中国参与国际科技合作30年（1987-2016）：论文合著与项目合作分析视角

方兴未艾的国际科技合作是科学复杂化与综合化的产物,亦是提升本国科研实力的必由之路。回顾我国30年参与国际科技合作历程,对于明晰我国在国际科技合作中的地位以及提升科研实力具有重要意义。论文合著与项目合作是科技合作的主要载体,通过搜寻Web of Science论文数据库和国家国际科技合作专项网、中国国际科技合作网、中国科学院官网、中国工程院官网等网站,分别检索1987-2016年我国国际论文合著和项目合作信息,选择科技合作重心、合作程度、合作热点进行量化分析。研究发现：①论文合著与项目合作重心分别呈现“极化到扩散”与“此消彼长”的合作态势,合作对象集中于发达国家,与新兴经济体国家的合作相对欠缺;②我国论文合著与项目合作程度持续深化,但国际主导型和参与的核心技术研发项目稀少,精准合作可以成为提升科技合作质量的出路;③论文合著与项目合作领域逐渐拓宽,但聚焦于数理、化学科学等自然科学领域,信息科学作为新兴学科也逐渐进入科技合作视野,社会科学领域合作则需要给予更多政策、基金与人才支持。     

我国产学研互惠性协同微观机理研究*

产学研是我国国家创新战略的核心内容之一,当前发展到协同阶段.我国产学研的协同效率较低,不足以实现产学研结构的有序化.互惠性思想和方法是激活产学研协同的动力源之一.实证检验发现:互惠性合作及交互效应对产学研项目质量、市场适应性、投入产出匹配均存在着显著的促进效应.我国产学研应走互惠性协同之路,大力培育互惠性文化、学习西方互惠性经验、以互惠合作来解决契约不完全问题、以互惠来驱动诚信合作、摒弃合作中的极端利己主义、灵活地执行合作制度和规范,才能突破产学研协同创新中的瓶颈.     

论跨国公司内部竞合中的子公司类型划分

外国子公司在合作和竞争的水平上是有差异的,有些子公司能够达到高水平的合作和竞争,而其他子公司可能进行高水平的合作、低水平的竞争,反之亦然。这种差异性形成了四种情况,它们反映了竞合矩阵中合作和竞争的不同排列。运用合适的分类方法,可以将大量的外国子公司分成四种,这样可以进一步解释每个类型存在和经营的共同条件,便于跨国公司更好地进行全球化的计划与协调工作。从经验主义的角度讲,可以根据每个子公司的竞争和合作水平,将之与企业层面的平均值进行比较,从而确定出它所属的类型。     

校企合作技术创新的博弈分析

面对国内外激烈的竞争压力和技术要求,企业与具有知识密集和专家众多的高校合作,创新才有希望。从博弈理论的角度出发,高校和企业长期合作对双方都有利,因而高校和企业在技术创新中应该加强合作,选择适合双方的合作模式,建立长期合作和信任机制,并努力寻求政府的帮助,从而实现双方的共赢。     

中国节能减排国际科学研究合作特征分析

基于ESI论文数据库,使用科学计量学方法和指标,从合作国家、学科、合作机构和高质量论文等方面,探究2003—2012年期间中国开展的节能减排国际科学研究合作的特征。研究结果表明:中国节能减排领域的国际合作论文总量快速增长,合作国家数不断增多,合作论文质量逐渐提高,合作深度不断增强,高质量论文主要集中在化学、材料科学和物理等中国传统优势学科领域。     

动态合作的利益分配机制设计

围绕基于盟主-成员的动态合作结构,首先,分析了影响动态合作利益分配的主要因素,从可分配的收益、分配标准以及分配方式三个方面看,动态合作的利益分配需要根据伙伴之间多样的协作形式,体现灵活动态的特性;其次,探讨了分配机制对于动态合作影响,合理的利益分配机制可以起到制度保障及激励作用,从而反作用于合作,促进合作成果的产生;此外,结合动态合作的特点以及合作利益分配过程及特征,分析了利益分配涉及的关键环节。利益分配原则分析表明,信息不对称是合作中导致利益分配问题的主要因素,围绕利益分配过程中的可分配利益确定、分配原则及分配方式制定三个环节,提出了动态合作中利益分配机制的设计要点。最后,针对实际中多方动态合作的利益分配问题,建立了基于多人合作博弈的利益分配模型,并就不存在核解的情况,借助模糊数学的方法进行了求解。     

