‘Voice’ and ‘exit’ in Japanese firms during the Second World War: Sanpo revisited*

During the Second World War, the Japanese government and private sector searched for and implemented new mechanisms for coordination and motivation. One of these was sangyo hokokukai (sanpo). The Sanpo unit was basically an organization of the employer and employees of each firm, which held meetings to moderate labour relations. As a result of government policy to promote sanpo units, around 70 per cent of the total workers in Japan were organized into sanpo units in the early 1940s. As the members of trades unions and the workers of the companies that had factory committees were only 7 per cent and 5 per cent of the total workers in 1936 respectively, sanpo was the first large‐scale mechanism for Japanese employees to have a voice. This article examines the role of sanpo, using prefecture‐level and firm‐level data, based on a framework integrating the ‘voice view’ of unionism and transaction cost economics. It was found that sanpo reduced the participation rate in labour disputes, and enhanced labour productivity at least for some of the time.     

Serbia on the path to modern economic growth

Given the scanty and inadequate studies on Serbia's growth performance before the First World War, this paper presents production-side GDP estimates for Serbia for six years between 1867 and 1910. It probes into the growth dynamics, assessing convergence with the more developed countries of north-western Europe, as well as progress towards achieving modern economic growth. Although the economy showed some dynamism in terms of overall GDP, per capita GDP in pre-First World War Serbia grew by only 0.28 per cent per annum, as much of the overall GDP growth was eroded by rapid population growth. Far from converging with north-western Europe, Serbia continued to fall behind. Sluggish structural transformation and slow income per capita growth suggest that Serbia's transition to modern economic growth was in its infancy. Growth in the dominant agricultural sector was extensive, driven by expanding arable land and population growth. Land was affordable and easy to obtain; hence, peasants invested little in new technologies. Meanwhile, the modern industrial and service sectors were below a threshold that could sustain rapid growth. Nevertheless, this study also highlights the rapid expansion of a small modern sector and export diversification that reflected emergent ‘green shoots’ in 1905–10.     

Has China's Housing Production Peaked?

China's real estate has been a key engine of its sustained economic expansion. This paper argues, however, that even before the COVID‐19 shock, a decades‐long housing boom had given rise to severe price misalignments and regional supply–demand mismatches, making an adjustment both necessary and inevitable. We make use of newly available and updated data sources to analyze supply–demand conditions in the fast‐moving Chinese economy. The imbalances are then compared to benchmarks from other economies. We conclude that the real estate sector is quite vulnerable to a sustained aggregate growth shock, such as COVID‐19 might pose. In our baseline calibration, using input–output tables and taking account of the very large footprint of housing construction and real estate related sectors, the adjustment to a decline in housing activity can easily trim a cumulative 5–10 percent from the level of output over a period of years.     

Labor Market Dynamics and Structural Change: Evidence from China

Structural change theories usually assume agents are homogeneous. However, because of demand‐side or supply‐side heterogeneities, the probability of switching among sectors differs across people. This paper reveals these differences through restoring a long‐period, individual‐level panel dataset from China's Urban Household Survey for 1986–2009. We find that both for people who started working for the first time and those who switched jobs, the sector choice depends on personal characteristics. In particular, women and people with higher educational attainment or a previous white‐collar job are more likely to join the tertiary sector and less likely to join the primary sector. These effects are substantial even if the macroeconomic variables used in conventional structural change theories are controlled. They are also robust in various periods and at more detailed industry levels. Our research suggests that it is important to pay greater attention to the labor composition when making policy related to economic structural change.     

The decline of US manufacturing productivity between 1941 and 1948

The view that war benefits potential output has been influential in treatments of US mobilization for the Second World War, where it has been largely premised on the benefits of learning by doing in producing military durables. If the thesis that war benefits aggregate supply is correct, it is indeed within manufacturing that we should most likely see its effects. Total factor productivity within the sector in fact fell at a rate of −1.4 per cent per year between 1941 and 1948, −3.7 per cent a year between 1941 and 1944, and −5.1 per cent a year between 1941 and 1945. The emphasis on learning by doing has obscured the negative effects of the sudden, radical, and temporary changes in the product mix, the behavioural pathologies accompanying the transition to a shortage economy, and the resource shocks inflicted on the country by the Japanese and Germans. From a long-run perspective, the war can be seen, ironically, as the beginning of the end of US world economic dominance in manufacturing.     

