Firm‐specific human capital investments as a signal of general value: Revisiting assumptions about human capital and how it is managed

Research summary : Prior scholarship has assumed that firm‐specific and general human capital can be analyzed separately. This article argues that, in some settings, this is not the case because prior firm‐specific human capital investments can be a market signal of an individual's willingness and ability to make such investments in the future. As such, the willingness and ability to make firm‐specific investments is a type of general human capital that links firm‐specific and general human capital in important ways. The article develops theory about these investments, market signals, and value appropriation. Then, the article examines implications for human resource management and several important questions in the field of strategic management, including theories of the firm and microfoundations of competitive advantage. Managerial summary : While managers don't often use the terms firm‐specific and general skills, they certainly recognize that investments employees make in their skill sets are more or less relevant to a specific firm. For instance, investing in specific relationships within a firm or learning a firm's proprietary software would be considered firm‐specific investments. While such skills may seem relevant only to the particular firm in which they were invested, these investments may also send valuable signals to competing firms that such employees are willing and able to make similar investments elsewhere. Hence, managers should be interested in determining if a potential hire has made prior firm‐specific investments to help them know whether that person might be likely to make such investments in his or her future place of employment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal

Research summary : We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms. Managerial summary : A firm's knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Increase in takeover protection and firm knowledge accumulation strategy

Research summary : We argue that the extent to which a firm faces takeover threats affects its knowledge structure. In particular, takeover threats may lead to managers' reluctance to adopt a strategy toward firm‐specific knowledge accumulation because implementing this strategy requires them to acquire specialized skills, which are at risk under takeover threats. Conversely, takeover protection leads to an increase in firm‐specific knowledge. Further, the relationship between takeover protection and firm‐specific knowledge is positively moderated by managerial ownership, which helps align managerial interests with those of shareholders. But the relationship is negatively moderated by managerial tenure, as long‐tenured managers have already committed to their firms. Using a differences‐in‐differences method with Delaware antitakeover rulings in the mid‐1990s as an exogenous shock, we found results supporting these arguments. Managerial summary : We examined how changes in the Delaware antitakeover rulings in mid‐1990s affected the knowledge structure of firms incorporated in Delaware. We reasoned that with a greater level of takeover protection, top managers of those firms incorporated in Delaware felt higher job security, thus providing them stronger incentives to make strategic decisions toward the development of firm‐specific knowledge and to make corresponding human capital investments in specialized skills. Empirically, firms incorporated in Delaware were found to have an increase in the level of firm‐specific knowledge in their knowledge structure after the mid‐1990s. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the role of takeover protection on top manager incentives is particularly salient when the managers are awarded with more company shares and when the managers have shorter organizational tenure. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Employee mobility,spin‐outs,and knowledge spill‐in: How incumbent firms can learn from new ventures

Research summary: We consider conditions in which incumbent firms are particularly poised to benefit from knowledge spilling in from new ventures that employ individuals previously employed by the focal incumbent firm. We distinguish between inventors who leave their incumbent employers to found spin‐outs and those who become non‐founding employees of existing new ventures. Using a sample of new ventures and incumbent firms in the U.S. information technology (IT) sector, we find that incumbents are more likely to benefit from patented knowledge that spills in from their spin‐outs than from new ventures that employ non‐founding inventors formerly employed by the respective incumbent. Any advantage that parent firms have in reaping such knowledge quickly dissipates, however, when these parents have a history of misappropriating the intellectual property of others. Managerial summary: It has long been acknowledged that new ventures can acquire valuable knowledge from their larger and more established counterparts by hiring away their talented employees. We consider the possibility of a reverse flow of knowledge where established firms learn from those new ventures that have poached employees from them. We find that established information technology (IT) firms are more likely to learn and build on the technology of their spin‐outs (i.e., new ventures founded by their former inventors) than from new ventures that simply employ non‐founding inventors formerly employed by the respective IT firm. Any advantage that these IT firms had in reaping technical know‐how from their spin‐outs quickly dissipated, however, when they had a history of misappropriating the intellectual property of others. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An empirical examination of transaction‐ and firm‐level influences on the vertical boundaries of the firm

