Equities of scope as merger incentives under capital regulation: narrow versus synergy banking valuation

The call options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to narrow-banking contingent claims of one bank, while the cap options theory is applied to synergy-banking contingent claims of another bank. This article investigates efficiency gains specified as equities of scope associated with the likelihood of the two banks involved in merger under capital regulation. We find that merger incentives are encouraged when the narrowing banking is conducted by the consolidated bank, whereas discouraged when the synergy banking is conducted. Raising bank capital requirement leads to an increased interest margin of the consolidated bank with the narrow banking valuation; however, to a decreased margin of the consolidated bank with the synergy banking valuation. An increase in the capital regulation reduces the merger incentives in the narrow banking valuation whereas increases the merger disincentive in the synergy banking valuation. These findings are consistent with the organizational theory that predicts a comparative advantage of narrow banking proposals in bank mergers.     

Income inequality and economic incentives: Is there an equity–efficiency tradeoff?

What is the basis and direction of relationship between income inequality and economic growth? The equity versus efficiency dictum which predicts a positive relationship between inequality, capital formation, and real GDP growth—emphasizes the importance of economic incentives. Subsequently, this was challenged by the incomplete markets and political outcomes theories, because of increasing empirical evidence of an inverse relationship between income inequality and economic growth. In this paper, we offer a further explanation of the basis and nature of the inequality–capital–growth relationship which emphasizes the divergence between savings and investment. For the United States over the period 1970–2006, we have found no empirical evidence for the support of the equity versus efficiency hypothesis—that economic incentives are necessary for capital accumulation and growth. In fact, it was discovered that in most cases, inequality has had little or no impact on movements in the US capital stock, net investment, and consequently, economic growth. Another interesting finding of this study was that inequality exhibits hysteresis—implying that any positive shock, such as the dot-com boom, can lead to persistent and enduring increases in inequality.     

Capital requirements and business cycles with credit market imperfections

The business cycle effects of bank capital regulatory regimes are examined in a New Keynesian model with credit market imperfections and a cost channel of monetary policy. Bank capital increases incentives for banks to monitor borrowers, thereby raising the repayment probability, and excess capital generates benefits in terms of reduced regulatory scrutiny. Basel I- and Basel II-type regulatory regimes are defined, and the model is calibrated for a middle-income country. Simulations of a supply shock show that, depending on the elasticity that relates the repayment probability to the bank capital–loan ratio, the Basel II regime may be less procyclical than a Basel I regime.     

Incentives for firms to provide safety: Regulatory authority and capital market reactions

We investigate the relationship between the various incentives that firms have to act safely, focusing on the relationship between the equity losses experienced by a firm following a fatal, accident and the incentive effects created by government regulation. The major findings are that first, the capital market reactions vary dramatically by which agency has regulatory jurisdiction for the accident. And second, the capital market effects tend to be weak (equity values do not decline sizably) where federal agencies rely heavily on an ex ante inspection policy. On the other hand, where ex ante inspection policy is lax or nonexistent, capital market effects tend to be strong - up to an order of magnitude higher per fatality than willingness-to-pay estimates based on labor market data.     

Market and public provision in the presence of human capital externalities

For many goods and services, such as health, education, legal services, police protection, the cost incurred by an individual supplier for providing quality is affected by the human capital of her colleagues. The paper shows that this human capital externality is crucial to determine whether such goods and services should be privately or publicly provided. Public and private provisions give individuals different incentives to acquire human capital, and the paper shows that either may be socially preferable, depending on the nature of the human capital externality: private provision of the final goods and services gives stronger incentives to human capital acquisition (and may therefore be socially preferable) if own human capital and one's colleagues' human capital are substitutes, and if suppliers with high human capital benefit more than suppliers with low human capital from their colleagues' human capital, but not excessively so.     

管理者股权激励、内部资本市场与公司多元化

以我国多元化公司中管理者利用内部资本市场进行资金错配攫取私利行为为背景,研究管理者股权激励对多元化公司内部资本市场效率和公司价值的影响。通过建立双重委托代理模型,选取2009-2014年我国A股上市公司面板数据进行实证检验。结果发现：①多元化公司内部资本市场效率随管理者股权激励水平的提高而提高;②管理者股权激励水平提高最终导致多元化公司价值增加,内部资本市场在其中起部分中介作用;③公司多元化水平影响管理者股权激励对内部资本市场效率和公司价值的促进效应。     

Corporate Expenditure on Environmental Protection

We examine the determinants of firm’s current environmental expenditure and firm’s capital investment in equipment for pollution control in Irish manufacturing industries using a Heckman selection model. The main determinants for the two types of expenditure are similar: larger, exporting and energy-intensive firms are more likely to spend. Being subject to environmental regulation also has an effect. Once the decision to commit resources has been taken, larger, older, foreign-owned, exporting and energy-intensive firms incur higher environmental expenditure. For the amount of capital investment only firm size and age play a role. This suggests that the economic and regulatory incentives in place are such that it is the largest and most polluting firms that do most to reduce pollution.     

