A test of the impact of mergers on bank competition

We propose a new test to evaluate the impact of horizontal mergers on competition in the banking industry. The test is designed to be applied ex ante to potential mergers while being parsimonious in terms of data, as it only uses information on branches in local markets. The test is a counterfactual exercise based on a two‐stage model where banks compete in branching and interest rates and requires comparing the estimated degree of competition in the status quo, where branching networks by banks are those actually observed, with a counterfactual scenario, where the branching network of the new entity is the sum of the branches of the banks involved in the horizontal merger. The statistical difference between the two estimated measures of competition quantifies the impact of the merger. We apply our test to French and Italian mergers.     

Monopolization through endogenous vertical mergers

While endogenous merger analysis has been applied to horizontal mergers, the thrust of vertical merger analysis has been based on exogenous mergers. The goal of this paper is to analyze endogenous vertical mergers. I consider a market structure with a downstream monopolist and an oligopolistic upstream industry. The downstream monopolist chooses to buy a certain number of the upstream firms. Mergers are endogenous, in the sense that the bids made by the downstream firm must be accepted by each of the integrated upstream firms, and must not exceed the increase in the profits of the downstream firm. It is shown that the unique equilibrium is complete monopolization: the buyer buys all the firms in the upstream industry. This result is consistent with the result that vertical mergers are profitable. However, it is in contrast with horizontal endogenous mergers, where complete monopolization is generally not an equilibrium.     

Mergers and capital flight in unionised oligopolies: Is there scope for a “national champion” policy?

Many policy makers seem to prefer domestic alternatives to cross-border mergers. We construct a model where cross-border mergers drive down union-set wages, domestic mergers have non-labour cost synergies and policy evaluators care more about workers than capital owners. Apparently, the stage is set for “national champion” policies to be sensible. However, we also introduce the possibility of capital flight by allowing a domestic firm to move production abroad. Restrictive cross-border merger policies can then seriously backfire, since they do not necessarily bring about a domestic merger — but capital flight instead.     

Electricity market mergers with endogenous forward contracting

We analyze the effects of electricity market mergers in an environment where firms endogenously choose their level of forward contracts prior to competing in the wholesale market. We apply our model to Alberta’s wholesale electricity market. Firms have an incentive to reduce their forward contract coverage in the more concentrated post-merger equilibrium. We demonstrate that endogenous forward contracting magnifies the price increasing impacts of mergers, resulting in larger reductions in consumer surplus. Current market screening procedures used to analyze electricity mergers consider firms’ pre-existing forward commitments. We illustrate that ignoring the endogenous nature of firms’ forward commitments can yield biased conclusions regarding the impacts of market structure changes such as mergers. In particular, we show that the price effects of mergers can be largely underestimated when forward contract quantities are held at pre-merger levels. Whether the profits of the merged firm are greater with fixed or endogenous forward quantities is ambiguous.     

Horizontal Mergers and Merger Waves in a Location Model

We consider sequential mergers in a spatial model with Cournot competition. This model is suitable for explaining the behaviour of some industries where several brands of the same product are delivered by plants. The automobile and oil product industries are examples. To discuss sequential mergers, we use the method of Nilssen and Sørgard (1998). We show that if the transportation cost per length is large relative to market size, a merger wave occurs. In addition, it might improve social surplus. On the other hand, if the transportation cost per length is relatively small, a merger wave does not occur even though firms would be better off with sequential mergers.
We also compare our model to that of Levy and Reitzes (1992) who consider horizontal mergers with spatial price competition. We show that in a merger of neighbouring firms the merged firm's profit decreases. This result is opposite to that of Levy and Reitzes (1992).
Finally, we consider how a regulator affects sequential mergers. When each merger occurs, the regulator assesses each merger. In this case, there is a possibility that the existence of the regulator deters welfare-improving sequential mergers.     

The closed‐loop effect and the profitability of horizontal mergers

Abstract.  We study the profitability of horizontal mergers in a dynamic competition context with sticky prices. It is shown that, when firms use open‐loop strategies, a merger is profitable only if the share of the market that merges is significant enough. In the case where firms use closed‐loop strategies we provide a method to conduct analytically the study of the profitability of horizontal mergers. We first prove the existence of an equilibrium of the game when a subset of firms merges. When firms use feedback strategies, mergers are profitable even when the share of the market that merges is arbitrarily small. JEL Classification:D4, L13     

Local representation and strategic voting: Evidence from electoral boundary reforms

We analyze whether voters value local political representation by exploiting municipal mergers, which increase the number of candidates available to voters and intensify political competition. In the Finnish open-list proportional representation system, voters rank the candidates within parties, and thus, concentrating votes to local candidates increases the extent of local representation. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that the vote distributions become more concentrated in municipalities less likely to gain local representation after the mergers. Moreover, the effect is much larger in municipalities where the benefits of local representation to voters are large. The latter result disentangles voters' responses from the responses of other political actors. The results are important also for designing local government mergers, which are an important policy tool in many countries. They highlight that concerns over deteriorating local democracy due to mergers have merit, because voters have preferences for local representation. At the same time, the vote concentration patterns we find alleviate these concerns.     

