Ambiguous Information,Portfolio Inertia,and Excess Volatility

I study the effects of risk and ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) on optimal portfolios and equilibrium asset prices when investors receive information that is difficult to link to fundamentals. I show that the desire of investors to hedge ambiguity leads to portfolio inertia and excess volatility. Specifically, when news is surprising, investors may not react to price changes even if there are no transaction costs or other market frictions. Moreover, I show that small shocks to cash flow news, asset betas, or market risk premia may lead to drastic changes in the stock price and hence to excess volatility.     

Earnings volatility,ambiguity, and crisis-period stock returns

Financial crises are marked by substantial increases in ambiguity where prices appear to decouple from fundamentals. Consistent with ambiguity-based asset pricing theories, we find that ambiguity concerns are more severe for firms with higher earnings volatility, causing investors to demand a higher ambiguity premium for such firms. While there is no relation between earnings volatility and stock returns under normal conditions, there is a significant negative relation between crisis-period stock returns and prior earnings volatility. The effect is stronger in firms with low institutional ownership and low analyst following, consistent with ambiguity concerns being greatest amongst firms with unsophisticated investors.     

Investor Information Demand: Evidence from Google Searches Around Earnings Announcements

The objective of this study is to investigate factors that influence investor information demand around earnings announcements and to provide insights into how variation in information demand impacts the capital market response to earnings. The Internet is one channel through which public information is disseminated to investors and we propose that one way that investors express their demand for public information is via Google searches. We find that abnormal Google search increases about two weeks prior to the earnings announcement, spikes markedly at the announcement, and continues at high levels for a period after the announcement. This finding suggests that information diffusion is not instantaneous with the release of the earnings information, but rather is spread over a period surrounding the announcement. We also find that information demand is positively associated with media attention and news, and is negatively associated with investor distraction. When investors search for more information in the days just prior to the announcement, preannouncement price and volume changes reflect more of the upcoming earnings news and there is less of a price and volume response when the news is announced. This result suggests that, when investors demand more information about a firm, the information content of the earnings announcement is partially preempted.     

Detecting news in aggregate accounting earnings: implications for stock market valuation

How much news is there in aggregate accounting earnings? I provide evidence that earnings changes at the stock market level are correlated with new information about not only expected future cash flows but also discount rates. A comprehensive investigation of the link to discount rates reveals that aggregate earnings changes are tied to news about all components of the expected future stock market return, i.e., the real riskless rate, expected inflation, and the expected equity risk premium. Over the sample period studied, cash flow news and discount rate news in aggregate earnings changes covary positively and have offsetting impacts on stock market prices. As a result, stock market prices appear to be insensitive to aggregate earnings changes. The findings highlight the importance of separating cash flow news from discount rate news when evaluating the information content of accounting earnings at the stock market level. Overall, my study sheds new light on the informativeness and relevance of accounting earnings for valuation at the stock market level.     

Insider trading,future earnings,and post-earnings announcement drift

This paper examines the association between insider trading prior to quarterly earnings announcements and the magnitude of the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). We conjecture and find that insider trades reflect insiders’ private information about the persistence of earnings news. Thus, insider trades can help investors better understand and incorporate the time-series properties of quarterly earnings into stock prices in a timely and unbiased manner, thereby mitigating PEAD. As predicted, PEAD is significantly lower when earnings announcements are preceded by insider trading. The reduction in PEAD is driven by contradictory insider trades (i.e., net buys before large negative earnings news or net sells before large positive earnings news) and is more pronounced in the presence of more sophisticated market participants. Consistent with investors extracting and trading on insiders’ private information, pre-announcement insider trading is associated with smaller market reactions to future earnings news in each of the four subsequent quarters. Overall, our findings indicate insider trading contributes to stock price efficiency by conveying insiders’ private information about future earnings and especially the persistence of earnings news.     

Inconsistent Signals,Earnings Announcements,and Market Uncertainty

We test the proposition in Johnstone (2016) that new information may lead to higher, rather than lower, uncertainty about firms’ future payoffs. Based on the Bayesian rule, we hypothesize earnings news that is inconsistent with investors’ prior belief will lead to higher market uncertainty. Using earnings signals in the past few quarters to proxy for investors’ prior belief, we find supporting evidence that, relative to consistent earnings news, inconsistent news results in an increase in market uncertainty measured by implied volatility. Inconsistent earnings news has a larger effect on market uncertainty when prior beliefs are stronger and when the news is negative. Overall, our evidence highlights the importance of prior belief and inconsistent signals in understanding the effect of earnings news on market uncertainty.     

Announcing the announcement

What drives investors’ attention? We study how far in advance earnings calendars are pre-announced and find that investors are more attentive to earnings news when such details are disclosed well ahead of time. This variation in investors' attention affects short-run and long-run stock returns, thereby creating incentives for firms to strategically pre-announce the report date on short notice when the earnings news is bad. Consistent with this idea, firms pre-announce their report dates well ahead of time when earnings are good and do it at the very last moment when earnings are bad. A trading strategy that exploits such variations yields abnormal returns of 1.5% per month.     

