW

It is argued that leveraged buyouts (LBOs) provide managers with a powerful incentive to release excess cash rather than invest in negative net present value projects. This incentive is attributed to the large debt obligations associated with “junk” bond financing and to an increase in the shareholdings of top management. In this paper I explore the conditions under which leverage and management shareholdings complement one another in resolving the agency costs of free cash flow and would therefore optimally be used “together” as in an LBO. Complementarity is shown to obtain under plausible conditions, essentially because increased leverage reduces equityholders' share of investment returns. Increased management shareholdings then leverage this underinvestment effect. My analysis also helps explain why top managers who participate in an LBO receive a highly leveraged equity claim rather than a share of the “strip” that is generally provided to outside investors.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVIDEND CHANGES AND CASH FLOW: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

It is often assumed that cash flow affects dividend payout. This study provides evidence on the incremental information content of cash flow numbers over Profits and Previous Year's Dividends (Lintner's model) in explaining changes in cash dividends. It further examines whether different measures of cash flow differ in information content for dividend-increasing and dividend-decreasing firms. Lintner's model of dividend changes is robust across firms with either dividend increases or decreases. The null hypotheses, that no definition of cash flow adds to the model, could not be rejected for any of the definitions.