Polluting Non-Renewable Resources and Growth

In an endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation, we introduce non-renewable resources which cause flow pollution problems. In this set-up the negative external effect of pollution on productivity does not cause any distortions in the economy: The market economy will achieve the optimal extraction and growth rates. Consequently, emission taxes are unnecessary and, when introduced, will have no effect on the economy. The more important is the negative pollution externality, the larger will be the optimal long-run growth rate (which may be either positive or negative). In the case of a positive human capital externality, consumption in the market economy may approach zero in the long run, although positive consumption growth is socially optimal. Growth-enhancing policies do not necessarily cause a larger drain in the resource stock.     

干中学、过度投资和R&D对人力资本积累的“侵蚀效应”

R&D的过度投资对人力资本积累具有"侵蚀效应"。本文提出了一个同时内生化技术进步和人力资本积累的经济增长模型,强调了R&D过程中的两种特征,即R&D过程需要人力资本投入和新技术的研发通过干中学获得,并就R&D对人力资本积累的"侵蚀效应"所造成的负外部性进行了分析。通过比较分散经济均衡和集中经济均衡,本文得出结论:垄断加价及其引致的物质资本和人力资本的过度投资与"侵蚀效应"相互交错、共同作用,会在一定程度上降低人力资本的积累率和经济增长率。     

Are short‐term effects of pollution important for growth and optimal fiscal policy?

We study optimal fiscal policy in a stock‐flow model of the environment within an endogenous growth framework, where some pollutants have a lasting impact on environmental quality which is restored through abatement expenditure, while others dissipate and hence, have a short‐term effect on the environment. All pollutants, however, affect the productivity of a public good negatively. Given that short‐term pollution, although it dissipates, is irreversible in this sense, a government cannot ignore its negative effects since this type of pollution lowers the productivity of all inputs. We find that a larger negative effect of short‐term pollutants as well as a higher congestion effect of private capital leads to corrective fiscal policies with higher optimal income tax and abatement expenditure rates, which have favorable growth consequences. Interestingly, we find that the rate of short‐term pollution does not affect optimal fiscal policy while that of the long‐term pollution does.     

REAL EXCHANGE RATE,MERCANTILISM AND THE LEARNING BY DOING EXTERNALITY

This paper examines the degree to which the learning by doing (LBD) externality calls for an undervalued exchange rate. We obtain mixed results. For an economy where the LBD externality operates in the traded sector, real exchange rate undervaluation may be used to internalize this externality, if the LBD calls for subsidizing employment in the traded sector. If the LBD externality is embodied in aggregate investment, the optimal policy calls for subsidizing the cost of capital in the traded sector, and there is no room for undervalued exchange rate policy.     

When Environmental Policy is Superfluous: Growth and Polluting Resources

In a research–driven endogenous growth model, a non–renewable resource gives rise to pollution. Consumption may either grow or decline along the optimal balanced growth path, but the (flow) pollution level necessarily diminishes continuously. Any positive balanced growth path is sustainable. Utility may improve, even though consumption declines. Although positive growth is optimal, the market economy may nevertheless result in permanently declining consumption possibilities. At the same time, a growth–enhancing government policy may improve long–run environmental conditions. The pollution externality does not distort the decisions of the market economy, so that a specific environmental policy is superfluous.
JEL classification : O 41; Q 20; Q 28; Q 32     

财政政策的供给效应与经济发展

本文分析了发展中国家公共投资对私人资本积累的动态响应。针对公共资本的拥挤性特征 ,同时考虑财政投资可能引起的风险。在不考虑公共投资风险的分权经济中 ,由于公共资本和私人资本都处于短缺状态 ,企业争夺拥挤性公共资本而扩张私人资本的投资行为虽然使经济超常增长 ,但是存在过度投资和过度拥挤。在集中优化模型中 ,如果考虑到公共投资的风险 ,政府通过税收方式弥补公共投资风险 ,同时将企业投资产生的拥挤效应内部化 ,就能消除企业的过度投资和过度拥挤现象 ,使经济保持合理持续的增长。对中国这样的发展中国家 ,需要重视财政的供给效应 ,在经济起飞初期保证一定数量的政府资本性支出是必要的 ,但随着经济的不断发展和政府资本性支出累积的风险增加 ,财政转型十分必要。     

Joint Management of Emission Abatement and Technological Innovation for Stock Externalities

We investigate how emission abatement and technological innovation provide different solutions to reduce pollutant emissions. In the case of a stock externality emission abatement leads to a smooth and continuous adjustment of emissions. Conversely, technological innovation has to be interpreted as an option on a less polluted environment and can justify the use of a pollution threshold above which it is optimal to start a research and development programme for a less polluting technology. It is shown that technological innovation interferes with the traditional emission abatement approach. The optimal abatement level is logically lowered once the less polluting technology is available; nevertheless a temporary increase in emissions is optimal during the research and development period. The usual Pigouvian tax system proves to remain an efficient corrective instrument. A numerical application to the Greenhouse effect is provided.     

