Eliciting Willingness to Pay without Bias using Follow-up Certainty Statements: Comparisons between Probably/Definitely and a 10-point Certainty Scale

Correction for hypothetical bias using follow up certainty questions often takes one of two forms: (1) two options, “definitely sure” and “probably sure”, or (2) a 10-point scale with 10 very certain. While both have been successful in eliminating hypothetical bias from estimates of WTP by calibrating based on the certainty of yes responses, little is known about the relationship between the two. The purpose of this paper is to compare the two using data from three field experiments in a private good, dichotomous choice format. We compare four types of yes responses that differ in the criterion used to determine if there is sufficient certainty for a hypothetical yes response to be considered a true yes response. We make several comparisons, but focus on determining which values on the 10-point scale give the same estimates of WTP as “definitely sure” hypothetical yeses and real yeses (actual purchases). Values that produce equivalence are near 10 on the certainty scale.     

Do People Always Pay Less Than They Say? Testbed Laboratory Experiments with IV and HG Values

Hypothetical bias is a long‐standing issue in stated preference and contingent valuation studies—people tend to overstate their preferences when they do not experience the real monetary consequences of their decision. This view, however, has been challenged by recent evidence based on the elicitation of induced values (IV) in the lab and homegrown (HG) demand function from different countries. This paper uses an experimental design to assess the extent and relevance of hypothetical bias in demand elicitation exercises for both induced (IV) and homegrown (HG) values. For testbed purpose, we use a classic second‐price auction to elicit preferences. Comparing the demand curve we elicit in both, hypothetical bias unambiguously (i) vanishes in an IV, private good context and (ii) persists in HG values elicitation context. This suggests hypothetical bias in preference elicitation appears to be driven by “preference formation” rather than “preference elicitation.” In addition, companion treatments highlight two sources of the discrepancy observed in the HG setting: the hypothetical context leads bidders to underestimate the constraints imposed by their budget limitations, whereas the real context creates pressure leading them to bid “zero” to opt out from the elicitation mechanism. As a result, there is a need for a demand elicitation procedure that helps subjects take the valuation exercise sincerely, but without putting extra pressure on them.     

Communication & competition

Charness and Dufwenberg (Am. Econ. Rev. 101(4):1211–1237, 2011) have recently demonstrated that cheap-talk communication raises efficiency in bilateral contracting situations with adverse selection. We replicate their main finding and extend their design to include competition between agents. We find that communication and competition act as “substitutes:” communication raises efficiency in the absence of competition but not with competition, and competition raises efficiency without communication but lowers efficiency with communication. We briefly review some behavioral theories that have been proposed in this context and show that each can explain some but not all features of the observed data patterns. Our findings highlight the fragility of cheap-talk communication and may serve as a guide to refine existing behavioral theories.     

A Learning Design for Reducing Hypothetical Bias in the Contingent Valuation Method

Over the last few years a great deal of research has focussed on hypothetical bias in value estimates obtained with the contingent valuation (CV) method and on means for ameliorating if not eliminating such bias. To date, efforts to eliminate hypothetical bias have relied on calibration techniques or on word-smithing of one kind or another to induce subjects to provide responses to hypothetical questions that mimic responses made by subjects facing actual payments in the valuation experiment. This paper introduces a different approach for eliminating hypothetical bias. A design for a CV survey format is presented which provides subjects with the opportunity to learn how the CV institution works. Sequential referenda are conducted where respondents gain experience in CV settings by participating in both hypothetical and real referenda. The logic of this Learning Design is a straightforward application of the trials process used in experimental economics. We demonstrate that the Learning Design is effective in eliminating hypothetical bias in surveys concerning donations to two different public goods.     

When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests

We study the quality of advice that an informed and biased expert gives to an uninformed decision maker. We compare two scenarios: mandatory disclosure of the bias and nondisclosure, where information about the bias can only be revealed through cheap-talk. We find that in many scenarios nondisclosure allows for higher welfare for both parties. Hiding the bias allows for more precise communication for the more biased type and, if different types are biased in different directions, may allow for the same for the less biased type. We identify contexts where equilibrium revelation allows but mandatory disclosure prevents meaningful communication.     

Induced-Value Tests of Contingent Valuation Elicitation Mechanisms

Using an induced-value experimental design that varies whether values for a “good” are certain or uncertain and whether payment is real or hypothetical, this study investigates issues of demand revelation, hypothetical bias, and value uncertainty for four elicitation mechanisms used in contingent valuation surveys: dichotomous choice, dichotomous choice with follow-up certainty question, payment card, and multiple-bounded discrete choice. For all elicitation mechanisms, we find no evidence of hypothetical bias: voting decisions do not vary systematically when payment is hypothetical versus when it is real. Under all design conditions we find the fewest deviations between stated and induced values and the strongest evidence of demand revelation with dichotomous choice. Stated uncertainty in dichotomous choice follow-up and multiple-bounded discrete choice questions does correlate with uncertain induced values, but the signal is noisy. We discuss the implications of our findings for the design of contingent valuation surveys.     

