Structural Reform and Transparency in a Monetary Union

We assess how central bank transparency affects the incentives for labour market reform in a monetary union. We introduce transparency as affecting unemployment forecasts that provide information that the central bank has to the private sector and the governments. Under conditions of monetary policy opaqueness and inflation bias, we show that monetary union may induce more reform (as governments mitigate inflation surprises under idiosyncratic shocks), albeit to a lesser extent when inflation bias is only present at the national level. In the absence of inflation bias, central bank transparency, by eliminating inflation surprises in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, induces less reform in a currency union relative to monetary autonomy. Altogether, these results point to the need for a strong political commitment to reform so that member states benefit most from the combination of a credible and transparent single monetary policy with measures aimed at improving competitiveness and enhancing long-term growth.     

Inflation and Inflation Expectations in South Africa: an Attempt at Explanation

This paper examines the relationship between inflation and inflation expectations in South Africa. We use inflation expectations derived from the quarterly surveys conducted by the Bureau of Economic Research from 2001Q1 to 2011Q4 . Using these data, we estimate the model assuming that private sector expectations are a linear function of the inflation target and lagged inflation. The results indicate that economic agents' expectations largely depend on lagged inflation. This suggests that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has not been successful in anchoring expectations of the private sector since the adoption of the inflation targeting (IT) regime in 2000. We also find evidence indicating that the SARB's implicit inflation target lies above the upper bound of the official IT band. Finally, it appears that the SARB has been more concerned about output stabilisation than inflation stabilisation.     

COPING WITH INFLATION AND EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY

Over the past ten years South Africa has moved to an increasingly open economy, characterised by a (relatively) low inflation and large and unpredictable movements in the prices of financial assets. One of these asset prices is the value of the South African currency. This volatility in the exchange rate has a direct impact on inflation. Using the interest rate as operational target, a central bank might ignore or underestimate the exchange rate transmission mechanism through which the economy is influenced. This paper proposes a Monetary Conditions Index for South Africa that can be used as a policy rule or simply as an important information variable in conducting monetary policy under an inflation‐targeting regime with a volatile exchange rate.     

INFLATION TARGETING AND THE FISHER EFFECT IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

The paper analyses the relationship between expected inflation and nominal interest rates during a period of inflation targeting in South Africa, i.e. from 2000 to 2005. Specifically, it investigates the Fisher hypothesis that nominal interest rates move one‐to‐one with expected inflation, leaving the real interest rate unaffected. The analysis distinguishes between a short‐run Fisher effect and a long‐run Fisher effect. Using cointegration and error correction models (for monthly data for the period April 2000 to July 2005), it was found that the short‐run Fisher hypothesis did not hold during the relevant period under the inflation targeting monetary policy framework in South Africa. This is attributed to a combination of the South African Reserve Bank's (SARB) control over short‐term interest rates and the effects of the monetary transmission mechanism. The long‐run Fisher hypothesis could not be confirmed in its strictest form: while changes in inflation expectations move in the same direction as the nominal long‐term interest rate. This suggests that monetary policy has an influence on the real long‐term interest rate, which has positive implications for general economic activity, thus confirming the credibility of the inflation targeting framework.     

On the conduct of monetary policy in Vietnam

Vietnam has the highest inflation rate in Southeast Asia (over 20 per cent year‐on‐year in 2011). This paper examines the extent to which inflation in Vietnam is due to its conduct of monetary policy. It is argued that, had the central bank implemented policy on a more timely basis, inflation would not have been as high as it was, but the more fundamental problem is that the central bank does not have the tools it needs to conduct monetary policy effectively. Monetary policy is further complicated by Vietnam's exchange rate policy. By choosing to peg the currency and maintain fairly free capital mobility, the country has all but given up the ability to pursue an independent monetary policy. As a consequence, the central bank is forced to attempt to sterilise its foreign exchange interventions, which it is ill‐equipped to do. The paper argues that financial sector liberalisation is needed not only to promote growth but also to maintain macroeconomic stability.     

FOOD INFLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC POLICY

This paper analyses the trends in food price movements in South Africa between 1980 and 2008. There are three main results emanating from the analysis in this paper. Firstly, food price movements have played a large role in generating inflationary episodes in South Africa. Secondly, while external influences do matter, South African food price movements are mainly due to domestic influences. This implies that national policy has an important role to play in taming domestic food price inflation. Thirdly, given the strong second round impacts, food price movements warrant special attention in monetary policymaking. Core measures of inflation that exclude food price movements may not accurately reflect the underlying inflationary pressures in the economy and could compromise the attainment of the goal of price stability.     

