随机需求下考虑排污权交易的制造商最优生产与定价联合决策研究

在考虑排污权交易的情况下,研究了具有价格依赖需求特征的排污制造商如何进行单周期生产和定价联合决策的问题。研究表明:制造商的最优生产量和最优定价存在且唯一;制造商的最大期望利润既是排污权交易一级市场排污权交易价格的减函数,也是二级市场排污权交易价格的减函数(当最优生产量大于排污上限时)或增函数(当最优生产量小于排污上限时);与不考虑排污权交易的情况相比,排污权交易二级市场的存在可以促进制造商进行减排投资、提高排污生产效率;由制造商决策对排污权交易政策的反应函数可知,排污权交易中的各种政策因素和市场因素都会对制造商的生产经营决策产生显著影响。     

随机需求下考虑排污权交易的制造商最优生产与定价联合决策研究

在考虑排污权交易的情况下,研究了具有价格依赖需求特征的排污制造商如何进行单周期生产和定价联合决策的问题。研究表明:制造商的最优生产量和最优定价存在且唯一;制造商的最大期望利润既是排污权交易一级市场排污权交易价格的减函数,也是二级市场排污权交易价格的减函数(当最优生产量大于排污上限时)或增函数(当最优生产量小于排污上限时);与不考虑排污权交易的情况相比,排污权交易二级市场的存在可以促进制造商进行减排投资、提高排污生产效率;由制造商决策对排污权交易政策的反应函数可知,排污权交易中的各种政策因素和市场因素都会对制造商的生产经营决策产生显著影响。     

排污权交易、技术不确定性条件下厂商治污技术投资期权博弈

在排污权交易条件下,追求利润最大化的厂商必须对是否及何时进行治污技术投资进行决策。运用实物期权理论,建立了排污权交易、技术不确定性条件下厂商污染治理技术投资策略模型,并给出了厂商污染治理技术投资的最佳时机及价值函数。     

排污权交易机制对污染治理产业化的作用

基于产权理论和最优决策理论,研究了排污权交易的内生机制及其对污染治理产业化的作用。结果表明:排污权交易是企业追求整体效益最大化的策略选择;当排污权交易价格大于企业单位治污成本时,企业在完成减排目标的情况下就会出售或购买排污权;当政府减排指标只影响治污系统成本时,企业将依赖技术进步或通过获得剩余排污权来降低治污成本;企业选择自行治污策略不利于污染治理产业化。     

排污权交易政策的评价标准研究

排污权交易政策的相关问题在我国学术界、政府环保决策部门已成为热点。结合美国排污权交易政策的演进特点,对排污权交易政策优劣的一般评价标准进行分析,研究建立我国高效排污权交易制度的基本要求。     

排污权初始分配拍卖模型研究

排污权交易是近年来备受各国关注的一项旨在保护环境的经济政策,其初始分配模式通过改变市场结构影响企业行为和企业绩效,进而影响经济运行效率。拍卖模型作为一种初始分配模式,在总量控制的前提下,通过排污权的市场交易,实现低成本控制污染。相对于政府行政管制手段较多的免费分配模型,拍卖模型充分地运用了排污权资源配置方面的优势。本文通过追溯国内外排污权初始分配的研究,明确拍卖模型中的企业最优报价策略。在此基础上,结合我国实际,分析交易主体的成本收益,最后提出对这一问题的今后研究方向。     

排污权交易如何提升企业能源效率：微观机理与模式差异

提升能源利用效率是推动绿色低碳转型,实现碳达峰碳中和目标的关键路径。本文基于中国工业企业与企业污染排放的匹配数据,运用双重差分法研究二氧化硫排污权交易制度对企业能源效率的影响及作用机制,并探讨不同市场发展模式选择的影响差异。研究结果表明,排污权交易制度能够显著提升企业能源效率。机制检验发现,排污权交易主要通过优化能源消费结构和阻碍污染企业进入有效促进企业能源效率提升,但没有观察到排污权交易产生偏向型技术进步与中性技术进步激励。基于不同的排污权交易市场发展模式发现,与“一级市场先行”模式相比,“二级市场先行”模式下排污权交易的能源效率提升效应更强;除了能源结构优化,“二级市场先行”模式下的能源效率提升效应还来自排污权交易产生的偏向型技术进步激励和污染企业进入壁垒。本文有助于揭示利用市场机制提升能源效率的微观机理,为通过排污权交易机制设计与模式创新,推动能源高效利用与双碳目标实现提供政策启示。     

排污权价格形成机制及其优化分析

构建有效的排污权价格形成与运行机制是排污权交易制度建设的关键环节。本文分析了排污权的初始分配机制以及不同市场条件下排污权交易的价格形成机制。在完全竞争市场条件下,排污权的市场价格等于各企业的边际治理成本。经济增长、污染治理技术进步、政府环境目标以及预期因素等将对排污权价格变动产生影响。在不完全竞争条件下,市场势力和交易费用的存在降低了排污权价格机制的效率。文章最后提出了优化排污权价格形成和运行机制的政策建议。     

