Early-stage business model experimentation and pivoting

Recent literature suggests entrepreneurs struggle to pivot—or fundamentally change aspects of their venture—due to identity-based resistance to change. Yet, when entrepreneurs receive negative feedback, overcoming this resistance may be important to pivoting their business model. We adopt a convergent, mixed methods research design to explore when and why some entrepreneurs overcome resistance to change in response to negative feedback during early-stage business model experimentation. Building upon qualitative data that we gathered and analyzed, we theorize entrepreneurs may resist pivoting their value proposition relative to other business model components despite receiving negative feedback on this aspect of their business model. However, we find three factors – entrepreneurial experience, startup mentoring, and team size – may enable entrepreneurs to pivot in response to negative feedback. We theorize that these factors broaden a startup team's perspective, enabling value proposition pivoting during early-stage business model experimentation. We test these relationships with quantitative data from 80 startups engaged in business model experimentation and find support across hypotheses. We contribute to understanding when and why entrepreneurs pivot aspects of their business models in response to negative feedback during early-stage business model experimentation.Executive summaryThe entrepreneurship literature suggests startups may benefit from experimentation and pivoting different parts of their business model in response to negative feedback from stakeholders (Andries et al., 2021; Camuffo et al., 2020; Shepherd and Gruber, 2021). In early stages of starting a new venture, a business model refers to a cognitive schema or belief about an activity system that could potentially create and capture value (Massa et al., 2017; Shepherd and Gruber, 2021). Business model experimentation is the process of testing assumptions underlying this potential business model and pivoting business model assumptions in response to negative feedback (Andries et al., 2013; McDonald and Eisenhardt, 2020; Leatherbee and Katila, 2020). Building upon prior literature, we define business model pivoting as a fundamental change to parts of the business model (Berends et al., 2021; Snihur and Clarysse, 2022; Shepherd and Gruber, 2021). Yet, literature also suggests founders often struggle to pivot assumptions despite negative feedback. Motives to preserve and protect certain assumptions relevant to founders' identities can interfere with pivoting (Grimes, 2018; Kirtley and O'Mahony, 2023; Zuzul and Tripsas, 2020). Despite the general understanding that founders struggle to change their ideas, however, the entrepreneurship literature currently lacks precise insight into when and why founders can overcome resistance to pivoting.In this research, we explore when and why startups pivot different parts of their business model. We do so within the context of early-stage business model experimentation, where founders explicitly state assumptions about different parts of their potential business model, test those assumptions against stakeholder feedback, and are encouraged to pivot business model components in response to negative feedback. Through a mixed methods research design, we find (1) founders tend to resist pivoting their value propositions relative to other parts of a business model in response to negative feedback; and (2) entrepreneurial experience, startup mentoring, and team size enables startups to overcome this resistance to pivoting in response to negative feedback. We theorize these factors broaden founders' perspectives (Warshay, 1962), contributing to a greater willingness to pivot during experimentation.We contribute to the literature on entrepreneurial pivoting by explaining nuanced variation in pivoting distinct business model components during experimentation. This contribution is important because it reveals that resistance to pivoting the business model may be more complex than previously thought. We also contribute to the literature at the nexus of business model experimentation and entrepreneurial cognition by finding that entrepreneurial experience, startup mentoring, and team size enable startups to pivot despite psychological resistance to pivoting in response to negative feedback because it broadens founders' perspectives. This insight is important theoretically because it advances what we know about enabling experimenting with business models under conditions of uncertainty. The research presented here has clear and important implications for practice. This research suggests founders often resist changing the value proposition versus other components of their business models in early stages of venture development. This resistance can impede experimentation and pivoting in response to negative feedback. To the extent founders want to broaden their perspective to enable pivoting their value propositions in response to negative feedback during early stages of venture development, our data suggest they may be able to do so by recruiting members with entrepreneurial experience on their team (or gain entrepreneurial experience themselves), engage frequently with startup mentors, and increase the size of their team. Overall, we view the breath of perspective that comes from experience and interactions with others as an advantage for entrepreneurs when experimenting with their business models during early stages of venture development.     

The Corridor Principle

This article discusses how many entrepreneurs create multiple ventures, and thereby apparently lengthen the duration of their entrepreneurial careers. A new concept, called the Corridor Principle, is proposed as a possible explanation of the multiple venture phenomenon. The Corridor Principle states that the mere act of starting a venture enables entrepreneurs to see other venture opportunities they could neither see nor take advantage of until they had started their initial venture.The Corridor Principle presents an alternative model to the linear single venture career model, embodied by such celebrity entrepreneurs as Ray Kroc of MacDonald' s and Kenneth Olsen of Digital Equipment Corp. Six hypotheses test expectations about the timing and duration of entrepreneurial careers, as well as the relationship between entrepreneurial career length and the creation of multiple ventures.The findings strongly support: • the position that entrepreneurship is a dynamic, multi-venture process for a great many entrepreneurs the rule, rather than the exception. • the existence of a positive correlation between finding at least a second venture and realizing a longer entrepreneurial career. Though there are a variety of explanations for this, and the patterns include both sequential and overlapping ventures, the net effect of creating multiple ventures appears to produce a longer entrepreneurial career. • the position that significant numbers of entrepreneurs create their second venture very early in their entrepreneurial careers especially when contrasted to the group of ex-entrepreneurs, who create multiple ventures (if at all) at a slower rate and later in their careers.Overall, these observations reinforce the notion of the Corridor Principle. Though who can and cannot take advantage of the Corridor Principle is not entirely revealed by the data, some indication exists that an entrepreneurs ability to use Corridor Principle strategy to prolong his or her career is related both to age at startup, and to conscious anticipation and preparation for an entrepreneurial career.The main implications for entrepreneurship practitioners, advisors, researchers, teachers and students are these: Whether studying the entrepreneurial process or planning to start an entrepreneurial career, a long-term view should be taken, one that includes the likely possibility of multiple ventures. The minimum economic returns of earlier ventures can be lower than previously thought if these ventures provide entry to subsequent ventures that possess higher (more acceptable) returns to the entrepreneur. The evidence thus far available indicates that the creation of subsequent ventures occurs relatively quickly when corridors of opportunity become visible and attainable after earlier ventures are established. The likelihood of career failure, as opposed to venture failure, may be lowered if one selects earlier ventures based on their potential to reveal follow-on-venture opportunities that the entrepreneur can investigate and possibly pursue.     

