Large deviations and multinomial probit choice

We consider a discrete choice model in which the payoffs to each of an agent?s n actions are subjected to the average of m i.i.d. shocks, and use tools from large deviations theory to characterize the rate of decay of the probability of choosing a given suboptimal action as m approaches infinity. Our model includes the multinomial probit model of Myatt and Wallace (2003) [5] as a special case. We show that their formula describing the rates of decay of choice probabilities is incorrect, provide the correct formula, and use our large deviations analysis to provide intuition for the difference between the two.     

Aggregation of multiple prior opinions

Experts are asked to provide their advice in a situation of uncertainty. They adopt the decision maker?s utility function, but each has a potentially different set of prior probabilities, and so does the decision maker. The decision maker and the experts maximize the minimal expected utility with respect to their sets of priors. We show that a natural Pareto condition is equivalent to the existence of a set Λ of probability vectors over the experts, interpreted as possible allocations of weights to the experts, such that (i) the decision maker?s set of priors is precisely all the weighted-averages of priors, where an expert?s prior is taken from her set and the weight vector is taken from Λ; (ii) the decision maker?s valuation of an act is the minimal weighted valuation, over all weight vectors in Λ, of the experts? valuations.     

Choosing and sharing

Implementing a project, like a nationwide nuclear waste disposal, which benefits all involved agents but brings major costs only to the host is often problematic. In practice, revelation issues and redistributional concerns are significant obstacles to achieving stable agreements. We address these issues by proposing the first mechanism to select the efficient site (the host with the lowest cost) while simultaneously allowing for the implementation of any individually rational division of the whole hosting cost. The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of our simple mechanism are efficient, budget-balanced and individually rational. Moreover, the truthful equilibrium is immune to coalitional deviations.     

The trade paradox persists under excise taxes

Brander and Krugman (1983) and Sertel (1988) followed by Krugman (1989), showed two sides of a ‘trade paradox’: The paradox in competition, viz. that opening trade (or increasing competition) may cause welfare to decline, and the paradox in efficiency, viz. that an increase in unit transport cost may increase welfare. In this paper, we consider the situation in an environment where interventionist trade policies are not permitted but each country is sovereign to impose an excise tax (or subsidy). The paradoxes persist under equilibrium excise taxes, reckoned both at the non-cooperative (Nash or dominant strategy) equilibrium and at the cooperative solution among tax-imposing authorities maximizing welfare. We also see that the paradoxes persist in a taxless environment where market equilibrium is Stackelberg rather than Cournot.     

Switching error-correction models of house prices in the United Kingdom

This paper develops error-correction models of real house prices in the UK in which the adjustment coefficient switches stochastically between a stable regime where disequilibrium correction takes place and an unstable regime where such a correction does not occur. The generating mechanism of the shifts is modelled as a Markov process with transition probabilities which are either time-invariant or depend on the extent to which the system is out of disequilibrium. Estimation of error-correction models for the UK reveals that the observed booms in real house prices are associated with an unstable regime. We also find that the probability that the system remains in an unstable regime decreases as deviations from equilibrium increase.     

Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Affect Investment and Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian Firms

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion, and overinvestment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians, and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE's investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and overinvestment. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; and CERIS–CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, National Research Council, Via Avogadro, 8, 10121 Turin, Italy. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.     

Misery loves company: Social regret and social interaction effects in choices under risk and uncertainty

Extensive field evidence shows individuals? decisions in settings involving uncertainty depend on their peers? decisions. One hypothesized cause of peer group effects is social interaction effects: an individual?s utility from an action is enhanced by others taking the same action. We employ a series of controlled laboratory experiments to study the causes of peer effects in choice under uncertainty. We find strong peer group effects in the laboratory. Our design allows us to rule out social learning, social norms, group affiliation, and complementarities as possible causes for the observed peer group effects, leaving social interaction effects as the likely cause. We use a combination of theory and empirical analysis to show that preferences including “social regret” are more consistent with the data than preferences including a taste for conformity. We observe spillover effects, as observing another?s choice of one risky gamble makes all risky gambles more likely to be chosen.     

Do judges react to the probability of appellate review? Empirical evidence from trial court procedures

The appellate review system is intended to serve as an efficient remedy for imperfect judicial decision making. However, it can fulfil this task only when appeals are ex ante unpredictable to the judge, and thus can be expected to occur primarily in case of a bad verdict. Using data from case records of a German trial court, we show that the probability of appeal can be predicted based on easily observable exogenous factors. Controlling for the complexity of a legal case, we find that judges also tend to decrease their effort when the ex ante probability of appeal is low. Thus, our empirical evidence indicates an inefficiency in the appellate review system because trial judges allocate their effort to cases not exclusively according to case complexity, but particularly according to the ex ante probability of being reviewed.     

Prize sharing in collective contests

The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed private–public good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size. (iii) In each group the members decide how much effort to put without observing the sharing rules of the other groups. It is shown that endogenous determination of group sharing rules completely eliminates the group-size paradox, i.e. a larger group always attains a higher winning probability than a smaller group, unless the prize is purely private. In addition, an interesting pattern of equilibrium group sharing rules is revealed: The group attaining the lower winning probability is the one choosing the rule giving higher incentives to the members.     

Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381]

Ma (in Econ. Theory 8, 377–381, 1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econometrica 58, 1475–1480, 1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented – and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 – is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as “symmetric.” We thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. B. Klaus’s and F. Klijn’s research was supported by Ramón y Cajal contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The work of the authors was also partially supported through the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (BEC2002-02130 and SEJ2005-01690) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2005-00626 and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA).     

