投资者关注与投资者权益保护：定向增发视角研究评述

上市公司股票定价是定向增发的核心，对中小投资者权益影响较大。在定向增发过程中存在着上市公司大股东锁定较低发行价格的自利行为以及投资者非理性情绪推动股票价格的大幅涨跌，使其权益遭受损失的现象。如何保护投资者权益？本文基于投资者关注这一视角，分别围绕投资者关注的分类与度量、投资者关注与资产定价、定向增发一级市场定价效率与权益保护、定向增发折价问题成因与权益保护四个方面对国内外文献进行梳理与分析，并针对现有不足提出未来研究方向与重要议题。     

建立中小投资者权益保障机制

证券市场中的投资者包括机构投资者和中小投资者。中小投资者权益保护事关证券市场发展，成熟市场都有一整套保护中小股东利益的政策和措施，目前我国证券市场最为突出的问题是投资者权益受到侵犯，笔者认为，以制度创新推动上市公司与证券市场规范发展，尽快构建我国投资者权益保护的法律框架，设立证券市场投资者权益保障中心，提高证券市场监管效率，加大对违规行为的惩治力度，教育投资者，增强维权意识应是构建我国中小投资者权益保障机制之关键。     

投资者保护与权益资本成本的关系探讨

本文以沪深两市2003年576家上市公司为研究样本，以权益资本成本为因变量，以本文所构建的投资者保护指数为自变量，运用多元回归方法对两者关系进行检验分析。研究发现：投资者保护与权益资本成本呈显著负相关关系，即使在考虑了公司规模、Beta系数、行业影响等因素后，两者之间的负相关关系仍然显著，这就证明我国上市公司虽然整体投资者保护水平不高，但公司之间的保护程度仍有重大差异；我国证券市场上的投资者已经能够在一定程度上区别对待投资者保护水平不同的上市公司。     

当前我国中小投资者权益保护机制中存在的问题及对策

在我国证券市场上,中小股东往往处于弱势地位。本文在分析现阶段我国证券市场上中小投资者权益受损状况的基础上,从制度性、结构性、技术性三方面对我国中小投资者权益保护不力的原因进行深入探讨,并提出了建立我国中小投资者权益保护机制的对策。     

从“国九条”透析我国中小投资者权益保护

广泛的中小投资者虽然拥有庞大的群体,但在投资者权益方面依旧"势单力薄",沦为"弱势群体"。本文在分类梳理中外中小投资者保护相关文献的基础上,对我国中小投资者权益受侵害的原因进行了分析,结合"国九条"主要意见,提出了保护中小投资者权益的具体措施和对策建议。     

我国证券投资者权益保护问题初探

本文通过对投资者权益的概念、内涵作分析,论述了公众投资者权益受损的原因及表现,进而提出建立投资者权益保护机制的思路。     

推进投资者保护制度创新 服务多层次资本市场建设

＂多层次资本市场建设与投资者权益保护＂研讨会5月7日在深圳举行,深圳证券交易所理事长陈东征、中国证监会主席助理朱从玖等出席了会议,最高人民法院副院长奚晓明作了书面发言,深圳证券交易所总经理宋丽萍主持了会议。与会嘉宾紧密围绕证券市场投资者保护司法救济机制、创业板直接退市中的投资者权益保护、证券市场创新业务中的投资者权益保护、多层次资本市场建设中的法律问题四个专题畅所欲言,进行了热烈、深入而富有成效的讨论。     

完善我国证券投资者保护机制的设想

本文从证券投资者权益保护的内涵出发,在借鉴国际投资者权益保护经验的基础上,描述了我国证券投资者权益保护的基本格局,同时从投资者保护流程、投资者保护手段以及政府、法律、市场三者间的关系等角度,提出了构建以政府监督、市场自律、法律制度为基础,法律保护、行政保护、行业自律保护、社会监督与自我保护、保护基金制度、信息披露制度"六位一体"的投资者保护体系及保护机制的总体思路。     

浅谈股票市场投资者保护

有效保护投资者尤其是保护中小投资者的权益,是股票市场繁荣发展的基石.本文通过对国内股票市场的现状、特点和存在问题进行分析,论述投资者保护缺失的根源,并提出了相应的保护股票市场投资者利益的若干建议.     

关于如何建立我国中小投资者权益保护机制的研究

中小投资者利益保护是证券市场上的一个关键主题,但随着我国证券市场"变革加轻轨"新阶段的到来,证券市场主体损害投资者利益的行为时有发生,致使中小投资者长期处于证券市场的弱势地位。本文根据现阶段我国证券市场中小投资者权益受损情况,对众多文献关于中小投资者权益保护机制的探讨进行总结,并在此基础上做出对证券投资者保护机制的新探索。     

The contribution of stock repurchases to the value of the firm and cash holdings around the world

Using corporate payout data from 33 economies, this study investigates the contribution of stock repurchases to the value of the firm and cash holdings in different country-level investor protection environments. We find that stock repurchases contribute more to firm value in countries with strong investor protection than in countries with weak investor protection. We also report that dividends contribute approximately 60% more to firm value than repurchases in countries with weak investor protection. Furthermore, as the proportion of repurchases in total payouts increases, the marginal value of cash increases in countries with strong investor protection, whereas it declines in countries with weak investor protection. In a poor investor protection environment, the marginal value of cash for a firm that makes 100% of its payouts via repurchases is 12 cents lower than that for a firm that distributes 100% of its payouts via dividends. Overall, our findings highlight that stock repurchases are less effective than dividends in mitigating agency problems associated with free cash flow in countries with poor investor protection.     

