上市公司自愿性信息披露对股票流动性影响的实证研究

以2007～2008年沪深两市A股上市公司年报作为研究基础,运用描述性统计和两阶最小二乘法分析了自愿性信息披露对上市公司股票流动性的影响。验证了自愿性信息披露会促进上市公司股票的流动性,同时发现自愿性披露信息中财务方面信息对上市公司股票流动性的提高作用最大。     

How do suppliers benefit from customers’ voluntary disclosure? the effect of customers’ earnings guidance on upstream firms’ investment efficiency

We explore whether and how the issuance of customers’ financial forward-looking information affects the investment efficiency of their upstream firms. Using earnings guidance as a proxy for forward-looking information, we find that firms wherein customers disclose earnings forecasts invest more efficiently than those where customers withhold forward-looking information. Our findings hold after controlling for a set of firm characteristics, employing alternative model specifications and measurements, and using the 2011 Thailand flood as a quasi-experiment. Further analyses offer support that the positive impact of customers’ earnings guidance on upstream firms’ investment efficiency is stronger for customers issuing more informative, disaggregated, and accurate forecasts and suppliers with weaker bargaining power. We also observe an asymmetric response of suppliers’ investments toward customers’ good-news versus bad-news forecasts. Furthermore, by conducting a textual-based analysis, we find that suppliers’ investment efficiency increases with more embedded supply chain relevant information in customers’ earnings guidance reports. Overall, our findings suggest that suppliers benefit from customers’ earnings guidance to better assess their investment decisions, thereby achieving greater investment efficiency.     

Determinants and consequences of voluntary disclosure in an emerging market: Evidence from China

In this paper we examine empirically the determinants of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Chinese listed firms that issue both domestic and foreign shares and determine if the cost of debt capital is related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. We find the level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the proportion of state ownership, foreign ownership, firm performance measured by return on equity, and reputation of the engaged auditor. There is no evidence, however, that companies benefit from extensive voluntary disclosure by having a lower cost of debt capital.     

Silence can be golden: On the value of allowing managers to keep silent when information is soft

Most information that public firms are required to disclose is relatively hard (e.g., historical information), whereas the disclosure of relevant information that is softer in nature (e.g., forward-looking information) is typically left to firms' discretion. The lack of a mandatory requirement to disclose soft information has been at the heart of a number of on-going accounting debates. This study shows that while mandating disclosure increases the frequency of disclosure, it results in a reduction in disclosure quality when information is soft. By exploring this tradeoff, the paper sheds light on the merits of restricting mandatory disclosure requirements to verifiable information and leaving disclosure of soft information unregulated. The value of leaving disclosure unregulated is shown to be maximized when managers are given bonus-based compensation, with minimum performance thresholds and maximum caps, similar to those documented in the literature.     

Does product market competition affect corporate governance? Evidence from corporate takeovers

We examine the extent to which shareholders strategically allow a weak governance structure in response to increasing competition pressures in the product market. We treat acquisitions by rival firms as shocks that increase threats in a competitive product market. We find that firms adopt greater entrenchment provisions when there are greater competition threats. Moreover, firms with high institutional ownership – especially by dedicated investors – and​ board independence within the compensation committee are particularly aggressive, which is consistent with our theory that aggressive behavior represents a strategic decision by shareholders. Finally, we find positive relationship between the adoption of entrenchment provisions and firm’s future performance, but only for the adoption under relatively severe competitive pressures.     

上市公司主动信息披露行为的博弈分析

本文从同业竞争的简单博弈模型出发进行分析,得出了上市公司主动披露"好消息"但不主动披露"坏消息"的结论.而后,对市场监督机制存在的情况下对上市公司主动信息披露的行为进行博弈分析, 、得出了市场可预测与不可预测情况下上市公司的纳什均衡.最后,对外界监督压力存在的情况进行了博弈分析.上市公司一般会选择主动披露"好消息",但主动披露"坏消息"的行为则随约束条件的不同而变化.增强上市公司的同业竞争,提高上市公司对声誉的依赖性,提高监督效率,降低监督成本,提高监督的覆盖面,对提高上市公司主动信息披露行为会起积极作用.     

Discussion of ‘Strange bedfellows? Voluntary CSR disclosure and politics’

This article discusses the paper by Griffin and Sun (2013). Griffin and Sun (2013) investigate (i) the association between the company individuals and stakeholders political interests and the intensity of voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures, and (ii) investors response to these CSR disclosures. This discussion focuses on issues relating to five key areas of Griffin and Sun (2013), namely, the relationship between political interests and CSR disclosure intensity, the relationship between political interests and investors reactions to CSR disclosure, the political interest proxies employed, sample selection and the empirical analyses.     

Voluntary disclosure of reasons for auditor changes and the capital market reaction to information disclosure

This study examines the association between firm attributes and management’s voluntary disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor changes and evaluates the capital market reaction to information disclosure of the auditor change events accompanied by preexisting red flag and non-red flag issues. We find that managers are more likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes occurred because of benign business reasons or if the reasons do not indicate the presence of any underlying operating or financial reporting problem. On the other hand, managers are less likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes are preceded by red-flag situations. Furthermore, auditor changes accompanied by preexisting red-flag situations are viewed negatively by the capital market, implying that the full disclosure of reasons for auditor changes is informative to investors. This observation is supported further by our market-based analyses, which consistently show that auditor changes accompanied by prevailing red flag issues are valued incrementally in the market above and beyond the reportable events (under FRR No. 31) and auditor-initiated changes. The study contributes to the recent policy debate related to mandating the disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor switches. Specifically, the results support the recent debates that the current voluntary disclosure regime results in selective disclosure practices that are likely to contribute to the general lack of transparency with respect to auditor changes.     

