产权管制放松与中国经济转轨绩效

基于信息成本约束的政府放松对分散决策单位的产权管制会带来资源配置的激励机制和行为角色的重大变化。由于市场分散性决策的信息成本过高成为政府资源权利配置的约束条件,所以政府应逐渐放松对配置资源权利管制的范围,并让位于分散决策单位进行产权运用和调配。产权管制放松对经济转轨绩效的影响显著,是提高中国经济绩效的关键因素。     

Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information

We show that in public good problems under asymmetric information, the success of voluntary bargaining is closely related to the structure of property rights. We characterize property rights structures and mediated bargaining procedures that either lead to an efficient voluntary resolution to public good problems, or achieve the efficient outcome but slightly coerce the agents into participation. In this respect, we identify "efficient" property rights structures.     

Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments Within an Incomplete Contract Framework

This paper compares three different legal means—no environmental policy (the pollutee pays), full liability (the polluter pays), and pollution standards—to reduce and regulate neighborhood externalities within an incomplete contract framework. It turns out that the relative efficiency of these instruments depends, in general, on details. However, moderate standards are preferable to no environmental policy and tight (but not too tight) standards dominate liability. This provides under the given assumptions (neighborhood externalities, incomplete contracts) a justification for “sensible” standards for three reasons. First, unilateral allocations of property rights are biased that distort allocations even if ex post bargaining takes place. Second, a standard is superior in the following sense: if it is set equal to the outcome under any allocation of rights, it will be improved in the process of ex post bargaining. Third, unilateral property rights encourage strategic ex ante investments up to the point that committing to no bargaining would be beneficial (if possible).     

Private takings

This paper examines the implications associated with a recent Supreme Court ruling, Kelo v. City of New London (2005). Kelo can be interpreted as supporting eminent domain as a means of transferring property rights from one set of private agents—landowners—to another private agent—a developer. Under voluntary exchange, where the developer sequentially acquires property rights from landowners via bargaining, a holdout problem arises. Eminent domain gives all of the bargaining power to the developer and, as a result, eliminates the holdout problem. This is the benefit of Kelo. However, landowners lose all their bargaining power and, as a result, their property investments become more inefficient. This is the cost of Kelo. A policy of eminent domain increases social welfare compared to voluntary sequential exchange only when the holdout problem is severe, and this occurs only if the developer has very little bargaining power. We propose an alternative government policy that eliminates the holdout problem but does not affect the bargaining power of the various parties. This alternative policy strictly dominates a policy of eminent domain, which implies that eminent domain is an inefficient way to transfer property rights between private agents.     

Insecurity of property rights and social matching in the tenancy market

This paper shows that insecurity of property rights over agricultural land can have large efficiency and equity costs because of the way it affects matching in the tenancy market. A principal-agent framework is used to model the landlord's decision to rent when he takes into account the risk of losing the land to the tenant and when contract enforcement is decreasing in social distance with the tenant. These effects are quantified for the case of local land rental markets in the Dominican Republic. Results show that insecure property rights lead to matching in the tenancy market along socio-economic lines, severely limiting the size of the rental market and the choice of tenants for landlords, both with efficiency costs. Social segmentation reduces access to land for the rural poor, with high equity costs. Simulations suggest that improving tenure security would increase rental transactions by 21% and the area rented to the poor by 63%. Increased property rights security is hence beneficial not only to asset owners, but also to those with whom they might interact in the market.     

Government Partisanship and Property Rights: Cross‐Country Firm‐Level Evidence

Property rights are essential to economic development but vary with the political environment. We develop and test the claim that government partisanship influences the security of business firms' property rights: the perceived security of property rights increases when right‐wing parties take power and declines with the election of left‐leaning parties. Unlike research that uses country‐level aggregates to draw inferences about the determinants of secure property rights, we analyze survey responses of over 7,400 firm owners from 73 countries using a novel difference‐in‐differences approach. We find that the political partisanship of the government in power strongly affects individual perceptions of property rights: firm owners are more likely to perceive that their property rights are secure under right‐leaning governments. Our results are robust to firm‐ and country‐level economic performance as well as controls for political institutions that might induce more stability to property rights, such as the number of checks and balances (veto players) in a system. Overall, our results indicate that business owners' beliefs about the security of property rights are highly responsive to changes in government partisanship.     