Establishing a new business venture unit within a firm

The rapid growth of the United States as a whole is basically a story of the discovery and adoption of novel and improved ways of satisfying wants and needs. Previously, these wants and needs have been championed by individuals such as J.P. Morgan (finance), James B. Duke (tobacco), Andrew Carnegie (steel), Cornelius Vanderbilt (railroads), and John D. Rockefeller (oil). Each of these entrepreneurs commercialized a new idea or invention—the essence of the innovation process. Each bridged the gap between science and the marketplace by developing and commercializing a marketable innovation.Although even more of a need to reach the market as quickly as possible exists today, the majority of the innovations commercialized each year come from new or smaller organizations-often the ones with the least amount of capability and resources to accomplish the task. Existing businesses, especially larger ones, are in a much better position to bridge this gap. These companies have the existing financial resources, business skills, and usually the marketing and distribution systems to successfully commercialize a new innovation. Recognizing this capability, large companies have tried to instill an entrepreneurial spirit or an internal venturing program in an attempt to increase the amount and success of new offerings. This activity has taken on a variety of forms, one of which is the new business venture unit.What are the characteristics of a new business venture unit? Are they more successful at introducing new products than autonomous entrepreneurs? These and other questions were addressed in a research project of Fortune 1000 firms consisting of a mail questionnaire and in-depth personal interviews.The majority of these firms did not have a new business venture unit (70%). Of those firms that did, the average age of their unit was 5.3 years and the range of ages was from a few months to 20 years. In addition, the range of employees in the new business venture unit varied greatly: from one to 100. Firms in the primary product lines of chemical and medical products, computers, beauty products, and feminine products tended to have new business venture units more than did firms in other product areas. These units contained a variety of departments, including marketing (the most frequent), finance, and research and development. Through modest increases in the number of new products introduced each year, the new business venture units also significantly increased the per- centages of sales attributed to products introduced within the previous three years. A good environment for a successful new business venture unit included: encouraging new ideas; allowing mistakes and failure; making available the resources of the firm; encouraging teamwork; establishing broad per- formance goals and an appropriate reward system; and having top management strongly support the unit.     

Missing the boat or sinking the boat: a study of new venture decision making

Taking two conceptualizations of risk, Dickson and Giglierano's [J. Mark. 50 (1986) 58] nautical analogy of entrepreneurial risk (sinking vs. missing the boat) to represent the likelihood of loss element of new venture risk, and March and Shapira's [Manage. Sci. 33 (1987) 1404] risk as hazard (boat size) to represent the magnitude of loss element of new venture risk, we investigated how two contextual factors, the suitability of entrepreneurs' skills and their sources of funds, and two individual differences factors, the entrepreneurs' risk propensities and their perceptions of risk, influence their new venture decision making. Metaphorically speaking, we found that most entrepreneurs would rather risk missing than sinking the boat, and that they preferred to pilot bigger craft than smaller ones. Perhaps surprisingly, our sample of highly successful entrepreneurs made relatively risk-averse choices, with 83% choosing either of the two ventures for which the chances for loss were lowest. We also found that the source of new venture funding—the entrepreneur's own money versus that of investors—influenced our subjects' choices between ventures whose chances for loss or gain differed. A similar effect was found for the entrepreneur's risk propensity. On the other hand, we found that the risk the entrepreneurs perceived in the choice set also influenced choices, but only where the magnitude of the new venture's potential gain or loss varied. When viewed in total, our study and results suggest a risk- and reward-based typology of new venture opportunities, one that may provide a conceptual foundation for future explorations of a variety of questions relevant for entrepreneurs and theorists alike.     

Predicting new venture survival: An analysis of “anatomy of a start-up.” cases from Inc. Magazine

