Earnings Management Vehicles for Korean Firms

We investigated the vehicles that Korean firms use when the firms manage earnings. We partitioned our sample into low, mid and high accrual sub‐samples based on discretionary accruals. Low accrual firms are defined as income‐decreasing firms whereas the high accrual firms are considered income increasing firms in this study. We decomposed accounting earnings into cash from operations and various components of accruals in a systematic way. Next we examined the types of accruals individual firms use when the respective firms increase reported earnings. The empirical results of the study indicate that there are clear discrepancies in the earnings management vehicles firm use when the firms manage earnings depending on the directions of earnings management. More specifically, income‐increasing firms frequently employ non‐cash revenues including asset‐disposal gains. Income‐decreasing firms employ non‐cash expenses including bad‐debt expenses and asset‐disposal losses. Firms also tend to use current accruals but to a limited extent as current accruals entail cash flow implications in the following years.     

Accruals quality,information risk,and institutional investors’ trading behavior: Evidence from the Korean stock market

This study analyzes the effect of firm-specific information risk, measured by accruals quality, on the cost of capital using institutional investors’ trading behavior. Institutional investors in firms with lower accruals quality increase their net selling in later years. Furthermore, these investors’ net selling is relevant to the innate and discretionary factors of accruals quality. This relationship is stronger for foreign institutions than for domestic institutions, and it is mostly observed under favorable macroeconomic conditions. We do not observe this relationship for large business groups connected by shares.     

Toward the Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management——Empirical Evidence from Manufacturing Enterprises Listed in Shanghai Stock Market

Nowadays, earnings management is a hot issue, but most of the researches focus on the incentives of earnings management and few of them refer to the effect of audit quality on earnings management. In this study, we directly examine the effect of external audit quality on earnings management by using discretionary accruals. We find that the discretionary accruals of non-dual audit companies are significantly greater than those of dual audit companies. We also find that clients of non-First Ten auditors intend to report greater discretionary accruals than those of First Ten auditors.     

Insider Trading, Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence Based on Hong Kong Firms

We document positive association between earnings management and insider selling after the fiscal year‐end for Hong Kong firms. This positive association is especially evident before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Our findings suggest that Hong Kong executives manage reported earnings to maximize their private benefits from insider selling. Additionally, we find that a higher proportion of independent directors (INED) on corporate boards moderate the positive association between insider selling and earnings management. Stricter monitoring of earnings management by INED is especially evident when no member of the family with majority ownership is present on corporate boards as a director. This suggests that the presence of family members with majority ownership on corporate boards significantly reduces INED's monitoring effectiveness. Our findings suggest that strict regulations are needed to control insider trading, and independence of corporate boards is important for monitoring of earnings management associated with insider trading. Furthermore, appointment of family members with majority shareholdings should be avoided to enhance independence and to monitor effectiveness of corporate boards.     

SFAS 133 and income smoothing via discretionary accruals: The role of hedge effectiveness and market volatility

This study investigates whether the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 133 (SFAS 133) influences firms’ income smoothing via discretionary accruals decisions. Moreover, we investigate whether the level of hedge effectiveness and market volatility affects the impact of SFAS 133 on firms’ income smoothing via discretionary accruals decisions. Consistent with our predictions, we find a significant increase in income smoothing via discretionary accruals activity after the adoption of SFAS 133. We also find that income smoothing via discretionary accruals after the adoption of SFAS 133 increases with the level of hedge ineffectiveness. By contrast, we find that perfect hedgers do not engage in more income smoothing via discretionary accruals after the adoption of SFAS 133. Finally, we find that the higher the market volatility is the larger the income smoothing is via discretionary accruals after the adoption of SFAS 133. This implies that higher market volatility makes it more difficult for firms to meet hedge accounting requirements, thereby increasing unmanaged earnings volatility and income smoothing. Prior studies suggest that regulators are expressing concern about the effect of earnings management on the quality of reported earnings and the functioning of capital markets (e.g., Barton, 2001 ). In this regard, our findings imply that accounting standard setters should take into account the trade‐off between transparency and income smoothing.     

