On the origin and rise of central bank independence in West Germany∗

Abstract

This paper investigates the (re-)establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945 and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on central bank independence, which at the time represented a German peculiarity. The paper inquires whether contemporary German economic thought may have provided a theoretical case for this peculiar tradition and scrutinizes the political calculus that motivated some key actors in the play. Contrary to conventional wisdom, important contradictions between the postulate of central bank independence and Ordoliberalism are identified.

JEL Classification Codes: B22, B31, E50     

Does clarity of central bank communication affect credibility? Evidences considering governor-specific effects

Central banks have made great efforts to increase transparency and accountability to the public. Since then, studies seek empirical evidences about the effects of monetary policy communication over agent’s expectations. The recent literature on central bank communication draws attention to the importance of clarity of central bank communication. However, researches on this theme are still scarce, and there are few empirical studies with conclusive findings. Our study seeks empirical evidences on the relation between clarity of central bank communication and credibility of monetary policy. Estimates through different methods aim to identify whether clarity of central bank communication improves credibility. The study is the first to provide empirical evidence that a clearer communication can improve credibility. We also consider the differences between the two governors who ruled the Central Bank of Brazil in the period under analysis. The results indicate that a clear communication can improve credibility, but it depends on the commitment of the central banker with the goal of inflation control. Furthermore, estimates based on quantile regression indicate that the benefit brought by the clarity to the credibility depends on the commitment of the monetary authority with the goal guiding inflation expectations.     

The evolution of the Polish central bank’s views on Eurozone membership

This article analyses the reports published by the National Bank of Poland (NBP – Narodowy Bank Polski) between 2004 and 2014. These reports shed light on the evolution of official thinking on the possibility of Polish participation in the Eurozone, revealing a decline in enthusiasm over time. This change has taken place against a backdrop of a shift in general public attitudes (in Poland) towards the European Union, and a more specific shift in public opinion on the desirability of monetary integration on the supranational level caused by the economic crisis. These two factors explain the shift in conclusions and arguments contained in the official reports of the National Bank of Poland.     

Who upholds the surging gold price? The role of the central bank worldwide

Who upholds the surging gold price? Conventional wisdom suggests that the depreciation of the exchange rate, inflation and economic turmoil are the suspects. Nonetheless, while these factors cease, why does the gold price still stay around hikes? The gold market belongs to a global arena. Different from other commodities, its participants include the national central banks worldwide. However, surprisingly, the role played by these tremendous market participants’ gold holdings on the gold price has been ignored in past empirical works. This research focuses on central banks’ gold holdings to explore who upholds the surging gold price. Several interesting outcomes are derived. First, our empirical evidence shows an inverse phenomenon relative to news reports from the mass media that the gold holdings of central banks worldwide in fact continuously descend. Second, the mainstream countries of the world have not played a main role in the rising trend of the gold price in the recent decade; instead, newly emerging industrialized countries’ central banks’ gold holdings show their significant power in explaining causality to gold price fluctuations. Third, the reason for the persistent gold buying behaviour of emerging economies may be because the increase in the gold price delivers a kind of short squeeze effect to the central banks of emerging countries.     

Lenders on the storm of wholesale funding shocks: saved by the central bank?

We provide empirical evidence on banks’ responses to shocks in the wholesale funding market, using data of 181 euro area banks over the period from August 2007 to June 2013. Responses to funding liquidity shocks for both banks’ lending volumes and loan rates, to households and corporates, are analysed in a panel VAR framework. We thereby distinguish banks by country, extent of Eurosystem borrowing, bank size and capitalization. The results show that shocks in the securities and interbank markets have significant effects on loan rates and credit supply, particularly of banks in stressed countries of the periphery. The results also suggest that central bank liquidity has mitigated this effect on lending volumes. Lending to nonfinancial corporations is more sensitive to wholesale funding shocks than lending to households. Lending volumes of large banks that are typically more dependent on wholesale funding and banks with large exposure to sovereign bonds show stronger responses to wholesale funding shocks.     

The ‘compensation’ thesis,as exemplified by the case of the Chinese central bank

This paper extends the theory of demand-led money supply endogeneity to the case of an open economy with a fixed exchange rate. This theory is contrasted to the standard Mundell-Fleming view. In the compensation approach advocated here, central banks are able to set interest rates, even in a fixed exchange rate regime, either because there are automatic market mechanisms that will induce the private sector to act in such a way that changes in foreign reserves will be compensated by opposite changes in central bank claims over the domestic economy, or because the central bank will engage in endogenous sterilization operations in its efforts to enforce its benchmark interest rate. Analyzing the balance sheet of the Chinese central bank, we find that the large rise in foreign reserves on the asset side is compensated by large positive changes in items of the liability side, mainly bonds issued by the central bank. Foreign reserves are not cointegrated with the monetary base, meaning that there is no long-run relationship between foreign exchange reserves and the supply of base money. We also find no long-run relation between foreign exchange reserves and the consumer price index.     

ERM crisis in retrospect: What if a European central bank had been in existence before 1992?

This paper explores whether policy coordination or a single monetary policy implemented earlier would have kept the U.K. in the process of European monetary integration. On the basis of the pre-ERM crisis empirics by Douven and Plasmans (1996), a counterfactual game simulation approach is used, and five scenarios are established for comparison with the actual historical records. The final answer is negative.     

Macroeconomic shocks, unionized labour markets and central bank disclosure policy: How beneficial is increased transparency?