林木类生物资产会计信息披露研究

本文在对林木类生物资产投融资所处国内外资本市场环境分析基础上,选取我国拥有林木类生物资产的28家上市公司2007年年报为样本,对其林木类生物资产会计信息披露进行了研究,提出了进一步完善林木类生物资产会计信息披露的原则和内容,其重点在于完善林木类生物资产强制性披露,同时规范自愿性披露。     

Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries?

By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken corporate governance and increase the opportunity for managerial slack. Consistent with the notion that competition mitigates managerial slack, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant drop in operating performance after the laws’ passage, firms in competitive industries experience no significant effect. When we examine which agency problem competition mitigates, we find evidence in support of a “quiet-life” hypothesis. Input costs, wages, and overhead costs all increase after the laws’ passage, and only so in non-competitive industries. Similarly, when we conduct event studies around the dates of the first newspaper reports about the BC laws, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant stock price decline, firms in competitive industries experience a small and insignificant stock price impact.     

产品市场竞争、董事会治理与上市公司信息披露质量

以我国627家上市公司为样本,通过实证研究发现董事会规模、内部董事比例、两职分离状况的系数有利于提高企业的信息披露质量;独立董事比例以及董事会会议召开次数对信息披露质量的提高没有影响。在高竞争度的样本内,企业的内部董事比例、董事会会议召开次数与信息披露质量存在一定的显著性,董事会规模、独立董事比例、两职分离状况的系数与信息披露质量均表现出关系不显著的特征,这说明产品市场竞争与董事会治理机制之间为替代关系;而在低产品市场竞争度样本回归中,董事会治理五个特征变量与市场披露的相关系数与全样本基本一致。     

IPO waves, product market competition, and the going public decision: Theory and evidence

We develop a new rationale for initial public offering (IPO) waves based on product market considerations. Two firms, with differing productivity levels, compete in an industry with a significant probability of a positive productivity shock. Going public, though costly, not only allows a firm to raise external capital cheaply, but also enables it to grab market share from its private competitors. We solve for the decision of each firm to go public versus remain private, and the optimal timing of going public. In equilibrium, even firms with sufficient internal capital to fund their new investment may go public, driven by the possibility of their product market competitors going public. IPO waves may arise in equilibrium even in industries which do not experience a productivity shock. Our model predicts that firms going public during an IPO wave will have lower productivity and post-IPO profitability but larger cash holdings than those going public off the wave; it makes similar predictions for firms going public later versus earlier in an IPO wave. We empirically test and find support for these predictions.     

证券市场会计信息披露问题探讨

会计信息披露制度是证券市场制度体系的重要组成部分.规范的会计信息披露,对我国证券市场健康有序地发展至关重要.探究证券市场财务会计信息披露过程当中存在的问题及原因,以期寻求解决的方案和对策.     

资本市场会计信息披露暨治理问题研究--基于上市公司会计信息披露不对称的视角

上市公司会计信息生产和披露质量直接影响了资本市场的稳定健康发展。资本市场会计信息生产和披露存在着一定的供求机理,直接影响了会计信息生产和披露的质量。由于管理主体上的虚化、内控弱化和治理结构上的偏差、会计信息系统的集成和共享性弱以及从业人员素质上的差异,使得上市公司会计信息披露存在着不充分性、非主动性、虚假性和滞后性问题,由此增加了资本市场信息不对称和风险发生的可能。因此,严厉打击资本市场会计信息造假,规范资本市场会计信息披露,需要进一步完善资本市场会计信息披露制度,创新和完善新技术背景下会计准则和会计制度,加强对现有上市公司会计信息生产和会计信息披露标准的制定和使用,提升上市公司会计信息生产和会计信息披露独立审计监督的标准化和规范化水平,加强上市公司会计信息生产和披露监督标准化体系建设。     

The association between employee stock option disclosures and corporate governance: Evidence from an enhanced disclosure regime

This study examines the role of corporate governance in employee stock option (ESO) disclosures following the revision of AASB 1028 Employee Benefits in 2001. We find that, while firms do not fully comply with AASB 1028 ESO disclosures, they voluntarily provide other ESO disclosures. In relation to corporate governance measures that have a role in the financial reporting process, we find two corporate governance measures dominate our results—the quality of auditor and duality of the role of CEO and Chair of the Board of Directors. We show that, in general, external auditor quality has positive incremental association with both mandatory and voluntary ESO disclosures while the dual role of CEO and chairperson of the board is associated with lower levels of mandatory disclosure.     

审计师行业专长、产品市场竞争与财务重述——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

以2007~2012年我国 A 股上市公司为样本,对审计师行业专长与财务重述的关系,以及产品市场竞争程度对两者关系的影响进行实证研究。结果表明：审计师行业专长有助于降低财务重述发生的概率;产品市场竞争则削弱了审计师行业专长对财务重述行为的抑制作用。