This article tests the insights and predictions of venture success as offered by reporters and experts in Inc. magazine, to the predictions generated from an analysis of data from a venture screening questionnaire. The venture screening questionnaire, consisting of 85 items covering four broad categories: (1) Individual Characteristics; (2) Entrepreneurial Behaviors; (3) Strategy; and (4) Environment, was used to evaluate 27 “Anatomy of a Start-up” articles from Inc. magazine. The creation of the questionnaire was guided by the following premises:Individual Characteristics. We hypothesized that the chances of venture survival would be improved if: (1) entrepreneurs had substantial knowledge and ability at the beginning of the start-up story; (2) entrepreneurs gained knowledge and ability during the start-up process; and (3) entrepreneurs continued to demonstrate substantial knowledge and ability at the end of the start-up story.Entrepreneurial Behaviors. We hypothesized that entrepreneurs who expended more effort in any of the following activities would be in new ventures that survived compared to entrepreneurs who expended less effort: Finding and Refining the Opportunity—comprised of 9 different activities, such as, defining the purpose of the business, planning, analyzing competitors; Acquiring Resources and Help— comprised of 15 different activities, such as, finding investors, getting advice from lawyers, getting a loan, acquiring technical expertise; Operating the Business—comprised of 5 different activities, such as, dealing with distributors, managing the day to day operations of the business; Identifying and Selling to Customers—comprised of 5 different activities, such as, identifying specific customers to sell to, selling to customers, managing sales channels; Outside of the Business Issues—comprised of 4 different activities, such as, dealing with family problems, spouse, and friends.Strategy and Environment. The strategy and environment variables were characteristics requiring comparisons of the relative performance of new firms vis-à-vis other competitors and their industry characteristics, much like the questions used in PIMS research: first to entry, degree of innovation, rate of industry growth, size of market, relative price, and relative quality. There were 28 questions in this section of the instrument. We hypothesized that niche oriented strategies and high growth environments might be strategy and environmental characteristics common to startups that survived.In total, there were 85 questions that comprised the venture screening questionnaire.New Venture Survival. The measure of new venture survival for this study was a determination of whether the new venture described in each Inc. magazine article (Longsworth 1991) was still in operation as of January 1995. This date is nearly 4 years after the last case study that we analyzed was published (September 1990), and nearly 7 years after the first case study was published (February 1988). We were able to determine that of the 27 new ventures profiled in the “Anatomy of a Startup” series published in Longsworth (1991), 17 of these ventures were still in operation.A discriminant analysis was performed that resulted in seven variables that correctly classified 85% of the cases into new venture survivors or non-survivors. New ventures that survived were more likely to have: (1) entrepreneurs who gained knowledge and ability during the founding process; who devoted greater efforts to (2) dealing with suppliers; (3) analyzing potential new entrants and who (4) devoted less time to determining the identity of the business; businesses that had (5) “fundable” resource requirements (6) focused on products or services that were designed or produced to order; and (7) were in high growth industries. The classification accuracy of the model was much better than industry experts (55% correct), competitors (55% correct), venture capitalists and financiers (40% correct), and customers (38% correct).Even though the discriminant analysis was better able to predict venture survival or non-survival compared to the experts, there are significant limitations to the reliability and validity of this one particular model, and the data set used. The primary value of this exercise involves making obvious the variables that observers use to make judgments about predicting venture success. One of the frustrations we experienced in analyzing the expert’s predictions was our inability to glean consistent and general “rules of thumb” about new venture success from their observations. We conclude by discussing the value of academic research on new venture success predictors vis-à-vis other avenues of inquiry and expertise: popular journalism and practice.     

Social support timing and persistence in nascent entrepreneurship: exploring when instrumental and emotional support is most effective

This paper investigates how the timing of social support, both emotional and instrumental support, affects entrepreneurial persistence of nascent entrepreneurs. Drawing on social support theory, we hypothesize that the effectiveness of support depends on when, during the venture development process (number of gestation activities completed), it is provided. We also propose that the impact of social support depends on when during the entrepreneur’s life stage (age) that support is made available. Testing our hypotheses using a longitudinal dataset of nascent entrepreneurs, we find that emotional support is most relevant earlier on during venture development, while instrumental support is most relevant for entrepreneurs who begin their businesses in earlier life stages.     

Does money matter?: Wealth attainment as the motive for initiating growth-oriented technology ventures

The desire to attain personal wealth has long been regarded as the foremost motive for entrepreneurship. Other goals and values, however, may also contribute to entrepreneurial motivation. Thus, the extent to which money matters relative to other motives is an empirical question. In this study we examine the role of wealth as the motive for the decision to found new ventures. Three focal questions guide our research: 1) does money matter more relative to other decision dimensions in deciding to start a new high-technology venture? 2) does money matter more to entrepreneurs compared to non-entrepreneurs? and 3) does money matter in absolute terms, that is, does a decision model that focuses solely on the motive of wealth attainment parsimoniously predict entrepreneurs' start-up decisions?We conducted in-depth interviews with 51 entrepreneurs and a control group of 28 senior managers who decided not to start ventures (non-entrepreneurs) in the high-technology industry in British Columbia to address our research questions. The motives we examined are wealth attainment and an aggregate of other dimensions identified by entrepreneurs and managers. We considered three components of values: participants' ratings of the importance of various decision dimensions, their rating of the salience of these dimensions, and their satisfaction with prior levels of attainment on those decision dimensions. We assessed beliefs as participants' perceived probability of attaining their desired level of a particular decision dimension in each of three alternatives: the position held at the time the venture decision was made, the venture itself, and the next best career alternative at that time. The data were analyzed to compare entrepreneurs' values and beliefs regarding wealth with an aggregate of other decision dimensions (our relative hypotheses), and with those of non-entrepreneurs (our comparative hypotheses).Our findings do not support the common perception that money is the only, or even the most important, motive for entrepreneurs' decisions to start new ventures. Wealth attainment was significantly less important to entrepreneurs relative to an aggregate of 10 other decision dimensions, and entrepreneurs did not rate wealth as any more important than did non-entrepreneurs. Non-entrepreneurs rated wealth as no more important than other motives. Wealth attainment was also significantly less salient to entrepreneurs' decisions to venture than were other motives. Non-entrepreneurs reported that wealth was significantly more salient to their decision against founding a venture than other dimensions. In fact, non-entrepreneurs rated wealth attainment as significantly more salient to their decision against founding than entrepreneurs rated it for their decision to proceed with starting a high-technology business. A significant number of entrepreneurs started businesses even when they believed that doing so offered them a lower probability of obtaining their most desired level of wealth than did one of their other alternatives.Satisfaction ratings and stated beliefs also dispute classical predictions. Just prior to making the decision to venture, the entrepreneurs in our study were as satisfied with wealth as they were with other decision dimensions. The non-entrepreneurs were actually more satisfied with wealth attainment than with other dimensions. A comparison of the groups revealed no difference in satisfaction with wealth attainment levels. Entrepreneurs did believe that their chances of attaining their desired level of wealth were much greater through founding a new high-technology venture than through their other alternatives. This difference in beliefs, however, was not significantly greater than their optimistic beliefs about chances of attaining desired levels of other dimensions. It was significantly higher compared to the non-entrepreneurs' belief difference measures for wealth. In fact, the entrepreneurs' stated beliefs regarding the chances of attaining their desired levels of all dimensions were higher than those of the non-entrepreneurs, suggesting that entrepreneurs were simply more optimistic at the time of their decision than non-entrepreneurs.Salience findings suggest that these optimistic beliefs about wealth did not motivate the founding decision alone.We can distinguish those people who successfully started ventures by their regard for wealth as a less salient factor, and their beliefs in higher chances of a venture producing monetary and other returns. Other motives, such as innovation, vision, independence, and challenge were more important and much more salient to this sample of entrepreneurs.Our findings have implications for practice, teaching, and research. Venture capitalists who partially base their assessment of entrepreneurs on the extent to which they are motivated to make a great deal of money may benefit from reconsideration of this criterion. We have evidence of one group of high-technology entrepreneurs who achieved success without placing much decision weight on attainment of personal wealth. Nascent entrepreneurs and those who teach entrepreneurship can use this empirical finding to argue two main points: 1) not all entrepreneurs found a business for personal wealth reasons, and 2) one need not be motivated by personal wealth attainment to be a successful entrepreneur. Similarly, theoretical models that assume money is the primary motive for entrepreneurial activity require re-examination. Future research in entrepreneurship should focus less on wealth attainment and more on other motives for the venturing decision. A multiple-attribute decision model may be able to more fully explain venturing decisions.     

