Seasoned equity offerings by small and medium-sized enterprises

Most analyses of small firms’ decision to seek outside equity financing and the conditions thereof concern private firms. Knowledge of the risk and return of entrepreneurial ventures for outside investors is consequently limited. This paper attempts to fill this gap by examining the Canadian context, where small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are allowed to list on a stock market. We analyze seasoned equity offerings launched by SMEs over the last decade. These public issuers can be considered low quality firms with poor operating performance. Managers issue equity before a large decrease in operating and stock market performance. Individual investors do not price the stocks correctly around the issue and incur significant negative returns in the years following the issue. This is particularly true for constrained issuers. We confirm that entrepreneurial outside equity attracts lemons and that individual investors cannot invest wisely in emerging ventures. Probably as a consequence of individual investors’ lack of skill and rationality, the cost of outside equity financing of Canadian public SMEs is abnormally low.     

The Initial Public Offerings of Restaurant Firms: The Case of Industry-Specific Micromarket Capitalization Offerings

We investigate the pricing characteristics of 59 initial public offerings (IPOs) of firms in the restaurant industry. Many of these offers are by extremely small micromarket capitalization companies, ones that are typically excluded from other studies of IPOs. We find that the choice of underwriter and the issuing company's subsequent financial performance significantly affect the level of underpricing and aftermarket performance. Companies that employ small, regional investment banking houses as underwriters fail to attract much investor interest, resulting in less underpricing and poorer aftermarket performance. In addition, investors appear to accurately appraise those firms that subsequently suffer from poor financial performance. This is demonstrated through greater underpricing to compensate investors for the greater perceived risk.     

The relationship between venture capital backing and the top management team quality of firms going public and implications for initial public offerings

We make use of hand-collected data on a large sample of entrepreneurial firms going public to analyze the association between venture capital (VC) backing and the top management team (TMT) quality of firms at the time of their initial public offerings (IPOs), and the effect of both VC-backing and TMT quality on the growth in their post-IPO operating performance and IPO firm valuations. We first show that VC-backing is associated with higher TMT quality. We then show that both higher TMT quality and VC-backing lead to higher growth in post-IPO operating performance and higher IPO valuations. We find that the above two variables affect the growth in post-IPO operating performance through an “ability channel,” whereby the TMTs of such firms choose projects with higher equilibrium scale and implement them more ably. Further, TMT quality and VC-backing affect IPO firm valuations not only through the above ability channel, but also through a “certification channel,” whereby higher TMT quality and VC-backing credibly certify intrinsic firm value to the IPO market, thus reducing the extent of asymmetric information facing such firms in the IPO market and yielding these firms higher IPO valuations. Finally, we show that TMT quality and VC-backing act as complements in their effect on IPO firms' growth in post-IPO operating performance.     

Venture Capitalists, Syndication and Governance in Initial Public Offerings

This paper examines the development of effective boards in venture capital (VC)-backed initial public offerings. It argues that VC-backed IPOs suffer from two sets of agency costs which are related to principal–agent and principal–principal relationships between the founders and members of the VC syndicate. Using a unique sample of 293 entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK it shows that VC syndicates invest in relatively more risky firms. VC-backed IPOs have more independent boards than IPOs with no VC involvement, with board independence being higher in syndicated VC-backed firms. These results are consistent with assumption that these governance factors are used to mitigate agency costs associated with VC involvement in IPO firms. We also find that in syndicated IPOs there is a higher equity presence of passive private equity firms investing alongside VC firms.     

Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence

This paper investigates the role of venture capitalists. We view their “raison d’être” as their ability to reduce the cost of informational asymmetries. Our theoretical framework focuses on two major forms of asymmetric information: “hidden information” (leading to adverse selection) and “hidden action” (leading to moral hazard). Our theoretical analysis suggests four empirical predictions.1. Venture capitalists operate in environments where their relative efficiency in selecting and monitoring investments gives them a comparative advantage over other investors. This suggests strong industry effects in venture capital investments. Venture capitalists should be prominent in industries where informational concerns are important, such as biotechnology, computer software, etc., rather than in “routine” start-ups such as restaurants, retail outlets, etc. The latter are risky, in that returns show high variance, but they are relatively easy to monitor by conventional financial intermediaries.2. Within the class of projects where venture capitalists have an advantage, they will still prefer projects where monitoring and selection costs are relatively low or where the costs of informational asymmetry are less severe. Thus, within a given industry where venture capitalists would be expected to focus, we would also expect venture capitalists to favor firms with some track records over pure start-ups. To clarify the distinction between point 1 and point 2, note that point 1 states that if we look across investors, we will see that venture capitalists will be more concentrated in areas characterized by significant informational asymmetry. Point 2 says that if we look across investment opportunities, venture capitalists will still favor those situations which provide better information (as will all other investors). Thus venture capitalists perceive informational asymmetries as costly, but they perceive them as less costly than do other investors.3. If informational asymmetries are important, then the ability of the venture capitalist to “exit” may be significantly affected. Ideally, venture capitalists will sell off their share in the venture after it “goes public” on a stock exchange. If, however, venture investments are made in situations where informational asymmetries are important, it may be difficult to sell shares in a public market where most investors are relatively uninformed. This concern invokes two natural reactions. One is that many “exits” would take place through sales to informed investors, such as to other firms in the same industry or to the venture’s own management or owners. A second reaction is that venture capitalists might try to acquire reputations for presenting good quality ventures in public offerings. Therefore, we might expect that the exits that occur in initial public offerings would be drawn from the better-performing ventures.4. Finally, informational asymmetries suggest that owner-managers will perform best when they have a large stake in the venture. Therefore, we can expect entrepreneurial firms in which venture capitalists own a large share to perform less well than other ventures. This is moral hazard problem, as higher values of a venture capitalist’s share reduce the incentives of the entrepreneur to provide effort. Nevertheless, it might still be best in a given situation for the venture capitalist to take on a high ownership share, since this might be the only way of getting sufficient financial capital into the firm. However, we would still expect a negative correlation between the venture capital ownership share and firm performance.Our empirical examination of Canadian venture capital shows that these predictions are consistent with the data. In particular, there are significant industry effects in the data, with venture capitalists having disproportionate representation in industries that are thought to have high levels of informational asymmetry. Secondly, venture capitalists favor later stage investment to start-up investment. Third, most exit is through “insider” sales, particularly management buyouts, acquisitions by third parties, rather than IPOs. However, IPOs have higher returns than other forms of exit. In addition, the data exhibit the negative relationship between the extent of venture capital ownership and firm performance predicted by our analysis.     

The informal venture capital market: Aspects of scale and market efficiency

Risk capital is a resource essential to the formation and growth of entrepreneurial ventures. In a society that is increasingly dependent upon innovation and entrepreneurship for its economic vitality, the performance of the venture capital markets is a matter of fundamental concern to entrepreneurs, venture investors and to public officials. This article deals with the informal venture capital market, the market in which entrepreneurs raise equity-type financing from private investors, (business angels). The informal venture capital market is virtually invisible and often misunderstood. It is composed of a diverse and diffuse population of individuals of means; many of whom have created their own successful ventures. There are no directories of individual venture investors and no public records of their investment transactions. Consequently, the informal venture capital market poses many unanswered questions.The author discusses two aspects of the informal venture capital market: questions of scale and market efficiency. The discussion draws upon existing research to extract and synthesize data that provide a reasonable basis for inferences about scale and efficiency.Private venture investors tend to be self-made individuals with substantial business and financial experience and with a net worth of $1 million or more. The author estimates that the number of private venture investors in the United States is at least 250,000, of whom about 100,000 are active in any given year. By providing seed capital for ventures that subsequently raise funds from professional venture investors or in the public equity markets and equity financing for privately-held firms that are growing faster than internal cash flow can support, private investors fill gaps in the institutional equity markets.The author estimates that private investors manage a portfolio of venture investments aggregating in the neighborhood of $50 billion, about twice the capital managed by professional venture investors. By participating in smaller transactions, private investors finance over five times as many entrepreneurs as professional venture investors; 20,000 or more firms per year compared to two or three thousand. The typical angel-backed venture raises about $250,000 from three or more private investors.Despite the apparent scale of the informal venture capital market, the author cites evidence that the market is relatively inefficient. It is a market characterized by limited information about investors and investment opportunities. Furthermore, many entrepreneurs and private investors are unfamiliar with the techniques of successful venture financing. The author's scale and efficiency inferences, coupled with evidence documenting gaps between private and social returns from innovation, prompt questions about public as well as private initiatives to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market.The article concludes with a discussion of Venture Capital Network, Inc. (VCN), an experimental effort to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market. VCN's procedures and performance are described, followed by a discussion of the lessons learned during the first two years of the experiment.     