排污权跨区域交易对绿色经济的影响研究

明确具体环境规制政策工具对经济的影响,是正确选择环境政策工具、提高环境规制效率的重要前提。基于部分排污权交易试点2010年进行跨区域交易这一自然实验,运用倾向得分匹配法与双重差分法相结合的方法(PSM-DID),以省级排污权交易试点2003—2015年的面板数据为基础,分析了排污权跨区域交易政策对绿色经济的影响。实证结果表明:在消除可能因素所造成的影响和时间效应后,试点地区排污权跨区域交易政策对绿色经济的发展起促进作用;教育程度、技术水平、大气污染治理投资、排污费、环境效率等经济因素也能促进绿色经济发展,财政水平、工业化程度、外商投资水平对绿色经济发展具有负向效应。     

排污权价格形成机制及其优化分析

构建有效的排污权价格形成与运行机制是排污权交易制度建设的关键环节.本文分析了排污权的初始分配机制以及不同市场条件下排污权交易的价格形成机制.在完全竞争市场条件下,排污权的市场价格等于各企业的边际治理成本.经济增长、污染治理技术进步、政府环境目标以及预期因素等将对排污权价格变动产生影响.在不完全竞争条件下,市场势力和交易费用的存在降低了排污权价格机制的效率.文章最后提出了优化排污权价格形成和运行机制的政策建议.     

市场型环境规制与企业绿色创新——来自碳排放交易试点的证据

为研究碳排放交易政策对企业绿色技术创新的影响，验证“波特假说”在中国市场化环境规制改革背景下的成立性，以2006—2019年中国A股上市公司的绿色技术创新数据为研究样本，利用双重差分和三重差分模型研究发现碳排放交易政策对企业绿色创新具有显著的促进作用，从而“波特假说”成立，且该结论能够通过稳健性检验；进一步研究发现，碳排放交易政策对企业绿色技术创新的促进作用主要来源于企业原有创新活动基础上的“杠杆作用”；拓展研究发现，该促进作用主要存在于国有企业、规模较大的企业和高碳排放的行业；此外，碳排放交易试点政策在提高绿色创新质量方面起到了积极作用。     

Liability Structure and Carbon Emissions Abatement: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Enterprises

As it is known that the linkage between financial performance and environmental performance of enterprises has not obtained conclusive results, and the role of liability and its structure have not been considered yet. In view of these gaps, this paper employed the data of Chinese manufacturing firms from 2008 to 2011, to examine the impact of liability structure on enterprises’ carbon emissions abatement. The results manifest that both the relative and absolute proportions of long-term liabilities have a significant negative effect on the level value and growth rate of enterprise carbon emissions in China. Heterogeneity analysis demonstrates that enterprises in high energy consumption group have higher total carbon emissions and growth rate compared with enterprises in low and middle energy consumption groups. For enterprises of different ownership, the level of private-owned enterprises is higher and the growth rate is lower. The findings imply that policy makers should not adopt a one-size-fits-all policies to reduce firm carbon emissions.

     

Alternative standards and instruments for air pollution control in Poland

Like other Central European countries, Poland faces the twin challenges of improving environmental quality while also fostering sustainable economic development. In this study we examine the costs of different standards for air pollution control, and the cost savings from using incentive-based policy instruments in lieu of more rigid command-and-control policies. The comparisons are based on the results of a simulation model of energy use and air pollution control for the Polish economy over 1990–2015. The model simulates least-cost energy supply decisions under different environmental policy assumptions, the corresponding emissions, and the cost of achieving the specified policy objectives. The model results suggest that incentive-based policies will have efficiency gains over command policies that are at least worthy of consideration and may be quite substantial. The size of the gains in practice depends in part on how much flexibility is built into the command approach, e.g., capacity for intrafirm trading as well as alack of technology-specific requirements. To achieve these gains, an increase in the current levels of emissions fees is desirable both to strengthen abatement incentives and to improve the capacity of the Polish government to overcome past environmental damages. However, it seems highly unlikely in practice that fees could be raised to the levels necessary to meet current Polish emissions standards. To make further headway, an evolutionary approach to emissions trading patterned after (and profiting from the experience with) emissions trading in the U.S. seems useful. The program could start out relatively modestly and increase in ambitiousness as the Polish economic transition proceeds.     