Demand Revelation,Hypothetical Bias,and Threshold Public Goods Provision

We examine the issues of hypothetical bias, demand revelation, and gender differences in a threshold public goods experiment with heterogeneous induced-values. First, we find no evidence of hypothetical bias in our threshold provision public goods experiments, despite the fact this is an open-ended type mechanism. Our results support recent experimental findings that use induced-values to investigate hypothetical bias. Second, we investigate the demand revealing performance of real and hypothetical payments and find no evidence that real payment performs better than hypothetical payment in our experiments. Third, we examine whether payments, real and hypothetical, are positively related to induced-values. Our results suggest there is statistical evidence that payments are positively related to true values. Finally, we examine the effect of gender on real and hypothetical payments in our experiment. The results show that gender matters for contributions through both real and hypothetical payments, after controlling for true values as well as socio-economic variables. Results also indicate that females are more likely to truthfully reveal their value than males through hypothetical payments, but gender is not significant for truthfully revealing their value through real payments.     

Consumers’ preferences for a local food product: a real choice experiment

This paper analyses consumers’ preferences for a local food in Spain and assesses their willingness to pay (WTP) using a real choice experiment to mitigate possible hypothetical bias. In particular, preferences for fresh lamb meat were investigated and two attributes evaluated, “locally grown” and the type of lamb meat. Data came from an experiment conducted in Spain during 2009. An error component random Parameter model with correlated errors was used to estimate the effect of the attributes on consumers’ utility and derive their WTP. Results suggest that consumers positively value both attributes and are willing to pay a premium of 9 % price increase for the “locally grown” lamb meat (“Ojinegra from Teruel”) and 13 % price increase for the “Ternasco” lamb meat. If we assume a market where only “Ternasco” lamb meat without indication of the local origin is sold, and then a new “Ternasco” lamb is introduced in the market with the “Ojinegra from Teruel” label, this new local lamb meat would capture 18 % of the market if the package is assumed to be sold at 3.5 \(\hbox {C}\!\!\!\!\!=\) and a 10 % market share if the package is assumed to be sold at 4 \(\hbox {C}\!\!\!\!\!=\) .     

Resolving questions about bias in real and hypothetical referenda

Despite 10 years of research on behavior in hypothetical referenda, conflict remains in the literature on whether or not the mechanism generates biased responses compared to real referenda, and the nature and source of any such bias. Almost all previous inquiry in respect of this issue has concentrated on bias at the aggregate level. This paper reports a series of three experiments which focuses on bias at the individual level and how this can translate to bias at the aggregate level. The authors argue that only an individual approach to hypothetical bias is consistent with the concept of incentive compatibility. The results of these experiments reflect these previous conflicting findings but go on to show that individual hypothetical bias is a robust result driven by the differing influence of pure self-interest and other- regarding preferences in real and hypothetical situations, rather than by a single behavioral theory such as free riding. In a hypothetical situation these preferences cause yea-saying and non-demand revealing voting. This suggests that investigation of individual respondents in other hypothetical one-shot binary choices may also provide us with insights into aggregate behavior in these situations. Alphabetical list of authors no seniority of authorship attributed.     

Willingness to pay for a Green Energy program: A comparison of ex-ante and ex-post hypothetical bias mitigation approaches

The most persistently troubling empirical result in the contingent valuation method literature is the tendency for hypothetical willingness to pay to overestimate real willingness to pay. Two approaches, ex-ante and ex-post, have been developed to mitigate or eliminate the overstatement of hypothetical willingness to pay. The ex-ante approach addresses hypothetical bias in the survey design stage while the ex-post approach addresses hypothetical bias with follow-up questions to the hypothetical willingness to pay question. We find that willingness to pay estimates are similar when either the ex-ante or ex-post approach are employed. Our results suggest that the approaches should be considered as complements and not substitutes. Employing both approaches to mitigate hypothetical bias we estimate that the annual benefits of the regional amenities associated with a Green Energy program in North Carolina are $186 million.     

DO CHINESE UNIONS HAVE “REAL” EFFECTS ON EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION?