产权、代理成本和代理效率

本文选择政府管制较少、竞争较为充分的电子电器行业作为研究对象,考察了产权制度与代理成本和代理效率的关系,得到以下结论:(1)在代理成本上,国有产权企业普遍高于混和产权企业,混和产权企业高于个人产权企业;在代理成本差异上,混和产权企业与个人产权企业的差异小于与国有产权企业的差异。(2)长期投资率和职工人数与代理成本呈显著正相关关系,而长期投资率、财务杠杆比率、职工人数等与代理效率呈显著负相关关系。(3)企业规模越大,不同产权的代理成本差异越小;反之代理成本差异越大。(4)随着市场竞争程度的提高,各类产权企业的代理成本都呈现下降趋势,其代理效率呈现提高趋势。我们研究的启示是国有企业改革的突破口应考虑如何降低其代理成本,解决的措施之一是产权改革,尤其是产权多元化的改革,其次是完善对投资和负债及冗员的监督和控制机制,以促进代理成本的降低和代理效率的提高。     

产权保护、二元准则与适应性效率

会计在准确界定产权和有效保护产权的过程中处于最基础、最重要和最具操作性的地位。为了获取准则变迁收益,降低准则执行成本,提高准则的适应性效率,中国基于"分立法"理念建立了适用于大中型企业的《企业会计准则》和小企业的《小企业会计准则》,形成了"二元"结构会计准则体系。"二元"结构准则之间存在的主要差异决定了各自的适应性效率。本文首次从产权保护视角将《企业会计准则》和《小企业会计准则》结合起来进行考察,提出了准则的适应性效率问题,运用二元结构理念分析了准则的适应性效率。     

Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights

The consumption of an indivisible good causes identity-dependent externalities to non-consumers. We analyse resale markets where the current owner designs the trading procedure, but cannot commit to future actions. We ask the following questions: (1) Does the identity of the initial owner matter for the determination of the final consumer? (2) Is the outcome always efficient? The major conclusion of our paper is that the irrelevance of the initial structure of property rights arises in resale processes even if there are transaction costs that hinder efficiency. This result complements the Coasian view where the irrelevance of the assignment of property rights is a consequence of efficiency.     

Rapacious Resource Depletion,Excessive Investment and Insecure Property Rights: A Puzzle

For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick rule. The theory suggests that power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consumption and welfare, especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights. Also, adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices over-estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving. Since our theory suggests that genuine saving is zero while empirically they are negative in resource-rich, fractionalized countries, we suggest ways of resolving this puzzle.     

Willingness to Pay for Forest Property Rights and the Value of Increased Property Rights Security

This paper studies the willingness to pay (WTP) for forest property rights in Viet Nam. We do so by asking respondents to estimate the value of two different forest property rights regimes where only the level of property security differs and all other forest plot characteristics are constant. We use this information to identify the value of the property rights security. Our results reveal that a significant number of individuals are willing to pay for an additional area of forestland but that the amount offered appears to be inadequate to compensate sellers, as very few land market transactions actually take place. The results further indicate that income relates positively to WTP, irrespective of forest property regime. Wealth, age, and ethnicity also have an impact on the amount households are willing to pay. As expected, there was a significant mark-up on the more secure right. Econometric estimates of the difference between the WTP for secure and insecure property rights show that a higher level of female education, and household age decrease the difference between the two WTP measures while the difference tends to increase as income improves. This has important policy implications, as it indicates that households tend to evaluate the property rights institutions differently.     

When should market-supporting institutions be established?

Market-supporting institutions play an essential role in successfulmarket economies, yet much remains unanswered about when inthe course of economic development those institutions shouldbe established. This article develops a model that shows howprivate sector growth can depend on the time at which a countryestablishes institutions belonging to a specific category: thosethat have the potential not only to enhance efficiency, butto threaten private property rights by facilitating income redistribution(e.g., agencies to enforce regulations and tax laws). If a countryhas no difficulty committing to secure property rights, it isefficient to establish potentially efficiency-enhancing institutionsas soon as possible. In the presence of commitment problems,however, eventually desirable institutions (even those essentialfor economic growth) can derail growth if established prematurely.Restricting voting rights may have positive or negative effectson growth, and there exist potential complementarities betweendemocracy and efficiency-enhancing institutions.     

论市场产权及其成本构成要素

市场是一个有着丰富涵义与本质规定性的复杂有机体。从产权角度讲,市场是一国政府构建、所有、运作、管理市场及从市场获益的一系列产权规则与制度安排(权力束集合体)。市场产权归中央政府(国家)所有。市场产权成本包括有形成本、制度成本及人力成本等,研究市场产权成本有利于确立投资与所有匹配原则、投资与收益匹配原则及成本与效率统一原则。     

Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs

This paper, by introducing complexity considerations, provides a dynamic foundation for the Coase theorem and highlights the role of transaction costs in generating inefficient bargaining/negotiation outcomes. We show, when the players have a preference for less complex strategies, the Coase theorem holds in negotiation models with repeated surplus and endogenous disagreement payoffs if and only if there are no transaction costs. Specifically, complexity considerations select only efficient equilibria in these models without transaction costs while every equilibrium induces perpetual disagreement and inefficiency with transaction costs. We also show the latter is true in the Rubinstein bargaining model with transaction costs.     