Differentiating Legal Issues by Business Type

Developing legal strategies is a fundamental part of business formation and strategic operation. The ability to incorporate legal planning into the business planning process allows entrepreneurs to strategically plan their operations to minimize risks arising from legal and regulatory regimes and better protect the assets of the business and entrepreneur. Research regarding the legal issues encountered in nascent business ventures is just beginning. Conducting a content analysis of 292 legal information letters, prepared in a university-based legal clinic for new ventures, legal issues and business type were identified. An analysis of the data indicated that: (1) certain legal issues are relevant to all new ventures, (2) certain legal issues are relevant to specific types of new ventures, and (3) the relevancy of individual legal issues will vary depending on the category of business.     

Venture capitalists' decision criteria in new venture evaluation

What criteria do venture capitalists use to make venture investment decisions? The criteria venture capitalists use to make their venture investment decisions are of interest for several reasons. First, venture capitalists are conspicuously successful in their investment decisions. The success rate of venture capital-backed ventures is significantly higher than the success rate of new ventures generally (Dorsey 1979: Davis and Stetson 1984). A better understanding of the criteria used could lead to a better understanding of the reasons for this success.Second, a better understanding of the criteria for successful new ventures could lead to an improvement in the success rate of new ventures. Although there is no clear agreement on the precise rate, the failure rate among new ventures is generally viewed as significantly higher than the average failure rate (Dun and Bradstreet 1984; Van de Ven 1980; Shapero 1981).Finally, venture capitalists' investment criteria are of enormous import to entrepreneurs seeking venture funding. Such entrepreneurs require a significant infusion of capital in order to grow their businesses, and knowledge of the criteria sought by venture capitalists can aid entrepreneurs in gaining the necessary financing.This study attempts to uncover the criteria used by venture capitalists through semistructured interviews and verbal protocol analysis of venture capitalists' evaluations of actual venture proposals. Sixteen verbal protocols—in which the participants “think aloud” as they review business proposals— were made of venture capitalists' venture evaluation decisions.The findings of this study suggest that venture capitalists screen and assess business proposals very rapidly: the subjects in this study reached a GO/NO-GO decision in an average of less than six minutes on initial screening and less than 21 minutes on proposal assessment. In venture capitalists' initial proposal screening, key criteria identified include fit with the venture firm's lending guidelines and the long-term growth and profitability of the industry in which the proposed business will operate. In the second stage of proposal assessment, the source of the business proposal also played a major role in the venture capitalists' interest in the plan, with proposals previously reviewed by persons known and trusted by the venture capitalist receiving a high level of interest.In addition to the specific criteria identified and how they were used in reaching GO/NO-GO decisions, the findings of this study also were surprising for the lack of importance venture capitalists attached to the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team and the strategy of the proposed venture during these early stages of the venture evaluation process.     

Speed to Legal Registration and Nascent Venture Performance: A Temporal Dilemma for Nascent Entrepreneurs in an Emerging Economy

In this paper, we examine the effect of a nascent venture's speed to legal registration during its formation on the initial venture performance in an emerging economy. Quickly obtaining legitimacy via legal registration in the early stages of a new venture's formation accelerates its resources acquisition and transition to other start‐up activities, facilitating the venture to seize dynamic entrepreneurial opportunities; however, in an emerging economy, quick legal registration also incurs substantial costs and compliance activities that may inhibit the venture's engagement in other start‐up activities. A nascent venture in an emerging economy suffers from being either too fast (early) or too slow (late) in registering its business during the formation process, and the relationship between the speed to registration and nascent venture performance is best reflected by an inverse U‐shape. Moreover, the inverse U‐relationship becomes more pronounced when the entrepreneurial opportunity is more innovative. Based on analyzing 145 nascent entrepreneurs from the event history data set of the China Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (CPSED), we found strong support for our arguments.     