A large literature has successfully employed transaction cost economic theory to describe how exchange conditions affect the optimal form of organization. However, this approach has historically not accounted for the influence of firm‐specific attributes on the governance decision. This paper develops a model based on insights from transaction cost economics, the resource‐based view, and real options theory to examine how transaction‐level characteristics, firm‐specific capabilities, and product‐market scope influence the governance of production. Empirical evidence derived from analysis of 469 make‐or‐buy decisions involving 117 semiconductor firms indicates that decisions regarding the governance of production activities are strongly influenced by both transaction‐ and firm‐level effects. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategy,human capital investments,business‐domain capabilities,and performance: a study in the global software services industry

Research summary : In knowledge‐based industries, continuous human capital investments are essential for firms to enhance capabilities and sustain competitive advantage. However, such investments present a dilemma for firms, because human resources are mobile. Using detailed project‐level operational, financial, and human capital data from a leading multinational firm in the global IT services industry, this study finds that deliberate investments in improving general human capital can help firms develop superior capabilities and maintain high profits. This paper identifies two types of capabilities essential for success in this industry—technological and business‐domain capabilities—and provides empirical evidence justifying such investments. Theoretical and practical implications of capability‐seeking general human capital investments are discussed. Managerial summary : The primary managerial implication of this research is that capability‐seeking investments in developing general human capital through strategic learning (training and internal certifications) can enhance firm performance. Although investing in general human capital is risky, the firm considered this a strategic necessity in order to thrive in the fast paced IT services industry. By leveraging general technological skills in combination with business‐domain knowledge to address customer's business problems firms can earn and sustain higher profits. Our study also demonstrates how a developing‐country firm responded to strong competitive challenge from global rivals possessing superior capabilities by upgrading the capabilities of its employees through internal development. In doing so the firm was able to narrow the capability gap vis‐à‐vis its foreign peers and expand its business globally. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How dynamics,management, and governance of resource deployments influence firm‐level performance

To help understand how firms develop and maintain dynamic capabilities, we examine the effects of the dynamics, management, and governance of R & D and marketing resource deployments on firm‐level economic performance. In a sample of technology‐based entrepreneurial firms, we find that a history of increased investments in marketing is an enduring source of competitive advantage. We also find that managers' firm‐specific experience positively moderates the relationship between R & D deployment intensity and economic returns. In addition, institutional ownership boosts economic returns from marketing deployments by subjecting these deployments to increased scrutiny and by sending positive signals to the market about the firm. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

Employee Mobility and Interfirm Relationship Transfer: Evidence from the Mobility and Client Attachments of United States Federal Lobbyists, 1998–2014

Research summary : Employee mobility can erode competitive advantage by facilitating interfirm knowledge and relationship transfer. This study investigates the latter and identifies factors that influence the likelihood of its occurrence. Using a novel database that tracks the employment and client attachments of U.S. federal lobbyists, I show that repeated exchange with employees (firms) increases (decreases) the likelihood clients follow employees who switch firms. Structurally, multiplexity reduces the likelihood of client transfer and weakens the effect of employee–client repeated exchange, with the multiplexity effect strongest when team members have specialized expertise. By examining the main and interactive effects of repeated exchange, multiplexity, and specialized human capital, this study extends prior work by demonstrating how individual, organizational, and structural relationship characteristics affect client transfer and retention ex‐post employee mobility . Managerial summary : When do clients follow employees who switch firms? What can firms do to guard against it? These questions are important in service‐based industries where clients may become loyal to individual employees within the firm rather than to the firm itself. This study provides evidence that helps practicing managers: (a) identify which clients are most at risk of defecting if employees exit, and (b) structure relationships in ways that mitigate the likelihood that employee exit results in client loss. Findings suggest that a client is more likely to defect when she has extensive history working with the exiting employee, particularly if the employee was the sole link between the client and firm. Managers, however, can reduce the risk of client loss following employee exit by structuring relationships so that clients work with teams of employees rather than exclusively with an individual and by increasing the degree of specialization within these teams . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mutual commitment to support exchange: relation‐specific IT system as a substitute for managerial hierarchy