Merger and optimal number of firms: an integrated simulation approach

In a market where imperfect competition occurs as a result of mergers, this study proposes a framework consisting of both efficiency and risk analyses that allow the simulation of pro forma mergers and hence the determination of the optimal number of firms in the industry. This is valuable policy information for regulators concerned with possible intervention in the case of competition and anti-trust violations, and also for business managers seeking acquisition targets. The framework is applied to the banking industry in Taiwan. Results reveal the potential for industrial restructuring in a sector where the optimal number of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) is between four and six, subject to whether partial control is assumed.     

Australian Company Mergers 1960-1970*

This study recorded 340 international mergers and 1992 domestic mergers in Australia in the period mid 1959-December 1970. In the 1,460 mergers for which price information was available, the total merger value amounted to $2,283.3 million. The merger movement was most intensive in the later years of the period, with $1,034.8 million being paid for 429 firms during 1968-1970. This compares with some 1,157 mergers transacted at a total cost of $558.4 million recorded by Mr Bushnell [2] in the period 1947-to mid 1959.²³ While mergers took place in almost all industries, they were not uniformly distributed. More than two-thirds of foreign take-overs occurred in manufacturing, compared with less than one-half of domestic mergers in manufacturing. Foreign companies have purchased the largest or leading Australian firms in their respective industries. Moreover, United States take-overs were important in basic chemicals and flour mill and cereal products; on the other hand, United Kingdom take-overs were prominent in beverages and malt, other industrial machinery and fabricated metal products. Among the foreign acquiring companies, merger activity was more concentrated in United Kingdom-based companies than among United States-based companies. For the period as a whole, domestic take-overs outnumbered foreign take-overs by more than 5·5 to 1. In examining the limited evidence for foreign take-over activity in the period 1946-59,²⁴ it is apparent that foreign firms have accounted for a much higher share of merger activity during the nineteen-sixties. In addition, mergers overseas have brought together the Australian subsidiaries of the merging companies. Mr Bushnell [2] rated the tax structure including all its ramifications as probably the single most important cause for mergers.²⁵ While tax factors have continued to play an important role in merger activity, it appears that, during the sixties, a far more important reason for mergers in many industries has been the so-called proliferation effect of mergers. As some firms, especially the multinationals, took over leading local companies making for cost and competitive advantages, invariably the smaller remaining independent firms were compelled to resort to mergers for defensive reasons. The owners of many of these firms, fearing a war of attrition, took advantage of avoiding risks by capitalizing future profits in the form of tax-free capital gains, by selling out before a situation emerged where their bargaining power would have been seriously eroded. Most of these firms disappearing into mergers, did so with partners closely related to their existing operations. Approximately three-fourths of domestic and foreign take-overs were of the broad horizontal class.     

Upstream mergers,downstream mergers,and secret vertical contracts

In an industry characterized by secret vertical contracts, we consider a benchmark case where two vertical chains exist, with two upstream manufacturers selling to two downstream retailers, and show that the equilibrium prices are independent of whether upstream or downstream firms have all the bargaining power. We then analyse two alternative mergers, and show that a downstream merger (which gives the downstream monopolist all the bargaining power) is more welfare detrimental than an upstream merger (which gives the bargaining power to the upstream monopolist). We also show that downstream and upstream mergers have the same effects when contracts are observable.     

TAXING FOREIGN PROFITS WITH INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS*

A large part of border crossing investment takes the form of international mergers and acquisitions. In this article, we ask how optimal repatriation tax systems look like in a world where investment involves a change of ownership, instead of a reallocation of real capital. We find that the standard results of international taxation do not carry over to the case of international mergers and acquisitions. The deduction system is no longer optimal from a national perspective and the foreign tax credit system fails to ensure global optimality. The tax exemption system is optimal if ownership advantage is a public good within the multinational firm. However, the cross‐border cash‐flow tax system dominates the exemption system in terms of optimality properties.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization On Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergers*

This paper analyzes the effects of tariff reductions on horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly in a two-country world. It is shown that for mergers between two domestic firms and for cross-border mergers which supply both markets from a foreign plant, unilateral tariff reduction encourages mergers which concentrate market power at the expense of mergers which reduce cost, while bilateral tariff reductions have the opposite effect, encouraging mergers which significantly reduce cost. Cross-border mergers which continue to supply each market from a local plant are discouraged by both unilateral and bilateral tariff reduction.     

