Scenario development for corporate planning

The term “scenario” is familiar to those involved in forecasting, but too few people are aware of what exactly a scenario is, or how it can best be developed and applied. The author describes a method developed over several years in response to a need which most forecasting efforts have left unfulfilled. The method enables quantitative and qualitative forecasts to be combined in a manner which can be directly related to an organisation's planning and decision-making processes, and which permits the evaluation of a company's objectives and performance in the light of those forecasts. The analysis of an organisation's likely performance in given scenarios can, in turn, provide a basis for contingency planning.     

Creditor rights and the market power-stability relationship in banking

I use the staggered passage of creditor rights reforms in 13 countries to examine how changes in creditor rights affect (a) bank stability and (b) the bank market power-stability relationship. (a) There is statistically weak evidence that stronger creditor rights enhance bank stability; the result is not robust across specifications. (b) Market power positively affects stability. However, there is asymmetry in the effect of market power on stability, depending on whether there is an increase or a decrease in creditor rights. The market power-stability relationship is stronger when a country weakens its creditor rights vis-á-vis when it strengthens its creditor rights.     

Creditor rights and debt allocation within multinationals

We analyze the optimal debt structure of multinational corporations choosing between centralized or decentralized borrowing. We identify how this choice is affected by creditor rights and bankruptcy costs, taking into account managerial incentives and coinsurance considerations. We find that partially centralized borrowing structures are optimal with either weak or strong creditor rights. For intermediate levels of creditor rights fully decentralized (centralized) borrowing structures are optimal if managers have strong (weak) empire-building tendencies. Decentralized borrowing is more attractive for companies focussing on short-term profitability. Credits are rather taken in countries with better creditor rights and more efficient insolvency systems.     

Culture, openness, and finance

Differences in culture, proxied by differences in religion and language, cannot be ignored when examining why investor protection differs across countries. We show that a country's principal religion predicts the cross-sectional variation in creditor rights better than a country's natural openness to international trade, its language, its income per capita, or the origin of its legal system. Catholic countries protect the rights of creditors less well than Protestant countries. A country's natural openness to international trade mitigates the influence of religion on creditor rights. Culture proxies are also helpful in understanding how investor rights are enforced across countries.     

Business environment and the incorporation decision

Using firm-level data from 52 countries we investigate how a country’s institutions and business environment affect firm’s organizational choices and what impact the organizational form has on access to finance and growth. We find that businesses are more likely to choose the corporate form in countries with developed financial sectors and efficient legal systems, strong shareholder and creditor rights, low regulatory burdens and corporate taxes and efficient bankruptcy processes. Corporations report fewer financing, legal and regulatory obstacles than unincorporated firms and this advantage is greater in countries with more developed institutions and favourable business environments. We do find some evidence of higher growth of incorporated businesses in countries with good financial and legal institutions.     

IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Adjustment Programs

This article uses finance and agency theory to establish twokey propositions about International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionalityand country ownership of IMF-supported adjustment programs.First, the authors propose that the conditionality attachedto these programs is justified. Second, the article hypothesizesthat country ownership of these programs is crucial for theirsuccess. Because IMF conditionality and country ownership areboth necessary, the challenge is designing conditionality thatmaximizes ownership while providing adequate safeguards forIMF lending. The article analyzes several recent proposals aimedat enhancing country ownership of policies contained in IMF-supportedprograms. These proposals include encouraging countries to designtheir own adjustment and reform programs, streamlining structuralconditionality, introducing flexibility in the timing of structuralpolicy measures (floating tranche conditionality), and applyingconditionality to outcomes rather than policies (outcomes-basedconditionality).      

Diversification in euro area stock markets: Country versus industry

The harmonization of fiscal and economic policy within the European Monetary Union (EMU) has had a considerable impact on the economies of member countries. In particular, several studies indicate that the proceeding economic integration among euro area countries has important consequences for the factors driving asset returns in financial markets. However, these studies rely on one specific methodology [Heston, S.L., Rouwenhorst, K.G., 1994. Does industrial structure explain the benefits of international diversification? Journal of Financial Economics 36, 3–27; Heston, S.L., Rouwenhorst, K.G., 1995. Industry and country effects in international stock returns. Journal of Portfolio Management Spring, 53–58], that has recently been criticized as too restrictive. This study adopts a mean–variance approach instead. Using recent euro area stock markets data, we find strong evidence that diversification over industries yields more efficient portfolios than diversification over countries.     

Applying portfolio theory to global bank lending

Portfolio theory provides some insights into how a bank should manage its global exposures. Practical application of some of the principles of portfolio analysis is possible if comparable credit ratings are available and if the impact on each loan's rating of likely future events can be assessed. If further restrictive assumptions are made about which quality dimensions of the portfolio are more important (and how much more important), and if judgements can be quantified about what risk-return tradeoffs are acceptable, then it is possible to derive measures to guide exposure and pricing decisions. This article is related to the other papers in this special issue in that country and corporate risk assessment methodologies can provide important inputs into the portfolio analysis. This paper, however, attempts to go beyond the evaluation of risk at the level of individual companies, countries, or other loan customers, and to focus instead on the problem of managing the riskiness of the overall bank loan portfolio.     

