FARMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO INVEST IN NEW COOPERATIVE INSTRUMENTS: A CHOICE EXPERIMENT

Globalization of agricultural markets put pressures on producer cooperatives to invest in expansion and growth to safeguard their competitiveness. Availability of capital is limited if farmers do not have incentives to increase their capital contribution. Cooperative literature recognizes the residual rights, transferability, and the appreciation potential of the investment as the potential solutions for the problems that may impede cooperative investments. The objective of this study is to understand farmer preferences regarding investment attributes and the potential for attracting investment capital from members and non‐members. We employ a choice experiment method to test new cooperative investment instruments. The data consist of a questionnaire conducted with 406 Finnish dairy farmers. Random parameter latent class logit model is used in the estimation of the data. The results indicate that most of the respondents regard the new investment instruments positively. However, farmers prefer restricting ownership rights to members. Incentives for members to participate in financing cooperative growth could be designed with capital‐based residual rights, mechanisms for transferability and for the appreciation of firm value. Estimation that considered choice difficulty improved model fit, which highlights the need to address respondent burden also in future studies of hypothetical investments in order to produce unbiased estimates.     

A Risk‐Dominant Allocation: Maximizing Coalition Stability

This paper presents a rule to allocate a coalition’s worth for superadditive games with positive externalities. The allocation rule awards each member their outside payoff, plus an equal share of the surplus. The resulting allocation maximizes coalition stability. Stable coalitions are Strong Nash equilibria since no subset of members has an incentive to leave. Similarly, no subset of non‐members has an incentive to join a stable coalition if the game is concave in this region. The allocation is risk‐dominant. All stable coalitions are robust to the maximum probability of 50% that players’ deviate from their individual best‐responses. The paper compares the allocation to the Shapley value and the Nash bargaining solution, and illustrates why these traditional rules result in small coalitions when applied to issues such as international environmental agreements.     

Information Revelation and Market Incompleteness

This paper introduces a theory of market incompleteness based on the information transmission role of prices and its adverse impact on the provision of insurance in financial markets. We analyse a simple security design model in which the number and payoff of securities are endogenous. Agents have rational expectations and differ in information, endowments, and attitudes toward risk. When markets are incomplete, equilibrium prices are typically partially revealing, while full relevation is attained with complete markets. The optimality of complete or incomplete markets depends on whether the adverse selection effect (the unwillingness of agents to trade risks when they are informationally disadvantaged) is stronger or weaker than the Hirshleifer effect (the impossibility of trading risks that have already been resolved), as new securities are issued and prices reveal more information. When the Hirshleifer effect dominates, an incomplete set of securities is preferred by all agents, and generates a higher volume of trade.     

Subprime borrowers,securitization and the transmission of business cycles

A growing literature (e.g., Jaffee et al. 2009, Acharya and Schnabl 2009) argues that securitization improves financial stability if the securitized assets are held by capital market participants, rather than financial intermediaries. I construct a quantitative macroeconomic model with a novel specification for mortgage‐backed securities (MBS) to evaluate this claim. My findings suggest that the existence of the securitization market stabilizes the economy under the condition that financial intermediaries do not engage in the acquisition of securitized assets. In the presence of large negative housing preference shocks, the drop in output in the first year after the shock is halved if subprime MBS are purchased by non‐financial agents rather than held by banks.     

A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS PAYOFF MOTIVES AND ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY*

A model of endogenous payoff motives and endogenous order of moves is analysed in a mixed duopoly. We find that, when a non‐negative price constraint is imposed on public and private firms' quantity choice, both firms always choose to be relative‐payoff‐maximisers, and both simultaneous move and sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium. In contrast, when non‐negative absolute profit constraint is imposed, public and private firms always choose to be absolute‐payoff‐maximisers, and only sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium.     

What Motivates Members to Participate in Co‐operative and Mutual Businesses?