Constant-returns endogenous growth with pollution control

Pollution control with positive externality from the government is incorporated in an endogenous growth model with AK production function. The result indicate that if consumption and abatement expenditure grows at a constant rate, pollution stock will have smaller growth rate. The growth rate of consumption in a command economy will in general be greater than in a competitive economy. A greater intertemporal elasticity of substitution will result in a lower growth rate only if the household's preference parameter against pollution is sufficiently small. The development strategy of pursuing higher growth rate accompanied by more pollution in the early stage of economic development is economically justifiable. The utility in a wealthier economy is always higher in all stages of development than in a poorer economy, as is the pollution stock, although it may converge in the steady state.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Congress on Modelling and Simulation, December 6–10, 1993, Perth, Australia. Constructive comments and suggestions from two anonymous reviewers of this journal are greatly appreciated, and so is the financial support from the Bureau of Industrial Development in Taiwan.     

Dynamic modelling of pollution abatement in a CGE framework

This paper deals with the specification of pollution abatement in dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and analyses the dynamic feedback mechanisms between economy and abatement in the context of environmental policy. A Ramsey-type economic model is presented, in which bottom-up technical and economic information on abatement techniques is integrated in a top-down dynamic CGE context. The practical suitability of the specification is illustrated by an empirical application for climate change and acidification in the Netherlands. The results show that a mixture of some slowdown of economic growth, a substantial restructuring of the economy and implementation of most technical abatement measures is optimal.     

Human Development at Risk: Economic Growth with Pollution-Induced Health Shocks

Risks to human health stemming from polluted air, water, and soil are substantial, especially in the rapidly growing economies. The present paper develops a theoretical framework to study an endogenously growing economy which is subject to pollution-induced health shocks with the health status being an argument of the welfare function. Pollution, arising as a negative externality from production, adversely and randomly affects the regeneration ability of a human body leading to a decline in the overall health status of the population. We include two types of uncertainty surrounding the health status: continuous small-scale fluctuations, driven by the Wiener process, and large-scale shocks or epidemics, driven by the Poisson process. We derive closed-form analytical solutions for the optimal abatement policy and the growth rate of consumption. Devoting a constant fraction of output to emissions abatement delivers the first-best allocation. This fraction is an increasing function of total factor productivity, polluting intensity of production, and damage intensity of both continuous and jump-type shocks. A higher frequency of jumps also calls for more vigorous abatement policies. By contrast, the optimal growth rate of the economy is decreasing in the frequency and intensity of shocks and in the polluting intensity of output. The efficiency of abatement technology has, in general, an ambiguous bearing on both the growth rate and on the abatement share due to the opposing forces of the direct and indirect effects.     

A dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution abatement under learning by doing

In 2013, Beladi et al. constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution, and characterized a steady-state equilibrium. In this paper, we extend Beladi et al.’s model to an even more general model in which the pollution abatement costs under learning by doing are taken into account. In our model, the instantaneous abatement costs depend on both the rate of abatement and the experience of using a technology. Our objective is to apply optimal control theory to investigate the dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution abatement, and derive the steady-state equilibrium properties and optimal levels of emission permits and pollution treatment.     

The Optimal Timing of Adoption of a Green Technology

We study the optimal timing of adoption of a cleaner technology and its effects on the rate of growth of an economy in the context of an AK endogenous growth model. We show that the results depend upon the behavior of the marginal utility of environmental quality with respect to consumption. When it is increasing, we derive the capital level at the optimal timing of adoption. We show that this capital threshold is independent of the initial conditions on the stock of capital, implying that capital-poor countries tend to take longer to adopt. Also, country-specific characteristics, as the existence of high barriers to adoption, may lead to different capital thresholds for different countries. If the marginal utility of environmental quality decreases with consumption, a country should never delay adoption; the optimal policy is either to adopt immediately or, if adoption costs are “too high”, to never adopt. The policy implications of these results are discussed in the context of the international debate surrounding the environmental political agenda.      

Optimal Stabilization Policy in the Presence of Learning by Doing

This paper analyses the optimal stabilization policy when growth is driven by learning by doing. If benefits of learning by doing are not fully internalized, the optimal policy is to tax labor during expansions and to subsidize it during recessions. The long-term impact of this policy depends critically on initial conditions: If stabilization starts during an expansion, it has a positive effect on long-term production. When stabilization starts during a recession, its long-term effect is negative. The paper makes a methodological contribution in its analytical derivation of the optimal policy along the transition path as well as in the steady state.     