The Timing of Environmental Policy: A Note on the Role of Product Differentiation

We examine the role that product differentiation can play in the design of environmental policy under full commitment and no commitment on the part of the environmental regulator. We consider a setting with two firms selling a differentiated product which generates pollution through emissions. Firms can reduce their emissions by undertaking abatement activities while an environmental regulator taxes emissions. The main results are: (1) When products are highly differentiated, the optimal time-consistent (no commitment) tax is always lower than the optimal pre-commitment tax. As the degree of product differentiation decreases, for relatively efficient abatement technology and high damages, the time-consistent emission tax exceeds the optimal pre-commitment one. (2) Abatement when product differentiation is extensive is higher under the time-consistent regime unless the abatement technology is extremely efficient. The same ranking applies to social welfare. However, as products become more and more similar, these results are (partially) reversed and pre-commitment could lead to both higher levels of abatement and welfare.     

企业环境保护投资规模优化的灰色关联分析

利用灰色系统理论,以环保投资外部效益内化为前提,对企业优化环保投资规模进行综合评价与决策,以提高企业的环保投资效率、激励企业的环保投资行为。认为,在相关环境标准和法律约束的框架下,应该使用经济杠杆赋予企业一定的污染治理选择权,促使其综合考虑、权衡利弊,开拓和寻找既切合实际又具有良好环境效益、社会效益与经济效益的污染治理方案,环保投资活动才有经济基础,才有可持续的动力。     

The effects of environmental policies on the abatement investment decisions of a green firm

This paper focuses on environmental policies aimed at rising investment in pollution abatement capital. We assume that ecological uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty over the dynamics of pollution, affects firm investment decisions. Capital irreversibility is not postulated but endogenized using a quadratic adjustment cost function. Using this framework, we study the effects of environmental policies considering taxes on polluting inputs and subsidies to reduce the cost of abatement capital. Environmental policies promoted to enforce abatement capital may generate the unexpected result of reducing the abatement investment rate.     

Irreversible abatement investment under cost uncertainties: tradable emission permits and emissions charges

A major concern with tradable emission permits is that stochastic permit prices may reduce a firm’s incentive to invest in abatement capital or technologies relative to other policies such as a fixed emissions charge. However, under efficient permit trading, the permit price uncertainty is caused by abatement cost uncertainties which affect investment under both permit and charge policies. We develop a rational expectations general equilibrium model of permit trading and irreversible abatement investment to show how cost uncertainties affect investment under permits. We compare the resulting investment incentive with that under charges. After controlling for the assumption that random shocks affect the abatement cost linearly, we find that firms’ investment incentive decreases in cost uncertainties, but more so under emissions charges than under permits. Therefore, tradable permits in fact may help maintain firms’ investment incentive under uncertainty.     

Policy choice for end-of-pipe abatement technology adoption under technological uncertainty

Regulators have increasingly become concerned about end-of-pipe abatement technologies because they not only play a crucial role in air pollution control but also ensure the achievement of the deep carbon emissions reduction target. This paper investigates the effect of emission taxes and standards on the adoption of end-of-pipe abatement technology when the arrival time and degree of improvement of the new emissions abatement technology are uncertain. We find that the ranking of emission taxes and standards in terms of motivating early adoption depends on the policy stringency. More specifically, for high levels of environmental stringency, standards induce an earlier technology adoption than taxes, while the opposite conclusion holds for low levels of environmental stringency. The sensitivity analysis shows that these findings are robust to various relevant crucial parameters. Finally, the implications for the choice of environmental policy have been provided.     

Rethinking the optimal level of environmental quality: justifications for strict environmental policy

Traditional environmental theory suggests that the optimal level of a pollution emission occurs when the marginal damage created by the emissions is equal to the marginal cost of reducing the emissions. We argue that the benefits from reducing pollution should be much more broadly defined to include at least three other sources of benefits. First, we develop a game-theoretic model in which firms may under-invest in cost-saving ‘green technologies’. Second, we demonstrate that consideration of future damages and abatement costs leads to a lower current optimal pollution level than that obtained in traditional models. Finally, we show that ecological complexity creates indirect pathways by which greater pollution increases the likelihood of generating irreversible environmental damage. This broader definition of the benefits of pollution abatement yields an optimal level of pollution that may actually be less than the level at which conventionally-measured marginal damages are equal to marginal abatement costs. Thus, environmental policy should be stricter.     

用能权交易制度对绿色技术创新的影响效应与传导机制

绿色技术创新是中国达成碳达峰、碳中和目标的根本途径,厘清用能权交易制度对绿色技术创新的影响效应和作用渠道是贯彻落实新发展理念的关键。以用能权交易制度作为准自然实验,基于2014—2019年中国A股工业企业面板数据,运用倾向匹配得分法和双重差分模型探究用能权交易制度对中国工业企业绿色技术创新的影响机制。研究表明：用能权交易制度显著推动了中国工业企业绿色技术创新,且在一系列稳健性检验后结论依然成立。此外,用能权交易制度诱发企业绿色技术创新的作用效果依企业所属行业和所有权性质不同而不同。究其原因,用能权交易制度主要通过影响企业研发资金、研发人员、税收优惠和政府补贴等促进企业绿色技术创新。