Stock Prices and the Supply of Information

We develop a model in which the dependence of the brokerage commission rate on share price provides an incentive for brokers to produce research reports on firms with low share prices. Stock splits therefore affect the attention paid to a firm by investment analysts. Managers with favorable private information about their firms have an incentive to split their firm's shares in order to reveal the information to investors. We find empirical evidence that is consistent with the major new prediction of the model, that the number of analysts following a firm is inversely related to its share price.     

What Drives Sell‐Side Analyst Compensation at High‐Status Investment Banks?

We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with analysts’ annual compensation. We find compensation to be positively related to “All‐Star” recognition, investment‐banking contributions, the size of analysts’ portfolios, and whether an analyst is identified as a top stock picker by the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that compensation is related to earnings forecast accuracy. But consistent with prior studies, we find analyst turnover to be related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that analyst forecasting incentives are primarily termination based. Additional analyses indicate that “All‐Star” recognition proxies for buy‐side client votes on analyst research quality used to allocate commissions across banks and analysts. Taken as a whole, our evidence is consistent with analyst compensation being designed to reward actions that increase brokerage and investment‐banking revenues. To assess the generality of our findings, we test the same relations using compensation data from a second high‐status bank and obtain similar results.     

Are All Security Analysts Equal?

We examine the extent to which security analysts are homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation as measured by Tobin's Q. Earlier research documents a significant and positive relation between analyst coverage and firm valuation. We identify three classes of equity analysts and examine their differential effect on firm valuation associated with their coverage and their information production. We find that equity analysts are not homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation. The presence of analysts at national securities firms have the strongest effect on firm valuation followed by analysts at regional securities firms and finally analysts at nonbrokerage, or research, firms. We attribute this result to the differential monitoring and information dissemination function rendered by the analysts. Information produced by analysts, however, does not share the same credibility. Specifically, we find brokerage firms' buy recommendations are discounted by the market and have a weak effect on firm valuation. The results can be supported by arguments that brokerage firm analysts' recommendations are contaminated by their firms' investment banking relations with corporations.     

Do independent research analysts issue more or less informative recommendation revisions?

This paper studies whether independent research analysts issue more informative stock recommendation revisions than investment bank analysts. I find independent analyst recommendation upgrades and downgrades significantly less informative. I also investigate whether the identified differences in informativeness are the result of systematic cross-sectional variation in analyst ability, portfolio complexity, and brokerage firm resources. Including these variables reduces the disparity in information content between groups. However, independent revisions continue to have lower informativeness. I follow prior research and compute daily buy-and-hold abnormal returns to portfolios formed based on analyst firm type. I find that investment bank analyst portfolios generally outperform those of independent research analysts. Lastly, I examine market reactions before and after the Global Settlement Agreement that was enacted to limit the perceived conflicts in the industry. Lastly, investment bank analyst upgrades generate an 18.7% greater reaction in the post-regulation period, suggesting the Global Settlement helped mitigate biased research. Independent analysts continue to issue less informative recommendations.     

Which types of analyst firms are more optimistic?

Research optimism among securities analysts has been attributed to incentives provided by underwriting activities. We examine how analysts’ forecast and recommendation optimism varies with the business activities used to fund research. We find that analysts at firms that funded research through underwriting and trading activities actually made less optimistic forecasts and recommendations than those at brokerage houses, who performed no underwriting. Optimism was particularly low for bulge underwriter firm analysts, implying that firm reputation reduces research optimism. There is also evidence that analysts at retail brokerage firms are more optimistic than those serving only institutional investors. We conclude that analyst optimism is at least partially driven by trading incentives.     

The determinants of analyst-firm pairings

This paper explores the determinants of observed analyst-firm pairings. We adopt an analyst/brokerage house perspective that allows us to examine not only firm-level characteristics as in prior research, but also attributes of the analyst and the analyst’s brokerage house that may drive these pairings. Our empirical analyses provide two primary insights. First, analyst characteristics such as industry expertise and relative experience, and brokerage house characteristics such as continuity of coverage, are associated with the decision to follow a firm. Second, there is substantial variation in the association between firm, analyst, and brokerage house characteristics and the decision to follow a firm; this occurs across individual analysts as well as across different types of brokerage houses. Overall, our results provide further insights into the factors leading to observed analyst-firm pairings, and indicate that these factors vary across analysts and their brokerage houses – suggesting richer associations than the average firm-level relationships documented by prior research.     

Do Bank‐Affiliated Analysts Benefit from Lending Relationships?

This paper investigates whether private information from lending activities improves the forecast accuracy of bank‐affiliated analysts. Using a matched sample design, matching by affiliated bank or borrower, we demonstrate that the forecast accuracy of bank‐affiliated analysts increases after the followed firm borrows from the affiliated bank. We also find that the increase in forecast accuracy is more pronounced for borrowers with greater information asymmetry and bad news, and for deals with financial covenants. Last, we find that the informational advantage of bank‐affiliated analysts exists only when the affiliated banks serve as lead arrangers, not merely as participating lenders. Overall, our evidence suggests that information flows from commercial banking to equity research divisions within financial conglomerates.     