Ambiguity, Information Quality, and Asset Pricing

When ambiguity‐averse investors process news of uncertain quality, they act as if they take a worst‐case assessment of quality. As a result, they react more strongly to bad news than to good news. They also dislike assets for which information quality is poor, especially when the underlying fundamentals are volatile. These effects induce ambiguity premia that depend on idiosyncratic risk in fundamentals as well as skewness in returns. Moreover, shocks to information quality can have persistent negative effects on prices even if fundamentals do not change.     

Investor and Analyst Reactions to Earnings Announcements of Related Firms: An Empirical Analysis

In this article I examine the response of investors and analysts of nonannouncing firms to the earnings report of the first announcers in the industry. The error in the earnings forecast of the first announcer is found to be informative about the errors in the contemporaneous earnings forecasts of subsequent announcers in the industry. However, investors and analysts do not appear to fully incorporate the information from the first announcers' news in their revised earnings expectations for subsequent announcers. This apparent underreaction to the first announcers' news leads to predictable stock returns for subsequent announcers in the days following the first announcement. Results of this study can be seen as further evidence of investor and analyst underreaction to publicly available information.     

Weather,institutional investors and earnings news

We examine how pre-announcement weather conditions near a firm's major institutional investors affect stock market reactions to firms' earnings announcements. We find that unpleasant weather experienced by institutional investors leads to more delayed market responses to subsequent earnings news. Moreover, unpleasant weather of institutional investors is associated with higher earnings announcement premia. The influence of institutional investors' weather is robust after controlling for New York City weather, extreme weather conditions, and firm local weather. Additional cross-sectional evidence suggests that the strength of this weather effect is related to institutional investors' trading behavior.     

投资者异质后验信念对股票价格影响的实证研究

过度自信程度不同的投资者因消息确认精度差异引起意见分歧,产生异质后验信念,导致投资者对股价高估或者低估。在此基础上,以盈余公告信息作为利好或利空消息,研究不同环境下异质后验信念对我国股票价格的影响。实证结果表明:不管在牛市还是在熊市环境下,异质后验信念均会对股价产生影响,当盈余公告为利好消息时,异质后验信念程度越高,当期股价被高估的程度越显著;当盈余公告为利空消息时,异质后验信念程度越高,当期股价被低估的程度越显著。此外,在盈余公告前投资者就对盈余消息作出了反映,但对好消息与坏消息的反映程度不同。     

Does voluntary balance sheet disclosure mitigate post-earnings-announcement drift?

Theory suggests that balance sheet information such as total assets, total equity, or total liabilities complements earnings information in helping investors assess a firm’s profitability and estimate earnings growth. The voluntary disclosure of balance sheet information at earnings announcement could help investors gather and process this information at a lower cost. We therefore predict that voluntary balance sheet disclosure at the time of an earnings announcement helps investors promptly understand the implication of current earnings news for future earnings and subsequently reduces post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). Consistent with these predictions, our results show that when firms provide voluntary balance sheet disclosures, the earnings response coefficient in the event window is significantly higher and the corresponding PEAD is significantly lower. We further find that the impact of voluntary balance sheet disclosure on PEAD is more pronounced when the magnitude of balance sheet value surprise is larger, when balance sheet value is more informative about future earnings, when earnings uncertainty is higher, or when information cost is higher, consistent with our conjectures that helping investors to better understand future earnings performance and lowering information costs are key mechanisms underlying the effect of voluntary balance sheet disclosure on PEAD.     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts

We examine the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter Reg FD) on the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, especially those conveying bad news. We expect that managers are less timely in issuing bad news forecasts than good news forecasts prior to Reg FD when they can disclose bad news to selected analysts and institutional investors privately. As Reg FD prohibits private disclosures of material information, managers are expected to accelerate the issuance of long-horizon bad news forecasts after Reg FD due to concerns of litigation risk from institutional investors and loss of analyst coverage, leading to a decrease in timeliness asymmetry between bad news and good news forecasts. We also expect that the effect of Reg FD is stronger among firms with lower ex-ante litigation risk or higher information asymmetry as they are more likely to withhold bad news prior to Reg FD. In addition, we expect that investors and analysts react more to bad news forecasts than to good news forecasts prior to Reg FD, and this asymmetry decreases after Reg FD. Our results are consistent with our predictions and suggest that managers provide long-horizon forecasts conveying bad news more timely after Reg FD.     

Earnings Announcements and Systematic Risk

Firms scheduled to report earnings earn an annualized abnormal return of 9.9%. We propose a risk‐based explanation for this phenomenon, whereby investors use announcements to revise their expectations for nonannouncing firms, but can only do so imperfectly. Consequently, the covariance between firm‐specific and market cash flow news spikes around announcements, making announcers especially risky. Consistent with our hypothesis, announcer returns forecast aggregate earnings. The announcement premium is persistent across stocks, and early (late) announcers earn higher (lower) returns. Nonannouncers' response to announcements is consistent with our model, both over time and across firms. Finally, exposure to announcement risk is priced.     