The ambitious entrepreneur: High growth strategies of women-owned enterprises

During the last two decades, researchers have sought to develop categories of entrepreneurs and their businesses along a variety of dimensions to better comprehend and analyze the entrepreneurial growth process. Some of this research has focused on differences related to industrial sectors, firm size, the geographical region in which a business is located, the use of high-technology or low-technology, and the life-cycle stage of the firm (i.e., start-up vs. more mature, formalized companies). Researchers have also considered ways in which entrepreneurs can be differentiated from small business managers. One of these classifications is based on the entrepreneur's desire to grow the business rapidly. This is the focus of our study.To date, the media have paid considerable attention to rapidly growing new ventures. However, still lacking are large-scale research studies guided by theory through which we can expand our knowledge of the underlying factors supporting ambitious expansion plans. Some research has identified factors that enhance or reduce the willingness of the entrepreneur to grow the business. Factors include the strategic origin of the business (i.e., the methods and paths through which the firm was founded); previous experience of the founder/owner; and the ability of the entrepreneur to set realistic, measurable goals and to manage conflict effectively.Our study attempted to identify the strategic paths chosen by entrepreneurs and the relation of those paths to the growth orientation of the firm. The entrepreneurs sampled in this study are women entrepreneurs across a wide range of industrial sectors. Recent reviews of entrepreneurship research have suggested the need for more studies comparing high-growth firms with slower-growth firms to better delineate their differences in strategic choices and behaviors.Our study sought to answer the following questions: What characterizes a “high growth-oriented entrepreneur?” Is this distinction associated with specific strategic intentions, prior experience, equity held in previous firms, the type of company structure in place, or success factors the entrepreneur perceives are important to the business? Do “high growth” entrepreneurs show greater entrepreneurial “intensity” (i.e., commitment to the firm's success)? Are they willing to “pay the price” for their own and their firm's success? (i.e., the “opportunity costs” associated with business success and growth). Other relationships under investigation included different patterns of financing the business' start-up and early growth. Do “high-growth” entrepreneurs use unique sources of funding compared with “lower-growth” entrepreneurs?Eight hundred thirty-two entrepreneurs responded to a survey in which they were asked to describe their growth intentions along nineteen strategic dimensions, as well as respond to the foregoing questions. Some of the strategic activity measures included adding a new product or service, expanding operations, selling to a new market, and applying for a loan to expand operations. Actual growth rates based on sales revenues were calculated, and average annualized growth rates of the industrial sectors represented in the sample were obtained. This study showed that high-growth-oriented entrepreneurs were clearly different from low-growth-oriented entrepreneurs along several dimensions. The former were much more likely to select strategies for their firms that permitted greater focus on market expansion and new technologies, to exhibit greater intensity towards business ownership (“my business is the most important activity in my life”), and to be willing to incur greater opportunity costs for the success of their firms (“I would rather own my own business than earn a higher salary while employed by someone else”).The high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs tended to have a more structured approach to organizing their businesses, which suggests a more disciplined perception of managing the firm. In summary, results showed the group of high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs, labeled “ambitious,” as having the following distinctions: strategic intentions that emphasize market growth and technological change, stronger commitment to the success of the business, greater willingness to sacrifice on behalf of the business, earlier planning for the growth of the business, utilization of a team-based form of organization design, concern for reputation and quality, adequate capitalization, strong leadership, and utilization of a wider range of financing sources for the expansion of the venture. The purpose in uncovering these differences is to enable entrepreneurs and researchers to identify more clearly the attributes of rapid-growth ventures and their founders and to move closer to a field-based model of the entrepreneurial growth process which will help delineate the alternative paths to venture growth and organizational change.     

