Why aren't all Truck Drivers Owner‐Operators? Asset Ownership and the Employment Relation in Interstate for‐hire Trucking

Transaction‐cost and agency theorists have frequently cited trucks as prototypical user‐owned assets, and have consequently predicted a predominance of self‐employed drivers who contract with motor carriers. In fact, owner‐operators accounted for less than one‐third of US trucking activity conducted by large interstate trucking firms in 1991, a proportion that has changed little since deregulation. Given the predictions of organizational economists, why is self‐employment in the interstate trucking industry not the dominant organization form? We propose that transaction costs and agency costs are indeed important in the trucking industry. In the absence of externalities across hauls, contracting between carriers and owner‐operators is preferred for traditional agency reasons. However, when the outcome of one haul imposes externalities on other hauls or on the carrier's reputation, an owner‐operator will not internalize all costs associated with poor outcomes. Given problems of noncontractibility of maintenance effort, carrier ownership of the vehicle is the preferred organizational form in such a case. We also propose that vehicle idiosyncrasy can create thin market conditions that encourage carrier ownership of vehicles. A study of the organization and operations of 354 trucking firms for 1991 provides evidence consistent with these predictions.     

Firm performance and ownership structure: Dynamic network data envelopment analysis approach

This paper applies dynamic network slacks-based data envelopment analysis to measure financial performance based on the interrelationship among investment, financing, and dividend decisions. The empirical results show that financial performance is determined simultaneously by the efficiency of decisions, and sample firms have good performance in investment stage, but need to improve their financing and dividend policies. The proposal financial performance measure explains the multicriteria of decision-making rather than the single financial ratios. Besides, the research contributes a novel on the significant relationship between firm's ownership structure in the form of managers, government and foreign shareholders, and the firm's financial performance.     

Shareholder Heterogeneity and Conflicting Goals: Strategic Investments in the Japanese Electronics Industry

This article investigates the effects of the changing institutional environment on strategic orientations of Japanese electronics firms during the 1990s. We examine the effects of three different types of shareholders on strategic directions of their invested firms. The first one, foreign portfolio investors, characterizes the emerging influence that pressed for change in corporate strategies. The two domestic shareholders, corporate investors and financial institutions, represent the conventional forces for continuity. Between the two domestic forces, though, while corporate investors attempted to maintain status quo, financial institutions have shifted towards market‐oriented behaviour of investment. Specifically, we explore: (1) the influence of each type of shareholder on a firm's diversification strategy and capital commitment; and (2) the moderating effects of firm performance on the relationships between ownership structure and strategic choices. The results suggest that foreign investors prefer the focused product portfolio and conservative capital commitment. They also prefer the reduction of capital investment when the financial performance of their invested firms is poor. Domestic financial institutions are now similarly sensitive to the performance of their invested firms when those firms make strategic investments. By contrast, domestic corporate shareholders remain indifferent to performance, while they aim to maintain relational business ties with invested firms.     

Agency costs in the banking industry: An examination of ownership behavior,leverage and dividend policies

This paper examines agency theory arguments in the banking industry by analyzing the effect of four variables that proxy for agency costs—earnings volatility, managers' portfolio diversification losses, bank size, and standard deviation of bank equity returns—on the three financial policy variables of managerial stock ownership, leverage, and dividend yield. It is one of the first studies that examines the determination of financial policy variables, in light of agency concerns, in the banking industry. The study examines the largest 104 U.S. banks during the period 1985–1989. Evidence suggests that bank size and a measure of the managers' portfolio diversification opportunity set affect the bank's level of managerial stock ownership, leverage and dividends.     

Directors’ prior life experience and corporate donations: Evidence from China

We use a recent dataset of 16,082 firm-year observations from publicly traded Chinese firms to show that directors who have prior foreign study or work experience make more corporate donations, a result that supports the path dependency theory related to the effect of prior experiences on subsequent behaviors. The relationship between a director’s prior life experiences and corporate charitable contributions is robust across different types of ownership and industry. We show that corporate donations enable firms to have better access to bank loans, reducing their financial constraints. In addition, these directors appear to consume fewer perquisites, implying lower agency cost with corporate donations.     

