Impatience,reputation and offending

Reconviction rates for offenders are high despite sentence severity increasing with the number of convictions. The standard one-shot model of crime provides little scope for exploring ‘persistence effects’, although recent papers by Emons and others have sought to put offending decisions into a more dynamic setting. This article develops a simple two-period model of offending in which criminal convictions act as an adverse signal in labour markets. Ordinary and multinomial logistic regression modelling is used to test the predictions of the theoritical model and explore the link between unemployment and convictions. The empirical results, which are based on longitudinal data from the National Child Development Study (NCDS) in the UK, strongly support the view that, ceteris paribus, individuals with previous convictions are at higher risk of being unemployed.     

Predation,reputation, and entry deterrence

Economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational, since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly. Our gametheoretic, equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants, then predation may be rational against early entrants, even if it is costly when viewed in isolation, because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants. Asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis, since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm's future behavior on its past actions. The analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena.     

An experiment on deception,reputation and trust

Experimental Economics - An experiment is designed to shed light on how deception works. The experiment involves a twenty period sender/receiver game in which period 5 has more weight than other...     

Audited reputation

We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854–882].     

Quality, reputation and the choice of organizational form

This paper revisits the hypothesis that nonprofit organizations emerge in markets that are characterized by contractual incompleteness because they ensure consumers against opportunistic behavior. We extend the Glaeser and Shleifer [Glaeser, E., Shleifer, A., 2001. Not-for-profit entrepreneurs. Journal of Public Economics 81, 99–115] framework, which studies an entrepreneur’s optimal choice of organizational form and service quality when quality is non-contractible into a repeated interaction setting. The main result is that when reputations can be sustained, then for-profit status is the preferred organizational form and high quality services are ensured. This finding suggests that existing explanations of nonprofit organizations that focus entirely on contractual imperfections in the producer/consumer relationship may be inadequate.     

Standards and the regulation of environmental risk

We study regulatory design for a pollution-generating firm who is better informed than the regulator regarding pollution mitigation possibilities, and who chooses an unobservable action when employing a particular mitigation plan. We distinguish among performance, process, and design standards, and study the relative merit of each type of regulatory instrument. Relative to previous work on standards design, we emphasize technology and process verification. An optimal performance standard is relatively strict when regulator and firm preferences are congruent, but the regulator may prefer no performance standard at all if verification costs are sufficiently high. A process standard unambiguously increases expected surplus (relative to no regulation) in some environments, and otherwise improves welfare only when it is unlikely to generate a “bad” technology choice by the firm. A design standard can improve welfare if the regulator is sufficiently well informed about the technological possibilities for pollution control, but only when the firm’s private benefits from technology choice are sufficiently small.     

Trust,reputation and bidding behaviour in online mystery auctions

We use transactions from a distinctive online environment of ‘mystery’ auctions to examine the role that trust plays and how it impacts bidding behaviour when the exact characteristics of a good being auctioned are purposefully concealed from buyers. We show that buyers are generally trusting seller claims in online transactions and that seller reputation becomes significantly more important to buyers (as demonstrated by their bids) when the quality (or value) of the good is unspecified. Our findings can be extrapolated to consider broader economic implications of bidding behaviour impacted by trust, such as in financial markets, where over-bidding may lead to price bubbles.     

Separating reputation, social influence, and identification effects in a dictator game

This study explores the ways in which information about other individual's action affects one's own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient's within-game reputation on the dictator's decision: Reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives is an important step in trying to understand how impulses towards selfish or generous behavior arise. The statistical analysis of experimental data reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than the social influence and identification.     

Financing,reputation and information disclosure quality in the Chinese market

In this article, we propose a theoretical model based on the reputation theory and hypothesize a positive relation between the information disclosure quality and the company’s refinancing decision. We collected data from the listed companies, which refinances in Shenzhen main board and SME board during 2006–2012, as a panel sample, and tested the hypothesis empirically. The results indicate that there exists a significant positive correction short-term relation between refinancing decision and the information disclosure quality, but in the long term the relationship between the information disclosure quality and refinancing decision is not significant.     

Firm reputation with hidden information

Summary. An adverse selection model of firm reputation is developed in which short-lived clients purchase services from firms operated by overlapping generations of agents. A firm's only asset is its name, or reputation, and trade of names is not observed by clients. As a result, names are traded in all equilibria regardless of the economy's horizon The general equilibrium analysis links the value of a name to the market for services. This causes a non-monotonicity that precludes higher types from sorting themselves through the market for names, and leads to “sensible” dynamics: reputations, and name prices, increase after success and decrease after failure. Received: July 31, 2001; revised version: December 20, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" I thank Jon Levin, Eric Maskin and Drew Fudenberg for valuable discussions, and Heski Bar-Isaac for comments on an earlier draft. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (NSF grants SBR-9818981 and SES-0079876) is gratefully acknowledged. This paper replaces an older (and incomplete) working paper titled “Reputation with Hidden Information”.     