This paper examines the effects of information technology (IT) on the governance of vertically related firms. We propose that a highly relation‐specific IT system in inter‐firm transactions plays a key role in the resulting inter‐firm governance as a mutual sunk‐cost commitment, in terms of leading to both less vertical integration (i.e., a change in governance mode as a first‐order effect) and a smaller number of suppliers (i.e., a change within a governance mode as a second‐order effect). As a result, this highly relation‐specific IT system (bilateral investment) can be an alternative governance mode of electronic integration that acts as a substitute for managerial hierarchy and vertical financial ownership. From a strategic management perspective, this paper provides transaction costs and resource‐based explanations on IT systems' impact on the organizational boundary decision and its impact on the likelihood of the firm achieving sustainable competitive advantage. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Formal governance mechanisms, relational governance mechanisms, and transaction-specific investments in supplier-manufacturer relationships

This study addresses the question of how to design governance mechanisms so that local suppliers are encouraged to make transaction-specific investments in foreign manufacturing firms. Suppliers' transaction-specific investments can increase the efficiency of production for foreign manufacturing firms operating in a host country. However, it can be difficult to induce suppliers to make specialized investments, because of the numerous hazards associated with such investments. Basing its conclusions on the results of a survey of Taiwanese firms using Chinese suppliers, this study examines the effectiveness of both formal governance mechanisms (i.e., contractual agreements and financial commitments) and relational governance mechanisms (i.e., calculative and benevolent trust) in inducing suppliers to make specialized investments. We find that both formal governance and relational governance mechanisms affect suppliers' tendencies to make specialized investments. Additionally, we find that calculative trust acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between formal governance mechanisms and transaction-specific investments.     

Why some firms never invest in formal R&D

In this paper we study the frequency of formal R&D investments. We link real options theory to the knowledge‐based view to explain how a firm's knowledge resources influence its frequency of investing in R&D to establish technological options. Specifically, we propose that a firm that lacks internal knowledge resources is more likely to never invest in R&D, a firm that has both internal and external knowledge resources is more likely to sometimes invest in R&D, while a firm that has internal knowledge resources but lacks external knowledge resources is more likely to always invest in R&D. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Direct and interaction effects of top management team and board compositions on R&D investment strategy

This paper examines why firms differ in levels of R&D investment intensity by developing and testing a theory of direct and interaction effects of top management team and board outsider composition on R&D intensity. The theory is tested in a longitudinal sample of technology‐intensive firms that completed an initial public offering. The results indicate that both top management team composition and board composition have direct and additive effects on R&D investment intensity. Also, monitoring by outsider directors does not constitute a universally effective governance mechanism with regard to a firm's R&D investment strategy. Firms opt for lower levels of R&D investment intensity when their outsider‐rich board interacts with a team of managers who have high levels of (1) firm tenure, (2) shared team‐specific experience, or (3) functional heterogeneity. When a firm's competitiveness relies on sustained R&D investments, it is important to note these interaction effects and make adjustments to promote a healthy dialogue between managers and the board. Adjustments could be made to the management team composition (e.g., initiating management turnover to reduce firm tenure) or to the bundle of governance mechanisms (e.g., partially substituting board monitoring with other mechanisms). Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm heterogeneity in complex problem solving: A knowledge‐based look at invention