Abstract *** : This article reports the findings of a project entitled ‘The participation of members in mutual businesses’. A previous project developed a theoretical model of what makes people participate, focusing on the participation of public service users in council housing and social care services. The current project builds on this work, applying the ‘mutual incentives model’ to a population sample of area committee members and a random sample of non‐participant members of a very large UK consumer co‐operative, the Co‐operative Group. Two arguments are presented as to why such research is needed. First, member participation in co‐operative and mutual businesses is becoming an important issue both for this sector and more generally for public policy. Second, a comparison between a public services setting and a co‐operative setting enables us to extend and further test the theoretical model. Two main features of the model are outlined: a ‘mutual incentives theory’ that goes beyond other models to combine individualistic and collectivistic motivations, and the ‘participation chain’, a synthesis of existing knowledge that joins motivations to three ‘links’ that we call ‘resources’, ‘mobilization’ and ‘dynamics’. The article then summarizes the project methodology, and reports the main findings. As in the public services project, on the ‘demand’ side, collectivistic incentives prove to be dominant over individualistic, but with some individual ‘internal’ benefits also being important. On the ‘supply’ side, skills derived from previous experience were important, as were a positive evaluation of opportunities to participate, and recruitment through existing networks. We then compare the findings to those from the public service users and from a regional co‐operative society; Oxford, Swindon and Gloucester Co‐op. Collective motivations are dominant in all three datasets, but are shown to vary in interesting ways that have important implications for member participation strategies.     

Preferential Trade and Welfare with Differentiated Products

We consider analytically and numerically the welfare tradeoffs inherent in a preferential trade area (PTA) with products differentiated by region of origin. For a small open economy in such a setting, welfare gains are associated with higher trade volumes within the PTA. However, welfare losses are induced by declining tariff revenues on trade with non‐member countries. We show that both effects are concave, while one is a non‐monotonic and the other a potentially non‐monotonic function of pre‐PTA partner trade shares. Therefore, the relationship between initial partner import shares and direct static welfare impacts of a PTA are theoretically ambiguous. This finding contrasts with conventional results in the homogeneous‐goods case, whereby the smaller is the pre‐agreement trade volume with a potential partner the more beneficial is a PTA.     

DOES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS AFFECT FIRM PERFORMANCE OF CONSUMER CO‐OPERATIVES? THE CASE OF ICOOP KOREA

Consumer co‐operatives in Korea have been growing rapidly since they launched their own shops. If co‐operatives would be too much oriented to enlargement or economic growth, they might easily pay no attention to members’ participation which is one of the priorities in co‐operatives. It could lead to losing the value of co‐operatives. So it is important to adjust the balance between members’ participation and economic growth. This paper focuses on the role of board of directors in doing that. It aims to examine how effectiveness of the board influences members’ participation and the participation has effect on performance of co‐operatives in the case of iCOOP Korea. The variables such as communication with members and usage of management skills and knowledge are employed as measures of the effectiveness of the board in decision‐making process. The data are collected by survey the respondents of which are 222 directors of 30 primary co‐operatives. It is analyzed by Structural Equation Model. The findings of the research are as follows. Firstly, communication of the board with members increases the members’ democratic participation, and the increased participation contributes to improving the financial performance. Secondly, management skills and knowledge of the board does not have significant relations with the level of members’ participation, even though members’ economic participation has significantly positive relation with the financial performance. The findings imply that members’ voluntary participation will be increased when boards of co‐operatives try to reflect members’ needs in the decision making processes, and it can help the co‐operatives improve their financial performance. It suggests a clue for the trade‐off between the value of co‐operatives and growth of business which many co‐operatives are trying to resolve.     

Nash equilibrium and party polarization in an electoral model with mixed motivations

We study the existence problem of Nash equilibrium as well as the patterns of equilibrium policy outcomes in an electoral competition model with mixed motivations. Each party maximizes a sum of party members’ expected utility and office rent. The inclusion of office rent renders the payoff of each party discontinuous. This makes it difficult to apply usually fixed point arguments to prove the existence of Nash equilibria. By using a recently developed concept, multiple restrictional security (MR‐security) we provide conditions under which a pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium exists within fairly general settings, and further the analysis by presenting conditions under which various patterns of policy choices, including polarization, arise in equilibrium.     