State investment tax incentives: A zero-sum game?

Over the past four decades, state investment tax incentives have proliferated. This emergence of state investment tax credits (ITC) and other investment tax incentives raises two important questions: 1) Are these tax incentives effective in achieving their stated objective, to increase investment within the state?; 2) To the extent these incentives raise investment within the state, how much of this increase is due to investment drawn away from other states?To begin to answer these questions, we construct a detailed panel dataset for 48 states for 20+ years. The dataset contains series on output and capital, their relative prices, and establishment counts. The effects of tax variables on capital formation and establishments are measured by the Jorgensonian user cost of capital that depends in a nonlinear manner on federal and state tax variables. Cross-jurisdictional differences in state investment tax credits and state corporate tax rates entering the user cost, combined with a panel that is long in the time dimension, are key to identifying the effectiveness of state investment incentives.Two models are estimated. The Capital Demand Model is motivated by the first-order condition for a profit-maximizing firm and relates at the state level the capital/output ratio to the relative user cost of capital. The Twin-Counties Model exploits both the spatial breaks (“discontinuities”) in tax policy at state borders and our panel dataset to relate at the county level the relative user cost to the location of manufacturing establishments. Using the Capital Demand Model, we find that own-state capital formation is substantially increased by tax-induced reductions in the own-state price of capital and, more interestingly, substantially decreased by tax-induced reductions in the price of capital in competitive-states. Similarly, using our Twin-Counties Model, we find that county manufacturing establishment counts around state borders are higher on the side of the border with the lower price of capital, but the difference is economically small, suggesting that establishments are much less mobile than overall capital. Extensions of the Capital Demand Model also reveal that state capital tax policy appears to be a zero-sum game among the states in that an equiproportionate increase in own-state and competitive-states user costs tends to have no effect on own-state capital formation.     

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND TRADE POLITICS: CAPITAL FLOWS, POLITICAL COALITIONS, AND LOBBYING

Conventional wisdom holds that increasing international capital mobility reduces incentives for firms to lobby for trade protection. This paper argues that the effects of increased international capital mobility on the lobbying incentives of firms depend critically upon levels of inter-industry mobility. General-equilibrium analysis reveals that if capital is highly industry-specific, greater international mobility among some types of specific capital may increase lobbying incentives for owners of other specific factors and thereby intensify industry-based rent-seeking in trade politics. Evidence on levels of inward and outward investment in US manufacturing industries between 1982 and 1996, and on industry lobbying activities, indicate that these effects may be quite strong.     

银行竞争、专用性人力资本投资激励与国有商业银行的公司治理

本文结合中国银行业竞争日趋激烈的现实背景,从商业银行专用性人力资本投资激励的独特视角入手,分别讨论了银行高层管理者和普通员工的专用性人力资本投资激励与他们参与银行公司治理机制的有关问题.研究发现,在国有商业银行公司治理结构改善过程中,更需要增加专用性人力资本投资的有效激励,并通过积极引入境外战略投资者和加强职工代表在银行监事会中影响力的办法,进一步激励银行员工进行能够提高银行经营绩效的专用性人力资本投资.     

人力资本对企业绩效的影响研究——薪酬的中介作用

本研究基于资源基础理论，对企业人力资本进行定量测度的基础上，分析了2615家上市公司在2014年至2017年期间薪酬管理模式在人力资本对企业绩效影响过程中发挥的作用，并使用结构方程模型和多群组分析法对假设进行检验。研究结果表明，薪酬管理在人力资本与企业绩效之间起完全中介效应。高人力资本、高薪酬激励的企业的绩效要高于低人力资本、低薪酬激励的企业的绩效；本研究还发现当企业具有高人力资本和低薪酬激励时，企业绩效甚至会低于具有低人力资本、低薪酬激励的企业绩效。本研究突破传统薪酬管理的质性研究方法，为打开战略人力资源管理领域的“黑箱”提供了一个新的视角。     

Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts

I consider an environment in which contract enforcement is a decision variable for the principal. I construct a model in which entrepreneurs cannot commit to repaying investors for the capital advanced, but investors can force repayment by spending resources. The principal uses enforcement to reduce the resources available to the agent after a default, thus providing incentives for the agent to stay in the relationship. She also ensures contract compliance by backloading the payments to the agent: expected utility rises over time, preventing a default. I consider an application of the framework developed in the paper to the area of firm dynamics. I show that enforcement and backloading are always used jointly. Firm size (measured by capital) grows with time and each firm converges to the efficient size. A second application is to the field of economic development. Costlier enforcement leads to the choice of sub-optimal technology; secondly, it leads to inefficient dispersion of capital across establishments.     