Social Capital,Informal Governance,and Post-IPO Firm Performance: A Study of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms

Social capital can serve as informal governance in weak investor-protection regimes. Using hand-collected data on entrepreneurs’ political connections and firm ownership, we construct several original measures of social capital and examine their effect on the performance of entrepreneurial firms in China after their initial public offerings. Political connections or a high percentage of external investors tend to enhance firm performance, but intragroup related-party transactions commonly lead to performance decline. These forms of social capital have a strong influence on the performance of Chinese firms, whereas formal governance variables such as board size or board independence have little effect. Although social capital may serve as an informal governance mechanism and effectively substitute for formal governance mechanisms in an emerging market, this role of social capital raises several ethical concerns, notably the development of rent-seeking and crony capitalism.     

Venture capital reputation: a blessing or a curse for entrepreneurial firm innovation—a contingent effect of industrial distance

This study investigates whether venture capital reputation is a blessing or a curse for entrepreneurial firm innovation by using data from 1553 observations of venture capital investments on entrepreneurial firms in China’s New Over-the-Counter (OTC) Market. Advantages that venture capital brings to entrepreneurial firms have been widely acknowledged in extant research. However, our research emphasizes the potential resource outflows rather than inflows when firms are embedded in a shared reputable venture capital, and finds that the curse effect of venture capital reputation on entrepreneurial firms is manifested. Furthermore, we develop the concept of venture capital “intra-industrial reputation” and “extra-industrial reputation” to give a contingent answer to the “blessing or curse” question. The conclusions are drawn indicating that the curse effect is contingent on industrial distance. Venture capital intra-industrial reputation is positively linked to entrepreneurial firm innovation, whereas extra-industrial reputation exerts a strong negative impact, which is responsible for the curse effect.     