Search for information and portfolio selection

The paper examines the problem of how to allocate scarce resources between increasing the investor's knowledge, that is reducing his uncertainty, and the actual investment—that is a kind of an ex ante decision before the final parameters of the securities are known. Our model provides answers to questions of how the search for knowledge affects portfolio selection, to what extent additional information can improve estimates of securities' statistical parameters and how the benefits and costs of additional search alter the investor's efficient mean-variance portfolio set.     

The effect of IMF lending on the probability of sovereign debt crises

This paper explores empirically how the adoption of IMF programs affects sovereign risk over the medium term. We find that IMF programs significantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults by approximately 1.5–2 percentage points. These results cannot be attributed to endogeneity bias as they are supported by specifications that explain sovereign defaults and program participation simultaneously. Furthermore, IMF programs turn out to be especially detrimental to fiscal solvency when the Fund distributes its resources to countries whose economic fundamentals are already weak. Our evidence is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that debtor moral hazard is most likely to occur in these circumstances. Other explanations that point to the effects of debt dilution and the possibility of IMF triggered debt runs, however, are also possible.     

Dividend policy,creditor rights,and the agency costs of debt

We show that country-level creditor rights influence dividend policies around the world by establishing the balance of power between debt and equity claimants. Creditors demand and managers consent to a more restrictive payout policy as a substitute for weak creditor rights in an effort to minimize the firm's agency costs of debt. Using a sample of 120,507 firm-years from 52 countries, we find that both the probability and amount of dividend payouts are significantly lower in countries with poor creditor rights. A reduction in the creditor rights index from its highest value to its lowest value implies a 41% reduction in the probability of paying a dividend, and a 60% reduction in dividend payout ratios. These results are robust to numerous control variables, sample variations, model specifications, and alternative hypotheses. We also show that the agency costs of debt play a more decisive role in determining dividend policies than the previously documented agency costs of equity. Overall, our findings contribute to the growing literature arguing that creditors exert significant influence over corporate decision-making outside of bankruptcy.     

The demand for and supply of deposits by credit unions: The Caisses populaires' case

The aim of the study is to explain Quebec major credit union's deposit market by way of intergrating its public demand function with the institution's rate-setting operation. The demand for Caisses' deposits is specified as a dynamic stock adjustment model. On the other hand, the intermediary's rate-setting reduced form is derived from a risk-return portfolio balance model which the managers maximize the expected utility of reserves. The two models are integrated by means of a liability composite rate. Econometric estimates of the integrated model provide us with interesting policy insights. For instance, the Quebecois public views chartered banks' deposits as a weak substitute for Caisses' deposits; it is also more responsive to non-rate arguments, such as loan eligibility or the institution's ethnic appeal. On the supply side, competitive liability rates are more important than returns on assets when the Caisses set its deposit rate. Finally, the impact growth imbalance between loans and deposits is well captured by a flow variable, without infringing on the steady-state determination based on rates.     

REFORM OF TRADE POLICY: Recent Evidence from Theory and Practice

In the 1980s many developing countries began to recognize thatrestrictive trade policies can constrain growth. To facilitatetrade and integration into the world economy, many countrieshave embarked on reform programs. This survey synthesizes theconclusions of the literature on trade policy reform with thoseof a recent study by the World Bank analyzing reforms in developingcountries, particularly those supported by adjustment lendingprograms. Its objective is to shed light on some of the questionsabout these programs to guide policymakers in the future. Thearticle reviews conditions in these countries before trade policyreforms were implemented and examines how much reform actuallytook place. It also examines the effects of the reforms on economicperformance and reviews the factors that constrained the reformprocess. The survey considers the most important issues in designingand implementing trade policy reforms and concludes that althoughpast reforms have had a positive impact, future programs shouldemphasize three elements: reducing the level of protection,maintaining macroeconomic stability, and accounting for theconflicts and complementarities with other policies.      

Insolvency law reform in Australia and Singapore: Directors' liability for insolvent trading and wrongful trading