Tests of Financial Intermediation and Banking Reform in China

We develop tests of financial intermediation by national banking systems based on the expectation that, in commercial systems, financial intermediation should not be overly influenced by policy variables; should be greater in richer, faster growing industrial areas; and should direct funds to the best projects regardless of where deposits originate. Using Chinese provincial data from 1991 to 1997, we test whether financial reforms in the mid-1990s increased efficient intermediation by different financial institutions. We find that the importance of policy lending by state banks did not fall during the recent period and that lending by financial institutions did not respond to economic fundamentals. J. Comp. Econ., December 2001, 29(4), pp. 608–644. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109; and Department of Government, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755. © 2001 Elsevier ScienceJournal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, O16, O53, P34.     

Stochastic evolutionary selection in finite populations

We primarily focus on a wide range of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics between two strategies which are characterized by a condition we call monotonicity: the sign of the difference between the probabilities of increasing and decreasing an A-individual completely depends on the difference of payoffs based on different strategies. When mutations are excluded, we provide sufficient conditions for selection to favor one strategy over the other and necessary conditions for selection to favor or oppose change, respectively. Moreover, we discuss which strategy will be favored in case of rare mutations and give a simple rule to determine evolutionary selection of strategies for large populations under some specific stochastic mutation–selection dynamics.     

How elastic are national corporate income tax bases in OECD countries? The role of domestic and foreign tax rates

Abstract To what extent do reductions in corporate income tax (CIT) rates attract foreign tax bases? What are the revenue implications of a unilateral tax reduction when tax bases are internationally mobile? These questions are explored using annual data from 17 OECD countries spanning the period 1982 to 2005. Controlling for fixed country effects, year effects, and country time trends, and subjecting our results to an extensive robustness analysis, we find (i) a country’s aggregate reported corporate profits are negatively and significantly affected by CIT rate reductions in neighbouring countries; (ii) a unilateral reduction in the domestic CIT rate results in lower domestic CIT revenues.     

A dynamic model of unsecured credit

We study the terms of credit in a competitive market in which sellers (lenders) are willing to repeatedly finance the purchases of buyers (borrowers) by engaging in a credit relationship. The key frictions are: (i) the lender cannot observe the borrower?s ability to repay a loan; (ii) the borrower cannot commit to any long-term contract; (iii) it is costly for the lender to contact a borrower and to walk away from a contract; and (iv) transactions within each credit relationship are not publicly observable. The lender?s optimal contract has two key properties: delayed settlement and debt forgiveness. Finally, we study the impact of changes in the initial cost of lending on the contract terms.     

Industry dynamics: Foundations for models with an infinite number of firms

This paper explores the connection between three important threads of economic research offering different approaches to studying the dynamics of an industry with heterogeneous firms. Finite models of the form pioneered by Ericson and Pakes (1995) capture the dynamics of a finite number of heterogeneous firms as they compete in an industry, and are typically analyzed using the concept of Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). Infinite models of the form pioneered by Hopenhayn (1992), on the other hand, consider an infinite number of infinitesimal firms, and are typically analyzed using the concept of stationary equilibrium (SE). A third approach uses oblivious equilibrium (OE), which maintains the simplifying benefits of an infinite model but within the more realistic setting of a finite model. The paper relates these three approaches. The main result of the paper provides conditions under which SE of infinite models approximate MPE of finite models arbitrarily well in asymptotically large markets. Our conditions require that the distribution of firm states in SE obeys a certain “light-tail” condition. In a second set of results, we show that the set of OE of a finite model approaches the set of SE of the infinite model in large markets under a similar light-tail condition.     

A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries

We model voting in juries as a game of incomplete information, allowing jurors to receive a continuum of signals. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game, and give a condition under which no asymmetric equilibria exist under unanimity rule. We offer a condition under which unanimity rule exhibits a bias toward convicting the innocent, regardless of the size of the jury, and give an example showing that this bias can be reversed. We prove a “jury theorem” for our general model: As the size of the jury increases, the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero for every voting rule except unanimity rule. For unanimity rule, the probability of making a mistake is bounded strictly above zero if and only if there do not exist arbitrarily strong signals of innocence. Our results explain the asymptotic inefficiency of unanimity rule in finite models and establishes the possibility of asymptotic efficiency, a property that could emerge only in a continuous model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D72.     

Keynes and probability: An assessment

Abstract

Most interpreters agree that Keynes had a wide-ranging, complex, ‘vision of the world’, which underlies his theoretical contributions. Whenever this is forgotten, as happens in the so-called neoclassical synthesis, not only the original Keynesian spirit goes lost but also, and especially, we lose substantive bricks for our theoretical constructions. The paper considers an important instance of this general rule; namely Keynes's views on the logic of probability, meant as the field concerning human behaviour in an uncertain world (hence connected to, but distinct from, the pure theory of probability, meant as a field of mathematics). The paper begins by recalling the main aspects of the classical and frequentist approaches to probability and the main criticisms they received, pertaining among other things to the limits of their applicability. We then consider Keynes's own views, stressing three aspects: the definition of probability as pertaining to the field of logic, the notion of uncertainty and of the ‘weight of the argument’, the ‘theory of groups’. We then discuss the subjective approach of de Finetti, Ramsey and Savage, and contrast it with Keynes's own views. Finally, we consider the implications of our analysis for the interpretation of Keynes's General Theory, and of his attitude towards econometrics.     

A Blotto game with multi-dimensional incomplete information

We examine a multi-dimensional incomplete information Colonel Blotto game in which each player’s n-tuple of battlefield valuations is drawn from a common n-variate joint distribution function that is uniform on the non-negative orthant of the surface of a sphere.