The paper investigates the implications of disclosure by the central bank to the private sector of information relating to the current realizations of macroeconomic disturbances. In the context of an economy in which the goods market is monopolistically competitive and where wages are set by atomistic unions, we find that greater precision of information provided to wage setters in respect of supply shocks has ambiguous welfare effects, both from the perspective of the social loss function and from the viewpoint of unions who act on the information. An important feature of the model is an externality in union wage setting which implies the outcome of the wage determination process is collectively inefficient.     

Is enhanced bank prestige a possible motive for bank mergers?

Most financial researchers utilize the shareholder wealth maximization model to explain corporate managerial behavior. It is empirically demonstrated that such a model cannot explain the degree of merger activity by banks—regulated entities— during a recent period. Empirical results suggest, however, that there is a link between degree of bank merger activity and bank prestige. Perhaps financial researchers could improve their explanatory models by incorporating “social wealth” factors along with “economic wealth” factors.     

Why do bank loans react with a delay to shifts in interest rates? A bank capital explanation

We advance an explanation for the delay in the response of the volume of bank loans to innovations in monetary policy. Capital requirements may effectively tie the evolution of bank credit to the evolution of bank equity. By uncovering a new mechanism by which shifts in interest rates affect the profitability of the banking sector, and in turn its equity, we find that the resulting movements in the amount of aggregate loans are consistent with the regularities observed in the data.     

Public subsidies and new ventures’ use of bank loans

Access to financial resources is crucial for young firms to strive. To foster innovation and growth in these firms, governments address financing constraints by initiating public support programs. For such financial support to be effective, it is, however, important that firms are able to augment publicly provided resources with additional means. This study examines the relationship between new ventures’ subsidy receipt and long-term bank loans. Studying new ventures founded between 2005 and 2009 in Germany, we test whether the subsidy itself facilitates use to bank financing. Applying econometric techniques that account for the endogenous nature of a subsidy receipt, we find that subsidized young firms are more likely to use bank loans and to have obtained a larger share of their financing mix from banks. We further show that this effect is stronger in highly information-opaque sectors. These results suggest that the effect may be attributed to an information value carried by the grant that is relevant to banks’ loan assessment procedures, especially when new venture value is difficult to judge.     

An analysis of commercial bank common stock returns: 1802–97

This study creates analyses for the first time a continous index of returns on commercial bank common stocks listed in a specific market. The index is constructed from a unique set of historical data and is calculated on both a weighted and unweighted basis, first including and then excluding dividends. A measure of volatility is calculated annually.

The results indicate that the dividend component of holding period returns is very important. Including dividends, average returns were 6.0% for the century; excluding dividends, average returns were 0.1%. Excess returns were calculated using two different measures of a riskless rate of return. Cumulative excess returns for the first half of the nineteenth century were negative. Real returns were calculated, and found to be generally positive over the century. The volatility of returns was quite high during certain periods.

Examining the effects of significant economic and political events on bank common stock returns, we find that the War of 1812, the Civil War, and the National Banking System had a significant impact on bank stock returns. Several economic panics, several depressions, the First and Second Banks of the United States, the Embargo of 1807, and the Suffolk Bank had no measureable impact.     

Do bank bondholders price banks’ ability to manage risk/return?

In this paper, we empirically investigate whether bank bondholders value risk management, measured as risk-return efficiency (RRE), when pricing bond spreads. Based on a sample of 2,452 bonds issued by 78 European listed banks, for the period 2001–2015, we find evidence that the ability of banks to manage risk affects bond spreads: banks with more capable managers obtain a lower cost of debt. In particular our results show that bank bondholders are even more sensitive to RRE during the crisis period, for relatively poorly rated bonds, for unsecured/subordinated debt, and for long maturity debt. Our findings highlight that bondholders’ monitoring of banks is effective and takes into account the efficiency of risk management during financial and economic downturns, but during sound periods bank bondholders should strengthen their monitoring of risk management.     

How does equity capital cost affect bank performance during a financial crisis?

This article theoretically examines how equity capital cost affects return performance and safety of a bank and how this effect varies across a financial crisis comparing to a normal time when the bank manager’s performance reveals the like of higher equity return and the dislike of higher equity risk. We derive two main results. First, an increase in the bank’s equity capital cost from an increase of the interest rate of the Federal funds results in a reduced loan risk-taking at an increased optimal bank interest margin, implying better bank performance. Second, by ignoring the dislike, we find that the better performance is reinforced during a financial crisis but is reduced during a normal time. Financial crises and the dislike preference as such contribute a relatively low return and the stability of banking activities.     

Is the Swedish central government a wage leader?

Is the Swedish central government a wage leader? This question is studied empirically in a vector error-correction model using a unique, high quality data set. It is first shown that salaries of white-collar workers in the private sector and central government are cointegrated. It is then found that private sector salaries are weakly exogenous to the system of equations. This means that the private sector is the wage leader in the long-run model. It is also found that changes in central government salaries do not Granger cause changes in private sector salaries. Together, these findings clearly demonstrate that the central government is not placing undue pressure on salaries in the private sector. The central government is not acting as a wage leader.     

Should central bankers discount the future? A note

Optimal monetary policy under discretion is analysed in a New Keynesian model with rule of thumb pricing. The paper finds that social welfare increases if the policy maker does not discount the future. The welfare improvement rises with the extent of intrinsic inflation persistence.