On Determinacy and Learnability in a New Keynesian Model with Unemployment

We analyse determinacy and stability under learning (E‐stability) of rational expectations equilibria in a new Keynesian model of inflation and unemployment, where labour market frictions due to costs of hiring workers play an important role. We derive results for alternative specifications of monetary policy rules and alternative values of hiring costs as a percentage of gross domestic product. We find that in general the region of indeterminacy and E‐instability in the policy space increases with hiring costs. Thus, higher hiring costs – consistent with European and South African “sclerotic” labour market institutions – seem to play an important part in explaining inflation and unemployment instability. Moreover, under lagged data‐based rules, the area where monetary policy delivers both determinacy and E‐stability shrinks. These rules also perform worse according to these two dimensions when hiring costs go up. Finally, under expectations‐based rules an additional explosive region is introduced. For South Africa, a rule based on current data – not unlike the original Taylor rule – works better than a forward‐looking rule.     

ON INFLATION

There is currently much more common sense in the South African inflation debate than a few decades ago. In particular, the South African Reserve Bank exhibits a pragmatic, eclectic approach to inflation (as reflected in its bi‐annual Monetary Policy Reports). This is in stark contrast to the narrow, monetarist‐type thinking that tended to dominate during the 1980s. This paper is an attempt to contribute to the debate by highlighting a few issues, including the widespread substitution of the CPI by the CPIX, the fact that inflation is a process, the need to combat inflation, the causes of the decline in inflation in South Africa and the essential features of an inflation‐targeting framework for monetary policy.     

Fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: Credible inflation targets or monetized debt?

Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Credible Inflation Targets or Monetized Debt? —The paper examines the interrelationship between fiscal and monetary policy in a two-country monetary union. The worst scenario occurs when an independent central bank sets the nominal interest rate and responds to rising government debt/GDP ratios by monetization. The result is high inflation, high debt/GDP ratios and a large public sector. Government debt and inflation are contained if the governments bear sole responsibility for solvency, but the public sector remains excessively large. The best scenario occurs if the central bank removes the incentive for the governments to engineer surprise inflation by credible inflation targeting.     

ISOLATING A MEASURE OF INFLATION EXPECTATIONS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN FINANCIAL MARKET USING FORWARD INTEREST RATES

The inflation expectations channel of the transmission mechanism is generally recognised as crucial for the implementation of modern monetary policy. This paper briefly reviews the practices commonly employed for measuring inflation expectations in South Africa, and offers an additional method, which is market based. The methodologies of Nelson and Siegel and Svensson are applied to determine implied nominal and real forward interest rates. The difference between the nominal and real forward rates (called inflation compensation) on a particular day is then used as a proxy for the market's inflation expectations. This measure should not be viewed as a substitute for other measures of inflation expectations, but should rather supplement these in order to offer an additional insight.     

Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement,Determinants, and Economic Effects

This paper studies monetary policy committee transparency (MPCT) based on a new index that measures central bankers’ educational and professional backgrounds as disclosed through central bank websites. Based on a novel cross-sectional data set covering 75 central banks, we investigate the determinants of MPCT as well as its economic consequences. We find that past inflation, institutional indicators, and monetary policy strategy are important determinants of MPCT. MPCT has a robust and significantly negative impact on inflation variability and inflation expectations, even after controlling for important macroeconomic variables and institutional transparency, as well as instrumenting MPCT in various ways. MPCT can be both a complement to and a substitute for institutional transparency.     

INFLATION PERSISTENCE AND CORE INFLATION: THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA

This paper analyses the persistence of inflation in South Africa since 1981. A measure of the persistence of inflation provides important information about the impact of shocks on the economy over time. This information can be extremely useful for the purpose of setting monetary policy, especially in a small, open economy like South Africa. In addition, an estimate of persistence at the disaggregate level helps in the identification of the main drivers of aggregate inflation. This information is useful in deriving a core measure of South African inflation, which outperforms some of the more readily available core measures in identifying the underlying inflationary pressures in the economy.     

Will the Sarb always Succeed in Fighting Inflation with Contractionary Policy?

The conventional view is that a monetary policy shock has both supply‐side and demand‐side effects, at least in the short run. Barth and Ramey show that the supply‐side effect of a monetary policy shock may be greater than the demand‐side effect. We argue that it is crucial for monetary authorities to understand whether an increase in expected future inflation is due to supply shocks or demand shocks before applying contractionary policy to forestall inflation. We estimate a standard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with the cost channel of monetary policy for the South African economy to show that whether the South African Reserve Bank should apply contractionary policy to fight inflation depends critically on the nature of the disturbance. If an increase in expected future inflation is mainly due to supply shocks, the South African Reserve Bank should not apply contractionary policy to fight inflation, as this would lead to a persistent increase in inflation and a greater loss in output. Our estimation results also show that with a moderate level of cost‐channel effect and nominal rigidities, a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with the cost channel of monetary policy is able to mimic the price puzzle produced by an estimated vector autoregressive model.     