The ambitious entrepreneur: High growth strategies of women-owned enterprises

During the last two decades, researchers have sought to develop categories of entrepreneurs and their businesses along a variety of dimensions to better comprehend and analyze the entrepreneurial growth process. Some of this research has focused on differences related to industrial sectors, firm size, the geographical region in which a business is located, the use of high-technology or low-technology, and the life-cycle stage of the firm (i.e., start-up vs. more mature, formalized companies). Researchers have also considered ways in which entrepreneurs can be differentiated from small business managers. One of these classifications is based on the entrepreneur's desire to grow the business rapidly. This is the focus of our study.To date, the media have paid considerable attention to rapidly growing new ventures. However, still lacking are large-scale research studies guided by theory through which we can expand our knowledge of the underlying factors supporting ambitious expansion plans. Some research has identified factors that enhance or reduce the willingness of the entrepreneur to grow the business. Factors include the strategic origin of the business (i.e., the methods and paths through which the firm was founded); previous experience of the founder/owner; and the ability of the entrepreneur to set realistic, measurable goals and to manage conflict effectively.Our study attempted to identify the strategic paths chosen by entrepreneurs and the relation of those paths to the growth orientation of the firm. The entrepreneurs sampled in this study are women entrepreneurs across a wide range of industrial sectors. Recent reviews of entrepreneurship research have suggested the need for more studies comparing high-growth firms with slower-growth firms to better delineate their differences in strategic choices and behaviors.Our study sought to answer the following questions: What characterizes a “high growth-oriented entrepreneur?” Is this distinction associated with specific strategic intentions, prior experience, equity held in previous firms, the type of company structure in place, or success factors the entrepreneur perceives are important to the business? Do “high growth” entrepreneurs show greater entrepreneurial “intensity” (i.e., commitment to the firm's success)? Are they willing to “pay the price” for their own and their firm's success? (i.e., the “opportunity costs” associated with business success and growth). Other relationships under investigation included different patterns of financing the business' start-up and early growth. Do “high-growth” entrepreneurs use unique sources of funding compared with “lower-growth” entrepreneurs?Eight hundred thirty-two entrepreneurs responded to a survey in which they were asked to describe their growth intentions along nineteen strategic dimensions, as well as respond to the foregoing questions. Some of the strategic activity measures included adding a new product or service, expanding operations, selling to a new market, and applying for a loan to expand operations. Actual growth rates based on sales revenues were calculated, and average annualized growth rates of the industrial sectors represented in the sample were obtained. This study showed that high-growth-oriented entrepreneurs were clearly different from low-growth-oriented entrepreneurs along several dimensions. The former were much more likely to select strategies for their firms that permitted greater focus on market expansion and new technologies, to exhibit greater intensity towards business ownership (“my business is the most important activity in my life”), and to be willing to incur greater opportunity costs for the success of their firms (“I would rather own my own business than earn a higher salary while employed by someone else”).The high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs tended to have a more structured approach to organizing their businesses, which suggests a more disciplined perception of managing the firm. In summary, results showed the group of high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs, labeled “ambitious,” as having the following distinctions: strategic intentions that emphasize market growth and technological change, stronger commitment to the success of the business, greater willingness to sacrifice on behalf of the business, earlier planning for the growth of the business, utilization of a team-based form of organization design, concern for reputation and quality, adequate capitalization, strong leadership, and utilization of a wider range of financing sources for the expansion of the venture. The purpose in uncovering these differences is to enable entrepreneurs and researchers to identify more clearly the attributes of rapid-growth ventures and their founders and to move closer to a field-based model of the entrepreneurial growth process which will help delineate the alternative paths to venture growth and organizational change.     

Managing radical innovation: The importance of specialized knowledge in the biotech revolution

This work has implications for managers, investors and entrepreneurs in times of breakthrough innovation at the firm or industry level. The work shows that the marketplace understands the importance of retaining and motivating critical specialized knowledge. By analyzing initial public offerings during the biotechnology discovery wave I find evidence that a dramatic decrease in the ability to include secondary shares (liquidity for early investors and entrepreneurs) in biotechnology IPOs corresponds with the radical increase in the importance of specialized knowledge in that industry, at the time of the rDNA breakthrough discovery and development.     

Publicly traded venture capital funds: implications for institutional “fund of funds” investors