In this article, we use enterprise population‐level data to investigate the effectiveness of Chinese unions in improving employee wage and nonwage compensation. We show that the effectiveness of Chinese unions stems from a “collective voice” face rather than from a “monopoly” face. The empirical findings on the effectiveness of unions are remarkable: unions in the workplace significantly improve employee wage and nonwage compensation, along with employee training. Moreover, the presence of unions within the same region and industry generates positive spillovers for employee compensation. The unions in China do have “real” effects. (JEL J30, J50, J51, K31)     

Hypothetical Bias in Risk Preferences as a Driver of Hypothetical Bias in Willingness to Pay: Experimental Evidence

This study provides new insight on the established issue of elicitation bias in hypothetical choice settings. In particular, using an experiment that elicits real and hypothetical willingness to pay for the protection of otters, we provide evidence that the observed bias is driven by those who are both uncertain about their value and exhibit hypothetical bias in risk attitudes. This finding provides a reason why calibration approaches based on follow-up certainty questions have proven useful, but also suggests a degree of caution in applying the approach. Our results favour combining uncertainty calibration with CVM-X in which hypothetical bias in risk attitudes is also taken account to correct for hypothetical bias in WTP.     

Home bias in divestment decisions of multinational corporations in the EU

We empirically investigate the claim that multinational corporations (MNCs) suffer from a “home bias” in divestment decisions: MNCs prefer to divest from foreign subsidiaries because the “emotional involvement” and the commitment in divesting from domestic subsidiaries is larger. This issue has not been yet empirically explored in the economic literature, although it is quite recurrent in the political debate on MNCs and FDI. Using detailed company‐level data on the EU corporate groups during the economic crisis (2008–2014), we show that, in spite of prima facie empirical evidence of a home bias, the bias disappears when firm‐, country‐, and sector‐specific factors are accounted for.     

Underreporting of Top Incomes and Inequality: A Comparison of Correction Methods using Simulations and Linked Survey and Tax Data

Household surveys do not capture incomes at the top of the distribution well. This yields biased inequality measures. We compare the performance of the reweighting and replacing methods to address top incomes underreporting in surveys using information from tax records. The biggest challenge is that the true threshold above which underreporting occurs is unknown. Relying on simulation, we construct a hypothetical true distribution and a “distorted” distribution that mimics an underreporting pattern found in a novel linked data for Uruguay. Our simulations show that if one chooses a threshold that is not close to the true one, corrected inequality measures may be significantly biased. Interestingly, the bias using the replacing method is less sensitive to the choice of threshold. We approach the threshold selection challenge in practice using the Uruguayan linked data. Our findings are analogous to the simulation exercise. These results, however, should not be considered a general assessment of the two methods.     

Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk

We analyze the role of cheap-talk in two player games with one-sided incomplete information. We identify conditions under which (1) players can fully communicate and coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria of the underlying complete information game; and (2) players cannot communicate so cheap-talk does not alter the equilibrium set of the Bayesian game. We present examples that illustrate several issues that arise when there is two-sided incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.     

Gender Bias in Education: the Role of Inter-household Externality, Dowry and other Social Institutions

We analyze gender bias in school enrollment by developing a two‐period model where women become part of extended families of their in‐laws. Each family decides how many sons and daughters are sent to school and thus become skilled. Gender bias occurs due to failure of the families to internalize inter‐household externalities. “Groom‐specific” dowry worsens the situation. Under “bride‐specific” dowry, bias exists if and only if the skill premium in the labor market is bigger than that in the marriage market. A specific discriminatory “food‐for‐education” policy is shown to reduce bias, but increase total enrollment.     

Social context,financial stakes and hypothetical bias: an induced value referendum experiment

This article investigates the effect of social context in an induced value, public good referendum experiment. In a split-sample treatment, social context is simulated by requiring participants to potentially have to disclose their vote to the group (voting disclosure) across both hypothetical and real settings. The experimental design also varies the cost (a coercive tax), and includes an uncertain level of benefit from the public good. The design allows investigation of the role of social context in both hypothetical and real referenda and its interaction with changes in the financial stakes involved (costs and potential benefits). Results show evidence of hypothetical bias, but also a social context effect that occurs in both real and hypothetical settings. This social context effect is larger than the effect of hypothetical bias, but is muted by the magnitude of costs and potential benefits. Hypothetical cases are also shown to be more prone to the social context effect.     

A Meta-analysis of Hypothetical Bias in Stated Preference Valuation

Individuals are widely believed to overstate their economic valuation of a good by a factor of two or three. This paper reports the results of a meta-analysis of hypothetical bias in 28 stated preference valuation studies that report monetary willingness-to-pay and used the same mechanism for eliciting both hypothetical and actual values. The papers generated 83 observations with a median ratio of hypothetical to actual value of only 1.35, and the distribution has severe positive skewness. We find that a choice-based elicitation mechanism is important in reducing bias. We provide some evidence that the use of student subjects may be a source of bias, but since this variable is highly correlated with group experimental settings, firm conclusions cannot be drawn. There is some weak evidence that bias increases when public goods are being valued, and that some calibration methods may be effective at reducing bias. However, results are quite sensitive to model specification, which will remain a problem until a comprehensive theory of hypothetical bias is developed.JEL classifications: C9, H41, Q26, Q28