Security Analysts’ Site Visits and Stock Price Synchronicity

This paper investigates how security analysts’ corporate site visits impact listed firms’ stock-price informativeness. Examining a sample of security analysts’ visits to Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2019, we find that security analysts incorporate firm-specific information into share prices through site visits, significantly reducing the visited firms’ stock price synchronicity. This finding is robust to an alternative measure of stock price informativeness and a two-stage least-squares approach using the introduction of high-speed rail as the instrumental variable. We also find that the impact of analysts’ site visits on firms’ stock price synchronicity is more pronounced for firms with lower information disclosure quality and poor corporate governance than for other firms. Further analysis on firm characteristics documents that this effect is stronger for large-size firms, firms in the manufacturing industry, and state-owned enterprises.     

Stock index adjustments and analysts’ forecast optimism: A quasi-natural experiment on the CSI 300 Index

As stock index adjustments comprise a basic system of capital market, their potential influence on analysts’ earnings forecasts is worthy of research. Based on a research sample of 23 adjustments to the CSI 300 Index from June 2007 to June 2018 and the backup stocks announced during the same period, this study examines the impact of additions to stock index on analysts’ forecast optimism using a staggered difference-in-differences model. The research results show that after stocks are added to the stock index, analysts’ earnings forecast optimism about these stocks increases significantly. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that this increase is more significant when the market is bullish, institutional ownership is low, the ratio of listed brokerage firms is low, star analyst coverage is low, firms show seasoned equity offering activity, the ratio of analysts from the top five brokerage firms ranked by commission income is high, and the analysts’ brokerage firms are shareholders. However, analyst-level tests find that analysts’ ability helps to reduce the impact of additions to stock index on earnings forecast optimism. Furthermore, additions to stock index significantly increase analyst coverage and forecast divergence. Economic consequences tests find additions to stock index significantly increases stock price synchronization, which is partly mediated by analysts’ earnings forecast optimism. This study enriches the literature on the impact of basic capital market systems and analyst behavior. The findings suggest that investors should rationally evaluate analysts’ earnings forecasts for stocks added to the stock index and obtain further information from various channels to improve asset allocation efficiency.     

Interlock Concentration and Analyst Forecast Accuracy: Value Implications of Interlock

From the perspective of information commonalities among firms with director interlock relationships, this study mainly investigates the outcomes of earnings forecasts by analysts who choose to concentrate on interlocked firms (analysts following both a firm and its interlocked partner firm in their research portfolio). Using interlocked A‐share firms listed in the Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2013 as samples, we empirically find that analysts who concentrate on interlocked firms produce more accurate earnings forecasts than analysts who do not. In additional analysis, we also find that analysts with an interlock concentration provide superior earnings forecast quality for other non‐interlocked firms in their research portfolios. Finally, through examining the market reaction to interlocked firms, we find that analysts with an interlock concentration provide new information and improve information efficiency for the capital market.     

The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analysts' Access to Management and Survival

This study offers evidence on the earnings forecast bias analysts use to please firm management and the associated benefits they obtain from issuing such biased forecasts in the years prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure. Analysts who issue initial optimistic earnings forecasts followed by pessimistic earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement produce more accurate earnings forecasts and are less likely to be fired by their employers. The effect of such biased earnings forecasts on forecast accuracy and firing is stronger for analysts who follow firms with heavy insider selling and hard‐to‐predict earnings. The above results hold regardless of whether a brokerage firm has investment banking business or not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts use biased earnings forecasts to curry favor with firm management in order to obtain better access to management's private information.     

The impact of business group affiliation on stock price informativeness: Evidence from an emerging market

This paper examines the relationship between business group affiliation and stock price informativeness in an emerging market setting. We use stock price synchronicity as a measure, and study the impact of group affiliation ‐specifically the extent of affiliation, ownership structure and existence of group bank‐ on firm specific information content. Results reveal that the amount of firm‐specific information capitalized into stock prices tends to be lower (higher) when the firm is group‐affiliated (unaffiliated), indirectly (directly) owned, and affiliated group has (does not have) a group bank. Additionally, the extent of group affiliation maintains a non‐linear relationship with synchronicity, suggesting that the perception of higher versus lower levels of group ownership differs.     

Do analysts affect bad news timeliness?

I investigate the effect of analysts on the speed with which bad news is reflected in earnings. Intuitively, the more analysts that cover a firm, the more costly it will be for the firm to keep bad news suppressed. Thus, analyst coverage should positively affect bad news timeliness (BNT) (but not necessarily the differential timeliness of bad news over good news, or conditional conservatism). Using brokerage house mergers as a natural experiment with a difference-in-differences design, I find that an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage decreases BNT; that is, analysts positively affect BNT. The decrease in BNT is robust to controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity, using a propensity score matched sample, persists for up to three years after the brokerage house merger, and is stronger for firms with relatively low analyst coverage before the merger. The result improves our understanding of how analysts affect a firm's information environment.     

Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

Brokerage M&As and the peer effect on analyst forecast accuracy

We examine whether the impact of a change in the number of analysts a brokerage firm employs has an asymmetric effect on the forecasting ability of superior and inferior analysts. Specifically, we show that following brokerage M&As only superior analysts benefit from a rise in having a larger number of peers. In addition, we find that the market does not account for the improved performance among superior analysts, and argue that this creates an opportunity for investors to capitalize on this.     

Relationship Incentives and the Optimistic/Pessimistic Pattern in Analysts' Forecasts

We examine whether analysts' incentives to maintain good relationships with management contribute to the optimistic/pessimistic within‐period time trend in analysts' forecasts. In our experiments, 81 experienced sell‐side analysts from two brokerage firms predict earnings based on historical information and management guidance. Analysts' forecasts exhibit an optimistic/pessimistic pattern across the two timing conditions (early and late in the quarter), and the effect is significantly stronger when the analysts have a good relationship with management than when their only incentive is to be accurate. Debriefing results indicate that analysts are aware of this pattern of forecasts, and believe that this benefits their future relationships with management and with brokerage clients. The analysts most frequently cite favored conference call participation and information access when describing benefits from maintaining good relationships with management. Our results suggest the following: The optimistic/pessimistic pattern in forecasts is in part a conscious response to relationship incentives, information access is perceived to be a major benefit of management relationships, and recent regulatory changes may have lessened but have not eliminated this conflict of interest source.     

The Effect of Organizational Climate on Sell-side Analyst Turnover and Performance

This paper investigates whether and how organizational climate (OC) in brokerage firms affects analyst turnover and performance. We find that firms with a lower-rated OC have a higher likelihood of analyst turnover. Also, when analysts leave and switch brokerage firms, they are more likely to move to a firm with a higher-rated OC and will deliver more accurate forecasts after switching firms. However, the performance improvements in better-rated OC firms are significant only for the initial years of the analysts’ employment in the new firms. We also show that OC-related analyst turnover negatively affects the performance of incumbent analysts, especially for those non-All-Star incumbent analysts, while these adverse performance effects are also transitory and last for two years only. Thus, our findings indicate that OC only has a short-lived effect on the behaviour of both leaving and remaining analysts, which challenges the long-held assumption that investments in a positive OC will always be associated with lower employee turnover and higher individual performance. We explain our results as arising from the high levels of labour mobility within the brokerage industry and the transparency of analyst forecasts as a public performance measure.     

The Effects of Disclosure and Analyst Regulations on the Relevance of Analyst Characteristics for Explaining Analyst Forecast Accuracy

We posit and find an effect of disclosure and analyst reporting regulations implemented from 2000 through 2003 (including Regulation Fair Disclosure, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act and the Global Settlement Act) on the importance of analyst and forecast characteristics for analyst forecast accuracy. Following the enactment of these regulations, more experienced analysts and All‐Star analysts do not maintain their superior forecast accuracy, and analysts employed by large brokerage houses perform worse than other analysts. In addition, we find a decrease in the importance of analyst effort, the number of industries and firms followed, days elapsed since the last forecast, and forecast horizon. While the importance of bold upward forecast revisions does not change, bold downward revisions lose their relevance for forecast accuracy after 2003. Finally, we find an increase in the importance of prior forecast accuracy. We find that the importance of these characteristics varies with the precision of publicly available information. Specifically, the decrease in the importance of most analyst and forecast characteristics and the increase in the importance of prior forecast accuracy are greater when the precision of publicly available information is low. Overall, our results suggest that the positive effects of experience, effort, brokerage house size and All‐Star status on forecast accuracy in the pre‐regulation period were because of the information advantages that these analysts enjoyed (rather than their ability to generate private information). In contrast, our results suggest that prior forecast accuracy is related to analysts’ ability to generate private information.     

Analyst information production and the timing of annual earnings forecasts

We investigate whether the reputation-herding theory or the tradeoff theory explains variation in the timing of individual analysts’ forecasts. Using forecast accuracy improvements, forecast boldness, and the price impact of forecasts as measures of forecast quality, we find that in the information discovery phase that precedes an earnings announcement, earlier forecasts have higher quality than later forecasts. We also find a similar pattern in the information analysis phase that begins with the earnings announcement date. Our findings suggest that consistent with the herding theory, analysts who are more capable participate early in discovering and analyzing information, and therefore earlier forecasts in the information discovery and analysis phases are of higher quality than later forecasts in that phase.     

The best of all possible worlds: unraveling target price optimism using analysts’ scenario-based valuations

We document that the relative placement of analysts’ target price within their subjective distribution of scenario-based valuations for the covered firm (i.e., tilt) is informative to investors. When analysts forecast price appreciation, tilt incrementally predicts ex post valuation errors and realized returns; the predictive value of tilt disappears when analysts forecast price declines. In additional analyses, we find that tilt appears to reflect an optimistic bias in target price forecasts as opposed to information about asymmetric state-contingent risk payoffs. Finally, we document that investors can use estimates of implied tilt based on observable firm characteristics to distinguish between investments with equally optimistic target price forecasts, yet lacking scenario-based information.