Government Engagement,Environmental Policy,and Environmental Performance: Evidence from the Most Polluting Chinese Listed Firms

This study empirically examines the implementation of environmental policies and how government engagement impacts on a firm's environmental performance based on a sample of Chinese listed firms in the eight most polluting industries over a 10‐year period. The findings of the study demonstrate that government engagement, measured as ownership structure, is positively correlated with environmental performance, measured by environmental capital expenditure, for state‐owned firms, but no significant relation is found for non‐state‐owned firms. In addition, non‐state‐owned firms are more likely to perform better in terms of environmental investment after the 2006 enactment of a new policy explicitly linking environmental issues with political incentives to regional governments. This study also reports that corporate environmental performance impairs firm value for state‐owned firms but has no impact on firm value for non‐state‐owned firms, suggesting that investors negatively respond to environmental investments made by state‐owned firms as a result of government engagement/political pressure. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Corporate Capital Budgeting Decisions and Information Sharing

Firms must overcome agency and information asymmetry problems to make efficient corporate capital budgeting decisions; this is particularly true for firms with multiple units dispersed across geographic locations. Internal communication and coordination may therefore be crucial in reducing information asymmetry and achieving efficient resource allocation. We examine the relationship between corporate capital budgeting decisions and the degree of internal information sharing using a dataset of 342 U.S. firms from 1993 to 2002. Information sharing is measured by the internal linkages observed in firms’ research and development activities worldwide. The efficiency of a firm's capital budgeting decisions is measured by the deviation of the firm's estimated marginal q from the theoretical tax‐adjusted benchmark. We observe a significant relationship between value‐enhancing capital budgeting decisions and stronger internal linkages. Specifically, corporate overinvestment is significantly reduced with better information sharing across units. All results are robust to firm‐ and industry‐level controls.     

Ownership Types and Strategic Groups in an Emerging Economy*

ABSTRACT Existing strategic group studies have rarely examined ownership type as a variable to classify firms in an industry. Using Chinese firms of different ownership types, we suggest that ownership type can be a parsimonious and important variable that managers use to cognitively classify firms into different strategic groups. While ownership itself is an objective variable, we contend that different ownership types lead to different managerial outlook and mentality due to a number of macro and micro foundations giving rise to various managerial cognitions. Employing the Miles and Snow typology, we find that state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately‐owned enterprises (POEs) tend to adopt defender and prospector strategies, respectively, while collectively‐owned enterprises (COEs) and foreign‐invested enterprises (FIEs) exhibit an analyser orientation that falls between defenders and prospectors on the strategy continuum. Three statistical tests suggest that ownership types can be used to successfully predict strategic group memberships in China's emerging economy.     

Private Equity Investments and Disclosure Policy

In the current study, we dynamically analyze unlisted firms' voluntary disclosure decisions around private equity (PE) participation. First, we disentangle the role of disclosure in attracting PE investments. In addition, we examine the extent to which a firm's disclosure policy is affected by the changing corporate setting and intensified corporate governance after having received PE. We find no evidence that firms would employ increased disclosure to signal their quality in the years preceding the PE financing. However, we document a significant switch to increased financial disclosure from the PE investment year onwards, consistent with the hypothesis that PE investor presence positively affects portfolio firms' disclosure decisions. Further, we show that the proportional PE ownership stake is positively related to increased disclosure, but only at very high ownership levels. We explain these results in that both internal and external information demands call for higher public disclosure in PE firms. We conclude that the changing information environment resulting from a PE investment stimulates increased public financial disclosure. Our results contribute to illustrate how an indisputable change in governance resulting from a PE investment affects inter-temporal corporate disclosure decisions in unlisted firms.     

The effects of corporate antitakeover provisions on long-term investment: empirical evidence

This paper's empirical results indicate that the average effect of antitakeover provisions on subsequent long‒term investment is negative. The interpretation of these results depends on whether one thinks that there was too much, too little, or just the right amount of long‒term investment prior to the antitakeover provision adoption. We use agency theory to devise more refined empirical tests of the effects of antitakeover provision adoption by managers in firms with different incentive and monitoring structures. Governance variables (e.g. percentage of outsiders on corporate boards, and separate CEO/chairperson positions) have an insignificant impact on subsequent long‒term investment behavior. However, consistent with agency theory predictions, managers in firms with better economic incentives (higher insider ownership) tend to cut subsequent long‒term investment less than managers in firms with less incentive alignment. Furthermore, managers in firms with greater external monitoring (due to higher institutional ownership) also tend to cut subsequent long‒term investment less than managers in firms with less external monitoring. Thus, the decrease in subsequent long‒term investment is significantly less for firms where the managers have greater incentives to act in shareholders' interests. Finally, there are interesting effects of the control variables. First, high book equity/market equity firms cut total long‒term investment more. Second, firms that were takeover targets or rumored to be takeover targets cut long‒term investment more. These results suggest that inefficient firms cut long‒term investment more when an antitakeover provision is adopted. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The financial investment decision of non-financial firms in China