STAGFLATIONARY CONSEQUENCES OF PRUDENT MONETARY POLICY IN A UNIONIZED ECONOMY

Stylised models of the policy game between monetary policy makersand the private sector have suggested that discretionary policyregimes suffer from an inherent inflationary bias and that pre-commitmentto a target rate of inflation may be desirable. This paper showsthat in the presence of labour unions, the monetary policy gamecan lead to radically different results: a central bank thatis completely indifferent to the level of inflation may obtainoutcomes with high employment rates and zero inflation while‘prudent’, inflation-averse, central banks generatestagflation with positive inflation and low rates of employment.     

MEASURING INFLATION CREDIBILITY: RESULTS OF A FIRST REPRESENTATIVE SOUTH AFRICAN SAMPLE

This study reports the measurement of inflation credibility of a representative sample of the South African population in terms of an inflation credibility barometer. The barometer is an instrument measuring the degree of acceptance of the accuracy of historic inflation figures. These research results serve as a benchmark for South Africa, as similar measurement of a representative sample has not been undertaken before. The sampling results show little public understanding of the rate of inflation and its measurement of average price increases experienced by an average household. As generally accepted international benchmarks for successful central-bank communication strategies do not exist, the application of the methodology reported in this paper can improve the effectiveness of central bank communication aimed at improving the general knowledge about inflation.     

MONETARY POLICY IN RWANDA: A COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS

Countries in Africa are increasingly becoming similar in outlook, especially as regards monetary policy. With a view to conducting a long‐term study of monetary policy in Africa, we apply an empirical test for the coherence of inflation targeting, first conducted by Nell (2003 ) for South Africa, to data from Rwanda. We find that like South Africa, Rwanda has a stable money demand function and the adoption of an inflation target is a wise policy option. Also, the Rwandan money market needs just over five quarters to eliminate half of any monetary disequilibrium. These results are of some interest to economists and policy makers for all the countries in the increasingly interconnected continent of Africa.     

Monetary policy transmission and macroeconomic policy coordination in Pacific island countries

During the global financial crisis, central banks in Pacific island countries eased monetary policy to stimulate economic activity. Judging by the ensuing movements in commercial bank interest rates and private sector credit, monetary policy transmission appears to be weak. This is confirmed by an empirical examination of interest rate pass‐through and credit growth. Weak credit demand and under‐developed financial markets seem to have limited the effectiveness of monetary policy, but the inflexibility of exchange rates and rising real interest rates have also served to frustrate the central banks' efforts despite a supporting fiscal policy. While highlighting the importance of developing domestic financial markets in the long run, this experience also points to the need to coordinate macroeconomic policies and to use all macroeconomic tools available in conducting countercyclical policies, including exchange rate flexibility.     

THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AND INFLATION TARGETING

There is widespread consensus that a goal dependent, but instrument independent central bank solves the democratic deficit. However, the standard solution to the democratic deficit risks reintroducing the biases of political control over monetary policy through the power of politicians to change the monetary policy rule. This paper considers the problem as an instance of the paradox of power in the sphere of monetary policy and proposes a solution drawing on criteria for the rule of law and the principles of constitutional economics. Finally a normative test of inflation targeting is proposed, again drawing on the constitutional economics literature.     

Do Monetary Policy Announcements Affect Exchange Rate Returns and Volatility of Returns? Some Evidence from High‐Frequency Intra‐Day South African Data

This paper examines the temporal effect of domestic monetary policy surprises on both returns and volatility of returns of the South African rand/U.S. dollar exchange rate. The analysis in this “event study” proceeds using intra‐day minute‐by‐minute exchange rate data, repo rate data from the South African Reserve Bank's scheduled monetary policy announcements, and market consensus repo rate forecasts. A carefully selected sample over the period August 2003 to November 2017 ensures that the change in monetary policy is exogenous to the exchange rate. We find statistically and economically significant responses in intra‐day high‐frequency South African rand/U.S. dollar exchange rate returns and volatility of exchange rate returns to domestic interest rate surprises, but anticipated changes have no bearing on exchange rate returns and their volatility. The empirical results also indicate that there is an instantaneous response of the rand/dollar exchange rate to monetary policy surprises and that monetary policy news is an important determinant of the exchange rate until at least 42 minutes after the pronouncement – suggesting a high degree of market “efficiency” in its mechanical sense (although not necessarily in the deeper economic‐informational sense) in processing this information. Essentially, the asymmetric GARCH results exhibit no leverage effects – positive and negative information shocks have symmetric effects on conditional variance.     

The Impact of Monetary and Commodity Fundamentals,Macro News and Central Bank Communication on the Exchange Rate: Evidence from South Africa

This paper studies drivers of high-frequency (daily) dynamics of the South African rand vis-à-vis the dollar from January 2001 to July 2007. We find strong nonlinear effects of commodity prices, perceived country and emerging market risk premium and changes in the dollar-euro exchange rate on changes in daily returns of the rand-dollar exchange rate. We also identify a one-sided nonlinear mean reversion to the long-term monetary equilibrium. In addition we establish very short-lived effects on the exchange rate of selected macroeconomic surprises and central bank communication aimed at talking up the rand.