TARIFFS,SUBSIDIES, AND PROFITS: A RE‐ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN AUSTRALIA 1901–39

We re‐interpret the drivers of structural change in Australia from Federation to World War II. Manufacturing increased its relative share of output and employment, the farm sector and mining contracted. Conventional wisdom contends these shifts largely resulted from government policy, particularly increases in trade barriers. We contend that the connection between tariffs and increased profitability is conceptually weak and not supported by extant evidence. We argue that exogenous shifts in consumer preferences, the adoption of new technologies, changing factor proportions, and greater specialisation in manufacturing and services were responsible for manufacturing increasing its share of the economy's resources and output.     

Trade and the structure of South African production, 1984-97

With the onset of trade liberalisation, fears have been raised concerning the impact of trade on manufacturing output, employment and growth. Using an input–output methodology, this article decomposes South African output growth between 1984 and 1997 into final demand expansion, trade flows and technology. There are two main findings. First, trade liberalisation has not deindustrialised the manufacturing sector. Although import penetration has risen, export growth has matched and exceeded the potential import-induced losses in domestic production. South Africa's response thus conforms closely to international evidence. Secondly, a combination of strong growth in capital-intensive exports and import penetration in ultra-labour-intensive sectors has aided the structural shift in production towards capital-intensive sectors. However, capital-biased supply-side policies, as well as endemic problems within ultra-labour-intensive sectors, suggest that domestic factors and not trade liberalisation lie behind this shift.     

The Role of the Real Estate Sector in the Structural Dynamics of the Chinese Economy: An Input–Output Analysis

Market‐oriented housing reforms and the rapid urbanization process have led to spectacular growth in the Chinese real estate sector (RES). However, the changes in the role played by this sector in the structural dynamics of the Chinese economy have not been examined sufficiently. Accordingly, we analyze the intersectoral structural changes to the Chinese RES, its linkages with the rest of the economy, and its growth sources, using four Chinese input–output tables from 2002 to 2017. We depart from existing work on the RES by using the causative matrix approach and structural decomposition analysis, and obtain three main results. First, the RES, which received little non‐RES feedback during the 2002–2007 period, has subsequently received much more substantial feedback. Second, the impact of the RES on China's economic growth stems mainly from its forward linkages. Third, the growth in the RES has been driven mainly by domestic demand expansion. Our results highlight that the Chinese RES, which plays a key role in value chains, is highly dependent on its own final demand and a fall in its demand would impede economic development. An important implication of these results is that developing the national economy by stimulating the RES would not be as effective as developing the RES through stimulating the national economy.     

Second World War spending and local economic activity in US counties, 1939–58

Studies of the development of local economies often point to large‐scale Second World War military spending as a source of economic growth, even though spending declined sharply after demobilization. We examine the relationship between war spending per capita and the changes in economic activity in US counties between 1939 before the war and a period several years after the war. In the longer term counties receiving more war spending per capita during the war experienced greater population growth, but growth in per capita measures of economic activity showed little relationship with per capita war spending.     

‘FORGING,AHEAD’: INDUSTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSFORMATION IN A MELBOURNE SUBURB 1906–85

The trajectory of the suburb Sunshine in Western Melbourne (1906–85), from industrial powerhouse to repository of social problems, sheds light on the issues surrounding organic urban expansion. For the many Australians living on the fringes of large cities, a sense of deprivation – particularly inequality in services – undercut the presumed comfort and stability of the post‐war period. Unrest in outer areas deepened following the contraction of the ‘long boom’. The area's pre‐Second World War origins as a manufacturing suburb regulated by the industrialist Hugh V. McKay is starkly contrasted with its later incarnation as a site of industrial and suburban sprawl.     

An annual index of Irish industrial production, 1800–1913

We assemble the Irish industrial data currently available for the years 1800–1921, the period during which the entire island was in a political union with Great Britain, and construct an annual index of Irish industrial output for 1800–1913. We also construct a new industrial price index. Irish industrial output grew by an average of 1.3 per cent per annum between 1800 and the outbreak of the First World War. Industrial growth was slightly slower than previously thought, especially during the two decades immediately preceding the Great Famine. While Ireland did not experience absolute deindustrialisation either before the Famine or afterwards, its industrial growth was disappointing when considered in a comparative perspective.     