Private Benefits of Control,Growth Opportunities and Investor Protection

We develop a model to illustrate that controlling shareholders choose the level of investor protection that maximizes their own interests. Controlling shareholders in companies with complicated control structures can easily extract private benefits and are thus reluctant to enhance investor protection which would necessitate increased transparency. In contrast, controlling shareholders in companies with valuable growth opportunities are willing to improve investor protection so that they can benefit from the increased value resulting from the lower cost of capital. We test this prediction using firm-level data in China. The results show that the level of investor protection increases with decreases in control structure opacity and increases in growth opportunities. The correlation is more significant for enforcement than for the mechanisms of investor protection.     

投资人保护的法律环境研究

国际证监会组织（IOSCO）将“保护投资者”列为对资本市场三大监管目标之一。国外实证研究也显示，投资人保护力度会影响一国的资本市场估值水平及抗冲击能力。投资人保护分为两个层次：第一个层次是对违法、违规行为的监管，第二个层次是建立在合法分规基础上的股东价值最大化问题。本文将研究重，点放在投资人保护的第一个层面上，试图探寻一条适合中国投资人保护的法律制度建设之路。     

Family control,expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations

We investigate whether the value impact of family control in Western European firms depends on country-level investor protection. To this aim, we account for ownership–value nonlinearities. Supporting that the risk of expropriation increases with high ownership concentration, we find an inverted U-shape relation between family control and firm value. Family firms incur a value discount when family equity holdings exceed approximately 50%. The nonlinear effect of family control is attributable to family firms from a strongly protective environment. When investor protection is weak, family control has a positive impact on firm value regardless of the ownership concentration level.     

Firm value in crisis: Effects of firm-level transparency and country-level institutions

Recent empirical research suggests that country-level and firm-level governance institutions are substitutes with respect to their effect on firm value. In this paper we demonstrate that during a crisis these institutions may actually become complements. Specifically, we find that the decline in companies’ valuation during the financial crisis of 2007–2009 was more sensitive to firm-level transparency in countries with stronger investor protection. We propose a theoretical model that reconciles our findings with the results in the literature. In our model, during “normal times” strong firm-level governance is crucial to attract outside financing in countries with weak investor protection, but is less important in countries with good investor protection. During a crisis, however, investment opportunities decline even in countries with strong investor protection, and, as a result, relative importance of firm-level governance increases in such places.     

Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings and Dividends to Firm Value Depend on Governance? A Cross‐country Analysis

Agency theories predict that the value of corporate cash holdings is less in countries with poor investor protection because of the greater ability of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits from cash holdings in such countries. Using various specifications of the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998) , we find that the relation between cash holdings and firm value is much weaker in countries with poor investor protection than in other countries. In further support of the importance of agency theories, the relation between dividends and firm value is weaker in countries with stronger investor protection.     

The impact of investor protection law on corporate policy and performance: Evidence from the blue sky laws

Recent studies have debated the impact of investor protection law on corporate behavior and value. I exploit the staggered passage of state securities fraud statutes (“blue sky laws”) in the United States to estimate the causal effects of investor protection law on firm financing decisions and investment activity. The statutes induce firms to increase dividends, issue equity, and grow in size. The laws also facilitate improvements in operating performance and market valuations. Overall, the evidence is strongly supportive of theoretical models that predict investor protection law has a significant impact on corporate policy and performance.     

Market discipline or rent extraction: Impacts of share trading by foreign institutional investors in different corporate governance and investor protection environments

Minority investors' reliance on market discipline can vary with different country-level investor protection and firm-level corporate governance environments, which affect both discipline and rent extraction incentives of foreign institutional investors (FIIs). Using data from 47 economies between 2009 and 2017, we find that firm value increases with FIIs aggressive trading but decreases with FIIs discreet trading. The positive and negative impacts of FIIs trading are strengthened when investor protection is stronger, but weakened when corporate governance is stronger. Our analysis enhances understanding of trade-offs of FIIs trading between discipline and rent extraction in different corporate governance and investor protection environments.     

Investor protection,cross-listing and accounting quality

Using 42,808 firm-year observations from 32 countries around the world, we investigate whether cross-listing in the US is associated with better accounting quality, and whether investor protection moderates the effect of cross-listing on accounting quality. Our main results show firms that are cross-listed in the US exhibit more timely reporting of losses, greater tendency to manage earnings downward, and more value relevance of accounting numbers as compared to their domestic counterparts. Cross-listed firms originating from high investor protection jurisdictions, particularly in high anti-director rights and common law countries, exhibit greater tendency to recognise a more timely reporting of losses and to manage earnings downward but exhibit lower value relevance of earnings as compared to cross-listed firms domiciled in low anti-director rights and non-common law countries. These results suggest that the strength of investor protection in home country plays an important role in determining the quality of accounting numbers of cross-listed firms.     

投资者保护变迁与会计改革的共生互动性

本文尝试从理论上解析,并以我国的改革实践印证投资者保护与会计的共生互动性。由于会计具有重要的投资者保护功能,投资者保护与会计之间始终处于一种共生互动的协调状态。投资者保护目标的实现需要会计的顺应性支持,而会计也能通过其具体机制的变革和发展服务于这种需要。我国近30年的会计改革实践印证了在政府主导环境下,投资者保护与会计之间的动态协调仍是一个显著特征。