An Analysis of FEE-HELP in the Vocational Education and Training Sector

The public vocational education and training (VET) system is one of the few areas in Australia's tertiary education system where students are required to pay upfront fees without access to loan assistance. These arrangements may lead to sub‐optimal educational outcomes to the extent that prospective students reject a VET education on the basis of short‐term financial constraints. In this paper we analyse some of the important issues related to the adoption of FEE‐HELP (a 2005 federal government financial instrument based on the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS)). It is argued that income contingent loans of this kind are associated with the advantages of both default‐protection and consumption smoothing. Using data from the first three waves of the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, we examine various empirical issues associated with the adoption of FEE‐HELP in VET, including the extent of private salary returns to VET qualifications. As well, we explore issues related to the public subsidies inherent in the adoption of FEE‐HELP in VET, and illustrate the time periods involved in loan repayments for various assumptions concerning the size of the charge and the future income of VET graduates. Administrative issues are considered, as are the implications for the Commonwealth government with respect to potential subsidies associated with the design parameters. In the 2007–08 Federal Budget, the former government announced a small extension of the FEE‐HELP system into Australian VET, a reform consistent with improved tertiary funding arrangements.     

Disability and Economy: A Game Theoretic Approach

This paper takes a game theoretic approach to disability‐related issues by constructing a model that studies the case of hereditary deafness on Martha's Vineyard Island, USA from the seventeenth century to the early years of twentieth, where the island community adjusted itself to the hereditary deafness so that it was not treated as a disability. The model of the present paper has two stages. First of all, there are two types of continua of agents, the deaf and the non‐deaf. In the first stage, the non‐deaf agents become either bilinguals or monolinguals. In the second stage, agents are classified into deaf people, bilinguals and monolinguals. They are then randomly matched to form a trio to play a three‐person bargaining game with infinite horizon, random proposers and language constraints. Two bargaining games are considered. The first one is a majority bargaining game where only two out of three can agree to implement a bargaining outcome. The second one is a unanimity bargaining game where all three agents are required to reach an agreement. The majority game exhibits strategic complementarity, while the unanimity game exhibits strategic substitutability. This paper also takes an inductive approach to examine how prejudice against people with disability may emerge.     

Risk aversion,cooperative membership,and path dependences of smallholder farmers in Ethiopia

Smallholder farmers in Sub‐Saharan Africa often mitigate production risks through cooperative membership: institutionalized arrangements where they pool resources and collectively manage production and marketing chains. Cooperative membership has a significant advantage: it cushions detrimental effects of external forces, placing a premium on a risk‐seeking attitude (experimenting and innovating), which can yield greater accumulation. However, cooperatives are self‐selective institutions: relatively better‐endowed farmers, who are usually less risk‐avoidant than poorer ones (a consequence of their broader material bases), tend to be overrepresented. These two realities complicate the causal assessment of the relationships between risk attitudes, farmers’ socioeconomic status, and cooperative membership that is essential to comprehend the role of cooperatives in local capital accumulation. To help resolve this thorny analytical problem, an experimental study was carried out in eastern Ethiopia—a risky production environment where cooperatives feature prominently and relatively affluent farmers exist alongside poorer ones. It unveils the working of specific path dependences: poorer cooperative members are less risk seeking than nonmembers, but at an interval much less than that observed for affluent farmers. For development policies, this suggests that a greater payoff can be expected from investing in farmers’ material bases than from further improving cooperative membership.     

Lotteries vs. All‐Pay Auctions in Fair and Biased Contests

The form of contests for a single fixed prize can be determined by a designer who maximizes the contestants' efforts. This article establishes that, under common knowledge of the two asymmetric contestants' prize valuations, a fair Tullock‐type endogenously determined lottery is always superior to an all‐pay‐auction; it yields larger expected efforts (revenues) for the contest designer. If the contest can be unfair (structural discrimination is allowed), then the designer's payoff under the optimal lottery is equal to his expected payoff under the optimal all‐pay auction.     

契约不完全一定导致投资无效率吗?——一个带有不对称信息的敲竹杠模型

经典的不完全契约理论认为,契约不完全会导致专用性人力资本投资的无效率。但是这难以解释现实中大量存在的雇员进行有效率投资的现象。通过在一个经典的敲竹杠模型中引入重复博弈和关于投资者能力的不对称信息,本文证明:契约不完全一定会导致敲竹杠,但是敲竹杠未必妨碍专用性人力资本投资效率。本文刻画了三类完美贝叶斯均衡(PBE):好的声誉使高能者在第一期做出社会最优的专用性人力资本投资,并且使低能者退出市场;中性的声誉使高能者和低能者都在第一期做出社会最优的专用性人力资本投资;而坏的声誉使高能者和低能者都退出市场。本文还表明,在动态环境下产权仍然是重要的。     