What explains the recent fluctuations in Japan’s output? A structural factor analysis of Japan’s industrial production

By applying the structural factor analysis developed by Foerster et al. (2011), we decompose the fluctuations of Japan’s industrial production (IP) into sectoral shocks and aggregate shocks, taking input–output relationships between sectors into account. Our results show that, except for the global financial crisis period, sectoral shocks explain, on an average, nearly half of the quarterly variations in Japan’s IP. Although the relative importance of sectoral shocks declined during the global financial crisis period, it increased again in the recent post-crisis period and, at this time, it contributes to the increased volatility of Japan’s IP. Specifically, our analysis suggests that the intersectoral spillovers brought about by disruptions of supply chain networks in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the declines in domestic production (or production capacity) in some sectors, as a result of a deterioration in global competitiveness, and a shift to overseas production have contributed to the recent increase in fluctuations of Japan’s IP.     

A ‘blank cheque'? Portuguese Second World War sterling balances, 1940–73

The British effort in the Second World War required massive external financing which depended on Lend‐Lease and the accumulation of sterling balances. Indebtedness in sterling balances corresponded to almost 38 per cent of this total at the end of the war. Portuguese sterling balances, although a small share of the total, were important because of pre‐emptive purchases, especially of wolfram, and because of the ‘gold clause’ which was to be applied to outstanding balances. Portugal's willingness to finance British purchases contrasts with the requirement of German payments in goods or cash for their purchases in Portugal. The settlement of Portuguese sterling balances in August 1945 was singular as it preceded the Anglo‐American settlement of December 1945 which had important consequences for sterling balance holders, as the US insisted that the US$3.75 billion loan should not be used to settle British war debts. Postwar settlement of British debt through a long‐term loan from Portugal to Britain contrasts with settlements that involved the sale of British assets. Salazar's concerns about the postwar international position of Portugal, the Portuguese Empire, and the survival of the Portuguese regime are relevant in explaining his pro‐British stance during and after the war.     

Empirical Evidence of Productivity Growth in Tunisian Agriculture: 1961–2000

Abstract: This paper investigates the patterns of productivity growth in Tunisian agriculture during the period 1961–2000. Results indicate that output growth in Tunisian agriculture was high over the whole period of investigation. During the 1981–90 period, average output grew at an impressive rate exceeding 6 per cent. Over the whole period, capital was the most important contributor to output growth and labour was found to be the least significant contributor to economic growth. Total factor productivity contribution to output growth decreased from over 4 per cent in both the 1961–70 and 1981–90 periods to less than 3 per cent in both the 1971–80 and 1991–2000 periods. On average, productivity growth increased at an annual rate of 3.6 per cent.     

Slave prices,the African slave trade,and productivity in the Caribbean, 1674–18071

We draw wide‐ranging implications about slave productivity change by making use of newly collected data on the prices paid for nearly 230,000 slaves as they arrived in the Americas from Africa between 1674 and 1807. Prices for the product that most slaves were destined to produce‐sugar‐are also available. Together the comprehensive series allow us to derive annual measures of average slave productivity and to compare productivity trends across different sectors of the Caribbean. Average productivity rose throughout the Caribbean, and the pattern of average productivity change across regions was similar, indicating an open slave market. These averages mask sharp differences in the growth of demand for slaves among regions, as reflected by their slave populations. Between 1700 and 1790 the increase in demand ranged from 90 per cent in Barbados to 600 per cent in Jamaica and Cuba; while total factor productivity overall may have doubled. The slave trade accommodated the rising demand. It also served to offset population attrition among the slaves.     