Venture capitalists and serial entrepreneurs

Habitual entrepreneurship is receiving growing attention, much of which has focused on entrepreneurs who have started more than one venture. This paper examines the importance of habitual entrepreneurs to the venture capital industry, with particular emphasis on those who have exited from an initial investment in the venture capitalist's portfolio, termed serial entrepreneurs. As venture capital markets mature, increasing numbers of entrepreneurs are likely to exit from their initial enterprises, creating a pool of entrepreneurs with the potential for embarking on subsequent ventures. Venture capitalists making investments may invest both in entrepreneurs starting new ventures and those who purchase a venture through a management buy-out or buy-in. On this wider basis, the paper develops a classification of types of serial venture. A number of issues are raised for venture capitalists, notably the relative attractiveness of reinvesting in exited entrepreneurs and the policy they adopt in tracking and assessing such individuals.The paper addresses venture capitalists' perspectives on investing in serial entrepreneurs based on a representative sample of 55 UK venture capitalists (a response rate of 48.7%, and a follow-up survey of those who had more extensive experience of serial entrepreneurs (23 respondents). The results of the survey show that despite a strong preference for using an entrepreneur who had played a major role in a previous venture, the extent to which exiting entrepreneurs are funded from their own portfolio again is limited, though there is more extensive use of such individuals in a consultancy capacity. In screening entrepreneurs exiting from previous ventures for subsequent investments, venture capitalists scored attributes relating to commercial awareness, experience in a particular sector, and personal ambition of the entrepreneur most highly.Venture capitalists do make extensive use of serial entrepreneurs who have exited from other venture capitalists' portfolios, primarily to lead management buy-ins. Indications from the survey are that venture capitalists rarely assess entrepreneurs formally at the time of exit and that it is unusual to maintain formal links with entrepreneurs after they have exited. These apparent shortcomings suggest that perhaps investment opportunities are being missed. Those venture capitalists preferring serial entrepreneurs generally had a larger volume of funds under investment and were rather older than those venture capitalists who do not prefer to use serial entrepreneurs, reflecting the possibility that longer established venture capitalists have had more opportunity and experience in relation to second-time entrepreneurs.Investment appraisal factors were subject to a principal components analysis to identify underlying dimensions/relationships between them. With respect to the general investment appraisal factors, five factors were identified. Two factors were related to track record; one of these reflected ownership experience, while the other represented management experience. The third factor was related to personal attributes such as age, knowledge, and family background. The fourth factor represented links to the funding institution, and the final factor (a single variable factor) concerned financial commitment. The principal components analysis for screening factors on management buy-ins produced a single factor comprising all variables. These factors were then subject to a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with preference for use of a serial entrepreneur as the independent variable. The results suggest that there are significant differences between venture capitalists who prefer serial entrepreneurs and those who do not in respect to their business ownership experience, the length of their entrepreneurial careers, and the number of their previous ventures.The results of the study have implications for practitioners. First, the findings emphasize the importance of not considering previous venture experience in isolation but in the context of other key investment criteria. Second, the lack of strongly greater performance from serial, versus novice, entrepreneurs further emphasizes the care to be taken in assessing experienced entrepreneurs. Third, the relatively low degree of formal and rigorous post-exit assessment and monitoring by venture capitalists suggests that important opportunities to invest in experienced entrepreneurs may be missed.     

A fresh start and the learning experience of ethnic minority entrepreneurs

This paper focuses on ethnic minority entrepreneurs whose businesses failed within the first 3 years of trading, but were starting afresh with the help of the Brent Business Venture Fresh Start in Business programme. The paper aims to identify why the entrepreneurs had previously failed; what prompted them to start again; what was different about their business approach and practices second time around; and how key lessons had been learned as a result of their previous experiences that can improve their prospects for success in the future. The resultant insight derives out of an evaluation study of the Fresh Start programme, the methodology for which included initial telephone interviews with 20 ethnic minority entrepreneurs spread across eight business sectors, during which profile data were collected. The second phase of the study involved in‐depth face‐to‐face and semi‐structured interviews with the 20 entrepreneurs. The main findings suggest that failed entrepreneurs learn from their mistakes and actions embedded in the development processes and activities underpinning their first business venture attempt and are more successful second time around. The key learning processes and activities include learning from customer feedback, from interface with suppliers, from interaction with peers and from the fostering and facilitating inputs of provision such as the Fresh Start programme. The ability to learn by doing, problem‐solving and opportunity‐taking is important. The study concludes by highlighting key identified management capabilities which can improve the likelihood of new venture success, and in particular the value of giving future focus to the nature and form of effective strategic learning processes and activities that successful owner managers undertake and how these could be nurtured as part of the would‐be entrepreneurs’‘management capabilities tool box’.     

Critical assumption planning: A practical tool for managing business development risk

Although much has been written about the practice of new business development, the authors continue to find corporate managers and entrepreneurs repeating the same mistakes and often reaching the conclusion that venturing in the corporate environment won't work. The problem stems from a mental model about how business should be managed and managers' performance assessed. Corporate managers of existing businesses are judged against meeting plan. In growing new businesses, however, strict adherence to “the plan” can lead to business failure. To manage business development risk, venture managers must learn to deal with uncertainty. Whereas managers of mature businesses practice the ethic of predictability, venture managers must follow a learning ethic.Working with Fortune 100 corporations, the authors have evolved a practical, disciplined process for business development risk management that focuses on learning. Titled critical assumption planning (CAP), the process maximizes learning about new markets at lowest cost. Major uncertainties in the business proposition are isolated as critical planning assumptions. Critical assumptions in the plan are then tested. The test sequence is determined by the potential reduction of uncertainty per dollar of test cost. Assessment of the assumption test results marks a milestone. At each milestone the business plan is revised to reflect what has been learned, and the venture is redirected or terminated. This process avoids the wasted effort and expense of pursuing the original plan until commercial failure becomes obvious.The key steps in this learning process are identification of critical assumptions and cost-effective testing of assumptions. Because these steps are unfamiliar to most corporate managers, effective use requires a new perspective and new planning tools. The study explains this perspective and introduces new tools for employing the process. Following are some planning innovations that have been effective in changing perspective and that also are of practical use:

1. 1. Differentiation between primary and derivative assumptions with focus on extracting and understanding the primary assumptions.

2. 2. Early construction of a model of the business plan that allows calculation of the impact of primary assumptions such as price or sales productivity factors on derivative assumptions such as revenues and income.

3. 3. Assignment of uncertainty ranges to the primary assumption values, not just the most likely values.

4. 4. Identification of the critical planning assumptions by determining the impact of their uncertainty ranges on venture net present value.

5. 5. Selection of the next venture milestone based on the test program that results in maximum reduction of uncertainty at least cost in least time for the most critical assumption(s).

Using CAP, managers can control risk despite the many uncertainties surrounding a new business proposition. Above all, decisions to stop or redirect ventures can be taken earlier, saving the corporation money and venture managers their career credibility.     

The entrepreneur's mode of entry: Business takeover or new venture start?