Research summary : The knowledge‐based view suggests that complex problems are best solved under hierarchical (within‐firm) governance. We examined why firms assumed to be in general alignment with this theory might nonetheless produce solutions of varying usefulness. We theorize that a firm's internal knowledge variety (IKV) is associated with its capacity to support cross‐domain knowledge flows during search, and its ability to identify and explore promising areas on the solution landscape. We further theorize that partner knowledge in familiar (unfamiliar) domains can offset specific weaknesses in searching rugged landscapes, inherent with low or high (moderate) IKV. We find support for these ideas in the context of drug discovery, extending KBV's focus on governance alignment to explain variation in problem‐solving effectiveness within hierarchy. Managerial summary : Firms that concentrate their inventive efforts in a few technological domains, but also dabble in several others, have problem‐solving advantages: they can better support knowledge transfer and recombination across domains. Firms that focus too narrowly or spread their inventive efforts thinly across many domains lose these advantages, but might compensate through alliance partnerships. Our study of drug discovery shows that while firms with very low or high knowledge variety tend to produce weaker solutions than firms in the moderate range, their inventive performance improves when alliance partners afford them access to additional knowledge in familiar domains. We explain how the combination of firm and partner knowledge enables firms to better identify, evaluate, and implement alternative solutions to complex problems. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multimarket Contact and Rivalry over Knowledge‐based Resources

Research summary: Research shows that multimarket contact (MMC ) reduces rivalry involving downstream activities. Yet, studies showing that MMC can increase the threat of imitation suggest a need to better understand how MMC affects upstream rivalry over knowledge‐based resources. In this study, we argue that MMC increases rivalry over knowledge‐based resources since the deterrent threat of retaliation that typically leads to mutual forbearance in downstream activities will not be sufficient to restrain firms from protecting their knowledge from imitation in upstream activities. In support of these arguments we find that MMC increases the likelihood that a firm initiates patent litigation against a rival. This study suggests the relationship between MMC and rivalry may depend on the competitive domain and the type of resources over which firms are competing . Managerial Summary: How does market overlap or MMC affect rivalry between two competitors? Prior studies have largely found that an increase in market overlap decreases rivalry in less knowledge‐intensive context because of the deterrent threat of retaliation. However, in this paper, we argue that an increase in market overlap may not reduce rivalry in more knowledge‐intensive context because of heterogeneity in capabilities to protect knowledge. We find that a firm is more likely to initiate patent litigation against a rival as market overlap increases. Our findings suggest that the incentive to protect value across multiple product markets may surpass the motivation to cooperate with rivals and that managers should have a more nuanced view of how market overlap with competitors affects rivalry in more knowledge‐intensive contexts . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Resource Dedication and New Product Performance: A Resource‐Based View

Corporate investments in new product development (NPD) initiatives are strategically effective activities that are instrumental in contributing to new product performance. Given that a fundamental nature of product development is the ability to exploit new product opportunities, the authors investigate the firm‐level impact that corporate investments in knowledge workers and financial NPD resources have on new product performance. They track the resource dedication and new product financial performance of 41 firms over a seven‐year period. Our results provide evidence that financial investments have a contemporaneous return on investment while knowledge worker investments provide companies with both contemporaneous and carryover returns. When formulating strategy and making NPD resource allocation decisions, managers must remain cognizant of the time‐dependent nature of resource investments, the need for persistent investment, and the resulting performance impact.     

Capabilities,business processes,and competitive advantage: choosing the dependent variable in empirical tests of the resource‐based view

A growing body of empirical literature supports key assertions of the resource‐based view. However, most of this work examines the impact of firm‐specific resources on the overall performance of a firm. In this paper it is argued that, in some circumstances, adopting the effectiveness of business processes as a dependent variable may be more appropriate than adopting overall firm performance as a dependent variable. This idea is tested by examining the determinants of the effectiveness of the customer service business process in a sample of North American insurance companies. Results are consistent with resource‐based expectations, and they show that distinctive advantages observable at the process level are not necessarily reflected in firm level performance. The implications of these findings for research and practice are discussed along with a discussion of the relationship between resources and capabilities, on the one hand, and business processes, activities, and routines, on the other. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Which boundaries? How mobility networks across countries and status groups affect the creative performance of organizations