Institutional investors supply the bulk of the funds which are used by venture capital investment firms in financing emerging growth companies. These investors typically place their funds in a number of venture capital firms, thus achieving diversification across a range of investment philosophy, geography, management, industry, investment life cycle stage and type of security. Essentially, each institutional investor manages a “fund of funds,” attempting through the principles of portfolio theory to reduce the risk of participating in the venture capital business while retaining the up-side potential which was the original source of attraction to the business. Because most venture capital investment firms are privately held limited partnerships, it is very difficult to measure risk adjusted rates of return on these funds on a continuous basis.In this paper, we use the set of twelve publicly traded venture capital firms as a proxy to develop insight regarding the risk reduction effect of investment in a portfolio of venture capital funds, i.e., a fund of funds. Measurements of weekly total returns for the shares of these funds are compared with similar returns on a set of comparably sized “maximum capital gain” mutual funds and the daily return of the S&P 500 Index. A comparison of returns on an individual fund basis, as well as a correlation of daily returns of these individual funds, were made. In order to adjust for any systematic bias resulting from the “thin market” characteristic of the securities of the firms being observed, the Scholes-Williams beta estimation technique was used to reduce the effects of nonsynchronous trading.The results indicate that superior returns are realized on such portfolios when compared with portfolios of growth-oriented mutual funds and with the S&P 500 Index. This is the case whether the portfolios are equally weighted (i.e., “naive”) or constructed to be mean-variant efficient, ex ante, according to the capital asset pricing model. When compared individually, more of the venture funds dominated the S&P Market Index than did the mutual funds and by much larger margins. When combined in portfolios, the venture capital funds demonstrated very low beta coefficients and very low covariance of returns among portfolio components when compared with portfolios of mutual funds. To aid in interpreting these results, we analyzed the discounts and premia from net asset value on the funds involved and compared them to Thompson's findings regarding the contribution of such differences to abnormal returns. We found that observed excess returns greatly exceed the level which would be explained by these differences.The implications of these results for the practitioner are significant. They essentially tell us that, while investment in individual venture capital deals is considered to have high risk relative to potential return, combinations of deals (i.e., venture capital portfolios) were shown to produce superior risk adjusted returns in the market place. Further, these results show that further combining these portfolios into larger portfolios (i.e., “funds of funds”) provides even greater excess returns over the market index, thus plausibly explaining the “fund of funds” approach to venture capital investment taken by many institutional investors.While the funds studied are relatively small and are either small business investment companies or business development companies, they serve as a useful proxy for the organized venture capital industry, despite the fact that the bulk of the funds in the industry are institutionally funded, private, closely held limited partnerships which do not trade continuously in an open market. These results demonstrate to investors the magnitude of the differences in risk adjusted total return between publicly traded venture capital funds and growth oriented mutual funds on an individual fund basis. They also demonstrate to investors the power of the “fund of funds” approach to institutional involvement in the venture capital business. Because such an approach produces better risk adjusted investment results for the institutional investor, it seems to justify a greater flow of capital into the business from more risk averse institutional investment sources. This may mean greater access to institutional funds for those seeking to form new venture capital funds. For entrepreneurs seeking venture capital funds for their young companies, it may also mean a lower potential cost of capital for the financing of business venturing. From the viewpoint of public policy makers interested in facilitating the funding of business venturing, it may provide insight regarding regulatory issues surrounding taxation and the barriers and incentives which affect venture capital investment.     