How Do Financial Constraints Relate to Financial Reporting Quality? Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings

This paper examines how constraints on firms’ financing capacity relate to managers’ discretionary accounting choices. Three hypotheses of earnings management – the opportunism hypothesis, the rational expectations hypothesis, and the signaling hypothesis – predict that constrained firms engage in greater upward earnings management than unconstrained firms when selling equity. Using a sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) announced between 1983 and 2014, I find support for this prediction. The relation between financial constraints and earnings management is robust to including controls such as offer size, growth opportunities, analyst following, and chief executive officer equity holdings, as well as to using the instrumental variable approach. Investors’ reaction around and following the SEO announcement supports the rational expectations hypothesis. I find that aggressive earnings management by constrained issuers is associated with lower SEO announcement returns but is not followed by negative abnormal returns in the long run. The evidence suggests that constrained issuers’ aggressive use of income-increasing accruals is an outcome of managerial myopia caused by capital market pressure, not managerial opportunism intended to mislead investors.     

The Role of Overbilling in Hospitals’ Earnings Management Decisions

Abstract

This paper examines the role of overbilling in hospitals’ earnings management choices. Overbilling by hospitals is a form of revenue manipulation that involves misclassifying a patient into a diagnosis-related group that yields higher reimbursement. As overbilling allows hospitals to increase revenues without altering operations, affecting costs, or having to reverse such behavior in the future, I propose and find that overbilling reduces hospitals’ use of managing accruals or cutting discretionary expenditures. Next, I find that hospital managers prefer overbilling to managing accruals (cutting discretionary expenditures) when cutting discretionary expenditures (managing accruals) is constrained, and vice versa. Collectively, my findings suggest that overbilling is an important alternative manipulation tool in hospitals.     

审计师性别组成对审计质量、审计费用的影响——来自中国的经验证据

以2001年—2008年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,考察签字审计师性别和性别组成对审计质量和审计费用的影响后发现,女性组审计师可以在5%的显著性统计水平上增加负向的操纵性应计利润,审计师的性别组成与绝对的、正向及负向操纵性应计利润并无显著关系,女性组审计师及混合组审计师的审计费用都要显著高于男性组审计师。研究结论为审计师性别组成对中国审计市场的影响提供了重要的经验证据。     

CPA-Firm Merger: An Investigation of Audit Quality

It would be interesting to know how the theories and hypotheses in auditing developed for a mature economy work in an emerging market. This paper uses the merger of Diwan, Ernst & Young and J.T. Lai & Co., CPAs in Taiwan in 2000 as a target to study the effects of a CPA-firm merger on audit quality, measured by discretionary accruals. Diwan, Ernst & Young and J.T. Lai & Co., CPAs belonged to Big 5 and non-Big 5 CPA firms in Taiwan, respectively, before they merged. The magnitudes of the increased size and reputation caused by the merger are different between the two firms. Therefore, we also analyse whether the merger has different effects on audit quality of these two firms. The empirical evidence shows that after the merger, the discretionary accruals of the two firms' clients significantly decrease. In addition, the magnitude of the change is greater for the clients of J.T. Lai & Co., CPAs than for those of Diwan, Ernst & Young. The results are consistent with predictions of both size and reputation effect hypotheses.     

Discretionary Accruals and Auditor Behaviour in Code-Law Contexts: An Application to Failing Spanish Firms

This study examines the relationship between earnings management and auditor behaviour in the pre-bankrupt client segment of the Spanish audit market. As proxies for auditor behaviour, we use type of audit firm (Big N/non-Big N) and type of audit report. In contrast to the USA, audit reports in Spain often include modifications other than a going-concern opinion. This allows us to study the relationship in more detail than is possible with US data. The results of our study show that discretionary accruals are negatively related to going-concern opinions but are positively related to reports modified for reasons other than going-concern problems. However, unlike Butler et al. (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37, pp. 139–165, 2004) the negative relationship is explained not by liquidity survival tactics but by auditor conservatism. We find this conservatism not only in the value of discretionary accruals but also in the qualifications that accompany a going concern. In these cases GAAP violations have a much greater income effect and a stronger relationship with the reversal of manipulation accumulated over the years than with the manipulation introduced during the last year. Finally, our results suggest that Big N differentiation in a code-law country is context-specific and depends on the business risk parameter of the ‘audit risk model’. In particular, for high-risk firms, Big N auditors show a significantly lower level of discretionary accruals and a greater propensity to issue a going-concern opinion.     