Effective property rights, conflict and growth

This paper shows how the interaction between conflict and growth can give rise to a nonmonotone relationship between property rights and social welfare. This interaction is illustrated in a model of endogenous growth in which equilibrium diversion of resources is the cost of securing effective property rights. A symmetric equilibrium allocation associated with more secure property rights and faster growth can be Pareto dominated by one associated with poorer property rights and slower growth. Faster growth can exacerbate the problem of diversion whenever property rights are sufficiently poor. These results call for caution before a society decides to pursue economic growth independently of the institutional structure of property rights. Furthermore, if this structure is inappropriate piecemeal reform might not be in the interest of society, and a substantial reform might be necessary if it is to be welfare-improving.     

COMPETITIVE PRICING AND EFFICIENCY IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM*

We consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium. Extending models by Rubinstein and Wolinsky and by Gale, heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition. When the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0, we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive, market clearing, price. Given positive search costs, efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies Hosios' condition and r=0. When prices are set by third‐party market makers, however, we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient.     

Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information

We study equilibria of a dynamic matching and bargaining game (DMBG) with two-sided private information bilateral bargaining. The model is a private information replica of Mortensen and Wright (2002). There are two kinds of frictions: time discounting and explicit search costs. A simple necessary and sufficient condition on parameters for existence of a nontrivial equilibrium is obtained. This condition is the same regardless whether the information is private or not. In addition, it is shown that when the discount rate is sufficiently small, the equilibrium is unique and has the property that every meeting results in trade.     

合作社内部“影响成本”决定因素的实证分析——基于山东省苹果专业合作社的调查数据

鉴于合作社集体产权安排和成员股权无法转让等原因,当存在影响社员利益分享或成本分担的组织决策且上下级信息沟通渠道顺畅时,利益相关者就会试图扭曲组织决策以获取潜在收益,进而产生降低决策效率的影响成本。本文利用山东省苹果专业合作社的调研数据,首先测度合作社内部影响成本规模,然后采用有序Probit模型对合作社内部影响成本的决定因素进行实证分析。研究表明:社员异质性是导致合作社内部影响成本增加的关键性因素;管理者存在外部选择诱惑、采用一人一票制表决方式和合作社扩张社员规模等对合作社内部影响成本也具有正向显著影响。基于此,协调异质性社员的利益诉求、选择合适的组织决策模式和设计合理的管理者激励制度对于转型经济时期农民专业合作社的健康发展至关重要。     

Efficiency of two sided investments in an equilibrium unemployment framework

This paper investigates the efficiency of investments by firms and workers in a matching model with high- and low-productivity jobs. Search is sector specific and random within sectors. Search frictions and ex-post bargaining imply that wage inequality arises as a result of the difference in investment costs between the sectors. The efficiency properties of the equilibrium are analyzed under the particular division in bargaining proposed by Hosios (1990). The conclusion is that the equilibrium is inefficient, with a too low fraction of workers and a too high vacancy-unemployment ratio in the high-productivity sector. The opposite happens in the low-productivity sector.     

Community–Industry Contracting over Natural Resource use in a Context of Weak Property Rights: The Case of Indonesia

Decentralization in Indonesia has resulted in an increased influence of local communities over the terms of logging agreements with timber companies. The outcomes of such community–company negotiations vary significantly across communities. What are the conditions that cause this variation, and how can the outcomes be more effectively and efficiently influenced by third-party actors such as the local government or NGOs? This paper addresses these questions by developing a game-theoretic model to illustrate the strategic interactions between communities and companies. The model allows for endogeneity of de facto property rights and bargaining positions. We show that third-party actions to improve the community’s bargaining position by raising its reservation utility may result in an increase in the area logged and thereby harm the environment. Our results indicate that the strategy of intervention matters. In particular, strategies that raise the sensitivity of interventions to local logging threats are likely to be more cost-effective in supporting communities and reducing forest degradation than more indiscriminatory strategies. The model will be relevant to other situations where communities negotiate contracts over natural resource use with outside actors in a context of weak property rights, a situation increasingly observed in other developing countries.