This paper constructs a portfolio model to analyze the determinants of the financial investment decision of non-financial firms in China. Unlike the literature assuming that financial investments are riskless, our model allows risks in both fixed and financial investments. We show that this extension provides an analytically similar but economically different model from the literature. In particular, it is relative risk and risk-adjusted return gap, not pure risk and simple return gap that enter into firms’ financial investment decision model. Using firm-level panel data of 1902 firms listed in Chinese stock market over the period from 2006 to 2016 with semi-annual frequency, we find that the ratio of fixed investment risk over total risk dominates financial investment decisions of non-financial firms. However, rates of risk-adjusted return gap between financial and fixed investments play no role in Chinese firms’ financial investment decisions, which is in stark contrast to the results using a model assuming riskless financial investments. The baseline findings are robust to alternative measures of financialization and investment risk and different firm sizes, ownership structures and time periods.     

Agency,corporate control and accounting methods–the lifo-fifo choice

The study examines the effect of the firm's ownership structure on its management's choice of LIFO or FIFO inventory valuation methods. Managers of widely held firms are found to select the accounting method that furthers their own interests, thus causing the firms' owners to bear agency costs that appear to be substantial.     

Board gender diversity and corporate environmental performance: The moderating role of family and dual‐class majority ownership structures

While prior work has investigated the impact of (a) ownership structure and (b) board gender diversity separately on corporate environmental performance, researchers have not studied the potentially important relationship between ownership control and female board diversity in influencing corporate environmental performance jointly. We do so in the context of majority ownership in family‐controlled and dual‐class firms whose motives and influence are theoretically different from that of the firm's minority shareholders. Drawing on resource dependency, socioemotional wealth theory, and secondary agency theory, we hypothesize that majority family owners and dual‐class owners likely choose women directors to help advance their personal preferences for environmental corporate social responsibility. Our empirical tests utilizing 2,755 U.S. firm years over the 2010–2015 show that, as hypothesized, these two majority ownership types interact with board gender diversity to positively influence corporate environmental performance.     

The Seller's Perspective on Determinants of Acquisition Likelihood: Insights from China's Beer Industry

This study investigates acquisition antecedents during China's transition from a planned to a market‐based economic system. Because of contextual realities such as a lack of freely tradable targets for buyers, the seller's willingness to sell is critical for acquisition occurrence in transition economies. We therefore take the seller's perspective and examine factors underlying firms' willingness to sell. We posit that selling is a decision based on the evaluation of a firm's prospects determined by its embeddedness within the planned system, organizational changes it undertook during the transition, and its ability to adjust its strategy according to the evolving strengths of the planning and marketing institutions. Data from the Chinese beer industry from 1995 to 2004 show that acquisition likelihood is high for firms founded as SOEs, low for firms having attracted more private investment or undertaken multiple changes, and has a U‐shaped relationship with firms' relative investment in marketing resources.     

Does the use of stock incentives influence the payout policy of financial institutions?

We investigate the link between payouts and stock incentives among financial institutions. We hypothesize that the varying degree of regulation across depositories, insurers, and securities firms is likely to influence the observed relation to the extent that regulation substitutes for other monitoring mechanisms. We find that managerial stock ownership is inversely related to dividend payouts across the institutions, consistent with the notion that managerial stock ownership is an effective method of reducing agency problems. We do not find evidence that the relationship occurs because of regulation since all institutions, regardless of the degree of regulation, exhibit the same inverse relationship between dividend payouts and management stock ownership. Our results suggest that, among financial institutions, regulation complements managerial stock ownership in minimizing agency problems.     