中国产学研合作发展现状及对策研究

产学研合作是国家创新体系的重要组成部分,对于促进科技成果转化,推动产业转型升级意义重大。通过对世界主要发达国家产学研合作政策的梳理,总结中国产学研合作发展现状及主要问题,提出将“产学研合作”政策提升为国策、设立国家产学研协作创新委员会、制定国家《产学研合作促进法》,提高中国产学研合作国际化水平等对策建议。     

Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes

We conduct a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in finitely repeated two-player games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in the case of strategic substitutes. The difference is to some extent driven by a difference in the speed with which some pairs reach stable full cooperation, but mainly by differences in choices of pairs that do not succeed in reaching full cooperation.     

Nonlinear behavior of the socio-economic dynamics for lake eutrophication control

To succeed in combating lake eutrophication, cooperation of local inhabitants, small factories, and farmers in reducing phosphorus discharge is very important. But the willingness of each player to cooperate would depend on the cooperation of other players and on the level of environmental concern of the society in general. Here we study the integrated dynamics of people's choice of behavior and the magnitude of eutrophication. Assumptions are: there are a number of players who choose between alternative options: a cooperative and environment-oriented option is more costly than the other. The decision of each player is affected by “social pressure” as well as by economical cost of the options. The lake pollution increases with the total phosphorus released, and a high pollution level in the lake would enhance the social pressure. The model includes a positive and a negative feedback loops which create diverse dynamical behavior. The model often shows bistability — having an equilibrium with a high level of cooperation among people and clean water, and the other equilibrium with low cooperation and polluted water, which are simultaneously stable. The model also shows fluctuation between a high and a low levels of cooperation in alternating years, cycle with a longer periodicity, or chaotic fluctuation. Conservatism of people stabilizes the system and sometimes helps maintaining cooperation. The system may show unexpected parameter dependence — the improved phosphorus removing efficiency might make water more polluted if it causes the decline in the environmental concern and cooperation among people.     

区域合作的制度基础:跨界治理理论与欧盟经验

区域合作是促进区域协调发展的重要形式。如何克服现有行政区划障碍与解决各合作方经济发展不平衡这“两个难题”是保证合作可持续发展的关键。解决这两个难题不是一个单纯的基于比较优势理论的资源配置或产业分工的问题,而是要建立合作的制度基础。文章尝试从“跨界治理”的视角,借鉴欧盟的跨界治理经验,研究我国区域经济合作的制度基础,提出建立一个符合市场经济原则的跨界治理体系,为推动中国区域经济合作提供一种新的路径参考。     

产业链的合作机制选择与低碳产品定价及碳减排策略

生产链上下游企业选择合适的合作机制对低碳产品定价及碳减排有重要影响。通过构建博弈模型分析三种不同合作机制下的低碳产品定价及碳减排问题:第一种合作机制即制造商与零售商进行合作,当两条生产链都选择这种合作机制时,能带来较高的碳减排率和较低的零售价格,这对制造商、零售商、消费者和环境都是有利的。第二种合作机制即两条生产链的制造商之间、零售商之间分别合作,这会带来较低的碳减排率和较高的零售价格,对两个制造商有利,而对零售商和消费者不利。分析前两种合作机制的利与弊提出第三种合作机制,即零售商和制造商共享利润下的有利于碳减排的策略。最后,结合案例讨论和数值分析的研究结果表明:当制造商和零售商收入共享比在一定范围内时,第三种合作机制可以给制造商和零售商带来更高的利润。由此为企业选择最佳的合作机制及合理的碳减排策略提供了理论指导。     

The evolution of human cooperation

We argue that cooperation is instinctual. Human cooperation conferred advantages to individuals in the ancestral environment in which evolution occurred. Explanations of the evolution of cooperation for any species (human, pre-human, and non-human) have to be consistent with the biological, physiological, and environmental constraints that existed in the ancestral environment during which evolutionary selection occurred. Our explanation is consistent with: (1) the anatomical evolution of humanity; (2) the paleontological and chronological evidence; and (3) modern biology.     

The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game

This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking activities in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking game between two groups of different size. We first investigate Nash reversion strategies to support cooperative behavior in both groups, before analyzing double-edge trigger strategies which support cooperation in one group only. These last strategies have the property that cheating on the agreement in the cooperative group is followed by non-cooperation in this group and cooperation in the rival group. The main conclusion is that the set of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained within the larger group as a subgame perfect outcome is as large as that for which cooperation can be sustained in the smaller group. Hence, in contrast to Olson?s (1965) celebrated thesis, but in accordance with many informal and formal observations, larger groups can be as effective as smaller groups in furthering their interests.     

