浅论我国中央银行独立性

在世界金融危机的大背景下,研究我国中央银行的独立性具有重要的现实意义.本文从中央银行独立性的基本理论出发,重点分析了我国中央银行独立性的现状,并对如何完善中央银行独立性提出了建议.     

中央银行独立性与货币、金融稳定政策协调

当今,金融危机给经济发展带来了极大的危害,为此,金融稳定是当务之急.审视中国的金融现状,我们必须加强金融体系各组成部分内部及其相互之问的有效风险配置、资源配置等核心功能,将中央银行独立性、货币稳定政策及金融稳定政策纳入统一框架之下,有效协调货币、金融稳定政策,提高金融机构风险管理水平.     

论中央银行的独立性

中央银行是以实现整个经济为特定目标而非利润最大化的、负责货币政策的政府机构。中央银行的独立性可以表现为两种形式：形式上的独立性与实质上的独立性。美联储可以放弃形式上的独立性成为政府的一部分,但保留实质上的独立性,使其能够置身于党派政治之外。     

中央银行独立性与货币政策有效性

货币本位制的确立和二战后各国经济的发展,使得货币政策的重要性日益增强,相应地中央银行独立性问题也引起了广泛的争论。这是因为各国经济发展的实践表明,中央银行能否有效地制定和执行货币政策,保持货币稳定,在很大程度上取决于中央银行的独立性。     

关于我国中央银行独立性与宏观经济表现的实证分析

本文对1984年中国人民银行正式行使中央银行职能至今20年的分析,探讨在我国CBI与通货膨胀率和GDP增长率之间的关系。通过回归分析,发现我国的数据支持已有的结论:1995年人民银行规范之前,存在CBI过低与通货膨胀率过高的现象;而1995年之后,CBI提高对应着较低的通胀率;1984-2001年的经济增长并没有表现出与CBI之间的明显关系。历史数据显示,我国的中央银行独立性过度受到政府干预,造成物价和经济激烈波动;但是随着金融体制改革的深入,中央银行的独立性在逐步提高,货币政策的效力也在增强。     

央行新目标——金融稳定内涵综述

2004年实施的《中华人民共和国中国人民银行法》为中国人民银行确立了一个新的重要目标——“金融稳定”。文章系统回顾了国际上对金融稳定概念的界定,为在此领域展开进一步研究提供一个平台。     

中国中央银行独立性研究

自改革开放以来,中国中央银行的独立性不断增强,尽管如此,中国中央银行的独立性仍不如人意。对此,本文提出提高中国中央银行独立性对策建议。     

中部崛起与自主创新

中部崛起的基础是经济的快速增长,没有这个基础,中部地区的“落后的增长”局面就无法改变。而中部地区经济快速增长的核心是区域自主创新,因为通过区域自主创新可以在转变经济增长方式的背景和区情条件下实现中部地区的跨越式发展。区域自主创新的关键是处理好几个关系,包括处理好制度创新与技术创新的关系、技术引进与技术创新的关系、人力资本积累和人力资本有效配置的关系等。     

Who Wants an Independent Central Bank? Monetary Policy‐making and Politics

The costs and benefits of cooperative monetary and fiscal policy are analysed in the framework of a partisan business-cycles model. It is shown that political parties with different ideologies prefer to choose different arrangements for macroeconomic policy-making. More specifically, right-wing parties favour independent central banks more than left-wing parties. An independent central bank is also the generally preferred option from a social welfare point of view. In addition, the form of policy-making arrangements between the fiscal and monetary authorities is shown to influence the extent of partisan cycles.
JEL classification : E 32; E 58; E 63; C 72     

Central Bankers and Central Bank Independence

This paper uses results of a questionnaire survey to look at how central bankers inthe Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia view various criteria of centralbank independence and compares their responses with central bankers in industrialcountries. Central bankers from both groups agree very strongly on the importanceof two pillars of central bank independence: goal independence and freedom toimplement these goals, together with a system of how credit is granted by a centralbank to a government that gives the central bank powers to determine terms andlimits the extent of such credit. Based on the responses, the paper also identifiessome weaknesses of the most frequently used indices of central bank independenceand makes recommendations on how to improve them.     

国外自主创新特征及其对我国的启示

在当代经济中,自主创新能力是企业生命力的重要标志,也是企业在全球性竞争中占据有利地位的重要保证.纵观世界各国经济的发展历程,处于领先地位的国家,总是伴随着技术的创新.可见,自主创新能力的高低,影响着一国整体实力的高低.通过论述分析国外自主创新的特征,为我国自主创新机制的完善提出建议对策.     

儒家思想与中国中央银行制度变迁

中央银行制度变迁是经济主体行为合力作用的结果.人类行为除了受正式制度约束外,还受制于人类行为背后的文化心理因素等非正式制度的影响,非正式制度映射到人们的金融意识上,直接决定人们的金融行为,影响着金融制度的变迁轨迹.居民的金融意识水平较低,是我国中央银行制度变迁的初始条件和逻辑起点.低下的金融意识水平对我国中央银行制度变迁形成了较大的制约和阻力.     

Transparency of Central Bank Preferences

Abstract. In this paper, we examine whether the transparency of the central bank's preferences is desirable. We make two major points. First, in the literature on preference transparency variance-reduction frameworks are often adopted. As a consequence a change in the degree of transparency affects the magnitude of information asymmetries, but at the same time it implies a rather arbitrary effect on the distribution of preferences. We present a clean framework without this problem. Second, using a very general specification of shocks to the central bank's preferences, we show that society prefers transparency if it sufficiently values the employment target, whereas it prefers opacity if it estimates inflation as sufficiently important.     

Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies

The paper discusses recent changes in central bank laws and the relationship between inflation and central bank independence in transition economies. Two indices of legal independence are constructed, covering political and economic aspects of independence. Most of the countries experienced high-inflation episodes in the recent past and changes introduced to the laws after, or simultaneously, with stabilization programmes strengthened the position of the central banks. In further analysis, an inverse relationship emerges between inflation and indices of central bank independence. However, the robust relationship is present only at a high level of economic liberalization. This conclusion is supported by results from regressions on time-aggregated and panel data, even after controlling for the government fiscal position and the absence/presence of an IMF stabilization package.     

我国中央银行监管方法的发展趋势及其创新探析

中央银行采取何种方法对银行业进行监管是一个值得关注和探讨的问题,本文通过对发达国家银行监管方式演变的分析,探讨我国中央银行监管方法的发展趋势及其创新策略。     

Comparing Different Central Bank Targets

In this paper we analyze different target regimes for a central bank. First, we determine the main macroeconomic variables under inflationtargeting and nominal income targeting in the context of a Mundell–Flemmingtwo country model. We then investigate under which conditions onetarget regime is superior to another if supply or demand shocks occur.The main result of this paper is that there exists a unique boundary for theweight on employment in the objective function of the centralbank. If the actual weight is smaller than this bound, inflation targetingis superior to nominal income targeting. For a weight larger than thisbound, nominal income targeting causes a smaller loss. For the two extremecases of the weight, namely zero or infinity one target regime coincideswith the loss-minimizing solution: inflation targeting for a weight of zeroand nominal income targeting for a weight of infinity.