Networking and growth of young technology-intensive ventures in China

More often than not, new ventures lack established products, known technologies, longstanding customer relations, experienced managerial teams, sufficient capital, and strong reputations. Almost by definition, small, new firms lack the resources of many larger, established firms. The task of an infant firm, and a measure of its success, is to make a transition from being resource weak to being resource strong.How can resources that are critical for profitable growth be acquired for the resource weak new venture? Researchers have found that entrepreneurs can gain access to valuable resources and they can seek to achieve competitive advantage through “networking activities.” Forming and utilizing available relationships with external organizations can allow entrepreneurs to build credibility, gain advice, financing, and customer access, build a positive image and obtain resources at below-market prices, and obtain channel access, information, and innovations. Business relationships with other organizations allow an entrepreneur to achieve desired business results through “asset parsimony.”A favorable view toward networking for new ventures leaves a number of unanswered questions, however. Relevant research questions might include, who should the entrepreneur seek as a business partner? Are all inter-organizational relationships equal, or are some types more valuable to new ventures than other relationships? Do firms relying on high levels of networking activities actually outperform firms that less actively seek resources through external organizational relationships?The present study provides a specific understanding of the concept of networking for entrepreneurs. We propose that networking can be understood in terms of “range,” the number of external relationships to obtain resources, and of “intensity,” the frequency of contact of and amount of resource obtained from these relationships. This research project evaluates the range and intensity of networking among high-growth and low-growth entrepreneurial ventures.Extensive interviewing with managers of six young technology-oriented firms in the People's Republic of China (PRC) affirmed the importance of entrepreneurial networking. Managers in the three high-growth firms reported greater range and intensity of business networking than did managers of three low-growth firms, matched by industry and age. Moreover, the relationship between networking activities and growth transcended the stage of firm development.Where networking range and intensity are deemed important in the growth process, new venture success may call for entrepreneurs to reach out deliberately to external organizations to capture needed resources. To a certain extent, such networking activities run counter to important entrepreneurial motivations of independence and autonomy. The concept of networking, and the results of this study, imply that entrepreneurs need to combine the spirit of independence with the reality of resource dependence, and they need to balance personal autonomy with strategic business relationships.This study also contributes to the understanding of entrepreneurship in our increasingly global economy, particularly in the PRC. Business relationships between the United States and the PRC have been expanding rapidly in the last decade. Many foreign businesses seek license agreements, joint venture partners, equity participation, or channel relationships with young ventures in that country. Do the same rules of networking apply in the PRC as the literature suggests apply in the United States? New ventures in this study were found to engage in processes of networking activities consistent with those in the West. Although networking activities may have different cultural roots, firm success appeared influenced by the same principles of networking.     

Do Private Equity Investors Create Value for Italian Initial Public Offerings?

This study analyses the role of private equity (PE) backing in initial public offerings (IPOs) using a dataset of 227 companies that went public on the Milan Stock Exchange between January 1995 and December 2007. The evidence rejects the certification and monitoring hypotheses and provides considerable support for the market power hypothesis. In accordance with Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) , we suggest that PE investors exploit their relationships with the key IPO market players to attract attention to the IPOs of firms backed by PE, thus obtaining a higher equity valuation (both in the IPO and in the secondary market).     

New issues on the U.K. Unlisted Securities Market: The ability of entrepreneurs to signal firm value

The present paper investigates whether small firm entrepreneurs are able to signal the value of their firms to potential investors when seeking a listing on the U.K. Unlisted Securities Market (USM). The signals considered are the percentage of equity retained by the original entrepreneurs, the net proceeds raised by an issue, the choice of advising agents to an issue, the disclosure of an earnings forecast and the level of underpricing of the new issue. In addition, the possible interactions between the individual signals are considered and included in the analysis. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that firm value is positively and significantly related to the percentage of retained equity and the net proceeds raised: thus suggesting, therefore, that stock markets will invest at higher values, ceteris paribus, if entrepreneurs indicate confidence in their enterprises via levels of equity retention and the funds they intend to invest in future projects.     

Is venture capital worth it? Effects on firm performance and founder returns

This paper extends research on venture capital (VC) finance by studying its effects on a venture's performance and on its founders' returns beyond an initial public offering (IPO). A “founder performance” construct, defined as a founder's financial and nonfinancial returns, is proposed and used to measure and compare returns to founders with returns to investors and firm performance. In general, venture characteristics pre-IPO and venture performance post-IPO were not significantly different when comparing ventures with and without VC backing. Only when VC backing is very high, do pre-IPO resources and funding improve significantly. However, higher levels of resource endowments did not seem to affect post-IPO performance for the venture or its investors. On the other hand, founders resorting to VC funding before taking their company public generated significantly less wealth for themselves and were less likely to remain as CEOs of their ventures after the IPO. Results suggest that founders motivated primarily by wealth creation and those motivated by remaining in control of their ventures should, in both instances, minimize VC backing when taking their ventures public. The finding that founder performance differs from venture and investor performance calls for future research to explore potential conflicts of interest that may arise from the double role of founders as principals and agents.     