太阳能技术的合作专利分析及对策

低碳经济已经成为国际经济发展的新要求,因此,低碳技术开发日益受到世界各国的重视。太阳能技术是一种典型的低碳技术,我国经过10几年的发展,在太阳能领域取得了举世瞩目的成就,但因缺乏核心技术,目前面临着严峻的挑战。由于专利分析能客观地评价技术创新与合作水平,因此,为更好地促进我国太阳能技术的发展,基于专利分析法,对我国太阳能合作专利数据进行了分析。结果表明:我国太阳能技术的跨机构技术联系较少,"产学研"创新体系尚不成熟;政策扶持对于太阳能这种新兴低碳技术有较大的影响力;国内太阳能专利授权的技术领域主要集中在太阳能热利用,而在光伏领域的合作较少;太阳能合作专利存在较大的区域差异,应该进一步加强区域之间的技术合作和技术转移:应该加强国际技术合作。     

全球价值链视角下产业合作模式选择

产业合作模式选择是产业合作实施的重要问题之一。随着区域经济不断发展,全球价值链成为影响产业合作模式选择的重要方面。在全球价值链视角下,遵循“产业特征定位—产业位势比较—产业合作模式选择”逻辑链提出产业合作模式选择模型,并以福建省主导产业中的化工业和机械制造业为研究对象,对闽台产业合作模式选择进行实证研究。结果显示：在福建省针对闽台产业合作模式选择决策中,化工行业需要采用垂直和水平产业升级合作模式,机械制造业需要采用垂直的产业协同和产业转移合作模式。全球价值链视角下产业合作模式选择的理论拓展与实际应用,对区域经济合作中的产业合作模式选择具有一定的借鉴价值。     

Cooperation in Stochastic OLG games

This paper builds on Cremer's (Quart. J. Econ. 101 (1986) 33) seminal analysis which shows that (almost) complete cooperation can be achieved as an equilibrium in a game played by overlapping generations of players if the institution in which players cooperate is infinitely lived.We analyze a similar model in which the costs of cooperation are subject to random shocks. Even if these random shocks are very small, the range of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained is decreased considerably in comparison to the deterministic case. Furthermore, we show how the efficient outcome can be approximated if the level of cooperation can be varied continuously and the cooperation technology has decreasing or constant returns to scale, while this is not possible in the case of increasing returns to scale.     

环阿尔泰区域经济圈建设: 亚洲开发银行的经验与启示

“四国六方”阿尔泰区域合作机制已经运作十年,其合作内容也日益广泛和深化,其中经贸领域的合作变得越来越重要.通过构建国家层面的环阿尔泰区域经济圈以加大经贸领域的合作力度日益成为“四国六方”的共识,但是就将其纳入上海合作组织框架还是亚洲开发银行次区域经济合作机制更有利于实质性的合作这一问题仍需深入探讨.本文通过比较认为,加入亚洲开发银行次区域经济合作机制是最佳选择,当然,这同时也不脱离上海合作组织.     

A resolution of N-person prisoners' dilemma

Summary. The purpose of this paper is to show that cooperation is possible in N-person prisoners' dilemma if players have incomplete information on the order of their moves. We consider a modified version of N-person prisoners' dilemma in which players sequentially move in the order determined by Nature, and during the play they get some information about others. We provide an information partition and a condition of payoffs for which cooperation is attained in an equilibrium. Further, for the case that full cooperation is not attained, we examine the largest partial cooperation which is achieved in an equilibrium. Received: March 5, 1995; revised version August 11, 1996     

Vertical R&D Spillovers,Cooperation, Market Structure,and Innovation

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three "competitive externalities" (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors decreases R&D when horizontal spillovers are low; the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers are sufficiently high, and/or when horizontal cooperation is combined with vertical cooperation.     

网络条件下企业技术创新合作行为分析:一个实验研究

运用实验方法,以网络条件下企业技术创新合作行为为实验背景,模拟了不同初始资源组合下企业的技术创新合作行为,探讨了企业在技术创新合作过程中的资源投入情况。研究结果表明,企业会根据自身及网络中其它企业的资源禀赋水平调整在合作过程中的投入程度,且初始资源水平的差异性会直接影响到网络条件下企业技术合作创新成功率。