Sales by multi‐product retailers

This paper examines the rationale underlying periodic price promotions, or sales, for perishable food products by supermarket retailers. Whereas previous studies explain sales in a single‐product context as arising from informational, storage cost, or demand heterogeneity, this study focuses on the central role of retailers as multi‐product sellers of complementary goods. By offering a larger number of discounted products within a particular category, retailers are able to attract a sufficient number of customers to offset the effect of lower margins on sale items by selling more high‐margin items. The implications that emerge from the resulting mixed‐strategy equilibrium are tested in a product‐level, retail‐scanner data set of fresh fruit sales. Hypotheses regarding the rationale and effectiveness of sales are tested by estimating econometric models that describe (1) the number of sales items per store, (2) the depth of a given sale, and (3) promotion effectiveness on store‐level demand. The results of this econometric analysis support the hypothesis that the breadth and depth of price promotions are complementary marketing tools, thus explaining how EDLP and HI‐LO store formats can exist in the same monopolistically competitive market equilibrium. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

MBO过程中的盈余管理行为——基子中国上市公司的实证研究

本文选取截至2002年底公认实行了MBO而又可获取资料的15家公司，研究其在MBO过程中是否存在减少报告盈余的应计会计处理。通过扩展的Jones模型进行实证分析，发现有证据支持管理层在MBO前一年采用了减少会计应计的统计证据。同时针对线下项目和费用的统计发现MBO公司和对照样本相比，在MBO的前一年度和当年度中，前者的投资收益、补贴收入和营业外利润比后者小，而前者的管理费用、销售费用比后後者大。这些证据表明在MBO过程中确实存在着盈余管理行为。     

公司治理、高管变更与盈余管理

使用中国上市公司2003～2008年数据,对不同治理结构下高管正常变更前一、两年的盈余管理行为进行实证研究,结果显示:董事长在正常变更前一、两年有调增利润的行为,且变更前一年的调增现象比前两年要显著,但没有证据显示总经理正常变更前存在显著的盈余管理行为。研究还发现,完善的公司治理结构对董事长正常变更诱发的盈余管理行为能够起到有效的抑制作用。因此,提高公司内部治理水平和建立外部市场高管长期声誉机制具有紧迫性。     

Earnings Management Around Zero: A motivation to local politician signalling competence

Abstract

Literature earnings management aims to determine what causes/motivates managers to disclose earnings close to zero and to use this as an instrument to influence users' decisions. However, limited research has been carried out on this subject in the public sector. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether local politicians (in Portuguese municipalities), aiming to demonstrate their high level of competence and skills, engage in earnings management in such a way as to ensure that earnings are positive but close to zero. We examined whether political competition is a determining factor of earnings management close to zero and if managers use discretionary accruals in order to do this. Results indicate that, in order to report positive net earnings close to zero, discretionary accruals are used. This study identified the overriding tendency to avoid the reporting of losses in those municipalities where political competition is greatest.     

可操纵应计的市场反应——来自中国证券市场的实证证据

基于应计制核算的净利润和经营活动现金流量之间的差异,可以分为不可操纵应计和可操纵应计,后者为企业管理层提供了一种重要的盈余管理手段。本文利用中国证券市场的数据,证明中国上市公司平均而言通过操纵应计项目进行了正的盈余管理,而且证券市场对可操纵应计作出了价格反应。     

Valuation effects of earnings management on hotel firm value

This study investigates the valuation effects of earnings quality on a hotel’s firm value between 1991 and 2017. A unique perspective from the financial crisis period is utilized to explore the changes further when hotel firms face financial distress. We adopt the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method in this study. Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression and Petersen’s Clustered Standard Error Model to confirm the validity of results. Seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) analysis is adopted to compare the impact of the financial crisis on subsamples of low and high Altman Z-scores and subsamples of non-Big-4 and Big-4 firms. Substantial evidence supports our assertion that increased discretionary accruals and earnings management bring down earnings quality and, in turn, decrease a hotel’s firm value. Results reinforce that the 2008 financial crisis had an impact on the relationship between earnings management and hotel firm value. The negative effect that discretionary accruals and earnings management have on hotel firm value is mitigated for hotel firms with low credit strength or not audited by one of the Big-4 firms. Stockholders of hotel firms should be aware of the impact and enforce additional measures to control earnings management activities during a financial crisis.     