Research summary : Losing key employees to competitors allows an organization to engage in external boundary‐spanning activities. It may benefit the organization through access to external knowledge, but may also increase the risks of leaking knowledge to competitors. We propose that the destination of departed employees is a crucial contingency: benefits or risks only materialize when employees leave for competitors that differ from the focal organization along significant dimensions, such as country or status group. In the context of the global fashion industry, we find that key employees' moves to foreign competitors may increase (albeit at a diminishing rate) their former employers' creative performance. Furthermore, firms may suffer from losing key employees to higher‐ or same‐status competitors, but may benefit from losing them to lower‐status competitors. Managerial summary : Losing key employees to competitors can provide organizations with access to external knowledge, but increase risks of leaking knowledge to competitors. We find that an organization's access to external knowledge and its risks of knowledge leakage through employee mobility may be affected by whether its employees leave for competitors in a foreign country or in a different status group. In the context of the global fashion industry, we show that key employees' moves to foreign competitors increase (up to a point) their former employers' creative performance. Furthermore, firms may suffer from losing key employees to higher‐ or same‐status competitors, but benefit from losing them to lower‐status competitors. Hence, executives in creative industries and possibly beyond could welcome losing employees to competitors in foreign countries or to lower‐status competitors. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The double‐edged effect of knowledge acquisition: How contracts safeguard pre‐existing resources

Research summary : Acquiring knowledge on a partner's pre‐existing resources plays an important yet ambiguous role in collaborative relationships. We formally model how contracts trade off productive and destructive uses of knowledge in a buyer‐supplier relationship. We show that, when the buyer's pre‐existing resources are vulnerable to the revelation of sensitive knowledge, the supplier overinvests in knowledge acquisition as it expects to use the knowledge as a threat in price negotiations. A non‐renegotiable closed‐price contract prevents such overinvestment and reduces the supplier's ability to expropriate the buyer ex post. Our results extend to the cases of renegotiable closed‐price contracts, repeated interactions between a buyer and a supplier, and the use of nondisclosure policies. We draw theoretical, empirical, and managerial implications from our model. Managerial summary : This study yields new insights regarding the use of contract design in protecting pre‐existing, nonrelationship specific assets in buyer‐supplier arrangements. Anecdotal examples illustrate the “dark side” of these arrangements where opportunistic suppliers exploit knowledge of buyers' pre‐existing resources to seek rent and appropriate value. When a supplier is likely to act harmfully, a closed‐price contract that specifies the price of the supplier's component upfront may reduce the supplier's incentives to overinvest in acquiring and exploiting knowledge of the buyer's pre‐existing resources. As such, when a buyer's pre‐existing resources are highly valuable, and thus more vulnerable to use by the supplier outside of the arrangement, a non‐renegotiable closed‐price contract is more efficient. Additionally, limited disclosure policies and informal agreements based on repeated interactions complement indirect governance via price contracts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reassessing the fundamentals and beyond: Ronald Coase,the transaction cost and resource‐based theories of the firm and the institutional structure of production

In this paper, three points are argued. The first is that Ronald Coase, best known as the forefather of transaction cost theory, foresaw many of the critical questions that proponents of the resource‐based view are concerned with today. The second is that resource‐based theory plays a potentially much more critical role in economic theory and in explaining the institutional structure of production than even many resource‐based scholars recognize. The last point is that a more complete understanding of the organization of economic activity requires a greater sensitivity to the interdependence of production and exchange relations. The arguments presented in this paper highlight important, but relatively ignored, elements in Coase's work that inform strategy research. More importantly, this paper makes the case for a triangular alignment between the triumvirate of governance structure, transaction, and resource attributes and demonstrates how the identity and strategy of a particular firm influences how its resources interact with the transaction and how the firm chooses to govern it. The general argument is then applied to the context of interfirm collaborative relations, where the key focus is broadened from just cost to also include skills/knowledge and the interdependence between cost and skills with respect to firm boundaries, both in terms of choice and nature. Such a broadening of focus enables us to additionally examine the transacting process as a productive endeavor, which underpins the co‐evolution of the competencies of partner firms. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.