The asymmetric effect of warranty payments on firm value: The moderating role of advertising,R&D,and industry concentration

Changes in firms’ warranty payments are informative signals that enable investors to form timely expectations about potential changes in product quality. The authors’ survey shows that warranty payments affect potential investors’ product quality assessments and stock investment likelihood. Their quantitative analysis reveals an asymmetric stock market reaction: unanticipated increases in warranty payments (which signal quality “losses”) lower stock returns but unanticipated decreases do not affect stock returns. Two important factors moderate this relationship. First, boosting advertising spending attenuates the negative stock return effect of unanticipated increases in warranty payments. Second, unanticipated decreases in warranty payments, which signal quality “gains”, translate into higher stock returns when the industry has become less concentrated. Interestingly, changes in R&D spending do not moderate investors’ response to unanticipated increases or decreases in warranty payments. The authors advise firms to use advertising to lessen the harm from warranty payment increases and to strongly communicate warranty payment decreases in the face of intensified competition. The authors also caution that offering warranties in general does not ensure greater firm value as declining quality firms that myopically offer warranty programs experience lower firm value than those that do not provide warranties.     

Participating convertible preferred stock in venture capital exits

This paper develops a theory of the participating convertible preferred (PCP) stock commonly used in venture capital settings. I show that the participation and convertibility features of PCP stock can be used to reduce information asymmetry between the venture and potential investors at the time of exit. Further, the convertibility feature of PCP helps in alleviating the problem of insufficient entrepreneurial effort. I then derive implications for the two most common types of exits in venture capital—initial public offerings and trade sales—and explain how US venture capital markets differ from other VC markets.     