论企业兼并过程中的企业家行为与兼并绩效

企业家作为企业兼并的操作主体，其行为对企业兼并的规范与否和绩效高低产生重要影响。从过程性的角度切入，提练、概括企业兼并过程中的企业家行为，并结合企业兼并绩效分析，整合性地研究了两者的关联机理。根据对五种关联机理的分析，证明不同的企业家行为会导致增值效应或减值效应。     

Monopoly medicine?

"Integrated" health plans, which tie together doctors, hospitals and other services, are being touted as a remedy for the nation's ailing health system. But in Minnesota, where such plans are relatively well established, a side effect has appeared: a rash of mergers and acquisitions that could undermine competition in the health care market.     

并购对创新投入的影响及持续性研究

基于2013-2017年中国A股上市公司数据,从创新资金投入和人员投入两个方面出发,通过比较研究和回归分析,探讨并购行为和并购类型分别与创新投入间的关系,以及主并企业性质和行业性质对并购创新效应的调节作用。结果显示：并购行为有助于企业创新投入水平提高,且这种积极作用具有持续性。其中,横向并购与创新投入显著正相关,而纵向并购和多元化并购与创新投入的关系不显著。进一步研究发现,主并企业性质和行业性质对并购创新效应具有显著调节作用,具体表现为：非国有企业横向并购能够显著促进企业创新投入,而国有企业并购创新效应不显著;高新技术企业横向并购能够显著提高创新投入水平,而非高新技术企业并购创新效应不显著。研究结论丰富了并购创新效应相关研究,可为国内企业并购行为提供实践依据。     

COORDINATION INCENTIVES UNDER COMPLEMENTARY COST‐REDUCING TECHNOLOGIES*

This paper focuses on the optimal regulation regarding technology transfer and mergers in a duopoly model where two complementary technologies can be developed. On the one hand, we show that there are cases where a prohibitive policy regarding (cross) licensing agreements can be socially desirable. On the other hand, our analysis stresses that, in many cases, there are important coordination problems that cannot be overcome by means of cross‐licensing agreements and merger is the optimal policy.     

“一带一路”背景下我国跨境并购现状、问题及对策建议

从国际上来看,跨国并购是对外直接投资的主流。随着我国企业"走出去"步伐不断加快,中国跨国企业对发达国家企业发起的跨国并购逐渐增多,已有不少成功案例,但总体来说成功率并不高。与发达国家企业发起的并购相比,新兴国家企业对发达国家企业发起的跨国并购有其独特的特点。基于此,分析我国跨国并购的现状及存在的问题,并提出对策建议。     

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Mergers: a Global Analysis*

We analyze the effects of bilateral tariff reductions on the profitability of cost‐reducing horizontal mergers. Given Cournot competition in a two‐country world, for any positive tariff below a certain threshold, marginal trade liberalization is shown to encourage only those domestic mergers with sufficiently large cost‐savings and to discourage the rest. For tariffs close to, but smaller than, the prohibitive tariff, however, marginal trade liberalization necessarily encourages all domestic mergers. Moreover, we show that for a given level of cost‐savings, the impact of marginal trade liberalization may not reliably predict that of nonmarginal liberalization. Although at high tariffs, domestic mergers are shown to be unambiguously more profitable than cross‐border mergers, near free trade, mergers which yield the most cost‐savings become the most profitable. Thus, when comparing domestic and cross‐border mergers, trade liberalization encourages the type which yields the most cost‐savings.     

外资并购与目标企业效率研究:基于啤酒行业的实证分析

外资并购是外国直接投资进入中国市场的一种主要手段.随着加入WTO后,外资在中国啤酒行业掀起一波接一波的并购浪潮.以中国啤酒行业2002-2006年间28起并购为研究对象,选取124家啤酒企业的财务数据,采用DEA-Tobit两阶段回归模型,实证分析外资并购相对于国内并购对目标企业的效率的影响.结果显示:外资并购既没有提升目标企业的纯技术效率,也没有对目标企业的规模效率产生影响,而与之形成对照的是内资并购对目标企业的纯技术效率有显著的提升.     

和而不同：高管团队职能背景异质性对企业跨界技术并购绩效的影响

跨界技术并购能够为企业提供全新的创新思路,在技术融合与创新背景下,其优势易于发挥。在并购发生后,高管团队职能背景异质性在很大程度上作用于企业战略和创新决策,对企业发展具有至关重要的作用。因此,选取首次并购公告日在2007年1月1日到2016年12月31日间的73个跨界技术并购案例为样本,运用多元回归方法对高管团队职能背景异质性与企业跨界技术并购绩效的关系进行实证分析。结果显示,高管团队职能背景异质性对企业跨界技术并购绩效具有正向影响;市场化程度和可用冗余均正向调节上述作用。探索高管职能背景异质性对跨界技术并购绩效的作用机理,拓展信息决策理论应用情境,并为企业在跨界技术并购时进行高管团队配置和资源布局提供决策依据。