Selective immigration policies, human capital accumulation and migration duration in infinite horizon

An increasing literature fosters selective immigration policies as a tool to increase human capital in both source and destination countries. These policies are supposed to prompt incentives to education, and–if selection is sufficiently severe–to increase the human capital stock in source countries. Nonetheless, when compared to open migration, selective policies make returns to education uncertain, and they may harm incentives to invest in human capital. As a consequence, they may reduce the human capital stock even though selection is “severe”. Moreover, when repeated migration is possible, they backfire on migration duration. We obtain our results in an infinite-horizon model that, unlike the current literature, places no restriction on the number of possible migration spells and allows for the possibility of a forced emigration.     

基于社会资本视角的民营上市公司非公开发行动因研究——相关证据及理论框架

本文从社会资本的视角,研究了民营上市公司非公开发行的动因。通过案例研究,笔者提供的证据表明,非公开发行不仅是民营上市公司的一种融资手段,而且是获得社会资本的重要途径。以相关证据为基础,笔者从社会资本视角构建了民营上市公司非公开发行动因的理论框架。本文的研究结论不仅对理论界从新的角度理解民营上市公司非公开发行的动因有重要启示,而且对民营上市公司采用非公开发行筹资实践有一定的借鉴作用。     

科技金融政策促进科技企业发展的资源配置效率研究——来自北京市的实证调查

以北京市科技企业为调查对象，对科技金融政策促进企业发展的资源配置效率进行问卷调查分析，结果发现：各分项政策效率由高到低排序依次为财政补贴、金融监管、服务平台、税收优惠、科技保险、风险投资、科技担保、科技信贷政策；政策资源配置在不同产权类型、注册资本、行业类型、员工规模、资质类型、成立年限和年营业收入之间的均衡程度不同；政策激励偏重于创业明朗期和成熟期实力雄厚的企业、区级高技术企业以及国家战略扶持或市场需求较强行业，对创业危险期和成长转型期企业、市级高技术企业、风险较高行业激励性较弱。因此，建议政策优化时处理好以下关系：助强与扶弱、需求与供给、优先与平衡、创业与后劲、管制与放开、独立与协同。     

The political economy of capital market integration and tax competition

This paper investigates the effect of capital market integration (CMI) on capital taxes in a political economy framework in which policy is influenced by lobbying of interest groups. CMI increases the efficiency cost of the capital tax, which introduces incentives to reduce the tax rate, but also reduces lobbying by owners of capitalists, which introduces countering incentives to increase the tax rate. CMI can therefore result in a higher capital tax rate. When the market share of each country is small, CMI may increase government supply of public goods and enhance efficiency, which implies that, in the presence of policy endogeneity through lobbying, decentralized policymaking can be more efficient than centralized policymaking.     

A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination

We study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium. The interaction between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize. Discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. The dominant group gains from discrimination, rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate discrimination. The model is also consistent with “reverse discrimination” as a remedy against discrimination since it may be necessary to decrease the welfare of the dominant group to achieve parity.     

Unilateral disclosure of private information by a regulated firm

It is common practice for regulators to depend on regulated firms for self-monitoring and self-reporting in spite of incentives for misrepresentation. Our analysis provides some justification for such dependence. We study disclosure of information in a game theoretic model of regulation, in which both the regulator and the firm are players in the game. Instead of designing a regulation scheme that compels disclosure, we study unilateral disclosure in a given regulatory framework (a framework which we believe has counterparts in current regulatory practice). The results provide insight to informal relationships between firms and regulators. Because the game is a single period game, the informal relationship in which the disclosures occur cannot be attributed to the existence of reputations and long term relationships.     

Entrepreneurial strategy v. accounting accuracy in ‘calculating’ capital and income

Both entrepreneurs and accountants ??calculate?? capital and income but their procedures diverge. The paper examines this divergence and the respective calculational objectives of entrepreneurs and accountants in the business enterprise. For the entrepreneur, capital and income are ex ante calculational judgments of prospective income gain from strategic use of the enterprise??s capital goods. But the accountant must shun entrepreneurial judgments to ??calculate?? the contemporary net market value of enterprise??s capital goods at a specified date. Hence, the accountant??s calculation of income is the net contemporary increase in the market value of the enterprise??s capital goods. These accounting calculations facilitate assessment of the success of an enterprise strategy. But critics assert that accounting practice ignores the need of external investor??s for accurate information on enterprise prospects. The paper concludes with a critique of accounting regulation and explores the feasibility and means of privatizing the entrepreneurial choice of accounting techniques.     

Electricity wheeling and incentive regulation

This paper relates social contract regulation strategies to a particularly important comtemporary issue in energy regulation—electricity wheeling; we find that substantial gains in economic efficiency may be possible. First, social contracts give potential wheelers more monetary incentive than traditional regulatory procedures to provide wheeling services to interested third parties. Second, social contract regulation gives potential wheelers better incentives to measure marginal costs accurately. Third, under social contract regulation, wheelers have proper incentives to install efficient amounts of transmission capacity, thereby avoiding Averch-Johnson and other regulatory distortions that emerge in traditional regulation.