Venture capital's role in financing innovation for economic growth

Previously, there has been little empirical evidence about the role of venture capital in fostering technological innovation. Recent research, sponsored by the National Science Foundation and Babson College and completed with our colleagues Stanley E. Pratt and Norman Fast (Venture Economics and Venture Capital Journal) shed some new light on the flow of venture capital to highly innovative technological ventures from 1967–1982. The evidence suggests that venture capital not only plays a significant role, but that it is a unique kind of investing in terms of when, where, and how it is done. Ironically, this research indicates that the “capital” in venture capital is the least important ingredient in fostering technological innovation. Rather, it is management intensive, requiring very early involvement by venture capitalists in nurturing budding innovators and technology, and thereby bird-dogging and accelerating the emergence of highly innovative technologies. Further, the post-1979 reduction of the capital-gains tax has led to unprecedented growth and development in the venture-capital industry. One result has been that a new industry structure is emerging, and along with it some new danger signals for the future flow and commercialization of technological innovation. Several lessons emerge from our findings that hold implications for venture capital investors and entrepreneurs alike.Successful venture-capital investing in technologically innovative firms requires more than just risk money. Savvy entrepreneurs seek out venture capitalists with noteworthy reputations for their nonmonetary, high value-added contributions to fledgling firms. Venture capitalists who can play a highly constructive role in emerging firms can attract higher-quality ventures. Qualities commonly cited by entrepreneurs are: helping to find the select key management-team members: providing credibility with suppliers and customers; and helping to shape strategy when the daily pressures postpone this vital task. As one put it, “It is far more important whom you obtain funding from than how much and at what price.”Investing in technologically innovative ventures is a more specialized business than suggested by the common stereotype of homogeneity among venture capitalists. Fewer than 5% of the 464 venture-capital firms in our study accounted for nearly 25% of all the investments in highly innovative technological ventures. Investors posses sepcialized know-how, including a web of contacts and networks, a great degree of syndication of deals, and a great intensity of involvement. The message for technology entrepreneurs is clear: focus on venture-capital firms with reputations for proven performance in your technology and market, especially with your targeted customers.Contrary to the notion that venture-capital investors sit and wait for business plans and innovative ideas to come to them and then simply write checks, many of the most active firms do just the opposite: they engage in active “bird-dogging” efforts to identify exceptional innovators with the relevant technical expertise and commitment to bring about the commercialization of promising technologies. They also team with innovators and entrepreneurs to create an “acceleration effect” by actually compressing the time span and increasing the velocity at which new technologies are brought to commercial maturity and societal utility. Founders and investors alike have related numerous examples of highly innovative technological ventures that became realities in what they believed to be one-fourth to one-half the time that would have been required within a large, established firm.Looking ahead, the new venture-capital climate of the mid-1980s offers both bane and blessing.As the pool of capital has exploded, the industry has become more diverse and specialized than even before. Sharp differences are visible in terms of investing objectives, criteria, and strategy, focusing on particular stages, size, and a technology-market niche. Megafunds of $100 + million have been raised, and as funds get larger the minimum investment escalates, typically $1 million or more now. Entrepreneurs in search of venture capital need to be more knowledgeable and focused than ever before.Significant portfolio problems continue to surface as the would-be “pearls” of 1982–1984 become “lemons” in 1985–1986. One results of this is the drying up of funds for seed and strat-up investments. Many venture capitalists are simply overburdened by cleaning up problems in their own portfolios and in replacing management. Fortunately, some innovative venture capitalists have seen opportunity in this adversity, and a handful of specialized seed and first-stage funds have been launched.Ironically, many of the trends and pressures in the venture-capital industry in the mid-1980s may inadvertently shift investing attention away from more innovative technological ventures. The implications of these changes are painful for entrepreneurs, investors, and the nations. How can technological innovation and international competitiveness be achieved of the venture-capital community is unable-or unwilling-to contribute as greatly to the funding of new innovations as it has in the past? Where will technology entrepreneurs find the risk capital and “value-added involvement” so vital to commercial success? And how can venture-capital pools provide the handsome yields on invested capital of the past if they shift investing to later-stage ventures?On the brighter side, we are still in an era of unprecedented opportunity for entrepreneurs and investors alike. Even with the sharp drop in new funds available in venture-capital pools to an estimated $2.5 billion in 1985, this is still 25 to 50 times greater than the annual flow of new venture capital during the dismal 1970s. The recent industry shake-up, coupled with a continuance of the favorable capital-gains tax, should foster a healthier, if not wiser and more disciplined, venture-capital industry during the remainder of the decade.     

The impact of firmspecific capabilities on the amount of capital raised in an initial public offering: Evidence from the biotechnology industry

Going “public” has a magical sound to most entrepreneurial managers. By going public the firm increases its legitimacy in the business community, improves access to debt financing, and creates a means of exit for major shareholders. However, by far the most important reason for going public is to infuse a significant amount of investment capital into the firm. It is well documented that small businesses frequently fail because of insufficient funding and heavy debt loads. Issuing an initial public offering (IPO) allows entrepreneurial firms to overcome these pitfalls. Clearly, if access to capital is the major goal of going public, then the success of an offering is measured by the amount of capital raised by the firm. This study presents a model of the total amount of capital raised by a firm through an IPO. The explanatory variables include several indicators of the scientific capabilities of the firm including the location of the firm, the quality of the research staff, the number of products under development, the number of patents held by the firm, and the firm's prior spending on research and development (R&D). The model is empirically tested on a sample of 92 biotechnology IPOs. The results provide strong support for the hypothesized positive relationship between the total amount of capital raised by a firm's IPO and the scientific capabilities of the firm.Our results have important implications for entrepreneurs. First, an entrepreneur needs to develop and send credible signals indicating the value of the firm's intangible assets to the market. Second, the market values as deep a product pipeline as possible given a firm's resource constraints. Third, choice of location is a key strategic decision that should not be overlooked. Fourth, the market values firm-specific capabilities and will increase the capital it is willing to invest in a firm accordingly. Finally, the amount of capital a firm raises in its IPO can be influenced by entrepreneurial managers' strategic decisions.