The factor income distribution in China: 1978–2007

This paper investigates changes in aggregate labor share in China during 1978 and 2007 with a particular focus on the 1995–2007 period during which official statistics report a drop of 12.45 percentage points in labor's share of national income (labor share). Our main findings are: (1) The reported fall in aggregate labor share is overstated. According to the official statistics released by the NBS (2007a), the labor share fell 5.25 percentage points from 2003 to 2004. However this dramatic decline, 42.16% of the total reported decline of the labor share from 1995 to 2007, is completely due to the changes in the way NBS break down the operating surplus state-owned and collective-owned farms and the mixed income of the owners of individual economy; (2) For the last three decades, two main forces have been driving shifts in the aggregate labor share: (i) structural transformation between the agriculture and non-agriculture sectors and (ii) shifts in the labor share within the industry sector; (3) From 1995 to 2003, these two effects are both negative and together drive down aggregate labor share by 5.48 percentage points. The structural change explains 61.31% of the decline and the remaining 38.69% of the decline is due to the changes in the labor share within sectors, primarily in the industry sector; (4) Labor share in agriculture is lower than labor share in services. Therefore, when the service sector grows relative to the agriculture sector in the economy, the aggregate labor share of income declines; and (5) Restructuring of the SOEs and expanded monopoly power are the main reasons for the decline of labor share within industry after 1998. Relative price shifts, the factor input ratio, and biased technological progress are all insignificant forces for this decline because the substitution between factors in the industry sector is nearly unit elastic.     

Sources of Chinese labor productivity growth: A structural decomposition analysis, 1987–2005

We decompose labor productivity growth from 1987 to 2005 by examining six partial factors (both supply and demand): changes in value-added coefficients, labor inputs, shares of sectoral demands that are fulfilled domestically, input mix, and the intra-sectoral shares and intersectoral mix of final demand. Our analysis confirms that simply by virtue of its size and extremely low level of labor productivity, China's farm sector continues to weigh heavily in China's overall economic advances. Labor savings have levied the largest influence on the labor productivity on all sectors across all three study subperiods. We find that this transition is highly correlated with capital deepening that accompanies China's opening up process. Still, changes in the intra-sectoral shares and the intersectoral mix of China's final demand also have become quite strong, especially in recent periods. Due to ever-increasing competitive pressures as China continues to open, changes in industries value-added coefficients have tended to counteract some of the positive benefits of labor savings for most sectors. The effects on changes in labor productivity of technology change and changes in the use of imports have been comparatively negligible and any variation in their sectoral effects have been waning over time.     

War,food rationing,and socioeconomic inequality in Germany during the First World War

Germany experienced a devastating period during the First World War due to severely restricted import possibilities and a general shortage of foodstuffs. This study uses the heights of some 4,000 individuals who served during the Second World War to quantify biological living standards from the 1900s to the 1920s, and focuses primarily on socioeconomic inequality during this period. The results suggest that generally the upper social strata, measured by fathers' occupation, exhibited the tallest average height, followed by the middle and lower classes. These socioeconomic differences became more pronounced during the First World War when the rationing system provided a limited food supply. Wealthier individuals were able to purchase additional foodstuffs on black markets. Therefore, children from upper‐class families experienced only a small decline in average height compared to their counterparts from the middle and lower social strata.     

Shakeout in the early commercial airframe industry

The commercial airframe industry in the US experienced a shakeout from the early 1930s into the post‐Second World War period. Unlike shakeouts in automobiles, tyres, or televisions, the commercial airframe industry's early life cycle was affected by external factors, particularly government demand. Using newly digitized data on all planes introduced in the commercial market between 1926 and 1965, we find that commercial airframe manufacturers with bomber contracts during the Second World War were more likely to have postwar market share than firms without such contracts, controlling for plane characteristics and other forms of government contracting. We attribute the effect of bomber contracts to advantages in R&D learning capacity acquired by firms with military airframe contracts. Despite low (or zero) initial presence in the commercial market, these learning capacity advantages allowed such firms to survive the early period of the shakeout, and later to thrive.     

中间品进口对我国制造业行业人均产出的影响——对1999-2003年28个行业的实证研究

中间品进口一方面可以促进本国制造业企业的发展,另一方面也会对本国同类中间品生产厂商产生负面的竞争效应.本文综合考虑这两种影响,采用2002年投入产出表和相应行业的进出口数据将中间品进口分为水平型的中间品进口和垂直型的中间品进口.然后分析1999-2003年28个制造业行业的中间品进口对行业人均产出的影响.实证分析表明,水平型的中间品进口对行业人均产出的增长率只存在不显著的抑制作用;但是垂直型中间品进口对行业人均产出增长率有明显的正面影响.