We extend the well-known occupational choice model of entrepreneurship by analyzing the mode of entry. Individuals can become entrepreneurs by taking over established businesses or starting up new ventures from scratch. We argue that the new venture creation mode is associated with higher levels of schooling whereas managerial experience, new venture start-up capital requirements and industry level risk promote the takeover mode. A sample of data on entrepreneurs from The Netherlands provides broad support for these hypotheses, and also bears out a prediction that entrepreneurs whose parents run a family firm tend to invest the least in schooling. We go on to discuss the implications for researchers, entrepreneurs and public policy makers.     

A proclivity for entrepreneurship: A comparison of entrepreneurs,small business owners,and corporate managers

Despite intensive inquiry, relatively little is known about the entrepreneur, the central figure in entrepreneurship. The question of how an individual who operates his or her own business differs from a corporate manager remains unanswered. In addressing this question, the primary purpose of this study was to investigate the potential of psychological constructs to predict a proclivity for entrepreneurship. The research model includes three classic themes in the literature: achievement motivation, risk-taking propensity, and preference for innovation.A survey of 767 small business owner-managers and corporate managers was assembled from a 20-state region, primarily the southeastern United States. The participants completed a questionnaire composed of the Achievement Scale of the Personality Research Form, the Risk-Taking and Innovation Scales of the Jackson Personality Inventory and questions pertaining to numerous individual and organizational variables. Respondents were first divided into two groups, managers and small business owner-managers. Subsequently, due to the often cited variations in entrepreneurs, the owner-managers were further categorized as either an entrepreneur or small business owner, using the widely cited Carland et al. (1984) theoretical definitions. Entrepreneurs are defined by their goals of profit and growth for their ventures and by their use of strategic planning. Alternatively, small business owners focus on providing family income and view the venture as an extension of their personalities. In this study, both groups of owner-managers were simultaneously compared with managers using hierarchical set multinomial LOGIT regression.The results indicated that the psychological constructs are associated with small business ownership, but with some important caveats. As hypothesized, those labeled entrepreneurs were higher in achievement motivation, risk-taking propensity, and preference for innovation than were both the corporate managers and the small business owners. This profile of the entrepreneur as a driven, creative risk-taker is consistent with much of the classic literature concerning the entrepreneur. Nonetheless, not all of the owner-managers fit this profile. When compared with managers, the small business owners demonstrated only a significantly higher risk-taking propensity. In terms of the constructs studied, the small business owners were more comparable to managers than to entrepreneurs.In addition to theoretical and methodological implications, the results presented here have important implications for small business owner-managers of both types. A major issue is the connection between the owner’s psychological profile and the characteristics of the venture, including performance. It would appear that psychological antecedents are associated with owner goals for the venture. Some owners will be more growth oriented than will others, and performance should be assessed in light of the owner’s aspirations for the venture. Moreover, owners should be aware of their own personality sets, including risk preferences, which may be more or less suited to different venture circumstances, including those with relatively high levels of risk.Planning in small businesses appears to enhance venture performance. Research has demonstrated the connections between psychological factors and planning behaviors in small businesses. Those labeled entrepreneurs in this study have goals of profit and growth, and tend to engage in more planning. An awareness of these psychological preferences and concomitant attention to planning behaviors have the potential to improve the performance of the venture, irrespective of owner aspirations.Venture teaming is becoming more popular among entrepreneurs. Balanced venture teams appear to improve the chances of entrepreneurial success (Timmons 1990), but a common source of conflict among venture team members is inconsistent or ambiguous motives for the new venture. Awareness of venture partners’ psychological predispositions in areas such as risk-taking could be used to identify and reconcile areas of potential conflict, and enhance the planning process in the small firm. In sum, an individual’s awareness of his or her psychological profile provides a number of advantages, not only to existing entrepreneurs, but also to aspiring entrepreneurs who should assess their perceived entrepreneurial opportunities against the backdrop of their psychological proclivity for entrepreneurship.     