Strategic human resource management,firm performance,and employee relations climate in China

We examined strategic human resource management (SHRM) and human resource practices in the People's Republic of China to assess the impact of these practices on firm performance and the employee relations climate. We also tested whether firm ownership moderates the above relationships. Empirical results from a sample of Chinese firms from various industries and regions showed that the levels of adoption of SHRM and HR practices were lower in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) than in foreign‐invested enterprises (FIEs) and privately owned enterprises (POEs). Both SHRM and HR practices were found to have direct and positive effects on financial performance, operational performance, and the employee relations climate. However, the moderating effect of ownership type was significant for financial performance only. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Ownership structure,information asymmetry and growth of the firm: Implications from nonfinancial firms listed in S&P500

This paper investigates the association between growth of the firm and ownership structure under conditions of information asymmetry. The objective is to show the effects of information asymmetry (favorable vs. adverse selection) on the choice of the ownership structure that helps firms grow. Our sample includes nonfinancial firms listed in the S&P500 over the period 2000 to 2016. The dependent variable is growth of the firm measured by growth in sales. The independent variables are proxies for changes in ownership structure, individual investors, investment managers, and brokerage firms. Observations are grouped according to level of information asymmetry (high or low) using three proxies for information asymmetry: beta of return on equity (ROE), probability of default of ROE, and q ratio. The results conclude that (a) changes in ownership structure affect growth of the firm positively and (b) the effect of ownership structure is more significant and consistent at low level of information asymmetry. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, it extends the arguments of corporate governance by showing the impact of ownership structure on growth of the firm. Second, the paper offers robust evidence that growth of the firm is associated with low level of information asymmetry. Third, the paper shows that fundamental financial information can help lessen the level of information asymmetry and thus help firms grow.     

Employee stock ownership and financial performance in European countries: The moderating effects of uncertainty avoidance and social trust

This study investigates how the effect of employee stock ownership on financial performance may hinge on the diverse cultural and societal contexts of European countries. Based on agency and national culture theories, we hypothesize that the positive relationship between employee stock ownership and return on assets (ROA) is stronger in those nations with lower uncertainty avoidance and higher social trust. Using a multisource, time‐lagged, large‐scale dataset of 1,741 firms from 21 countries in Europe, our multilevel, random coefficient modeling analysis found evidence for these hypotheses, suggesting that uncertainty avoidance and social trust serve as important contextual cues in predicting the linkage between employee stock ownership and financial performance. Our supplemental analysis with distinction between the managerial and nonmanagerial employee stock ownership further indicates managerial employee stock ownership has a direct positive effect on ROA. Although nonmanagerial employee stock ownership had a nonsignificant association with ROA, the relationship was positive and significant when uncertainty avoidance was low and social trust was high. This research contributes to the existing literature by illuminating some of the contextual influences altering the effectiveness of employee stock ownership. Our findings also offer practical suggestions for effectively using employee stock ownership.     

Financial Constraints on German Firms after the Crisis: Evidence from Threshold Panel Estimation

This article studies the existence and magnitude of financial investment constraints in Germany between 2006 and 2012 with a special emphasis on small and medium‐sized firms. The core contention is that the sensitivity of the investment rate to the cash flow rate is a function of a firm's financial position contributing to its access to external finance. The application of a nonlinear panel threshold model reveals that the marginal effect of the cash flow rate on the investment rate is almost twice as strong for ‘high debt’ firms compared to ‘low debt’ firms. This result holds for six out of seven balance sheet threshold variables. For a single specification, the results reveal a non‐monotonic relationship between the cash flow rate and investment rate. Firm size, however, does not explain differences in the cash‐flow‐investment nexus.     

The determinants of board composition: An agency theory perspective

This study examines the interrelation between board composition and variables that capture various agency and financial dimensions of the firm. The agency literature suggests that outside directors on the board provide important monitoring functions in an attempt to resolve, or at least mitigate, agency conflicts between management and shareholders. The agency literature indicates that other mechanisms such as managerial equity ownership, dividend payments, and debt leverage also serve as important devices in reducing agency conflicts in firms. This study argues and documents that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of external members on the board and managerial stock ownership, dividend payout, and debt leverage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individual firms choose an optimal board composition depending upon alternative mechanisms employed by the firm to control agency conflicts. Board composition is also found to be systematically related to a number of other variables including institutional holdings, growth, volatility, and CEO tenure.