This article compares reforms to directors' liability for insolvent trading in Singapore and in Australia. We analyse the law in these two countries because they are important Asia‐Pacific trading partners and their laws were originally largely the same—Singapore's law on insolvent trading reflected the law in Australia from the 1960s. However, the law in the two countries has now diverged substantially. The comparison of these two countries therefore represents an interesting case study in how countries differ in their approaches to balancing the competing interests evident in laws that impose personal liability on company directors for insolvent trading. Reform of the prohibition against insolvent trading was a focus of Australia's insolvency law reforms in 2017, which led to the introduction of a safe harbour for directors from liability. Singapore's omnibus insolvency law reforms of 2018–19 include amendments to update Singapore's fraudulent and insolvent trading provisions by introducing a concept of “wrongful trading.” The article finds that there are some areas of convergence between these two jurisdictions when it comes to debates about such provisions but concludes that the different contemporary legislative histories in Australia and Singapore have affected their approaches to reform. Reformers in both jurisdictions have attempted to find an appropriate balance between protecting creditors, discouraging director misconduct, and encouraging entrepreneurship and innovation; however, this comparison suggests that the weight that reformers place on creditor protection compared with the concern that excessive personal liability can make directors unduly risk‐averse is influenced by their existing legislative framework and experience of those laws. Although Australia has shifted away from a strict focus on creditor protection, to give directors more opportunities to engage in restructuring, Singapore's amendments may provide a more creditor‐friendly regime.     

Who survives? A cross-country comparison

How capital structure, dividend policy, and corporate governance vary across countries has been the focus of recent studies, but how resources are reallocated in response to poor performance has not received as much attention. This paper argues that the market for corporate control and the formal bankruptcy/liquidation processes of a country are two key mechanisms through which corporate assets are reallocated. Ideally, an economy would only allow the best users of economic resources to retain the right to use those assets and any sub-optimal use would result in either a take-over by a more proficient owner or an asset sale. We present evidence that equity market delistings occur more frequently in countries with strong shareholder rights. Furthermore, both strong creditor and shareholder rights increase the use of bankruptcy, relative to acquisitions, as a mechanism to resolve financial distress. We also present some evidence that these mechanisms are not as effective in Japan.     

Investment–cash flow sensitivity and investor protection

We examine the role of country-level legal investor protection (i.e., shareholder and creditor protection) on firm investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICFS). Using underexplored research data on investor protection across 21 countries and working with a conservative empirical design, we extend prior literature on the relation between investor protection and ICFS and provide new evidence on how these country-level attributes interact to explain a firm's ICFS. We find that either the strong legal protection of minority shareholders or the strong legal protection of creditors reduces the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow. However, in countries with strong levels of both minority shareholder and creditor protection, ICFS increases. Our results remain robust after controlling for several alternative explanations. The results support the argument that overregulation arises when policymakers increase investor protection at levels that lead firms to avoid external sources of finance, hampering firm investment. Our findings suggest that countries face a regulatory trade-off such that increasing investor protection (either shareholder or creditors protection) enhances financial markets efficiency, but excessive regulation can indeed lead to financial markets inefficiencies.     

Saving the Euro: Mitigating Financial or Trade Spillovers?

This paper analyzes through what channels the euro crisis affected firms and the efficacy of policies to mitigate the crisis. It analyzes stock price responses for 3,045 nonfinancial firms in 16 countries to four key policy events during 2010–11. Using precrisis benchmarks, it separates financial effects from trade effects and examines how bank and trade linkages propagated shocks. It finds that policy measures affected financially dependent firms more, particularly in creditor countries with greater bank exposure to peripheral euro countries, in statistically and economically significant ways. Trade linkages with peripheral countries played little role, although euro movements meant some differential effects.     

How creditor rights affect the value of cash: A cross-country study

We examine how legal protection of creditors affects the value of cash across countries. We find that the marginal value of cash is considerably higher in countries with weak creditor rights. Creditor rights are at least as relevant as shareholder rights, which other studies have found to be an important factor affecting various corporate policies. In addition, we find that marginal investment is more valuable for firms in countries with weak creditor rights. This combines the findings of previous studies that weak creditor protection makes firms financially constrained and that cash is more valuable for financially constrained firms. Subsample analysis suggests that financial constraints generated by weak creditor rights create underinvestment among cash starved firms but alleviate agency conflicts among cash rich firms. Further analysis reveals that good country governance complements laws protecting creditors in cash valuation.     

IMF programs, financial and real sector performance, and the Asian crisis

This paper has three objectives. First, using a richer and more comprehensive set of IMF-related news than previous studies, we examine the impact of IMF-related news on both financial and real stock sector returns in Indonesia during the Asian crisis. Second, we draw lessons about financial and real sectoral patterns of adjustment in crisis countries, including whether and how IMF programs facilitate this adjustment. Third, we explore the interplay between IMF actions in crisis countries and the actions and responses of local authorities. To do so, not only do we account for the impact of news regarding IMF policy actions but also the government’s reaction to them and willingness to implement such policies, and the public sentiment about the implemented IMF programs and government policies. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.     

A partial adjustment theory of the balance of payments

This paper develops a partial adjustment theory of the balance of payments by incorporating the inter-temporal optimizing behavior of the two agents of the society: the public and the central bank. The central bank is viewed as the government's regulator of domestic credit and its objectives are taken as distinct from and possibly at odds with the public's objectives due to imperfect competition in the political marketplace. The final equation derived here implies that the balance of payments reflects both the active behavior of the central bank concerning foreign reserves and the contribution of the public's flow demand for money.