Exploring start-up event sequences

This research analyzed new venture start-up activities undertaken by 71 nascent entrepreneurs. Nascent entrepreneurs are individuals who were identified as taking steps to found a new business but who had not yet succeeded in making the transition to new business ownership. Longitudinal data for the study comes from a secondary data analysis of two representative samples, one of 683 adult residents in Wisconsin (Reynolds and White 1993) and the other of 1016 adult residents of the United States (Curtin 1982). These surveys were conducted between 1992 and 1993, and the nascent entrepreneurs were reinterviewed six to 18 months after their initial interview.Three broad questions were addressed: (1) What activities do nascent entrepreneurs initiate in attempting to establish a new business? (2) How many activities do nascent entrepreneurs initiate during the gestation of the start-up? and (3) When are particular activities initiated or completed?Between the first and second interview, 48% of the nascent entrepreneurs reported they had set up a business in operation. Over 20% had given up and were no longer actively trying to establish a business. Almost a third of the respondents reported they were still trying to establish a firm.As a way to summarize the results and as a springboard toward some insights into the implications of this research for practice and future research, we developed the following activity profiles of the three types of nascent entrepreneurs studied. These profiles are offered as a combination of both fact and some intuition about the findings.STARTED A BUSINESS. Nascent entrepreneurs who were able to start a business were more aggressive in making their businesses real. They undertook activities that made their businesses tangible to others: they looked for facilities and equipment, sought and got financial support, formed a legal entity, organized a team, bought facilities and equipment, and devoted full time to the business. Individuals who started businesses seemed to act with a greater level of intensity. They undertook more activities than those individuals who did not start a business. The pattern of activities seem to indicate that individuals who started firms put themselves into the day-to-day process of running an ongoing business as quickly as they could and that these activities resulted in starting firms that generated sales (94% of the entrepreneurs) and positive cash flow (50% of the entrepreneurs). What is not known is how successful or profitable these new firms will be over time. For example, 50% of the firms that were started had not reached positive cash flow and these firms may have been started by individuals who were foolhardy and rushed into operation of a business that would not be sustainable.GAVE UP. The pattern of activities for the group of entrepreneurs who gave up seem to indicate that these entrepreneurs discovered that their initial idea for their businesses would not lead to success. The finding that the activity of developing a model or prototype differentiated individuals who gave up from those who were still trying would suggest that those who gave up had “tested” their ideas out and found that they would not work according to their expectations. Nascent entrepreneurs who gave up seemed to be similar in their activity patterns compared with those who started their firms, that is, individuals who gave up pursued the activities of creating a business in an aggressive manner at the beginning of the process. But as the business unfolded over time, these entrepreneurs decreased their activities and then ceased start-up activities. This group of individuals might be seen as either having the wisdom to test their ideas out before jumping into something that might lead to failure or lacking the flexibility to find more creative ways to solve the problems that they were confronted with.STILL TRYING. It would seem that those who are still trying are not putting enough effort into the start-up process in order to find out whether they should start the business or give up. Those still trying had undertaken fewer activities than individuals in the other two groups. The still trying entrepreneurs were devoting their short-term efforts toward activities internal to the start-up process (e.g., saving money and preparing a plan) and less effort toward activities that would make the business real to others. The still trying entrepreneurs may be all talk and little action. Or these still trying entrepreneurs might be involved in developing businesses that take longer for these particular opportunities to unfold. (It should be noted that there was no industry effect across the three groups.)Our advice to individuals considering business start-up is that the results seem to provide evidence that nascent entrepreneurs should aggressively pursue opportunities in the short-term, because they will quickly learn that these opportunities will either reveal themselves as worthy of start-up or as poor choices that should be abandoned. Individuals who do not devote the time and effort to undertaking the activities necessary for starting a business may find themselves perennially still trying, rather than succeeding or failing.What entrepreneurs do in their day-to-day activities matters. The kinds of activities that nascent entrepreneurs undertake, the number of activities, and the sequence of these activities have a significant influence on the ability of nascent entrepreneurs to successfully create new ventures. This study suggests that the behaviors of nascent entrepreneurs who have successfully started a new venture can be identified and differentiated from the behaviors of nascent entrepreneurs who failed. We believe that future studies will more precisely identify the kinds of behaviors appropriate for certain new venture conditions. If such contingency information can be generated, entrepreneurship research is likely to have significant benefits for entrepreneurship practice, education, and public policy.     

Successful U.S. Entrepreneurs: Identifying Ethical Decision-making and Social Responsibility Behaviors

This two-part study analyzed some of the ethical choices made by founding entrepreneurs during the creation and development of their ventures in order to identify the areas in which founding entrepreneurs must make decisions related to ethics or social responsibility during venture creation and development. Content analysis was used to identify decisions with ethical components and/or implications from in-depth interviews with 10 successful business founders. The research for part one of the study was guided by the following research question: In what areas must entrepreneurs make decisions with ethical and/or social responsibility implications during new venture creation and development? The authors identified four distinct categories of decisions where ethical or social responsibility components exist: (1) individual entrepreneurial values-related decisions, (2) organizational culture/employee well-being decisions, (3) customer satisfaction and quality decisions, and (4) external accountability decisions. In the second part of the study, the decisions identified in part one were analyzed using a framework derived from prior research in ethics. This framework was developed from the work of Kant (1964) who theorized about human morals and Rawls (1971) who developed theories about justice. Part two of the study was guided by the following research questions: Do entrepreneurs have values and ethics similar to those held by society in general? If they don’t, how do their values and ethics differ? The comparison revealed that the ethics and/or values that the entrepreneurs either explicitly or implicitly acknowledged were in fact similar to those of society in general.     

Entrepreneurial inception: The role of imprinting in entrepreneurial action

Recent research highlights that founders' early decisions and the environmental conditions at founding each imprint upon a new venture in ways that affect growth and survival. However, we know much less about how the entrepreneur is imprinted and how the outcome of this imprinting process influences the entrepreneur and the venture. Through semi-structured interviews and content analysis, our study examines entrepreneurs' formative experiences during sensitive periods of transition, which we refer to as sources of imprint. We illustrate how these sources of imprint impact entrepreneurial decision making and explain how they guide entrepreneurs' decisions as they progress through their entrepreneurial careers. In doing so, we improve our understanding of how entrepreneurs navigate the entrepreneurial process.     

So,you want to be an entrepreneur? Lessons from the Entrepreneurship Bootcamp for Veterans with Disabilities

Based on helping dozens of military veterans refine their ideas for starting a business, we identify and discuss a series of potential pitfalls that aspiring entrepreneurs—veterans and civilians alike—must avoid in order to be successful. Potential entrepreneurs must not confuse the pursuit of hobbies and self-employment with the act of creating a business. People who wish to build a business around public speaking or consulting need to firmly establish why customers should be willing to pay for their advice. Individuals that seek to develop a new non-profit organization must have a viable value proposition even though they are not pursing a profit motive. Overall, the entrepreneurial ventures that are most likely to succeed are those that (1) are based on a sustainable business model, (2) leverage the entrepreneur's unique experiences and attributes, and (3) are built around a process or system that enables the venture to prosper even if the entrepreneur leaves the venture.