Predation and reputation acquisition in debt markets

This paper presents a model of predation based on reputational differences between the entrant and an incumbent. While the incumbent has an established reputation in the debt market, the entrantss quality is not yet known in the debt market. We show that the incumbent may have incentives to prey in order to interfere with the reputation acquisition of the entrant.Received: June 2002 , Accepted: December 2002, JEL Classification: C72, D82, G3, L1I am grateful to one anonymous referee for very valuable comments. In addition, for helpful comments on previous versions of this paper, I thank Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole, António Pires, Soumodip Sarkar, and seminar participants at M.I.T., Boston University and Western Ontario University.     

Planned adaptation in risk regulation: An initial survey of US environmental, health, and safety regulation

In principle, we want regulatory programs to be based on current realities, as reflected for example in the best knowledge of relevant experts. That would imply that old rules now on the books should be consistent with today's knowledge base, not just what was known when a rule or standard was originally set. This paper reports on a survey of US programs, examining how often existing rules are actually updated in light of better knowledge, and identifies five programs that attempt to make policy routinely adaptive. These programs exhibit what we term Planned Adaptation: they both revise rules when relevant new knowledge appears, and take steps to produce such improved knowledge. While Planned Adaptation is rare, it is used in several nationally prominent programs, including air pollution, airplane safety, and drug safety. Planned Adaptation is a policy tool that deserves more attention.     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

市场经济信誉机制的构筑

信誉与市场经济并非对立和互相排斥,相反,信誉是市场经济的基础。良好的信誉可以大大拓宽市场经济的交易范围,大大减少交易费用。产权的明确界定,完善的法治环境和畅通的信息传播机制是建立良好的信誉的必要条件。     

Trust, reputation and relationships in grazing rights markets: An experimental economic study

Trust is frequently a requirement for economic exchanges and the management of natural resources. Providing public information on past actions can promote trust through the formation of reputations. We developed an economic experiment to test whether a formal reputation mechanism could facilitate trusting relationships in the tradable grazing rights markets. Providing information to create formal public reputations for market participants did not increase the overall efficiency of the market. However, it did result in greater equality of income between partners, suggesting that participants showed more concern for their partners when they knew they would be rated. Even with public reputation information, bilateral relationships remained central to the market. Market failures in existing grazing rights markets may be better addressed by measures to increase communication between partners rather than simply relying on a formal reputation mechanism.     

Flooding risk and housing values: An economic assessment of environmental hazard

Climate change, the ‘boom and bust’ cycles of rivers, and altered water resource management practice have caused significant changes in the spatial distribution of the risk of flooding. Hedonic pricing studies, predominantly for the US, have assessed the spatial incidence of risk and the associated implicit price of flood risk. Using these implicit price estimates and their associated standard errors, we perform a meta-analysis and find that an increase in the probability of flood risk of 0.01 in a year is associated to a difference in transaction price of an otherwise similar house of - 0.6%. The actual occurrence of a flooding event or increased stringency in disclosure rules causes ex-ante prices to differ from ex-post prices, but these effects are small. The marginal willingness to pay for reduced risk exposure has increased over time, and it is slightly lower for areas with a higher per capita income. We show that obfuscating amenity effects and risk exposure associated with proximity to water causes systematic bias in the implicit price of flood risk.     

Regulation,entrepreneurship, and firm size

Journal of Regulatory Economics - We empirically investigate the theory that regulatory growth within an industry disproportionately burdens small businesses relative to their larger competitors....     

TRIMs, environmental taxes, and foreign investment

Various second-best policy mixes of investment measures and environmental taxes for a polluted, small open economy with foreign capital and immovable trade restrictions are examined. The optimal policy mix depends on the types of trade restrictions. When tariffs are in place, strict policies of pollution taxes and export requirements are optimal for alleviating tariff-induced consumption and production distortions. When involuntary quotas are used in lieu of tariffs, however, the optimal policy mix is a zero export requirement and Pigouvian taxes on pollution. For the case of VERs, however, the optimal policy demands export requirements and a less stringent pollution tax.
TRIMs, impôts environnementaux et investissement étranger. Ce mémoire examine certains ensembles de politiques de second-ordre portant sur l'investissement et les impôts environnementaux dans une petite économie ouverte polluée où il y a capital étranger et restrictions au commerce international. Quand on a des droits de douane en place, des politiques de fiscalité environnementale et d'exportations requises sont optimales pour corriger les distorsions aux patterns de production et de consommation engendrées par les droits de douane. Cependant quand des contingentements involontaires sont en place plutôt que des droits de douane, le mélange optimal de politiques est de ne pas requérir d'exportation mais d'imposer des taxes à la Pigou sur la pollution. Pour ce qui est des restrictions volontaires à l'exportation, le mélange optimal de politiques réclame une taxe moins forte sur la pollution accompagnée par un certain niveau d'exportation requis.