Allocation of pollution abatement under learning by doing

This paper examines how learning by doing affects the allocation of pollution abatement between heterogeneous technologies over time. The optimal policy balances current abatement costs against reductions in future costs and infant technologies may be preferred to mature technologies despite greater initial costs. We characterize when a technological winner might emerge and we identify conditions under which optimal abatement is shared across all technologies. Pigouvian taxes can implement the first-best, but may need to be differentiated across technologies. When technical change is induced, an important role of environmental policies is to put abatement on the right technological trajectories.     

Intertemporal Emission Permits Trading Under Uncertainty and Irreversibility

This paper analyzes the effect of emission permit banking on clean technology investment and abatement under conditions where the stringency of the future cap is uncertain. We examine the problem of heterogeneous firms minimizing the cost of intertemporal emission control in the presence of stochastic future pollution standards and emission permits that are tradable across firms and through time. A firm can invest in clean capital (an improved pollution abatement technology) to reduce its abatement cost. We consider two possibilities: that investment is reversible or irreversible. Uncertainty is captured within a two period model: only the current period cap is known. We show that if banking is positive and marginal abatement costs are sufficiently convex, there will be more abatement and investment in clean technology under uncertainty than there would be under certainty and no banking. These results are at odds with the common belief that uncertainty on future environmental policy is a barrier to investment in clean capital. Moreover, under uncertainty and irreversibility, we find that there are cases where banking enables firms to invest more in clean capital.     

Foreign Investment,Technology Transfer and Foreign Capital Impact Function

This paper analyzes the optimal capital accumulation of a small open economy by incorporating the impact of technology transfer that accompanies foriegn ivestment. Assuming that technology transfer depends on the extent of foreign ownership, it is shown that, whenever there is technology transfer through foreìgn participation, the optimal rule suggests that a host country maintain some foreign capital in the steady state. The concept of the foreign capital impact function is introduced to capture possible negative effects in addition to the positive effects of foreign investment. The impact of foreign investment is shown to involve an externality, calling for government intervention for a social optimum. [110]     

How should environmental policy respond to business cycles? Optimal policy under persistent productivity shocks

How should environmental policy respond to economic fluctuations caused by persistent productivity shocks? This paper answers that question using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium real business cycle model that includes a pollution externality. I first estimate the relationship between the cyclical components of carbon dioxide emissions and US GDP and find it to be inelastic. Using this result to calibrate the model, I find that optimal policy allows carbon emissions to be procyclical: increasing during expansions and decreasing during recessions. However, optimal policy dampens the procyclicality of emissions compared to the unregulated case. A price effect from costlier abatement during booms outweighs an income effect of greater demand for clean air. I also model a decentralized economy, where government chooses an emissions tax or quantity restriction and firms and consumers respond. The optimal emissions tax rate and the optimal emissions quota are both procyclical: during recessions, the tax rate and the emissions quota both decrease.     

The trade-off between environmental care and long-term growth—Pollution in three prototype growth models

The effects of increased environmental care on optimal technology choice and long-term growth are studied for an economy in which pollution is a side-product of physical capital used in production. First, it is shown that in case of a standard neoclassical production structure, the result is a less capital-intensive production process whereas the long-run growth rate is not affected. Next, we introduce assumptions of the endogenous growth literature. When there are constant returns to physical capital, an increase in abatement activities crowds out investment and lowers the endogenous growth rate. When human capital accumulation is the engine of growth, physical capital intensity declines and the endogenous optimal growth rate is unaffected by increased environmental care or is even higher, depending on whether or not pollution influences agents' ability to learn.The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee, to Lans Bovenberg, Noud Gruijters, Theo van de Klundert, Lex Meijdam, and Sweder van Wijnbergen for helpful and stimulating comments. The views expressed in this paper are the authors' own and should not be attributed to the Ministry of Finance.     

Optimum Growth and Carbon Policies with Lags in the Climate System

We study the optimal carbon tax in an economy in which climate change, stemming from polluting non-renewable resource, affects the economy’s growth potential. Our main contribution is to introduce and explore the natural time lag of the climate system between emissions and damages to capital accumulation in an endogenous growth setting. This allows us to investigate how optimal climate policy, and its interplay with climate dynamics, affect long-run growth and the transition of the economy towards it. Without pollution decay, a higher speed of emissions diffusion steepens the growth profile of the economy. With pollution decay, this leads to lower short-run but higher long-run economic growth during transition. Poor understanding of the emissions diffusion process leads to suboptimal carbon taxes, resource extraction and growth.     

Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.