Do acquirers disclose good news or withhold bad news when they finance their acquisitions using equity?

Companies that use their own stock to finance acquisitions have incentives to increase their market values prior to the acquisition. This study examines whether such companies mislead investors by issuing overly optimistic forecasts of future earnings (“deception by commission”) or by withholding bad news about future earnings (“deception by omission”). We compare the management forecasts of acquiring firms in a pre-acquisition period (days −90 to −30 before the acquisition announcement) and a post-acquisition period (days +30 to +90 after the acquisition is completed). We show that, when acquisitions are financed using stock, companies are not more likely to issue overly optimistic earnings forecasts during the pre-acquisition period compared with the post-acquisition period. However, these same acquirers are more likely to withhold impending bad news about future earnings. Consistent with litigation having an asymmetric effect on disclosure incentives, our findings suggest that deception by omission occurs more often than deception by commission.     

Market ambiguity and individual investor information demand

We examine whether ambiguity in the market leads to an increase in information demand by individual investors. Drawing on the asset-pricing model proposed by Mele and Sangiorgi (2015), which incorporates market ambiguity, we measure individual information demand using daily Google searches and measure market ambiguity using a metric based on the market trades of institutional investors. We find that individual investors increase their information demand during periods of greater market ambiguity. We also provide evidence that information demand from individual investors spikes around earnings announcement days primarily when market uncertainty is driven by net-selling activity. Overall, these results suggest that the disagreement among institutional investors either represents uncertainty or contributes to the uncertainty related to a stock, leading to increased demand for information from individual investors.     

A new perspective on post‐earnings‐announcement‐drift: Using a relative drift measure

Prior research finds that there is a delayed reaction to both analyst‐based earnings surprises and random‐walk‐based earnings surprises. Focusing on the market reaction from the post‐announcement window, prior studies show that analyst‐based drift is larger than random walk‐based drift. This finding is counter‐intuitive if we believe large, sophisticated investors tend to trade on analysts’ forecast earnings news and thus react faster and more completely than smaller and less sophisticated investors react to random walk earnings news. In this study, we construct a relative measure of post‐earnings‐announcement drift (PEAD) (i.e., drift as a proportion of total market reaction to earnings news) which we refer to as the ‘drift ratio’, and we provide evidence, consistent with our intuition, that analyst‐based drift ratio is smaller (not greater) than random‐walk‐based drift ratio. We find that this difference is more pronounced in more recent periods and for firms with more sophisticated investors. Our approach to measure the PEAD is more intuitive than that in traditional PEAD literature. Our results thus complement existing research findings by utilizing the drift ratio measure to generate new insights about the drift phenomenon.     

Effects of Preannouncements on Analyst and Stock Price Reactions to Earnings News

This study examines the effects of earnings preannouncements on financial analyst and stock price reactions to earnings news. Prior experimental research documents that when the signs of a preannouncement surprise and subsequent earnings announcement surprise are consistent (i.e., both either positive or negative), analysts make larger magnitude revisions to their future period earnings forecasts in response to the total earnings news conveyed in the preannouncement and earnings announcement than when the surprise signs are inconsistent. This study extends this research by examining a sample of actual preannouncements from 1993–1997 to determine whether the effects documented in laboratory settings manifest at the aggregate market level in stock prices and consensus analyst forecast revisions. Results indicate that after controlling for the sign of earnings news, sign of earnings, and sign of the earnings announcement surprise, stock prices and analyst forecast revisions respond more strongly when a preannouncement and subsequent earnings announcement elicit the same surprise signs than when the surprise signs are inconsistent. Further analysis indicates that the consistency of the signs of a preannouncement surprise and earnings announcement surprise is not associated with future earnings, suggesting that the magnified reaction of investors and analysts to consistent surprise signs is not a rational reaction to associations observed in market settings.     

Value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the annual report

This paper examines whether the level of voluntary disclosure affects the association between current returns and future earnings. Economic theory suggests that firms might find it advantageous to provide additional pieces of information (i.e. voluntary disclosure) to investors and analysts. Our results indicate that more voluntary disclosure does not improve the association between current returns and future earnings (i.e. current returns do not reflect more future earnings news). This finding raises the question of whether voluntary information in the annual report contains value‐relevant information about future earnings or if investors are simply not capable of incorporating voluntary information in the firm value estimates.     

Beating market expectations and the pricing of firms’ probability of default

This study explores the impact of beating analysts' forecasts on investors' perceptions about firms' default probability. The information contained in analysts’ forecasts, both earnings and revenues, provides additional information to investors in pricing CDSs. While previous research has focused on the impact of beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, this study shows that firms that beat analysts' revenue forecasts also experience, on average, a decrease in the CDS premium around the earnings announcement date. This study also documents that the effect is stronger when firms beat/miss both earnings and revenue forecasts. When firms beat (miss) earnings and miss (beat) revenues, the effect of earnings is the dominant signal. These effects are stronger for firms with high levels of default risk.