The Effect of CEO Stock-Based Compensation on the Pricing of Future Earnings

This paper examines whether CEO stock-based compensation has an effect on the market’s ability to predict future earnings. When stock-based compensation motivates managers to share their private information with shareholders, it will expedite the pricing of future earnings in current stock prices. In contrast, when equity-compensated managers attempt to temporarily manipulate the stock price to maximize their own benefit rather than that of shareholders, the market may not fully anticipate future performance. We find that a CEO’s stock-based compensation strengthens the association between current returns and future earnings, indicating that more information about future earnings is reflected in current stock prices. In addition, we find that the positive effect is weaker for firms that have a high level of signed discretionary accruals or a low management forecast frequency. Overall, our study suggests that on average, equity-based compensation improves the informativeness of stock prices about future earnings, while opportunistic discretionary accruals or lowered earnings guidance hamper this improvement.     

An equilibrium model of insider trading in continuous time

We study a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium model of insider trading in continuous time. The supply of the risky asset is assumed to be stochastic. This supply can be interpreted as noise from nonrational traders (noise traders). A rational informed investor (the insider) has private information on the growth rate of the dividend flow rewarded by the risky asset. She is risk averse and maximizes her inter-temporal utility rate over an infinite time-horizon. The market is cleared by a risk neutral market maker who sets the price of the risky asset competitively as the conditional present value of future dividends, given the information supplied by the dividend history and the cumulative order flow. Due to the presence of noise traders, the market demand does not fully reveal the insider’s private information, which slowly becomes incorporated in prices. An interesting result of the paper is that a nonstandard linear filtering procedure gives an a priori form for the equilibrium strategy to be postulated. We show the existence of a stationary linear equilibrium where the insider acts strategically by taking advantage of the camouflage provided by the noise which affects the market maker’s estimates on private information. In this equilibrium, we find that the insider’s returns on the stock are uncorrelated over long periods of time. Finally, we show that the instantaneous variance of the price under asymmetric information lies between the instantaneous variance of the price under complete and incomplete information. The converse inequalities hold true for the unconditional variance of the price.     

Managerial Ownership and Earnings Management: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Japan

This paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and opportunistic managerial behavior relating to earnings management. Economics theory identifies two apparently conflicting effects of managerial ownership on managers' incentives: the incentive alignment effect and the management entrenchment effect. We construct a theoretical model demonstrating the two effects. This model suggests that as managerial ownership increases, earnings management decreases for both high and low levels of managerial ownership, while it increases for intermediate levels of managerial ownership if the sensitivity of the probability of managerial dismissal to the corporate performance is high enough and/or the manager's private benefit derived from managerial position is high enough. In a sample of Japanese firms, we find a significant nonmonotonic relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals, consistent with our model.     

Reputation, Honesty, and Efficiency with Insider Information: an Experiment

We conduct an experimental study of sales of insider information about an asset's future value, where the insiders cannot purchase the underlying asset. We examine whether such information is purchased, the quality of the information provided, and the subsequent accuracy of purchase decisions in the underlying asset market. Our design explores whether reputation, in a repeated game of finite (but uncertain) duration, is an effective constraint on deliberate strategic misinformation. The insiders have an immediate incentive to state that the asset value is high when its true value is low. We suggest an application to insider trading in financial information markets. With fixed matching, cooperative outcomes featuring truthful revelation are frequently achieved and sustained, even though this suggests subjects have sophisticated beliefs about the beliefs and behavior of others. As a comparison, we also conduct a control treatment with random rematching. Here, information purchase is less frequent, the rate of truthful revelation decreases, and efficiency is diminished. Our results suggest that most people anticipate that others realize the potential value of a good reputation.