服务型商业模式中价值主张创新对价值共创的影响机理

服务型商业模式是以服务为主导逻辑的经济环境下企业商业模式的创新。以价值主张画布为载体,探讨服务型商业模式对价值共创的影响机理。运用扎根案例研究方法,基于“价值共创主体（价值主张）→价值共创客体（价值创造）→价值共创行为（价值传递）→价值共创情境（价值获取）”的价值共创循环逻辑,识别出价值主张的共振性、场景性、精准性、互惠性4个属性特征,验证了其对企业与顾客的价值主张、产品市场、财务绩效3个方面的匹配。同时,建立起关系框架,希望为中国情境下传统企业转型升级提供借鉴。研究表明,服务型商业模式通过提供情感型价值主张实现企业商业模式创新,进而正向影响价值共创。     

Occupational Attainment and Immigrant Economic Progress in Australia*

Using data from the 2001 Australian Census of Population and Housing, on adult men in full‐time employment, this paper augments a conventional human capital earnings function with information on occupations. It also estimates models of occupational attainment. The results from both the earnings function and model of occupational attainment indicate that the limited international transferability of human capital skills results in immigrants entering into relatively low status occupations when they first enter the Australian labour market. Comparison with similar research for the USA suggests that the different immigrant selection regimes (primarily family reunion in the USA, skill‐based immigration in Australia) do not impact on the negative association between current occupational status and pre‐immigration labour market experience.     

Truth,Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games*

We have conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and institutional choice on truth‐telling and trust in sender–receiver games. We find that in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction predominantly after having trusted lies. Individuals who sanction are responsible for truth‐telling beyond standard equilibrium predictions, and they are more likely to choose the sanctioning institution. Sanctioning and non‐sanctioning institutions coexist if their choice is endogenous, and the former shows a higher level of truth‐telling but lower material payoffs. Our experimental findings are consistent with logit agent quantal response equilibrium with two distinct groups of individuals: one consisting of subjects who experience non‐monetary lying costs as senders and non‐monetary costs when being lied to as receivers, and the other consisting of payoff maximizers.     

Mena Stock Markets Integration: Pre and Post Global Financial Crisis

This paper examines the short‐ and long‐run linkages in pre and post global financial crisis among Middle East and North Africa (MENA) stock markets, between MENA and Chinese stock markets and also between MENA and developed (United States and United Kingdom) stock markets. Results indicate that both long‐run co‐integration relationships and short‐run causal linkages among MENA stock markets increased in post‐crisis than that in pre‐crisis sub‐period. The degree of integration between MENA and Chinese stock markets increased in post‐crisis than pre‐crisis. We also find that the degree of integration between MENA and developed (United States and United Kingdom) stock markets increased in post‐crisis than that in pre‐crisis. The presence of increased linkages among MENA markets, and between MENA and Chinese stock markets and also between MENA and developed (United States and United Kingdom) markets has important implications for portfolio investors and policy makers.     

Individual Characteristics,Behavioral Biases,and Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from a Survey in Japan

Import liberalization is one of the most actively debated issues in trade policy. This paper examines how trade policy preferences are related to individual characteristics based on a survey in Japan. Among 10,000 surveyed individuals, people working in non‐agricultural sectors, those working in managerial occupations, or those above retirement age tend to favor freer imports. This paper also finds that people who are influenced by the status quo bias are likely to oppose import liberalization even after controlling for each individual's various characteristics, suggesting that neither income compensation nor insurance schemes are sufficient for expanding support for free trade.     

Malnutrition and Child Labor

In pre‐industrial and developing economies, it is common to find (i) entire families, including children, working together in family farms or urban factories; and (ii) a positive link between a person's consumption and her productivity. This paper argues that there is a natural reason for the concurrence of (i) and (ii). As a rule, households are characterized by intra‐household altruism: an increase in the income of an individual increases the consumption of all household members. Hence, when an employer pays an adult worker a high wage to enhance her productivity, part of it ends up augmenting her children's consumption and productivity. One way for the employer to prevent this leakage and internalize the externality is to employ the children as well. This explains the higher incidence of family labor in poor societies where (ii) is more likely to be true.